opinion: Ryan Austin COLLINS, Petitioner
  v.
  VIRGINIA.
  No. 16-1027.
  Supreme Court of the United States
  Argued Jan. 9, 2018.
  Decided May 29, 2018.
  Matthew A. Fitzgerald, Richmond, VA, for Petitioner.
  Trevor S. Cox, Acting Solicitor General, for Respondent.
  Charles L. Weber, Jr., Attorney at Law, Charlottesville, VA, Matthew A. Fitzgerald, Brian D. Schmalzbach, Travis C. Gunn, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, VA, for Petitioner.
  Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Matthew R. McGuire, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Christopher P. Schandevel, Assistant Attorney General, Trevor S. Cox, Acting Solicitor General, Office of the Virginia Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Respondent.
  Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the question whether the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein. It does not.
  I
  Officer Matthew McCall of the Albemarle County Police Department in Virginia saw the driver of an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame commit a traffic infraction. The driver eluded Officer McCall's attempt to stop the motorcycle. A few weeks later, Officer David Rhodes of the same department saw an orange and black motorcycle traveling well over the speed limit, but the driver got away from him, too. The officers compared notes and concluded that the two incidents involved the same motorcyclist.
  Upon further investigation, the officers learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. After discovering photographs on Collins' Facebook profile that featured an orange and black motorcycle parked at the top of the driveway of a house, Officer Rhodes tracked down the address of the house, drove there, and parked on the street. It was later established that Collins' girlfriend lived in the house and that Collins stayed there a few nights per week.
  From his parked position on the street, Officer Rhodes saw what appeared to be a motorcycle with an extended frame covered with a white tarp, parked at the same angle and in the same location on the driveway as in the Facebook photograph. Officer Rhodes, who did not have a warrant, exited his car and walked toward the house. He stopped to take a photograph of the covered motorcycle from the sidewalk, and then walked onto the residential property and up to the top of the driveway to where the motorcycle was parked. In order "to investigate further," App. 80, Officer Rhodes pulled off the tarp, revealing a motorcycle that looked like the one from the speeding incident. He then ran a search of the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, which confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen. After gathering this information, Officer Rhodes took a photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, put the tarp back on, left the property, and returned to his car to wait for Collins.
  Shortly thereafter, Collins returned home. Officer Rhodes walked up to the front door of the house and knocked. Collins answered, agreed to speak with Officer Rhodes, and admitted that the motorcycle was his and that he had bought it without title. Officer Rhodes then arrested Collins.
  Collins was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for receiving stolen property. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence that Officer Rhodes had obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the motorcycle. Collins argued that Officer Rhodes had trespassed on the curtilage of the house to conduct an investigation in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion and Collins was convicted.
  The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. It assumed that the motorcycle was parked in the curtilage of the home and held that Officer Rhodes had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle under the tarp was the same motorcycle that had evaded him in the past. It further concluded that Officer Rhodes' actions were lawful under the Fourth Amendment even absent a warrant because "numerous exigencies justified both his entry onto the property and his moving the tarp to view the motorcycle and record its identification number." 65 Va.App. 37, 46, 773 S.E.2d 618, 623 (2015).
  The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed on different reasoning. It explained that the case was most properly resolved with reference to the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception. 292 Va. 486, 496-501, 790 S.E.2d 611, 616-618 (2016). Under that framework, it held that Officer Rhodes had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was contraband, and that the warrantless search therefore was justified. Id., at 498-499, 790 S.E.2d, at 617.
  We granted certiorari, 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 53, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017), and now reverse.
  II
  The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." This case arises at the intersection of two components of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to the curtilage of a home.
  A
  1
  The Court has held that the search of an automobile can be reasonable without a warrant. The Court first articulated the so-called automobile exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). In that case, law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that a car they observed traveling on the road contained illegal liquor. They stopped and searched the car, discovered and seized the illegal liquor, and arrested the occupants. Id., at 134-136, 45 S.Ct. 280. The Court upheld the warrantless search and seizure, explaining that a "necessary difference" exists between searching "a store, dwelling house or other structure" and searching "a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile" because a "vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id., at 153, 45 S.Ct. 280.
  The "ready mobility" of vehicles served as the core justification for the automobile exception for many years. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (citing, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967) ; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ). Later cases then introduced an additional rationale based on "the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." Carney, 471 U.S., at 392, 105 S.Ct. 2066. As the Court explained in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) :
  "Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order." Id., at 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092.
  In announcing each of these two justifications, the Court took care to emphasize that the rationales applied only to automobiles and not to houses, and therefore supported "treating automobiles differently from houses" as a constitutional matter. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
  When these justifications for the automobile exception "come into play," officers may search an automobile without having obtained a warrant so long as they have probable cause to do so. Carney, 471 U.S., at 392-393, 105 S.Ct. 2066.
  2
  Like the automobile exception, the Fourth Amendment's protection of curtilage has long been black letter law. "[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals." Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). "At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' " Ibid. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) ). To give full practical effect to that right, the Court considers curtilage-"the area 'immediately surrounding and associated with the home' "-to be " 'part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.' " Jardines, 569 U.S., at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) ). "The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986).
  When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Jardines, 569 U.S., at 11, 133 S.Ct. 1409. Such conduct thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.
  B
  1
  With this background in mind, we turn to the application of these doctrines in the instant case. As an initial matter, we decide whether the part of the driveway where Collins' motorcycle was parked and subsequently searched is curtilage.
  According to photographs in the record, the driveway runs alongside the front lawn and up a few yards past the front perimeter of the house. The top portion of the driveway that sits behind the front perimeter of the house is enclosed on two sides by a brick wall about the height of a car and on a third side by the house. A side door provides direct access between this partially enclosed section of the driveway and the house. A visitor endeavoring to reach the front door of the house would have to walk partway up the driveway, but would turn off before entering the enclosure and instead proceed up a set of steps leading to the front porch. When Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle, it was parked inside this partially enclosed top portion of the driveway that abuts the house.
  The " 'conception defining the curtilage' is ... familiar enough that it is 'easily understood from our daily experience.' " Jardines, 569 U.S., at 7, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S., at 182, n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 1735 ). Just like the front porch, side garden, or area "outside the front window," Jardines, 569 U.S., at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, the driveway enclosure where Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle constitutes "an area adjacent to the home and 'to which the activity of home life extends,' " and so is properly considered curtilage, id., at 7, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S., at 182, n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 1735 ).
  2
  In physically intruding on the curtilage of Collins' home to search the motorcycle, Officer Rhodes not only invaded Collins' Fourth Amendment interest in the item searched, i.e., the motorcycle, but also invaded Collins' Fourth Amendment interest in the curtilage of his home. The question before the Court is whether the automobile exception justifies the invasion of the curtilage. The answer is no.
  Applying the relevant legal principles to a slightly different factual scenario confirms that this is an easy case. Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of a house, visible through a window to a passerby on the street. Imagine further that an officer has probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was involved in a traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and confirm whether it is the right one? Surely not.
  The reason is that the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam ) (explaining that the automobile exception "permits police to search the vehicle"); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) ("[T]he Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless search of containers within an automobile"). Virginia asks the Court to expand the scope of the automobile exception to permit police to invade any space outside an automobile even if the Fourth Amendment protects that space. Nothing in our case law, however, suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Expanding the scope of the automobile exception in this way would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and " 'untether' " the automobile exception " 'from the justifications underlying' " it.
  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ).
  The Court already has declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home. The reasoning behind those decisions applies equally well in this context. For instance, under the plain-view doctrine, "any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence" requires that the officer "have a lawful right of access to the object itself." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) ; see also id., at 137, n. 7, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (" '[E]ven where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure' "); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) ("It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area ..., and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property ... situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer"). A plain-view seizure thus cannot be justified if it is effectuated "by unlawful trespass." Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Had Officer Rhodes seen illegal drugs through the window of Collins' house, for example, assuming no other warrant exception applied, he could not have entered the house to seize them without first obtaining a warrant.
  Similarly, it is a "settled rule that warrantless arrests in public places are valid," but, absent another exception such as exigent circumstances, officers may not enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant, even when they have probable cause. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). That is because being " 'arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home.' " Id., at 588-589, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (C.A.2 1978) ). Likewise, searching a vehicle parked in the curtilage involves not only the invasion of the Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle but also an invasion of the sanctity of the curtilage.
  Just as an officer must have a lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without a warrant, and just as an officer must have a lawful right of access in order to arrest a person in his home, so, too, an officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception. The automobile exception does not afford the necessary lawful right of access to search a vehicle parked within a home or its curtilage because it does not justify an intrusion on a person's separate and substantial Fourth Amendment interest in his home and curtilage.
  As noted, the rationales underlying the automobile exception are specific to the nature of a vehicle and the ways in which it is distinct from a house. See Part II-A-1, supra . The rationales thus take account only of the balance between the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interest in his vehicle and the governmental interests in an expedient search of that vehicle; they do not account for the distinct privacy interest in one's home or curtilage. To allow an officer to rely on the automobile exception to gain entry into a house or its curtilage for the purpose of conducting a vehicle search would unmoor the exception from its justifications, render hollow the core Fourth Amendment protection the Constitution extends to the house and its curtilage, and transform what was meant to be an exception into a tool with far broader application. Indeed, its name alone should make all this clear enough: It is, after all, an exception for automobiles.
  Given the centrality of the Fourth Amendment interest in the home and its curtilage and the disconnect between that interest and the justifications behind the automobile exception, we decline Virginia's invitation to extend the automobile exception to permit a warrantless intrusion on a home or its curtilage.
  III
  A
  Virginia argues that this Court's precedent indicates that the automobile exception is a categorical one that permits the warrantless search of a vehicle anytime, anywhere, including in a home or curtilage. Specifically, Virginia points to two decisions that it contends resolve this case in its favor. Neither is dispositive or persuasive.
  First, Virginia invokes Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938). In that case, federal officers received a confidential tip that a particular car would be transporting bootleg liquor at a specified time and place. The officers identified and followed the car until the driver "turned into a garage a few feet back of his residence and within the curtilage." Id., at 253, 59 S.Ct. 174. As the driver exited his car, an officer approached and stated that he had been informed that the car was carrying contraband. The driver acknowledged that there was liquor in the trunk, and the officer proceeded to open the trunk, find the liquor, arrest the driver, and seize both the car and the liquor. Id., at 253-254, 59 S.Ct. 174. Although the officer did not have a search warrant, the Court upheld the officer's actions as reasonable. Id., at 255, 59 S.Ct. 174.
  Scher is inapposite. Whereas Collins' motorcycle was parked and unattended when Officer Rhodes intruded on the curtilage to search it, the officers in Scher first encountered the vehicle when it was being driven on public streets, approached the curtilage of the home only when the driver turned into the garage, and searched the vehicle only after the driver admitted that it contained contraband. Scher by no means established a general rule that the automobile exception permits officers to enter a home or its curtilage absent a warrant. The Court's brief analysis referenced Carroll, but only in the context of observing that, consistent with that case, the "officers properly could have stopped" and searched the car "just before [petitioner] entered the garage," a proposition the petitioner did "not seriously controvert." Scher, 305 U.S., at 254-255, 59 S.Ct. 174. The Court then explained that the officers did not lose their ability to stop and search the car when it entered "the open garage closely followed by the observing officer" because "[n]o search was made of the garage." Id., at 255, 59 S.Ct. 174. It emphasized that "[e]xamination of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without objection and upon admission of probable guilt," and cited two search-incident-to-arrest cases. Ibid. (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925) ; Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825, 826 (C.A.6 1931) ). Scher 's reasoning thus was both case specific and imprecise, sounding in multiple doctrines, particularly, and perhaps most appropriately, hot pursuit. The decision is best regarded as a factbound one, and it certainly does not control this case.
  Second, Virginia points to Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, where the Court upheld under the automobile exception the warrantless search of an individual's pickup truck that was parked in the driveway of his father-in-law's farmhouse. Id., at 939-940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 ; Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 544 Pa. 439, 444, 677 A.2d 311, 313 (1995). But Labron provides scant support for Virginia's position. Unlike in this case, there was no indication that the individual who owned the truck in Labron had any Fourth Amendment interest in the farmhouse or its driveway, nor was there a determination that the driveway was curtilage.
  B
  Alternatively, Virginia urges the Court to adopt a more limited rule regarding the intersection of the automobile exception and the protection afforded to curtilage. Virginia would prefer that the Court draw a bright line and hold that the automobile exception does not permit warrantless entry into "the physical threshold of a house or a similar fixed, enclosed structure inside the curtilage like a garage." Brief for Respondent 46. Requiring officers to make "case-by-case curtilage determinations," Virginia reasons, unnecessarily complicates matters and "raises the potential for confusion and ... error." Id., at 46-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  The Court, though, has long been clear that curtilage is afforded constitutional protection. See Oliver, 466 U.S., at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735. As a result, officers regularly assess whether an area is curtilage before executing a search. Virginia provides no reason to conclude that this practice has proved to be unadministrable, either generally or in this context. Moreover, creating a carveout to the general rule that curtilage receives Fourth Amendment protection, such that certain types of curtilage would receive Fourth Amendment protection only for some purposes but not for others, seems far more likely to create confusion than does uniform application of the Court's doctrine.
  In addition, Virginia's proposed rule rests on a mistaken premise about the constitutional significance of visibility. The ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point is not the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant for the purpose of conducting a search to obtain information not otherwise accessible. Cf. Ciraolo, 476 U.S., at 213-214, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (holding that "physically nonintrusive" warrantless aerial observation of the curtilage of a home did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and could form the basis for probable cause to support a warrant to search the curtilage). So long as it is curtilage, a parking patio or carport into which an officer can see from the street is no less entitled to protection from trespass and a warrantless search than a fully enclosed garage.
  Finally, Virginia's proposed bright-line rule automatically would grant constitutional rights to those persons with the financial means to afford residences with garages in which to store their vehicles but deprive those persons without such resources of any individualized consideration as to whether the areas in which they store their vehicles qualify as curtilage. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) ("[T]he most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion").
  IV
  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein. We leave for resolution on remand whether Officer Rhodes' warrantless intrusion on the curtilage of Collins' house may have been reasonable on a different basis, such as the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
  Virginia does not dispute that Collins has Fourth Amendment standing. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).
  Helpfully, the parties have simplified matters somewhat by each making a concession. Petitioner concedes "for purposes of this appeal" that Officer Rhodes had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was the one that had eluded him, Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 3, and Virginia concedes that "Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle," Brief for Respondent 12.
  The dissent concedes that "the degree of the intrusion on privacy" is relevant in determining whether a warrant is required to search a motor vehicle "located on private property." Post, at 1670 - 1671 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Yet it puzzlingly asserts that the "privacy interests at stake" here are no greater than when a motor vehicle is searched "on public streets." Post, at 1669 - 1670. "An ordinary person of common sense," post, at 1676, however, clearly would understand that the privacy interests at stake in one's private residential property are far greater than on a public street. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, it is of no significance that the motorcycle was parked just a "short walk up the driveway." Ibid . The driveway was private, not public, property, and the motorcycle was parked in the portion of the driveway beyond where a neighbor would venture, in an area "intimately linked to the home, ... where privacy expectations are most heightened." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). Nor does it matter that Officer Rhodes "did not damage any property," post, at 1681, for an officer's care in conducting a search does not change the character of the place being searched. And, as we explain, see infra, at 1674 - 1675, it is not dispositive that Officer Rhodes did not "observe anything along the way" to the motorcycle "that he could not have seen from the street," post, at 1681. Law enforcement officers need not "shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares," Ciraolo, 476 U.S., at 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, but the ability visually to observe an area protected by the Fourth Amendment does not give officers the green light physically to intrude on it. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7-8, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). It certainly does not permit an officer physically to intrude on curtilage, remove a tarp to reveal license plate and vehicle identification numbers, and use those numbers to confirm that the defendant committed a crime.
  The dissent also mistakenly relies on a law enacted by the First Congress and mentioned in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-151, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), that authorized the warrantless search of vessels. Post, at 1677 - 1678, n. 3. The dissent thinks it implicit in that statute that "officers could cross private property such as wharves in order to reach and board those vessels."Ibid. Even if it were so that a police officer could have entered a private wharf to search a vessel, that would not prove he could enter the curtilage of a home to do so. To the contrary, whereas the statute relied upon in Carroll authorized warrantless searches of vessels, it expressly required warrants to search houses. See 267 U.S., at 150-157, 45 S.Ct. 280 ; Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. Here, Officer Rhodes did not invade a private wharf to undertake a search; he invaded the curtilage of a home.
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