McLEOD, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. et al.
No. 645.
Decided January 16, 1967.
Solicitor General Marshall, Richard A. Posner, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for petitioner in No. 645.
Irving Abramson and Ruth Weyand for petitioner in No. 774 and for respondent International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, in No. 645.
David L. Benetar for respondent General Electric Co. in both cases.
Together with No. 774, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. General Electric Co. et al., also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court.
Per Curiam.
The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is set aside with direction to that court to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion.
The Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing upon a charge filed by the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE). The charge alleged that General Electric Company violated §§ 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (5), in refusing to bargain upon the renewal of an expiring collective bargaining agreement because of “the inclusion among the persons designated by the Union to represent it ... of persons who also represented other labor organizations which engaged in collective bargaining with” the company. Pursuant to § 10 (j) of the Act the Regional Director also obtained a temporary injunction in the District Court for the Southern District of New York restraining the company from “[fjailing or refusing to meet, confer and bargain collectively in good faith with . . . [IUE], by declining to meet with the selected representatives of . . . [IUE] because of the presence of any representatives of other unions whom IUE and its constituent locals have invited to attend for the purpose of participating in the discussion and advising ór consulting with IUE and its constituent locals.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 366 F. 2d 847. Mr. Justice Harlan stayed the Court of Appeals’ judgment pending action on the petition for writ of certiorari filed in No. 645.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals differed regarding the proper standard which should be determinative of the right to injunctive relief under § 10 (j). The District Court applied a dual test: (1) whether “the impact upon the public interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action than the normal process of Board adjudication and court enforcement,” 257 F. Supp. 690, 708, and (2) “whether the Board has ‘reasonable cause to believe’ that the accused party has been guilty of unfair labor practices.” 257 F. Supp., at 709. The Court of Appeals on the other hand considered the proper standard to be whether the Board had “demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm.” 366 F. 2d, at 850.
We do not think it appropriate however to decide at this time the proper construction of § 10 (j). For on October 14, 1966, after the decision of the Court of Appeals, the company and IUE agreed upon a three-year collective bargaining agreement to replace the expired contract. We think th$t the District Court should determine in the first instance the effect of this supervening event upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The controversy over the proper standard for injunctive relief is immaterial if such relief is now improper whichever standard is applied. We therefore dissolve the stay granted by Mr. Justice Harlan and set.aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a new judgment setting aside the order of the District Court and remanding to that court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of the supervening event. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. S. 263; Scranton v. Drew, 379 U. S. 40.
It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations