opinion: Opinion of the Court by
  Mr. Justice Douglas,
  announced by Mr. Justice Harlan.
  Petitioner, a native of Hungary, was admitted to citizenship by a decree of the District Court in 1940. Respondent filed a complaint to revoke and set aside that order as authorized by § 340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 68 Stat. 1232, 8 U. S. C. § 1451 (a), on the ground that it had been procured “by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” The complaint stated that petitioner had falsely denied membership in the Communist Party and that by virtue of that membership he lacked the requisite attachment to the Constitution, etc., and the intent to renounce foreign allegiance. It also alleged that petitioner had procured his naturalization by concealing and misrepresenting a record of arrests. The District Court cancelled petitioner’s naturalization, finding that he had concealed and misrepresented three matters — his arrests, his membership in the Communist Party, and his allegiance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reaching only the question of the concealment of the arrests. 270 F. 2d 179. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 362 U. S. 901.
  One question, on a form petitioner filled out in connection with his petition for naturalization, asked if he had ever been “arrested or charged with violation of any law of the United States or State or any city ordinance or traffic regulation” and if so to give full particulars. To this question petitioner answered “no.” There was evidence that when he was questioned under oath by an examiner he gave the same answer. There was also evidence that if his answer had been “yes,” the investigative unit of the Immigration Service would check with the authorities at the places where the arrests occurred “to ascertain . . . whether the full facts were stated.”
  The District Court found that from 10 to 11 years before petitioner was naturalized he had been arrested three times as follows:
  (1) On July 30, 1929, he was arrested for distributing handbills in New Haven, Connecticut, in violation of an ordinance. He pleaded not guilty and was discharged.
  (2) On December 21, 1929, he was arrested for violating the park regulations in New Haven, Connecticut, by making “an oration, harangue, or other public demonstration in New Haven Green, outside of the churches.” Petitioner pleaded not guilty. Disposition of the charge is not clear, the notation on the court record reading “Found J. S.” which respondent suggests may mean “Judgment Suspended” after a finding of guilt.
  (3) On March 11, 1930, he was again arrested in New Haven and this time charged with “General Breach of the Peace.” He was found guilty by the City Court and fined $25. He took an appeal and the records show “nolled April 7, 1930.”
  Acquisition of American citizenship is a solemn affair. Full and truthful response to all relevant questions required by the naturalization procedure is, of course, to be exacted, and temporizing with the truth must be vigorously discouraged. Failure to give frank, honest, and unequivocal answers to the court when one seeks naturalization is a serious matter. Complete replies are essential so that the qualifications of the applicant or his lack of them may be ascertained. Suppressed or concealed facts, if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship. Or disclosure of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship.
  On the other hand, in view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization decrees are not lightly to be set aside — the evidence must indeed be “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” and not leave “the issue ... in doubt.” Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 125, 158; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 670. The issue in these cases is so important to the liberty of the citizen that the weight normally given concurrent findings of two lower courts does not preclude reconsideration here, for we deal with “judgments lying close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship.” Baumgartner v. United States, supra, 671. And see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 612 and (concurring opinion) 617.
  While disclosure of them was properly exacted, the arrests in these cases were not reflections on the character of the man seeking citizenship. The statute in force at the time of his naturalization required that “he has behaved as a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States” during the previous five years. These arrests were made some years prior to the critical five-year period. They did not, moreover, involve moral turpitude within the meaning of the law. Cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223. No fraudulent conduct was charged. They involved distributing handbills, making a speech, and a breach of the peace. In one instance he was discharged, in one instance the prosecution was “nolled,” and in the other (for making a speech in a park in violation of city regulations) he apparently received a suspended sentence. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the offenses charged makes them of extremely slight consequence. Had they involved moral turpitude or acts directed at the Government, had they involved conduct which even peripherally touched types of activity which might disqualify one from citizenship, a different case would be presented. On this record the nature of these arrests, the crimes charged, and the disposition of the cases do not bring them, inherently, even close to the requirement of “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence that naturalization was illegally procured within the meaning of § 340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
  It is argued, however, that disclosure of the arrests made in New Haven, Connecticut, in the years 1929 and 1930 would have led to a New Haven investigation at which leads to other evidence — more relevant and material than the arrests — might have been obtained. His residence in New Haven was from February 1929 to November 1930. Since that period was more than five years before his petition for naturalization, the name of his employer at that time was not required by the form prepared by the Service. It is now said, however, that if the arrests had been disclosed and investigated, the Service might well have discovered that petitioner in 1929 was “a district organizer” of the Communist Party in Connecticut. One witness in this denaturalization proceeding testified that such was the fact. An arrest, though by no means probative of any guilt or wrongdoing, is sufficiently significant as an episode in a man’s life that it may often be material at least to further enquiry. We do not minimize the importance of that disclosure. In this case, however, we are asked to base materiality on the tenuous line of investigation that might have led from the arrests to the alleged communistic affiliations, when as a matter of fact petitioner in this same application disclosed that he was an employee and member of the International Workers’ Order, which is said to be controlled by the Communist Party. In connection with petitioner’s denial of such affiliations, respondent argues that since it was testified that the IWO was an organization controlled and dominated by the Communist Party, it is reasonable to infer that petitioner had those affiliations at the time of the application. But by the same token it would seem that a much less tenuous and speculative nexus with the Communist Party, if it be such, was thereby disclosed and was available for further investigation if it had been deemed appropriate at the time. Cf. United States v. Anastasio, 226 F. 2d 912. It is said that IWO did not become tainted with Communist control until 1941. We read the record differently. If the Government’s case is made out, that taint extended back at least as far as 1939. Had that disclosure not been made in the application, failure to report the arrests would have had greater significance. It could then be forcefully argued that failure to disclose the arrests was part and parcel of a project to conceal a Communist Party affiliation. But on this record, the failure to report the three arrests occurring from 10 to 11 years previously is neutral. We do not speculate as to why they were not disclosed. We only conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the Government has failed to show by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
  There are issues in the case which we do not reach and which were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded to it so that the other questions raised in the appeal may be considered.
  It is so ordered.
  The section provides in relevant part:
  “It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 310 of this title [§ 1421 of 8 U. S. C.] in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate, respectively
  Section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 598, as amended, 45 Stat. 1513-1514.
choices: voting Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments ballot access (of candidates and political parties) desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action) desegregation, schools employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions. affirmative action slavery or indenture sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation) reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act debtors' rights deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization) employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization) sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment) sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination) Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over) Indians, state jurisdiction over juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates) poverty law, constitutional poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents military: draftee, or person subject to induction military: active duty military: veteran immigration and naturalization: permanent residence immigration and naturalization: citizenship immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization immigration and naturalization: access to public education immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel) indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel) indigents: payment of fine indigents: costs or filing fees indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee indigents: transcript indigents: assistance of psychiatrist indigents: miscellaneous liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty) miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)