opinion: Mr. Justice Reed
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioner was employed by respondent to assist with dredging operations being conducted by respondent in a slough dug to by-pass a rocky section of the Mississippi River. His work was that of a handyman; it included the carrying and storing of supplies, and the general maintenance of a dredge. He was injured by the explosion of a coal stove while placing signal lanterns from the dredge in a shed on the neighboring bank. He filed this suit under the Jones Act in the City Court of Granite City, Illinois, to recover damages for his injuries. The Act provides a cause of action for “any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.” 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688. This Court, however, has held that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., restricts the benefits of the Jones Act to “members of a crew of a vessel.” Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1. To recover, therefore, petitioner had to be a member of a crew, as that term is used in the Longshoremen’s Act, at the time of his injury.
  The jury returned a verdict for petitioner and judgment was entered in his favor. On appeal, the Fourth District Appellate Court of the State of Illinois held that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that petitioner was a member of a crew. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court and entered judgment for respondent. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 7 Ill. App. 2d 307, 129 N. E. 2d 454. The Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for an appeal. We granted certiorari. 351U. S.949.
  In South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, we said that whether or not an employee is “ 'a member of a crew’ turns on questions of fact” and that, if a finding on this question has evidence to support it, the finding is con-elusive. Id., at 257-258. The sole question presented here, therefore, is whether there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s finding that petitioner was a member of a crew at the time of his injury. This finding was made under specific instructions not objected to here.
  The appellate court characterized petitioner as
  “an employee whose principal duty is to load supplies on a vessel at anchor, and to perform incidental tasks of a common labor character . . . .” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 313, 129 N. E. 2d, at 457.
  They also noted that petitioner lived ashore and was not aboard except when the vessel was anchored. The court concluded that petitioner was not “naturally and primarily on board to aid in navigation” and could not “maintain an action under the Jones Act.” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 313-314, 129 N. E. 2d, at 457.
  It is true that the dredge was anchored to the shore at the time of petitioner’s injury and during all the time petitioner worked for respondent. It is also true that this dredge, like most dredges, was not frequently in transit. We believe, however, that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to decide that petitioner was permanently attached to and employed by the dredge as a member of its crew.
  Petitioner’s witnesses testified that he was known as a “deckhand” among rivermen. They said that he was hired to clean and take care of the deck, splice rope, stow supplies, and, in general, to keep the dredge “in shape.” This testimony indicated that substantially all of petitioner’s duties were performed on or for the dredge. A normal inference is that petitioner was responsible for its seaworthiness. If the dredge leaked, for example, the jury could suppose that his job would be to repair the leak. Furthermore, a witness testified that a usual duty of one holding petitioner’s job was to take soundings and clean navigation lights when the dredge was in transit. 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 310, 129 N. E. 2d, at 455-456. Here again, the jury could reasonably have believed that petitioner would have these responsibilities in the event that this dredge were moved. Whether petitioner would be a member of the dredge’s crew while taking soundings during a trip is certainly a jury question. If he were a member during travel, he would not necessarily lack that status during anchorage. Even a transoceanic liner may be confined to berth for lengthy periods, and while there the ship is kept in repair by its “crew.” There can be no doubt that a member of its crew would be covered by the Jones Act during this period, even though the ship was never in transit during his employment. In short, the duties of a man during a vessel’s travel are relevant in determining whether he is a “member of a crew” while the vessel is anchored. Thus, the fact that this dredge was connected to the shore cannot be controlling.
  The fact that petitioner’s injury occurred on land is not material. Admiralty jurisdiction and the coverage of the Jones Act depends only on a finding that the injured was “an employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment” at the time of his injury. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1, 4, citing O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36.
  As we have said before, this Court does not normally sit to re-examine a finding of the type that was made below. We believe, however, that our decision in South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, supra, has not been fully understood. Our holding there that the determination of whether an injured person was a “member of a crew” is to be left to the finder of fact meant that juries have the same discretion they have in finding negligence or any other fact. The essence of this discretion is that a jury’s decision is final if it has a reasonable basis, whether or not the appellate court agrees with the jury’s estimate.
  Because there was testimony introduced by petitioner tending to' show that he was employed almost solely on the dredge, that his duty was primarily to maintain the dredge during its anchorage and for its future trips, and that he would have a significant navigational function when the dredge was put in transit, we hold there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that petitioner was a member of the dredge’s crew. Cf. Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U. S. 879, reversing 222 F. 2d 382. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below.
  Respondent, on its appeal from the trial court’s judgment, raised two questions which the appellate court did not reach because of its disposition of the case. So that these issues may be reviewed, we remand the case to that court.
  It is so ordered.
  Although two other grounds were advanced on appeal, only this one was considered. See n. 4, infra. No question has been raised at any time as to whether the dredge involved here had the status of a “vessel” at the time of petitioner’s injury.
  The finder of fact in the Bassett case was a commissioner, but that holding applies with equal force to this case in which the finder was a jury.
  “The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.” 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. § 740.
  “2, the dredge was not operating in navigable waters; and 3, there was no evidence of negligence on its part and no basis to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 309, 129 N. E. 2d, at 455.
choices: stay, petition, or motion granted affirmed reversed reversed and remanded vacated and remanded affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded vacated petition denied or appeal dismissed modify remand unusual disposition