opinion: Justice White
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  At petitioner’s trial for various offenses arising out of a bank robbery, testimony was admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relating to an alleged crime that the defendant had previously been acquitted of committing. We conclude that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Due Process Clause barred the use of this testimony.
  I
  On the afternoon of July 8, 1985, a man wearing a ski mask and armed with a small pistol robbed the First Pennsylvania Bank in Frederiksted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, taking over $7,000 in cash from a bank teller, approximately $5,000 in cash from a customer, and various personal and travelers’ checks. The culprit ran from the bank, scurried around in the street momentarily, and then commandeered a passing taxi van. While driving away from the scene, the robber pulled off his ski mask. An eyewitness, who had slipped out of the bank while the robbery was taking place, saw the maskless man and at trial identified him as petitioner, Reuben Dowling. Other witnesses testified that they had seen Dowling driving the hijacked taxi van outside of Frederiksted shortly after the bank robbery.
  Following his arrest, Dowling was charged with the federal crimes of bank robbery, 18 U. S. C. § 2113(a), and armed robbery, § 2113(d), and with various crimes under Virgin Islands law. Dowling pleaded not guilty to all charges. Dowling’s first trial ended with a hung jury. He was tried again and convicted, but the Third Circuit reversed this conviction on appeal. Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F. 2d 134 (1987). After a third trial, Dowling was convicted on most of the counts; the trial judge sentenced him to 70 years’ imprisonment.
  During petitioner’s third trial, the Government, over petitioner’s objection, called a woman named Vena Henry to the stand. Ms. Henry testified that a man wearing a knitted mask with cutout eyes and carrying a small handgun had, together with a man named Delroy Christian, entered her home in Frederiksted approximately two weeks after the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery. Ms. Henry testified that a struggle ensued and that she unmasked the intruder, whom she identified as Dowling. Based on this incident, Dowling had been charged under Virgin Islands law with burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and weapons offenses, but had been acquitted after a trial held before his third trial in the bank robbery case.
  The Government assertedly elicited Henry’s testimony for two purposes. First, it believed that Henry’s description of Dowling as wearing a mask and carrying a gun similar to the mask worn and the gun carried by the robber of the First Pennsylvania Bank strengthened the Government’s identification of Dowling as the bank robber. Second, the Government sought to link Dowling with Delroy Christian, the other man who entered Henry’s home. The day before the bank robbery, Dowling had borrowed a white Volkswagen from a friend. At Dowling’s trial for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery, a police officer testified that, shortly before the bank robbery, she and her partner had come upon Christian and another man parked in a white Volkswagen in front of the bank with the car door open into the street; Christian was in the backseat. The officers told the two men to close the door, and the men drove away to the north. The police followed the Volkswagen for about a mile and, shortly thereafter, received a radio message that the bank had been robbed. The Government’s theory was that Christian and his friend were to drive the getaway car after Dowling robbed the bank.
  Before opening statements, the Government disclosed its intention to call Ms. Henry and explained its rationale for doing so, relying on Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible against a defendant for purposes other than character evidence. After a hearing, the District Court characterized the testimony as highly probative circumstantial evidence and ruled that it was admissible under Rule 404(b). App. 24-25. When Henry left the stand, the District Court instructed the jury that petitioner had been acquitted of robbing Henry, and emphasized the limited purpose for which Henry’s testimony was being offered. Id., at 28. The court reiterated that admonition in its final charge to the jury. Id., at 29.
  On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the District Court should not have admitted Henry’s testimony, but nevertheless affirmed Dowling’s conviction. 855 F. 2d 114 (1988). Relying on its decision in United States v. Keller, 624 F. 2d 1154 (1980), the court held that petitioner’s acquittal of the charges arising out of the incident at Henry’s home collaterally estopped the Government from offering evidence of that incident at petitioner’s trial for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery.
  Alternatively, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court noted that we had recently held in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U. S. 681 (1988), that “[i]n the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id., at 689. The Third Circuit found Henry’s testimony inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because “when the prior act sought to be introduced was the subject of an acquittal by a jury, a second jury should not be permitted to conclude ‘that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.’” 855 F. 2d, at 122. The court also relied on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because, in the Third Circuit’s opinion, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of Henry’s testimony. 855 F. 2d, at 122.
  The Third Circuit, however, held that the admission of Henry’s testimony was harmless because it was highly probable that the error did not prejudice the petitioner. Id., at 122-124. The Court of Appeals explicitly declined to apply the more stringent standard, see Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967), applicable to constitutional errors because, according to the court, the District Court’s mistake was merely evidentiary and not of constitutional dimension. 855 F. 2d, at 122-123. Having rejected petitioner’s other objections, the court affirmed the conviction. Id., at 124.
  Dowling claims that the Third Circuit was wrong when it found that the admission of Henry’s testimony did not offend the Constitution and therefore declined to apply the Chapman v. California, supra, harmless-error standard. We granted certiorari to consider Dowling’s contention that Henry’s testimony was inadmissible under both the Double Jeopardy and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. 489 U. S. 1051 (1989).
  II
  A
  There is no claim here that the acquittal in the case involving Ms. Henry barred further prosecution in the present case. The issue is the inadmissibility of Henry’s testimony.
  In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), we recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In that case, a group of masked men had robbed six men playing poker in the basement of a home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted Ashe for robbing one of the men. Six weeks later, however, the defendant was convicted for the robbery of one of the other players. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel which we found implicit in the Double Jeopardy Clause, we reversed Ashe’s conviction, holding that his acquittal in the first trial precluded the State from charging him for the second offense. Id., at 445-446. We defined the collateral-estoppel doctrine as providing that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id., at 443. Ashe’s acquittal in the first trial foreclosed the second trial because, in the circumstances of that case, the acquittal verdict could only have meant that the jury was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was one of the bandits. A second prosecution was impermissible because, to have convicted the defendant in the second trial, the second jury had to have reached a directly contrary conclusion. See id., at 445.
  Dowling contends that, by the same principle, his prior acquittal precluded the Government from introducing into evidence Henry’s testimony at the third trial in the bank robbery case. We disagree because, unlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson, the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case. This much Dowling concedes, and we decline to extend Ashe v. Swenson and the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances, as Dowling would have it, relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted.
  For present purposes, we assume for the sake of argument that Dowling’s acquittal established that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Dowling was the masked man who entered Vena Henry’s home with Delroy Christian two weeks after the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery. But to introduce evidence on this point at the bank robbery trial, the Government did not have to demonstrate that Dowling was the man who entered the home beyond a reasonable doubt: the Government sought to introduce Henry’s testimony under Rule 404(b), and, as mentioned earlier, in Huddleston v. United States, supra, at 689, we held that “[i]n the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Because a jury might reasonably conclude that Dowling was the masked man who entered Henry’s home, even if it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Dowling committed the crimes charged at the first trial, the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite.
  Our decision is consistent with other cases where we have held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984), for example, we unanimously agreed that a gun owner’s acquittal on a charge of dealing firearms without a license did not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms, even though forfeiture was only appropriate if the jury in the forfeiture proceeding concluded that the defendant had committed the underlying offense. Because the forfeiture action was a civil proceeding, we rejected the defendant’s contention that the Government was estopped from relitigating the issue of the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing:
  “[The acquittal did] not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. . . . [T]he jury verdict in the criminal action did not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show that [the defendant] was engaged in an unlicensed firearms business. ... It is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Id., at 361-362.
  In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 235 (1972), it was also held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a forfeiture action subsequent to acquittal on the underlying offense because “the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Helvering v. Mitch ell, 303 U. S. 391, 397 (1938), likewise observed that “[t]he difference in degree in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata.”
  We thus cannot agree that the Government was constitutionally barred from using Henry’s testimony at the bank robbery trial, and for the same reasons we find no merit in the Third Circuit’s holding that the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel in all circumstances bars the later use of evidence relating to prior conduct which the Government failed to prove violated a criminal law.
  B
  Even if we agreed with petitioner that the lower burden of proof at the second proceeding does not serve to avoid the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we agree with the Government that the challenged evidence was nevertheless admissible because Dowling did not demonstrate that his acquittal in his first trial represented a jury determination that he was not one of the men who entered Ms. Henry’s home. In Ashe v. Swenson, we stated that where a previous judgment of acquittal was based on a general verdict, courts must “‘examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’” 397 U. S., at 444 (citation omitted). The Courts of Appeals have unanimously placed the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding. United States v. Citron, 853 F. 2d 1055, 1058 (CA2 1988); United States v. Ragins, 840 F. 2d 1184, 1194 (CA4 1988); United States v. Gentile, 816 F. 2d 1157, 1162 (CA7 1987); United States v. Baugus, 761 F. 2d 506, 508 (CA8 1985); United States v. Mock, 640 F. 2d 629, 631, n. 1 (CA5 1981); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F. 2d 1381, 1387 (CA11 1981); United States v. Lasky, 600 F. 2d 765, 769 (CA9), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 979 (1979). We see no reason to depart from the majority rule in this case.
  The only clue to the issues in the earlier case was a discussion between the prosecutor, Dowling’s attorney, and the District Judge that took place during the District Court’s hearing on the admission of Henry’s testimony under Rule 404(b). App. 18-25. Arguing against the admission of Henry’s testimony, Dowling’s lawyer pointed out that Dowling had been acquitted of breaking into Ms. Henry’s home. The trial judge, who had also presided at Dowling’s first trial, recalled that Dowling “was not acquitted on the issue of identification.” Id., at 21. The prosecutor then contended that Dowling had not disputed identity, but rather had claimed that a robbery had not taken place because he and Christian allegedly “merely came to retrieve . , . money from an individual in the house.” Ibid. The court then made the statement that “Mr. Dowling’s presence in the house was not seriously contested in the case but he stated the general defense. Mr. Dowling, I don’t think took the stand.” Ibid.
  There are any number of possible explanations for the jury’s acquittal verdict at Dowling’s first trial. As the record stands, there is nothing at all that persuasively indicates that the question of identity was at issue and was determined in Dowling’s favor at the prior trial; at oral argument, Dowling conceded as much. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. As a result, even if we were to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to this case, we would conclude that petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the first jury concluded that he was not one of the intruders in Ms. Henry’s home.
  l — i I — I l — i
  Besides arguing that the introduction of Henry s testimony violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, petitioner also contends that the introduction of this evidence was unconstitutional because it failed the due process test of “fundamental fairness.” We recognize that the introduction of evidence in circumstances like those involved here has the potential to prejudice the jury or unfairly force the defendant to spend time and money relitigating matters considered at the first trial. The question, however, is whether it is acceptable to deal with the potential for abuse through nonconstitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence, or whether the introduction of this type of evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates “fundamental conceptions of justice.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 790 (1977).
  Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have defined the category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” very narrowly. As we observed in Lovasco, supra, at 790:
  “Judges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials [their] ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.’ Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 170 (1952). . . . [They] are to determine only whether the action complained of. . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,’ Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935), and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency,’ Rochin v. California, supra, at 173.”
  Especially in light of the limiting instructions provided by the trial judge, we cannot hold that the introduction of Henry’s testimony merits this kind of condemnation. Plainly Henry’s testimony was at least circumstantially valuable in proving petitioner’s guilt.
  Petitioner lists four reasons why, according to him, admission of Henry’s testimony was fundamentally unfair. First, petitioner suggests that evidence relating to acquitted conduct is inherently unreliable. We disagree: the jury in this case, for example, remained free to assess the truthfulness and the significance of Henry’s testimony, and petitioner had the opportunity to refute it. Second, Dowling contends that the use of this type of evidence creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury will convict the defendant on the basis of inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct; we believe that the trial court’s authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence adequately addresses this possibility.
  Third, petitioner claims that the exclusion of acquitted conduct evidence furthers the desirable goal of consistent jury verdicts. We, however, do not find any inconsistency between Dowling’s conviction for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery and his acquittal on the charge of robbing Ms. Henry for the obvious reason that the jury’s verdict in his second trial did not entail any judgment with respect to the offenses charged in his first. In any event, inconsistent verdicts are constitutionally tolerable. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U. S. 10, 25 (1980).
  Fourth, petitioner argues that the introduction of Henry’s testimony in this case contravenes a tradition that the government may not force a person acquitted in one trial to defend against the same accusation in a subsequent proceeding. We acknowledge the tradition, but find it amply protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We decline to use the Due Process Clause as a device for extending the double jeopardy protection to cases where it otherwise would not extend.
  IV
  Because we conclude that the admission of Ms. Henry’s testimony was constitutional and the Court of Appeals therefore applied the correct harmless-error standard, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
  It is so ordered.
  Dowling does not challenge the holding that the error was harmless under the less strict standard applied by the Court of Appeals.
  It is not clear from the record that this finding formed the basis for the jury’s verdict. See the discussion infra, at Part II-B.
  Dowling notes that the party introducing evidence carries the burden of demonstrating the evidence’s relevance. He argues that this duty, in the context of the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, requires the Government to establish that a previous acquittal did not resolve a question at issue in a second trial. We disagree. Relevancy is a threshold inquiry. That the burden is on the introducing party to establish relevancy does not also require the introducing party to anticipate and rebut possible objections to the offered evidence.
  Dowling also suggests that we should place the burden on the Government in this instance because, as opposed to the situation in Ashe v. Swen-son, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), for example, he does not seek to terminate the prosecution but merely hopes to exclude evidence. This is a distinction without a difference. If anything, the equities weigh in the other direction: in this case, Dowling only faces the risk of the introduction of prejudicial evidence, whereas, in Ashe v. Swenson, the defendant was threatened with an illegitimate conviction.
  The Third Circuit, as noted above, found Henry’s testimony inadmissible under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. 855 F. 2d 114, 122 (1988). The United States urges that this was error, but in affirming we need not pass on the validity of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in this respect.
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