opinion: Opinion of the Court by
  Mr. Justice Douglas,
  announced by Mr. Justice Reed.
  This case, here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York, presents an important question under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. Article IV, § 1. It is whether a New York decree awarding respondent $180 per month for her maintenance and support in a separation proceeding survived a Nevada divorce decree which subsequently was granted petitioner.
  The parties were married in 1937 and lived together in New York until 1942 when the husband left the wife. There was no issue of the marriage. In 1943 she brought an action against him for a separation. He entered a general appearance. The court, finding that he had abandoned her, granted her a decree of separation and awarded her $180 per month as permanent alimony. In January 1944 he went to Nevada where in 1945 he instituted an action for divorce. She was notified of the action by constructive service but entered no appearance in it. In May, 1945, the Nevada court, finding that petitioner had been a bona fide resident of Nevada since January 30, 1944, granted him an absolute divorce “on the ground of three years continual separation, without cohabitation.” The Nevada decree made no provision for alimony, though the Nevada court had been advised of the New York decree.
  Prior to that time petitioner had made payments of alimony under the New York decree. After entry of the Nevada decree he ceased paying. Thereupon respondent sued in New York for a supplementary judgment for the amount of the arrears. Petitioner appeared in the action and moved to eliminate the alimony provisions of the separation decree by reason of the Nevada decree. The Supreme Court denied the motion and granted respondent judgment for the arrears. 63 N. Y. S. 2d 476. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 271 App. Div. 829, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 421, and then by the Court of Appeals. 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113.
  We held in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287; 325 U. S. 226, (1) that a divorce decree granted by a State to one of its domiciliaries is entitled to full faith and credit in a bigamy prosecution brought in another State, even though the other spouse was given notice of the divorce proceeding only through constructive service; and (2) that while the finding of domicile by the court that granted the decree is entitled to -prima jade weight, it is not conclusive in a sister State but might be reliti-gated there. And see Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U. S. 279. The latter course was followed in this case, as a consequence of which the Supreme Court of New York found, in accord with the Nevada court, that petitioner “is now and since January, 1944, has been a bona fide resident of the State of Nevada.”
  Petitioner’s argument therefore is that the tail must go with the hide — that since by the Nevada decree, recognized in New York, he and respondent are no longer husband and wife, no legal incidence of the marriage remains. We are given a detailed analysis of New York law to show that the New York courts have no power either by statute or by common law to compel a man to support his ex-wife, that alimony is payable only so long as the relation of husband and wife exists, and that in New York, as in some other states, see Esenwein v. Esenwein, supra, p. 280, a support order does not survive divorce.
  The difficulty with that argument is that the highest court in New York has held in this case that a support order can survive divorce and that this one has survived petitioner’s divorce. That conclusion is binding on us, except as it conflicts with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is not for us to say whether that ruling squares with what the New York courts said on earlier occasions. It is enough that New York today says that such is her policy. The only question for us is whether New York is powerless to make such a ruling in view of the Nevada decree.
  We can put to one side the case where the wife was personally served or where she appeared in the divorce proceedings. Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32; Sherrer v. Sherrer, ante, p. 343; Coe v. Coe, ante, p. 378. The only service on her in this case was by publication and she made no appearance in the Nevada proceeding. The requirements of procedural due process were satisfied and the domicile of the husband in Nevada was foundation for a decree effecting a change in the marital capacity of both parties in all the other States of the Union, as well as in Nevada. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287. But the fact that marital capacity was changed does not mean that every other legal incidence of the marriage was necessarily affected.
  Although the point was not adjudicated in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 588, the Court in that case recognized that while a divorce decree obtained in Wisconsin by a husband from his absent wife might dissolve the vinculum of the marriage, it did not mean that he was freed from payment of alimony under an earlier separation decree granted by New York. An absolutist might quarrel with the result and demand a rule that once a divorce is granted, the whole of the marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils of any kind. But there are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is one of making accommodations between conflicting interests. This is why most legal problems end as questions of degree. That is .true of the present problem under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The question involves important considerations both of law and of policy which it is essential to state.
  The situations where a judgment of one State has been denied full faith and credit in another State, because its enforcement would contravene the latter’s policy, have been few and far between. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 294-295; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 438-439, and cases cited; Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to be applied, accordion-like, to accommodate our personal predilections. It substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 301-302; Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra. It ordered submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it. The fact that the requirements of full faith and credit, so far as judgments are concerned, are exacting, if not inexorable (Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra), does not mean, however, that the State of the domicile of one spouse may, through the use of constructive service, enter a decree that changes every legal incidence of the marriage relationship.
  Marital status involves the regularity and integrity of the marriage relation. It affects the legitimacy of the offspring of marriage. It is the basis of criminal laws, as the bigamy prosecution in Williams v. North Carolina dramatically illustrates. The State has a considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of marriages from being bastardized. The interest of the State extends to its domiciliaries. The State should have the power to guard its interest in them by changing or altering their marital status and by protecting them in that changed status throughout the farthest reaches of the nation. For a person domiciled in one State should not be allowed to suffer the penalties of bigamy for living outside the State with the only one which the State of his domicile recognizes as his lawful wife. And children born of the only marriage which is lawful in the State of his domicile should not carry the stigma of bastardy when they move elsewhere. These are matters of legitimate concern to the State of the domicile. They entitle the State of the domicile to bring in the absent spouse through constructive service. In no other way could the State of the domicile have and maintain effective control of the marital status of its domiciliaries.
  Those are the considerations that have long permitted the State of the matrimonial domicile to change the marital status of the parties by an ex parte divorce proceeding, Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, considerations which in the Williams cases we thought were equally applicable to any State in which one spouse had established a bona fide domicile. See 317 U. S. pp. 300-301. But those considerations have little relevancy here. In this case New York evinced a concern with this broken marriage when both parties were domiciled in New York and before Nevada had any concern with it. New York was rightly concerned lest the abandoned spouse be left impoverished and perhaps become a public charge. The problem of her livelihood and support is plainly a matter in which her community had a legitimate interest. The New York court, having jurisdiction over both parties, undertook to protect her by granting her a judgment of permanent alimony. Nevada, however, apparently follows the rule that dissolution of the marriage puts an end to a support order. See Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25 P. 2d 378, 380. But the question is whether Nevada could under any circumstances adjudicate rights of respondent under the New York judgment when she was not personally served or did not appear in the proceeding.
  Bassett v. Bassett, 141 F. 2d 954, held that Nevada could not. We agree with that view.
  The New York judgment is a property interest of respondent, created by New York in a proceeding in which both parties were present. It imposed obligations on petitioner and granted rights to respondent. The property interest which it created was an intangible, jurisdiction over which cannot be exerted through control over a physical thing. Jurisdiction over an intangible can indeed only arise from control or power over the persons whose relationships are the source of the rights and obligations. Cf. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 366.
  Jurisdiction over a debtor is sufficient to give the State of his domicile some control over the debt which he owes. It can, for example, levy a tax on its transfer by will (Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189; State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 176-177) appropriate it through garnishment or attachment Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710; see Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215), collect it and administer it for the benefit of creditors. (Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211; Fischer v. American United Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 549, 553. But we are aware of no power which the State of domicile of the debtor has to determine the personal rights of the creditor in the intangible unless the creditor has been personally served or appears in the proceeding. The existence of any such power has been repeatedly denied. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518.
  We know of no source of power which would take the present case out of that category. The Nevada decree that is said to wipe out respondent’s claim for alimony under the New York judgment is nothing less than an attempt by Nevada to restrain respondent from asserting her claim under that judgment. That is an attempt to exercise an in personam jurisdiction over a person not before the court. That may not be done. Since Nevada had no power to adjudicate respondent’s rights in the New York judgment, New York need not give full faith and credit to that phase of Nevada’s judgment. A judgment of a court having no jurisdiction to render it is not entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitution and statute of the United States demand. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40-41; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 229, and cases cited.
  The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible — to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by restricting each State to the matters of her dominant concern.
  Since Nevada had no jurisdiction to alter respondent’s rights in the New York judgment, we do not reach the further question whether in any event that judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1; Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77; Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220. And it will be time enough to consider the effect of any discrimination shown to out-of-state ex parte divorces when a State makes that its policy.
  Affirmed.
  That clause directs that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State” and provides that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” By the Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 1 Stat. 122, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 687, Congress provided that the “records and judicial proceedings” of the courts of any State “shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.”
  See Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 Corn. L. Quart. 393; Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause, 39 Ill. L. Rev. 1; Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1013, 1034; Barnhard, Haddock Reversed — Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce, 31 Geo. L. J. 210; Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled, 18 Ind. L. J. 165.
  As respects statutes, see the discussion in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 295-296.
  The case is unlike Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, where the wife by her conduct forfeited her right to alimony under the laws of the State of the matrimonial domicile where her husband obtained the divorce, and hence could not retain a judgment for maintenance subsequently obtained in another jurisdiction.
  And see Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
choices: Criminal Procedure Civil Rights First Amendment Due Process Privacy Attorneys Unions Economic Activity Judicial Power Federalism Interstate Relations Federal Taxation Miscellaneous Private Action