opinion: DALIA v. UNITED STATES
  No. 77-1722.
  Argued January 9, 10, 1979
  Decided April 18, 1979
  Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Btjkgek, C. J., and White, BlacemtjN, and RehNquist, JJ., joined and in Parts I and II of which BrennaN and Stewart, JJ., joined. BrenNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stewart, J., joined except as to Part I, post, p. 259. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 262.
  Louis Buprecht argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
  Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, William C. Bryson, Kenneth S. Getter, and Jerome M. Feit.
  Mr. Justice Powell
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U. S. C. §§2510-2520, permits courts to authorize electronic surveillance by Government officers in specified situations. We took this case by writ of certiorari to resolve two questions concerning the implementation of Title III surveillance orders. 439 U. S. 817. First, may courts authorize electronic surveillance that requires covert entry into private premises for installation of the necessary equipment? Second, must authorization for such surveillance include a specific statement by the court that it approves of the covert entry?
  I
  On March 14, 1973, Justice Department officials applied to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking authorization under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones in petitioner’s business office. After examining the affidavits submitted in support of the Government’s request, the District Court authorized the wiretap for a period of 20 days or until the purpose of the interception was achieved, whichever came first. The court found probable cause to believe that petitioner was a member of a conspiracy the purpose of which was to steal goods being shipped in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 659. Moreover, the court found reason to believe that petitioner’s business telephones were being used to further this conspiracy and that means of investigating the conspiracy other than electronic surveillance would be unlikely to succeed and would be dangerous. The wiretap order carefully enumerated the telephones to be affected and the types of conversations to be intercepted. Finally, the court ordered the officials in charge of the interceptions to take all reasonable precautions “to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception,” and required the officials to make periodic progress reports.
  At the end of the 20-day period covered by the March 14 court order, the Government requested an extension of the wiretap authorization. In addition, the Government for the first time asked the court to allow it to intercept all oral communications taking place in petitioner’s office, including those not involving the telephone. On April 5, 1973, the court granted the Government’s second request. Its order concerning the wiretap of petitioner’s telephones closely tracked the March 14 order. Finding reasonable cause to believe that petitioner’s office was being used by petitioner and others in connection with the alleged conspiracy, the court also authorized, for a maximum period of 20 days, the interception of all oral communications concerning the conspiracy at “the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15) by eighteen (18) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-O-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey.” The order included protective provisions similar to those in the March 14 wiretapping order. The electronic surveillance order of April 5 was extended by court order on April 27, 1973.
  On November 6, 1975, petitioner was indicted in a five-count indictment charging that he had been involved in a conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric. At trial, the Government introduced evidence showing that petitioner had been approached in March 1973 and asked to store in his New Jersey warehouse “a load of merchandise.” Although petitioner declined the request, he directed the requesting party to Higgins, an associate, with whom he agreed to share the $1,500 storage fee that was offered. The merchandise stored under this contract proved to be a tractor-trailer full of fabric worth $250,000 that three men stole on April 3, 1973, and transported to Higgins’ warehouse. Two days after the theft, FBI agents arrested Higgins and the individuals involved in the robbery.
  The Government introduced into evidence at petitioner’s trial various conversations intercepted pursuant to the court orders of March 14, April 5, and April 27, 1973. Intercepted telephone conversations showed that petitioner had arranged for the storage at Higgins’ warehouse and had helped negotiate the terms for that storage. One telephone conversation that took place after Higgins’ arrest made clear that petitioner had given advice to others involved in the robbery to “sit tight” and not to use the telephone. Finally, the Government introduced transcripts of conversations intercepted from petitioner’s office under the April 5 bugging order. In these conversations,, petitioner had discussed with various participants in the robbery how best to proceed after their confederates had been arrested. The unmistakable inference to be drawn from petitioner’s statements in these conversations is that he was an active participant in the scheme to steal the truckload of fabric.
  Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained through the interception of conversations by means of the device installed in his office. The District Court denied the suppression motion without prejudice to its being renewed following trial. After petitioner was convicted on two counts, he renewed his motion and the court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the method by which the electronic device had been installed. At this hearing it was shown that, although the April 5 court order did not explicitly authorize entry of petitioner’s business, the FBI agents assigned the task of implementing the order had entered petitioner’s office secretly at midnight on April 5 and had spent three hours in the building installing an electronic bug in the ceiling. All electronic surveillance of petitioner ended on May 16, 1973., at which time the agents re-entered petitioner’s office and removed the bug.
  In denying a second time petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the bug, the trial court ruled that under Title III a covert entry to install electronic eavesdropping equipment is not unlawful merely because the court approving the surveillance did not explicitly authorize such an entry. 426 F. Supp. 862 (1977). Indeed, in the court’s view, “implicit in the court’s order [authorizing electronic surveillance] is concomitant authorization for agents to covertly enter the premises in question and install the necessary equipment.” Id., at 866. As the court concluded that the FBI agents who had installed the electronic device were executing a lawful warrant issued by the court, the sole question was whether the method they chose for execution was reasonable. Under the circumstances, the court found the covert entry of petitioner’s office to have been “the safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation.” Ibid. Indeed, noting that petitioner himself had indicated that such a device could only have been installed through such an entry, the court observed that “[i]n most cases the only form of installing such devices is through breaking and entering. The nature of the act is such that entry must be surreptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation must be done without the knowledge of the residents or occupants.” Ibid.
  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 575 F. 2d 1344 (1978). Agreeing with the District Court, it rejected petitioner’s contention that separate court authorization was necessary for the covert entry of petitioner’s office, although it noted that “the more prudent or preferable approach for government agents would be to include a statement regarding the need of a surreptitious entry in a request for the interception of oral communications when a break-in is contemplated.” Id., at 1346-1347.
  II
  Petitioner first contends that the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry of private premises in all cases, irrespective of the reasonableness of the entry or the approval of a court. He contends that Title III is unconstitutional insofar as it enables courts to authorize covert entries for the installation of electronic bugging devices.
  In several cases this Court has implied that in some circumstances covert entry to install electronic bugging devices would be constitutionally acceptable if done pursuant to a search warrant. Thus, for example, in Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954), the plurality stated that in conducting electronic surveillance, state police officers had “flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal Government.” Id., at 132. It emphasized that the bugging equipment was installed through a covert entry of the defendant's home “without a search warrant or other process.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Similarly, in Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511-512 (1961), it was noted that “ [t]his Court has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man’s subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard.” (Emphasis added.) Implicit in decisions such as Silverman and Irvine has been the Court’s view that covert entries are constitutional in some circumstances, at least if they are made pursuant to warrant.
  Moreover, we find no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all covert entries. It is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed. See, e. g., Payne v. United States, 508 F. 2d 1391, 1394 (CA5 1975); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 28, 38 (1963); 18 U. S. C. § 3109. Petitioner nonetheless argues that covert entries are unconstitutional for their lack of notice. This argument is frivolous, as was indicated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355 n. 16 (1967), where the Court stated that “officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence.” In United States v. Donovan, 429 U. S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977), we held that Title III provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance. See 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). There is no reason why the same notice is not equally sufficient with respect to electronic surveillances requiring covert entry. We make explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with this subject: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.
  III
  Petitioner’s second contention is that Congress has not given the courts statutory authority to approve covert entries for the purpose of installing electronic surveillance equipment, even if constitutionally it could have done so. Petitioner emphasizes that although Title III sets forth with meticulous care the circumstances in which electronic surveillance is permitted, there is no comparable indication in the statute that covert entry ever may be ordered. Accord, United States v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453, 457-458 (CA9 1978).
  Title III does not refer explicitly to covert entry. The language, structure, and history of the statute, however, demonstrate that Congress meant to authorize courts — in certain specified circumstances — to approve electronic surveillance without limitation on the means necessary to its accomplishment, so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances. Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of electronic surveillance, prohibiting all secret interception of communications except as authorized by certain state and federal judges in response to applications from specified federal and state law enforcement officials. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 2511, 2515, and 2518; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 301-302 (1972). Although Congress was fully aware of the distinction between bugging and wiretapping, see S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (1968), Title III by its terms deals with each form of surveillance in essentially the same manner. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 (1) and (2); n. 1, supra. Orders authorizing interceptions of either wire or oral communications may be entered only after the court has made specific determinations concerning the likelihood that the interception will disclose evidence of criminal conduct. See 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (3). Moreover, with respect to both wiretapping and bugging, an authorizing court must specify the exact scope of the surveillance undertaken, enumerating the parties whose communications are to be overheard (if they are known), the place to be monitored, and the agency that will do the monitoring. See 18 U. S. C. §2518 (4).
  The plain effect of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is needed. Once this need has been demonstrated in accord with the requirements of § 2518, the courts have broad authority to “approv[e] interception of wire or oral communications,” 18 U. S. C. §§ 2516 (1), (2), subject of course to constitutional limitations. See Part II, supra. Nowhere in Title III is there any indication that the authority of courts under § 2518 is to be limited to approving those methods of interception that do not require covert entry for installation of the intercepting equipment.
  The legislative history of Title III underscores Congress’ understanding that courts would authorize electronic surveillance in situations where covert entry of private premises was necessary. Indeed, a close examination of that history reveals that Congress did not explicitly address the question of covert entries in the Act, only because it did not perceive surveillance requiring such entries to differ in any important way from that performed without entry. Testimony before subcommittees considering Title III and related bills indicated that covert entries were a necessary part of most electronic bugging operations. See, e. g., Anti-Crime Program: Hearings on H. R. 5037, etc., before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1031 (1967). Moreover, throughout the Senate Report on Title III indiscriminate reference is made to the types of surveillance this Court reviewed in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 74-75, 97, 101-102, 105. Apparently Committee members did not find it significant that Berger involved a covert entry, whereas Katz did not. Compare Berger v. New York, supra, at 45, with Katz v. United States, supra, at 348.
  It is understandable, therefore, that by the time Title III was discussed on the floor of Congress, those Members who referred to covert entries indicated their understanding that such entries would necessarily be a part of bugging authorized under Title III. Thus, for example, in voicing his support for Title III Senator Tydings emphasized the difficulties attendant upon installing necessary equipment:
  “[S]urveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic] must be installed on telephones, and wires strung. Bugs are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment.” 114 Cong. Rec. 12989 (1968) (emphasis added).
  In the face of this record, one simply cannot assume that Congress, aware that most bugging requires covert entry, nonetheless wished to except surveillance requiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III, and that it resolved to do so by remaining silent on the subject. On the contrary, the language and history of Title III convey quite a different explanation for Congress’ failure to distinguish between surveillance that requires covert entry and that which does not: Those considering the surveillance legislation understood that, by authorizing electronic interception of oral communications in addition to wire communications, they were necessarily authorizing surreptitious entries.
  Finally, Congress’ purpose in enacting the statute would be largely thwarted if we were to accept petitioner’s invitation to read into Title III a limitation on the courts’ authority under § 2518. Congress permitted limited electronic surveillance under Title III because it concluded that both wiretapping and bugging were necessary to enable law enforcement authorities to combat successfully certain forms of crime. Absent covert entry, however, almost all electronic bugging would be impossible. See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 882 (DC 1976), aff’d, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 553 F. 2d 146 (1977); McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After the Court Says “Yes”?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977). As recently as 1976, a congressional commission established to study and evaluate the effectiveness of Title III concluded that in most cases electronic surveillance cannot be performed without covert entry into the premises being monitored. See U. S. National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Surveillance 15, 43, and n. 19, 86 (1976). The same conclusion was reached by the American Bar Association committee charged with formulating standards governing use of electronic surveillance. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance 65 n. 175, 149 (App. Draft 1971).
  In sum, we conclude that Congress clearly understood that it was conferring power upon the courts to authorize covert entries ancillary to their responsibility to review and approve surveillance applications under the statute. To read the statute otherwise would be to deny the “respect for the policy of Congress [that] must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939).
  IV
  Petitioner’s final contention is that, if covert entries are to be authorized under Title III, the authorizing court must explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fact. In this case, as is customary, the court’s order constituted the sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner’s office. As it did not state in terms that the surveillance was to include a covert entry, petitioner insists that the entry violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Accord, United States v. Ford, 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 25, 553 F. 2d, at 170; Application of United States, 563 F. 2d 637, 644 (CA4 1977).
  The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued only “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Finding these words to be “precise and clear,” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481 (1965), this Court has interpreted them to require only three things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. See, e. g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245, 250-251 (1977) (per curiam); Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U. S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 459—460 (1971). Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that “the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction” for a particular offense. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 307 (1967). Finally, “warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized,’ ” as well as the place to be searched. Stanford v. Texas, supra, at 485.
  In the present case, the April 5 court order authorizing the interception of oral communications occurring within petitioner’s office was a warrant issued in full compliance with • these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. It was based upon a neutral magistrate’s independent finding of probable cause to believe that petitioner had been and was committing specifically enumerated federal crimes, that petitioner’s office was being used “in connection with the commission of [these] offenses,” and that bugging the office would result in the interception of “oral communications concerning these offenses.” App. 6a-7a. Moreover, the exact location and dimensions of petitioner’s office were set forth, see n. 4, supra, and the extent of the search was restricted to the “[i]ntercept[ion of] oral communications of Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of Larry Dalia . . . .” App. 8a.
  Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the April 5 order was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment for its failure to specify that it would be executed by means of a covert entry of his office. Nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court’s decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the three requirements discussed above, search warrants also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant — subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment protection “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
  Recognizing that the specificity required by the Fourth Amendment does not generally extend to the means by which warrants are executed, petitioner further argues that warrants for electronic surveillance are unique because often they impinge upon two different Fourth Amendment interests: The surveillance itself interferes only with the right to hold private conversations, whereas the entry subjects the suspect’s property to possible damage and personal effects to unauthorized examination. This view of the Warrant Clause parses too finely the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Often in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary to interfere with privacy rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the warrant. For example, police executing an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter the suspect’s home in order to take him into custody, and they thereby impinge on both privacy and freedom of movement. See, e. g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F. 2d 406, 421 (CA5 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Similarly, officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 556 F. 2d 304, 305 (CA5 1977); United States v. Gervato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 864 (1973).
  It would extend the Warrant Clause to the extreme to require that, whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights may be affected in more than one way, the court must set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the executing officers. Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as we have held — and the Government concedes — that the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 559-560 (1978). More important, we would promote empty formalism were we to require magistrates to make explicit what unquestionably is implicit in bugging authorizations: that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary for the installation of the surveillance equipment. See United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (Md. 1976). We conclude, therefore, that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a specific authorization to enter covertly the premises described in the order.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
  Affirmed.
  All types of electronic surveillance have the same purpose and effect: the secret interception of communications. As the Court set forth in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 45-47 (1967), however, this surveillance is performed in two quite different ways. Some surveillance is performed by “wiretapping,” which is confined to the interception of communication by telephone and telegraph and generally may be performed from outside the premises to be monitored. For a detailed description, see Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: Preseareh Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1414 n. 18 (1974). At issue in the present case is the form of surveillance commonly known as “bugging,” which includes the interception of all oral communication in a given location. Unlike wiretapping, this interception typically is accomplished by installation of a small microphone in the room to be bugged and transmission to some nearby receiver. See McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After the Court Says “Yes”?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1977); Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, reprinted in the President’s Commission on •Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime, App. C, 92, 97 (1967). Both wiretapping and bugging are regulated under Title III. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 (1) and (2).
  Every electronic surveillance necessarily is “covert” in the sense that it must be “hidden; secret; disguised” to be effective. Webster’s New International Dictionary 613 (2d ed. 1953). As used here, “covert entry” refers to the physical entry by a law enforcement officer into private premises without the owner’s permission or knowledge in order to install bugging equipment. Generally, such an entry will require a breaking and entering. See discussion infra, at 253-254.
  The Federal Courts of Appeals have given conflicting answers to these questions. See United States v. Finazzo, 583 F. 2d 837 (CA6 1978); United States v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453 (CA9 1978); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 903 (1978); United States v. Ford, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 553 F. 2d 146 (1977); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F. 2d 690 (CA8 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1045 (1977).
  In relevant part, the Title III order of April 5 provided:
  "[T]he Court finds:
  “(a) There is probable cause to believe that Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown, have committed and are committing offenses involving theft from interstate shipments, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 659; sale or receipt of stolen goods, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2315; and interference with commerce by threats or violence, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951; and are conspiring to commit such offenses in violation of Section 371 of Title 18, United States Code.
  “(b) There is probable cause to believe that particular wire and oral communications concerning these offenses will be obtained through these interceptions, authorization for which is herewith applied. In particular, these wire and oral communications will concern the theft or robbery of goods moving in interstate commerce, and the transportation, sale, receipt, storage, or distribution of these stolen goods, and the participants in the commission of said offenses.
  “(c) Normal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed and are too dangerous to be used.
  “(e) There is probable cause to believe that the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15) by eighteen (18) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly comer of a one-story building housing Wrap-O-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey, has been used, and is being used by Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown in connection with the commission of the above-described offenses.
  “WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
  “Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, are authorized . . .to:
  “(b) Intercept oral communications of Larry Dalia, and others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15) by eighteen (18) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-O-Matie Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey.
  “(c) Such interceptions shall not automatically terminate when the type of communication described above in paragraphs (a) and (b) have first been obtained, but shall continue until communications are intercepted which reveal the manner in which Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown participate in theft from interstate shipments; sale or receipt of stolen goods; and interference with commerce by threats or violence; and which reveal the identities of his confederates, their places of operation, and the nature of the conspiracy involved therein, or for a period of twenty (20) days from the date of this Order, whichever is earlier.
  “PROVIDING THAT, this authorization to intercept oral and wire communications shall be executed as soon as practicable after signing of this Order and shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, [or] in any event, at the end of twenty (20) days from the date of this Order.
  “PROVIDING ALSO, that Special Attorney James M. Deichert shall provide the Court with a report on the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth day following the date of this Order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception.”
  Count one charged petitioner and others with conspiring to transport, receive, and possess stolen goods in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2, 2314, 2115, and 659. Count two charged petitioner and others with conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1951 (b)(1). Count three charged that petitioner had transported stolen goods; count four charged that he had received stolen goods; and count five charged petitioner with possession of stolen goods.
  Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen goods and conspiring to transport, receive, and possess stolen goods. See n. 5, supra.
  One authority has said that the constitutional validity of covert entries to install bugs “is plainly the consequence of [the] reasoning” of Katz v. United States. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 114 (1969).
  Petitioner argues that, even if a covert entry would be constitutional in some cases, it was not in the present case, as there was no need for such entry. The District Court, however, specifically found that the “safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and entering [the office].” 426 F. Supp. 862, 866 (1977). Moreover, in issuing the Title III order, the court found that -“[formal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed and are too dangerous to be used.” App. 7a. And in his opinion denying petitioner’s subsequent suppression motion, the same judge stated:
  “The affidavits which supported the application for the warrant in question indicated that resort to electronic surveillance, to overhear meetings at Dalia’s office and conversations on Dalia’s telephones, was required to identify the sources of Dalia’s stolen goods, those working with him to transport and store stolen property, and the scope of the conspiracy. Oral evidence of this criminal enterprise was only available inside Dalia’s business premises.” 426 F. Supp., at 866.
  The District Court, therefore, concluded that the circumstances required the approach used by the officers, and nothing in the record brings this conclusion into question.
  It is clear that Title III serves a substantial public interest. See n. 13, infra. Congress and this Court have recognized, however, that electronic surveillance can be a threat to the “cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens” unless it is subjected to the careful supervision prescribed by Title III. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 312 (1972).
  Congress explicitly confirmed the breadth of the power it had conferred on courts acting under Title III when it amended the Act in 1970. Pub. L. 91-358, Title II, §211 (b), 84 Stat. 654. Section 2518 (4) now empowers a court authorizing electronic surveillance to “direct that a . . . landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively (Emphasis added.) Thus, it appears that Congress anticipated that landlords and custodians may be enlisted to aid law enforcement officials covertly to enter and place the necessary equipment in private areas.
  The only limitation Title III places on the manner in which these court orders are to be executed is in its requirements that no order extend beyond 30 days, and that every order must include provisions that it is to be executed as soon as practicable and in a manner that wifi minimize the interception of communications not within the purview of the order. See 18 U. S. C. §2518 (5).
  Indeed, the nature of electronic surveillance involved in Berger v. New York was mentioned on the floor of the Senate, when Senator Long observed that under the New York law, police could “obtain judicial warrants authorizing them to hide bugs in the premises of criminal suspects.” 114 Cong. Rec. 14708 (1968). To be sure, in his comments Senator Long did not explicitly suggest that Title III would authorize such covert entries. See post, at 272. His statement confirmed, however, what had been strongly indicated prior to the bill’s consideration by the full Congress: Members of Congress simply saw no distinction between electronic surveillance which required covert entry and that which required covert tapping of one’s telephone. The invasion of the privacy of conversation is the same in both situations.
  Title 18 U. S. C. § 2516 specifies that authorization for electronic surveillance may be sought only with respect to certain enumerated crimes. These include espionage, sabotage, treason, kidnaping, robbery, extortion, murder, various corrupt practices, and counterfeiting. According to the Senate Report concerning Title III, “[e]ach offense has been chosen either because it is intrinsically serious or because it is characteristic of the operations of organized crime.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 97 (1968). The need for use of electronic surveillance against organized crime had been thoroughly considered and documented, shortly before Congress began considering Title III, by a special organized-crime Task Force of a Presidential Commission charged with considering crime in the United States. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 91-104 (1967); see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 310 n. 9. A summary of the Task Force’s conclusions appeared in the Commission’s report, which was repeatedly referred to during consideration of Title III. See The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 200-203 (1967). In Congress, proponents of Title III, after hearing numerous witnesses testify concerning the importance of electronic surveillance in fighting organized crime, recommended the bill to their colleagues as “ [legislation meeting the constitutional standards set out in [Supreme Court] decisions, and granting law enforcement officers the authority to tap telephone wires and install electronic surveillance devices in the investigation of major crimes.” S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 75; see id., at 74. Indeed, the Senate Report on Title III unequivocally stated that “[t]he major purpose of title III is to combat organized crime.” Id., at 70. The rapid developments in technology available to the criminal underworld make it all the more imperative that the Government not “deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed against the Government and its law-abiding citizens.” United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 312.
  Although he cites no authority, Mr. Justice SteveNS apparently believes that a practicable alternative to covert entry would be installation of bugging devices through subterfuge. See post, at 272. Nowhere in the legislative history of Title III is there any indication that Congress wished to limit its authorization to bugs installed through subterfuge. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive why one means of gaining entry would be less intrusive than another. See, e. g., United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879 (DC 1976), aff’d, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 553 F. 2d 146 (1977) (bomb-scare ruse).
  Those few available devices that intercept conversations from outside of a building in many cases are impractical, either because of cost, reliability, or the configuration of the area being monitored. See U. S. National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Commission Studies 168-183 (1976); see, e. g., United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp., at 881.
  As we have concluded that Title III authorizes courts to approve covert entries to install electronic surveillance equipment, we do not consider whether such authority also is conferred by other federal enactments, such as Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651.
  There is no requirement in Title III that explicit authorization of covert entries be set forth in the court’s order. The statutory requirement that the surveillance “should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court” 82 Stat. 211, §801 (d), merely emphasizes that courts acting under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 should utilize their power under § 2518 (6) to require periodic progress reports after the installation of the wiretap or bug. If there is a requirement of explicit judicial authorization for covert entry, therefore, it must come from the Fourth Amendment alone.
  Because of the strict requirements of Title III, ah of the indicia of a warrant necessarily are present whenever an order under Title III is issued. Accord, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d, at 644 (Gurfein, J., concurring) . Indeed, it was Congress’ express design to create under Title III a mechanism by which search warrants valid under the Fourth Amendment would be issued for electronic surveillance. See S. Rep. No. 1097, supra n. 13, at 105; Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings on S. 300, etc., before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,. 176, 570, 919 (1967); Hearings on H. R. 5037, etc., before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 917, 934 (1967). No less would be required for the court authorization of electronic surveillance under Title III to be constitutional, as electronic surveillance undeniably is a Fourth Amendment intrusion requiring a warrant. See, e. g., Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 352-353, 356-357 (1967). And we have explicitly recognized the necessity of a warrant in cases of electronic surveillance. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 316-320.
  For example, courts have upheld the use of forceful breaking and entering where necessary to effect a warranted search, even though the warrant gave no indication that force had been contemplated. See, e. g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 864 (1973). To be sure, often it is impossible to anticipate when these actions will be necessary. See Note, Covert Entry in Electronic Surveillance: The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 203, 214 (1978). Nothing in the decisions of this Court, however, indicates that officers requesting a warrant would be constitutionally required to set forth the anticipated means for execution even in those cases where they know beforehand that unannounced or forced entry likely will be necessary. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 140 (1978).
  The District Court found that covert entry in the present case was reasonable. The officers entered petitioner's office only twice: once to install the bug and once to remove it. There is no indication that their intrusion went beyond what was necessary to install and remove the equipment. See n. 8, supra.
  In the present case, the District Court specifically noted that its order implicitly had authorized covert entry. See supra, at 246. Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, see post, at 270 n. 20, there is no question in this case “of the Executive’s authority to break and enter at will without any judicial authorization.”
  Although explicit authorization of the entry is not constitutionally required, we do agree with the Court of Appeals that the "preferable approach” would be for Government agents in the future to make explicit to the authorizing court their expectation that some form of surreptitious entry will be required to carry out the surveillance. Indeed, the Solicitor General has informed us that the Department of Justice has adopted a policy requiring its officers “[to] include [in applications for Title III orders] a request that the order providing for the interception specifically authorize surreptitious entry for the purpose of installing and removing any electronic interception devices to be utilized in accomplishing the oral interception.” See Brief for United States 56.
choices: stay, petition, or motion granted affirmed (includes modified) reversed reversed and remanded vacated and remanded affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded vacated petition denied or appeal dismissed certification to or from a lower court no disposition