Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The constitutionality of a criminal obscenity statute is the question in each of these cases. In Roth, the primary constitutional question is whether the federal obscenity statute violates the provision of the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” In Alberts, the primary constitutional question is whether the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code invade the freedoms of speech and press as they may be incorporated in the liberty protected from state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other constitutional questions are: whether these statutes violate due process, because too vague to support conviction for crime; whether power to punish speech and press offensive to decency and morality is in the States alone, so that the federal obscenity statute violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (raised in Roth); and whether Congress, by enacting the federal obscenity statute, under the power delegated by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7, to establish post offices and post roads, pre-empted the regulation of the subject matter (raised in Alberts).
Roth conducted a business in New York in the publication and sale of books, photographs and magazines. He used circulars and advertising matter to solicit sales. He was convicted by a jury in the District Court for the Southern District of New York upon 4 counts of a 26-count indictment charging him with mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity statute. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. We granted certiorari.
Alberts conducted a mail-order business from Los Angeles. He was convicted by the Judge of the Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District (having waived a jury trial) under a misdemeanor complaint which charged him with lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books, and with writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertisement of them, in violation of the California Penal Code. The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles. We noted probable jurisdiction.
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press. Although this is the first time the question has been squarely presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 736-737; United States v. Chase, 135 U. S. 255, 261; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 322; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 158; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266.
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. As early as 1712, Massachusetts made it criminal to publish “any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon” in imitation or mimicking of religious services. Acts and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), Mass. Bay Colony Charters & Laws 399 (1814). Thus, profanity and obscenity were related offenses.
In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266. At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press.
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. This objective was made explicit as early as 1774 in a letter of the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec:
“The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.” 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774).
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956. This is the same judgment expressed by this Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572:
“. . . There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
It is strenuously urged that these obscenity statutes offend the constitutional guaranties because they punish incitation to impure sexual thoughts, not shown to be related to any overt antisocial conduct which is or may be incited in the persons stimulated to such thoughts. In Roth, the trial judge instructed the jury: “The words 'obscene, lewd and lascivious’ as used in the law, signify that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.” (Emphasis added.) In Alberts, the trial judge applied the test laid down in People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 959, 178 P. 2d 853, namely, whether the material has “a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.” (Emphasis added.) It is insisted that the constitutional guaranties are violated because convictions may be had without proof either that obscene material will perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct. But, in light of our holding that obscenity is not protected speech, the complete answer to this argument is in the holding of this Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra, at 266:
“Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear and present danger.’ Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.”
However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e. g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. As to all such problems, this Court said in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102:
“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.” (Emphasis added.)
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Both trial courts below sufficiently followed the proper standard. Both courts used the proper definition of obscenity. In addition, in the Alberts case, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial judge indicated that, as the trier of facts, he was judging each item as a whole as it would affect the normal person, and in Roth, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
“. . . The test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in those comprising a particular segment of the community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish or would leave another segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved. . . .
“The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the community. The books, pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their entire context, and you are not to consider detached or separate portions in reaching a conclusion. You judge the circulars, pictures and publications which have been put in evidence by present-day standards of the community. You may ask yourselves does it offend the common conscience of the community by present-day standards.
“In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious — men, women and children.”
It is argued that the statutes do not provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt and therefore violate the constitutional requirements of due process. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507. The federal obscenity statute makes punishable the mailing of material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy ... or other publication of an indecent character.” The California statute makes punishable, inter alia, the keeping for sale or advertising material that is “obscene or indecent.” The thrust of the argument is that these words are not sufficiently precise because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all the time, everywhere.
Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. “. . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices....” United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8. These words, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and mark “. . . boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law .... That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. . . ." Id., at 7. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 624, n. 15; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340; United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 523-524; United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373.
In summary, then, we hold that these statutes, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited.
Roth’s argument that the federal obscenity statute unconstitutionally encroaches upon the powers reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the States and to the people to punish speech and press where offensive to decency and morality is hinged upon his contention that obscenity is expression not excepted from the sweep of the provision of the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” (Emphasis added.) That argument falls in light of our holding that obscenity is not expression protected by the First Amendment. We therefore hold that the federal obscenity statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 95-96, this Court said:
“. . . The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail. . .
Alberts argues that because his was a mail-order business, the California statute is repugnant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 7, under which the Congress allegedly pre-empted the regulatory field by enacting the federal obscenity statute punishing the mailing or advertising by mail of obscene material. The federal statute deals only with actual mailing; it does not eliminate the power of the state to punish "keeping for sale” or “advertising” obscene material. The state statute in no way imposes a burden or interferes with the federal postal functions. “. . . The decided cases which indicate the limits of state regulatory power in relation to the federal mail service involve situations where state regulation involved a direct, physical interference with federal activities under the postal power or some direct, immediate burden on the performance of the postal functions. . . .” Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 96.
The judgments are
Affirmed.
The federal obscenity statute provided, in pertinent part:
“Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; and—
“Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, . . . whether sealed or unsealed . . .
“Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
“Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 1461.
The 1955 amendment of this statute, 69 Stat. 183, is not applicable to this case.
The California Penal Code provides, in pertinent part:
“Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either:
“3. Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene or indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any obscene or indecent figure; or,
“4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement of any such writing, paper, book, picture, print or figure; . . .
“6. ... is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” West’s Cal. Penal Code Ann., 1955, § 311.
In Both, reliance is placed on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in Alberts, reliance is placed upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
237 F. 2d 796.
352 U. S. 964. Petitioner’s application for bail was granted by Mr. Justice Harlan in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit. 1 L. Ed. 2d 34, 77 Sup. Ct. 17.
138 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 909, 292 P. 2d 90. This is the highest state appellate court available to the appellant. Cal. Const., Art. VI, §5; see Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160.
352 U. S. 962.
No issue is presented in either case concerning the obscenity of the material involved.
See also the following cases in which convictions under obscenity statutes have been reviewed: Grimm v. United States, 156 U. S. 604; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29; Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446; Andrews v. United States, 162 U. S. 420; Price v. United States, 165 U. S. 311; Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486; Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427; United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424.
Del. Const., 1792, Art. I, § 5; Ga. Const., 1777, Art. LXI; Md. Const., 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 38; Mass. Const., 1780, Declaration of Rights, Art. XVI; N. H. Const., 1784, Art. I, §XXII; N. C. Const., 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art. XV; Pa. Const., 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art. XII; S. C. Const., 1778, Art. XLIII; Vt. Const., 1777, Declaration of Rights, Art. XIV; Va. Bill of Rights, 1776, § 12.
Act to Secure the Freedom of the Press (1804), 1 Conn. Pub. Stat. Laws 355 (1808); Del. Const., 1792, Art. I, §5; Ga. Penal Code, Eighth Div., §VIII (1817), Digest of the Laws of Ga. 364 (Prince 1822); Act of 1803, c. 54, II Md. Public General Laws 1096 (Poe 1888); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 232 (1838); Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Not Capital (1791), N. H. Laws 1792, 253; Act Respecting Libels (1799), N. J. Rev. Laws 411 (1800); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 337 (1804); Act of 1803, c. 632, 2 Laws of N. C. 999 (1821); Pa. Const., 1790, Art. IX, §7; R. I. Code of Laws (1647), Proceedings of the First General Assembly and Code of Laws 44^45 (1647); R. I. Const., 1842, Art. I, § 20; Act of 1804, 1 Laws of Vt. 366 (Tolman 1808); Commonwealth v. Morris, 1 Brock. & Hol. (Va.) 176 (1811).
Act for the Punishment of Divers Capital and Other Felonies, Acts and Laws of Conn. 66, 67 (1784); Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy, §§4, 5 (1737), 1 Laws of Del. 173, 174 (1797); Act to Regulate Taverns (1786), Digest of the Laws of Ga. 512, 513 (Prince 1822); Act of 1723, c. 16, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799); General Laws and Liberties of Mass. Bay, c. XVIII, § 3 (1646), Mass. Bay Colony Charters & Laws 58 (1814); Act of 1782, c. 8, Rev. Stat. of Mass. 741, § 15 (1836); Act of 1798, c. 33, §§ 1, 3, Rev. Stat. of Mass. 741, § 16 (1836); Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Not Capital (1791), N. H. Laws 1792, 252, 256; Act for the Punishment of Profane Cursing and Swearing (1791), N. H. Laws 1792, 258; Act for Suppressing Vice and Immorality, §§ VIII, IX (1798), N. J. Rev. Laws 329, 331 (1800); Act for Suppressing Immorality, § IV (1788), 2 Laws of N. Y. 257, 258 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290 (1811); Act ... for the More Effectual Suppression of Vice and Immorality, § III (1741), 1 N. C. Laws 52 (Martin Rev. 1715-1790) ; Act to Prevent the Grievous Sins of Cursing and Swearing (1700), II Statutes at Large of Pa. 49 (1700-1712); Act for the Prevention of Vice and Immorality, § II (1794), 3 Laws of Pa. 177, 178 (1791— 1802); Act to Reform the Penal Laws, §§33, 34 (1798), R. I. Laws 1798, 584, 595; Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Blasphemy and Prophaneness (1703), Laws of S. C. 4 (Grimké 1790); Act, for the Punishment of Certain Capital, and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 20 (1797), 1 Laws of Vt. 332, 339 (Tolman 1808); Act, for the Punishment of Certain Inferior Crimes and Misdemeanors, §20 (1797), 1 Laws of Vt. 352, 361 (Tolman 1808); Act for the Effectual Suppression of Vice, § 1 (1792), Acts of General Assembly of Va. 286 (1794).
Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, § 69 (1821), Stat. Laws of Conn. 109 (1824); Knowles v. State, 3 Day (Conn.) 103 (1808); Rev. Stat. of 1835, c. 130, §10, Rev. Stat. of Mass. 740 (1836); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821); Rev. Stat. of 1842, c. 113, § 2, Rev. Stat. of N. H. 221 (1843); Act for Suppressing Vice and Immorality, §XII (1798), N. J. Rev. Laws 329, 331 (1800); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815).
E. g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622; Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Labor Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 37 Stat. 1511; Treaties in Force 209 (U. S. Dept. State, October 31., 1956).
Hearings before Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, pursuant to S. Res. 62, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-52 (May 24, 1955).
Although New Mexico has no general obscenity statute, it does have a statute giving to municipalities the power “to prohibit the sale or exhibiting of obscene or immoral publications, prints, pictures, or illustrations.” N. M. Stat. Ann., 1953, §§ 14-21-3, 14-21-12.
5 Stat. 548, 566; 11 Stat. 168; 13 Stat. 504, 507; 17 Stat. 302; 17 Stat. 598; 19 Stat. 90; 25 Stat. 187, 188; 25 Stat. 496; 26 Stat. 567, 614-615; 29 Stat. 512; 33 Stat. 705; 35 Stat. 1129, 1138; 41 Stat. 1060; 46 Stat. 688; 48 Stat. 1091, 1100 ; 62 Stat. 768; 64 Stat. 194; 64 Stat. 451; 69 Stat. 183; 70 Stat. 699.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47. This approach is typified by the opinion of Judge Bok (written prior to this Court’s opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494) in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, aff’d, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494. This approach is typified by the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in the Roth case, 237 F. 2d, at 801. See also Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295 (1954).
I. e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Webster’s New International Dictionary (Unabridged, 2d ed., 1949) defines 'prurient, in pertinent part, as follows:
“. . . Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity, lewd. . . .”
Pruriency is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
“. . . Quality of being prurient; lascivious desire or thought. . . .” See also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 236 U. S. 230, 242, where this Court said as to motion pictures: “. . . They take their attraction from the general interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. . . (Emphasis added.)
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity developed in the case law and the definition of the A. L. I., Model Penal Code, §207.10 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), viz.:
“. . .A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. . . .” See Comment, id., at 10, and the discussion at page 29 et seq.
See, e. g., United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564.
Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 Elliot’s Debates 571.
See note 14, supra.
But see the instructions given to the jury by Mr. Justice Stable in Regina v. Martin Secker Warburg, [1954] 2 All Eng. 683 (C. C. C.).
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119; MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51; United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093; United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 500; Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86 N. E. 910.
E. g., Walker v. Popenoe, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 149 F. 2d 511; Parmelee v. United States, 72 App. D. C. 203, 113 F. 2d 729; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156; United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564; Khan v. Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450, aff’d, 165 F. 2d 188; United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, aff’d, 72 F. 2d 705; American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N. E. 2d 585; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N. E. 2d 840; Missouri v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S. W. 2d 283; Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N. J. 267, 96 A. 2d 519; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N. J. Super. 292, 96 A. 2d 47; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, aff’d, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389; cf. Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 794-795 (concurrence).
In. Alberts, the contention that the trial judge did not read the materials in their entirety is not before us because not fairly comprised within the questions presented. U. S. Sup. Ct. Rules, 15 (1) (c)(1).
This Court, as early as 1896, said of the federal obscenity statute:
“. . . Every one who uses the mails of the United States for carrying papers or publications must take notice of what, in this enlightened age, is meant by decency, purity, and chastity in social life, and what must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious.” Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 42.
E. g., Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 789; Parmelee v. United States, 72 App. D. C. 203, 204, 113 F. 2d 729, 730; United States v. 4200 Copies International Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 493; United States v. One Unbound Volume, 128 F. Supp. 280, 281.
It is argued that because juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material, the statutes must be held to be insufficiently precise to satisfy due process requirements. But, it is common experience that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system. Cf. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486, 499-500.
For the same reason, we reject, in this case, the argument that there is greater latitude for state action under the word “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment than is allowed to Congress by the language of the First Amendment.
In Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 506-508, this Court said:
“The constitutional principles underlying the administration of the Post Office Department were discussed in the opinion of the court in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, in which we held that the power vested in Congress to establish post offices and post roads embraced the regulation of the entire postal system of the country; that Congress might designate what might be carried in the mails and what excluded .... It may . . . refuse to include in its mails such printed matter or merchandise as may seem objectionable to it upon the ground of public policy .... For more than thirty years not only has the transmission of obscene matter been prohibited, but it has been made a crime, punishable by fine or imprisonment, for a person to deposit such matter in the mails. The constitutionality of this law we believe has never been attacked. . . .”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations