Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether States and state agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.
I — I
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November 1979, he filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that in 1978 the hospital denied him employment as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent charged that the hospital’s discriminatory refusal to hire him violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and certain state fair employment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-tive, and declaratory relief.
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from entertaining respondent’s claims. Alternatively, petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimination under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance received by the defendants is to provide employment, and that respondent’s case should be dismissed because he did not so allege. In January 1980, the District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 677 F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the question whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent’s suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the ground that respondent failed to allege an essential element of a claim under §504, namely, that a primary objective of the federal funds received by the defendants was to provide employment. Id., at 1272.
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1095 (1984), vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624 (1984), in which we held that §504’s bar on employment discrimination is not limited to programs that receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing employment. Id., at 632-633. On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It held that “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent’s] action because the State, if it has participated in and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. §794.” 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a State’s consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, procedures, and rights against “any recipient of Federal assistance” while implementing regulations expressly defined the class of recipients to include the States. Quoting our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 672 (1974), the court determined that the “‘threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes [the] States’ ” was present in this case. 735 F. 2d, at 361.
The court’s decision in this case is in conflict with those of the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm’n, 718 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 469 U. S. 1032 (1984), and we now reverse.
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment “lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill” of the Constitution. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984) (Pennhurst II). Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment do not so provide.
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” that is, by Congress’ power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States’ consent. Ibid.
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States, this Court consistently has held that these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to have waived its immunity “only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). Likewise, in determining whether Congress in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required “an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to ‘overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.’” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279 (1973).
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has waived its immunity by virtue of Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these claims has merit.
HH HH J — i
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 486 (1883). Respondent relies on Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution, which provides: “Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law.” In respondent’s view, unless the California Legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as well as state.
The test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just last Term, “a State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.” Pennhurst II, supra, at 99. Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). In view of these principles, we do not believe that Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution constitutes a waiver of the State’s constitutional immunity. This provision does not specifically indicate the State’s willingness to be sued in federal court. Indeed, the provision appears simply to authorize the legislature to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has waived its constitutional immunity.
IV
Respondent also contends that in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress abrogated the States’ constitutional immunity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and inferences from general statutory language. To reach respondent’s conclusion, we would have to temper the requirement, well established in our cases, that Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. Pennhwrst II, supra, at 99; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 342-345. We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion.
Only recently the Court reiterated that “the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system . . . .” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 547 (1985). The “constitutionally mandated balance of power” between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of “our fundamental liberties.” Id., at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment serves to maintain this balance. “Our reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit .in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.” Pennhurst II, supra, at 99.
Congress’ power to abrogate a State’s immunity means that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government does not obtain. “Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.” Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language ensures such certainty.
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, the courts themselves must decide whether their own jurisdiction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty of this Court “to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has enhanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . .”).
For these reasons, we hold — consistent with Quern, Edel-man, and Pennhurst II — that Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Congress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to override the Eleventh Amendment. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 87 Stat. 394, as amended and as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794.
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794a, describes the available remedies under the Act, including the provisions pertinent to this case:
“(a)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title.
“(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 by “any recipient of Federal assistance.” There is no claim here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically. Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99, citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States.
V
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 735 F. 2d, at 361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on “the extensive provisions [of the Act] under which the states are the express intended recipients of federal assistance.” Id., at 360. It reasoned that “this is a case in which a ‘congressional enactment... by its terms authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which literally included States or state instru-mentalities,’ and ‘the State by its participation in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity,”’ id., at 361, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that if the State “has participated in and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. §794.” 735 F. 2d, at 362.
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court. Ibid., citing Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S., at 150; Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673. The court erred, however, in concluding that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation Act are addressed to the States, a State necessarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in programs funded under the statute. We have decided today that the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity. Thus, were we to view this statute as an enactment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see n. 4, supra, we would hold that there was no indication that the State of California consented to federal jurisdiction.
<1 I — I
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in federal court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), “[clonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here.”
Justice Brennan’s dissent repeatedly asserts that established Eleventh Amendment doctrine is not “grounded on principles essential to the structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional liberties of our people . . . Post, at 247-248; see also post, at 258, 302. We believe, however, that our Eleventh Amendment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the Constitution. See n. 3, infra. The Framers believed that the States played a vital role in our system and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a “counterpoise” to the power of the Federal Government. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); The Federalist No. 46, p. 316 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The “new evidence,” discovered by the dissent in The Federalist and in the records of the state ratifying conventions, has been available to historians and Justices of this Court for almost two centuries. Viewed in isolation, some of it is subject to varying interpretations. But none of the Framers questioned that the Constitution created a federal system with some authority expressly granted the Federal Government and the remainder retained by the several States. See, e. g., The Federalist Nos. 39, 45. The Constitution never would have been ratified if the States and their courts were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself.
The principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the sovereign immunity of the States “is, without question, a reflection of concern for the sovereignty of the States . . . .” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 293 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result). As the Court explained almost 65 years ago:
“That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against the State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (citations omitted).
See also cases cited in n. 3, infra.
Justice Brennan’s dissent also argues that in the absence of jurisdiction in the federal courts, the States are “exemp[t] . . . from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our Nation.” Post, at 248. This claim wholly misconceives our federal system. As Justice Marshall has noted, “the issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit. . . but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit before federal tribunals.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra, at 293-294 (concurring in result) (emphasis added). It denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493, n. 35 (1976), and post, at 256, n. 8.
In a remarkable view of stare decisis, Justice Brennan’s dissent states that our decision today evinces a “lack of respect for precedent.” Post, at 258. Not a single authority is cited for this claim. In fact, adoption of the dissent’s position would require us to overrule numerous decisions of this Court. However one may view the merits of the dissent’s historical argument, the principle of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), that “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill,” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 98, has been affirmed time and time again, up to the present day. E. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Mississippi, 177 U. S. 693 (1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S., at 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, n. 13 (1952); Farden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees v. Missouri Public Health and Welfare Dept., 411 U. S., at 280; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 662-663; Pennhurst II, supra. Justice Brennan long has maintained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as established in the holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. See, e. g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); Pennhurst II, supra, at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra, at 298 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is a view, of course, that he is entitled to hold. But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to make a further response to the scholarly, 55-page elaboration of it today.
In a dissent expressing his willingness to overrule Edelman v. Jordan, supra, as well as at least 16 other Supreme Court decisions that have followed Hans v. Louisiana, see supra, Justice Stevens would “further unrave[l] the doctrine of stare decisis,” Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 155 (1981), because he views the Court’s decision in Pennhurst II as “repudiat[ing] at least 28 cases. ” Post, at 304, citing Pennhurst II, supra, at 165-166, n. 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). We previously have addressed at length his allegation that the decision in Pennhurst II overruled precedents of this Court, and decline to do so again here. See Pennhurst II, supra, at 109-111, nn. 19, 20, and 21. Justice Stevens would ignore stare decisis in this case because in the view of a minority of the Court two prior decisions of the Court ignored it. This reasoning would indeed “unravel” a doctrine upon which the rule of law depends.
Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not represent an exercise of Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze § 504 in light of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject uncon-senting States to federal court jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). In Part V, infra, at 246, we address the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and conclude that by accepting funds under the Act, the State did not “implicitly consen[t] to be sued . . . .” 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984).
Although the Court of Appeals seemed to state that the Rehabilitation Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations