Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Interstate Commerce Act confers broad powers upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroad transportation in the United States or to or from a foreign country, “but only insofar as such transportation . . . takes place within the United States.” In this case, here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b), a three-judge District Court set aside a Commission order on the ground that the Commission was attempting to regulate railroad transportation in Canada in excess of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
The Province of Quebec, Canada, is a principal source of asbestos for manufacturers of asbestos products in this country. It is transported by Canadian railroads through southern Canada to points in Vermont three to five miles south of the border and carried from there by the various appellee railroads to other points in the United States. Canadian and American carriers have joined in the publication of joint through rates available to consignees in “official territory” in the Northeastern States, which rates are substantially lower than the combination of separate or local rates that are published and available as combination through rates for consignees in the Southern States. On the basis of these and other facts the Commission found after hearings that the higher combination rates to complainants in the South were: (a) “unjust and unreasonable” and therefore in violation of § 1 (6) of the Act, and (b) “unduly prejudicial” to the southern consignees and “unduly preferential” to the northern consignees enjoying the lower joint rates, and therefore in violation of § 3 (1). The Commission then entered its order directing the railroads to cease and desist from continuing to practice the undue prejudice and preference it had found and to establish, post and maintain rates and practices which would thereafter “prevent and avoid” such prejudice and preference.
The District Court’s holding that the Commission was without jurisdiction was based on its assumption that the Commission’s order attempted to control the Canadian part of the transportation. But the order did not run against any transportation except that taking place “within the United States.” The order directed the defendant railroads, “according as they participate in the transportation within the United States,” to take action within their power to cease their participation in a transportation practice that the Commission had found to be prejudicial in violation of §3 (1). The affected transportation within this country was that “from a foreign country” over which §1(1) (a) specifically gives the Commission jurisdiction, and the order did nothing more than direct railroads engaged in that transportation to adjust their transportation practices “within the United States” in such a way as to eliminate illegal discriminations. These railroads operating within the United States undoubtedly have complete power to stop these discriminations. Mere withdrawal by the American railroads from the preferential joint through-rate agreements would be an obvious way to do so, and an alternative method would be to lower the combination through rates to southern territory by reduction of the rates from the Vermont interchange points to the South.
It has long been settled that the Commission’s power to forbid unlawful rate discriminations is in no way diminished because the rates are published as joint through rates or combination through rates. This power likewise is not lost merely because the particular transportation by railroads carrying goods in this country happens to be a continuation of carriage from another country. Otherwise the Commission’s mandate to protect shippers against all undue discriminations would be frustrated with respect to rates that in part include payment for transportation that takes place in a foreign country.
It was error to set aside the Commission’s order for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore the District Court’s judgment is
Reversed.
49 U. S. C. § 1 (1)(a) and §1 (2).
182 F. Supp. 516.
“Official territory” is in general that .area of the United States lying east of the Mississippi River and north of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers. See Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C. 447, 457.
49 U. S. C. §1 (5).
49 U. S. C. §3 (1).
Since the challenged order prescribed no “reasonable rates” to be observed, we have no occasion to consider the contention that the Commission was without jurisdiction to prescribe such rates. Nor did the Commission enter any final order that a complainant is entitled to an award of damages because it had been charged unlawful rates. Such an order, when and if made, can be challenged before a single judge under 49 U. S. C. § 16 (2). See United States v. I. C. C., 337 U. S. 426, 442-443; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U. S. 202, 205.
See United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U. S. 515, 527.
Cf. Commissioner Eastman’s concurring opinion in Cyanamid and Crude Cyanide from Niagara Falls, Ontario, 155 I. C. C. 488, 501-502.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations