Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Adam Warpouske, an Oregon resident, died in a United States Veterans’ Administration Hospital in Oregon without a will or legal heirs, leaving a net estate composed of personal property worth about $13,000. Oregon law provides that such property shall escheat to the State. A United States statute, on the other hand, provides that when a veteran dies without a will or legal heirs in a veterans’ hospital, his personal property “shall immediately vest in and become the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund . ...” In reliance upon these provisions of their respective statutes, both the State of Oregon and the Government of the United States filed claims for Warpouske’s estate in the Oregon probate court having jurisdiction of the matter.
Recognizing that the federal statute, if applicable and valid, would make the claim of the United States paramount, the State attacked the Government’s reliance upon that statute on two grounds: first, it urged that the federal statute did not apply to this case on the theory that its provisions depended upon the Government’s having made a valid contract with the veteran prior to his death and that Warpouske had made no such contract because he had been mentally incompetent to do so when he entered the hospital and at all times thereafter up to his death; and, secondly, it urged that the federal statute, even if applicable, was invalid because it pertains to the devolution of property, a matter contended to have been wholly reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
After hearings, the probate court found as a fact that Warpouske had been unable to enter into a valid contract with the Government because of his mental incompetence. That court then accepted the State’s interpretation of the federal statute as requiring a valid contract as a prerequisite to its application and concluded that since such a contract could not, in this case, have been made, the State was entitled to Warpouske’s property by virtue of its escheat law. On appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed on the same grounds. Because of the importance of this question of federal statutory construction and an alleged conflict between this decision and decisions previously made by other state courts of final jurisdiction, we granted certiorari.
Since we accept the findings of the two state courts that Warpouske could not and did not enter into a contract to leave his property to the United States, the crucial question is whether the Government can prevail in the absence of such a contract. We hold that it can on the grounds that the federal statute relied upon does not require a contract and that this statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
The controlling provision was passed in 1941 as an amendment to the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1910. The 1910 Act quite plainly and unequivocally provided that the admission of an applicant to a veterans’ home should “be and constitute a valid and binding contract between such applicant and the Board of Managers of said home that on the death of said applicant while a member of such home, leaving no heirs at law nor next of kin, all personal property owned by said applicant at the time of his death, including money or choses in action held by him and not disposed of by will . . . shall vest in and become the property of the said Board of Managers for the sole use and benefit of the post fund of said home . . . .” The contractual nature of these provisions of the 1910 Act was clear and, indeed, we expressly recognized that fact when the question of the validity of the Act was brought before this Court.
The 1910 Act was greatly amplified, however, by the amendments adopted in 1941 and the central provision of the Act, quoted above, was significantly changed. Section 1 of the new Act restates this provision without reference to the word “contract,” providing simply that when a veteran dies “while a member or patient in any facility, or any hospital while being furnished care or treatment,” all his personal property “not disposed of by will or otherwise, shall immediately vest in and become the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund . ...” The Act then goes on to supplement this basic provision with other provisions that are drawn in the language of contract. But these provisions must be read in the context of § 2 of the Act which provides that the death of a veteran in a veterans’ hospital “shall give rise to a conclusive presumption of a valid contract.” Read in this context, the language of contract which appears in these other provisions of the Act is not at all inconsistent with the provision for automatic vesting without a contract in § 1. Quite the contrary, it seems plain to us that these “contractual” provisions were included in the Act for the purpose of reinforcing rather than detracting from the provisions of § 1 — the thought apparently being that there was some chance that the Act would be attacked as unconstitutional and that it would consequently be advisable to include alternative bases upon which it could be upheld.
This natural construction we give to § 1 makes it fit well in the pattern of legislation dealing with this subject. The solicitude of Congress for veterans is of long standing. Veterans’ pensions, homes, hospitals and other facilities have been supplied on an ever-increasing scale. Many veterans, as did the deceased veteran here, have had to depend upon these benefits for long periods of their lives. Warpouske, for example, appears to have spent more than ten years of his life, at various intervals from time to time, in veterans’ homes and hospitals throughout the country. These were the only homes he had at those times. The congressional plan here is that whatever little personal property veterans without wills or kin happen to leave when they die in veterans’ homes and hospitals should be paid into the General Post Fund, to be used for the recreation and pleasure of other ex-service men and women who have to spend their days in veterans’ homes and hospitals. This idea was expressed by Representative Jennings during the discussion of the 1941 Act on the floor of the House: “And would it not be much better to let that money go into a fund that would inure to the benefit of other veterans than to let . . . it go into a fund under the escheat laws of [a] State?”
Having concluded that the provisions of § 1 are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act. Since the State has placed such heavy reliance upon that history, however, we do deem it appropriate to point out that this history is at best inconclusive. It is true, as the State points out, that Representative Rankin, as Chairman of the Committee handling the bill on the floor of the House, expressed his view during the course of discussion of the bill on the floor that the 1941 Act would not apply to insane veterans incompetent to make valid contracts. But such statements, even when they stand alone, have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify deviation from the plain language of a statute. They are even less so here for there is powerful countervailing evidence as to the intention of those who drafted the bill. The bill was drawn up and sent to the Speaker of the House, in the very form in which it was passed, by the Veterans’ Bureau itself. And that Bureau, we are told, has consistently interpreted the 1941 Act as making the sanity or insanity of a veteran who dies in a veterans’ hospital entirely irrelevant to the determination of the Government’s rights under the Act.
We see no merit in the challenge to the constitutionality of § 1 as construed in this natural manner. Congress undoubtedly has the power — under its constitutional powers to raise armies and navies and to conduct wars— to pay pensions, and to build hospitals and homes for veterans. We think it plain that the same sources of power authorize Congress to require that the personal property left by its wards when they die in government facilities shall be devoted to the comfort and recreation of other ex-service people who must depend upon the Government for care. The fact that this law pertains to the devolution of property does not render it invalid. Although it is true that this is an area normally left to the States, it is not immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Federal Government which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the exercise of a delegated power.
The judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Ore. Rev. Stat., § 120.010, provides: “Immediately upon the death of any person who dies intestate without heirs, leaving any real, personal or mixed property, interest or estate in this state, the same escheats to and vests in the state, subject only to the claims of the creditors and as provided in ORS 120.060 to 120.130; and the clear proceeds derived therefrom shall be paid into and become a part of the Common School Fund of this state and be loaned or invested by the State Land Board, as provided by law.”
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17.
222 Ore. 40, 352 P. 2d 539.
The conflict alleged is with the decisions in Skriziszouski Estate, 382 Pa. 634, 116 A. 2d 841; and In re Gonsky’s Estate, 79 N. D. 123, 55 N. W. 2d 60.
364 U. S. 877.
36 Stat. 703, 736
“In passing the Act of June, 1910, Congress merely directed the terms and conditions under which veterans, consistently with state law, can obtain admittance to Homes built, maintained and operated by the government for the benefit of veterans. Homes for the aged, needy, or infirm, in return for the benefits bestowed by them, generally receive some benefit from any property or estates of their members.” United States v. Stevens, 302 U. S. 623, 627.
55 Stat. 868, 38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17 et seq.
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17.
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17a.
These fears doubtless arose, in part at least, from the fact that the Circuit Court of Appeals had, in the Stevens case, supra, declared even the milder provisions of the 1910 Act unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, Stevens v. United States, 89 F. 2d 151, a holding ultimately reversed by this Court.
See the Brief History of Legislation Pertaining to Veterans’ Benefits, 38 U. S. C. A. 1.
87 Cong. Rec. 5203-5204.
Cf. United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513-514; National Home v. Wood, 299 U. S. 211, 216.
87 Cong. Rec. 5203.
See H. R. Rep. No. 609, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2.
See, e, g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, ante, p. 187, This was also implicit in the holding in United States v. Stevens, 302 U. S. 623, See n. 11, supra. Cf. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85, in which this Court rejected the contention that the Federal Constitution does not confer any authority upon Congress to deal with mental incompetents.
See, e. g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92; Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations