Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee Harry Vail, Jr., is a judgment debtor who was held in contempt of court by the County Court of Dutchess County, N. Y., and who thereafter sought to have the statutory provisions authorizing contempts enjoined as unconstitutional in an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The state-court proceedings against Vail were found by the District Court to be in most respects representative of those against the other named appellees as well.
Vail defaulted on a credit arrangement with the Public Loan Co., and in January 1974, a default judgment for $534.36 was entered against him in the City Court of Poughkeepsie, N. Y. Three months later, when the judgment remained unpaid, Vail was served with a subpoena requiring him to attend a deposition so as to give information relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment. The subpoena required him to appear at the office of the creditor’s attorney on May 28, a little more than a month after the date on which it was served, and stated, as is required by N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5223 (McKinney 1963), that “failure to comply . . . is punishable as a contempt of court.”
Vail did not appear for the deposition. Nearly two months after the scheduled deposition date, appellant Juidice, a Justice of the Dutchess County Court, issued an order requiring Vail to appear in that court on August 13 to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Vail failed to appear for that hearing. On August 30, appellant Juidice entered an order holding Vail in contempt and imposing a fine in the amount of $250 plus costs. Vail failed to pay the fine. On September 23, appellant Juidice issued an ex parte commitment order, and Vail was arrested and jailed pursuant to this order on October 1. He was released the following day when he paid the fine which had been imposed by the order.
Shortly thereafter, Vail, who had ignored for a period of more than nine months every stage of the state-court proceedings in which he had been a defendant, became a plaintiff in an action brought in the United States District Court. He and his coplaintiffs there sought to enjoin, on behalf of a class of judgment debtors, the use of the statutory contempt procedures authorized by New York law and employed by appellant justices on the ground that the procedures leading to imprisonment for contempt of court violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As they never appeared in the New York courts, they obviously did not raise these constitutional claims in the state-court proceedings. The contentions made before the District Court, however, could have been raised by appellees in the state courts, as a defense to the ongoing proceedings. Had the County Court ruled against these contentions, appellees could have appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. They chose, by resorting to the federal courts, not to avail themselves of this forum afforded them by the State of New York. We must decide whether, with the existence of an available forum for raising constitutional issues in a state judicial proceeding, the United States District Court could properly entertain appellees’ § 1983 action in light of our decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). We hold that it could not.
I
A three-judge District Court was convened in response to appellees’ complaint and the action was later certified as a Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) class action. The class was defined to include “all persons who have been, or are presently subject to the civil contempt proceedings contained in the challenged sections of the Judiciary Law.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement 18a. At the same time the District Court rendered an opinion granting partial summary judgment to the appellees and
“declaring that Sections 756, 757, 770, 772, 773, 774 and 775 of the Judiciary Law of the State of New York are unconstitutional on their face and permanently enjoining the operation of said statutes against plaintiffs and members of their class, namely, all persons who have been or are presently subject to civil contempt proceedings pursuant to the above sections of the Judiciary Law . . . .” Id., at 20a.
Appellants in this Court challenged the District Court’s failure to abstain on Younger grounds as well as its decision on the merits. We noted probable jurisdiction, 426 U. S. 946, and since we agree with appellants’ first contention we do not reach the merits of the constitutional dispute.
Although raised by neither of the parties, we are first obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Art. III, to seek injunctive relief in the District Court. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244 (1971); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493-498 (1974). At the time this lawsuit was commenced, or the additional appellees added, the named appellees, except Patrick Ward and Joseph Rabasco, had already been imprisoned pursuant to the contempt order, and, again excepting Ward and Rabasco, had been released after payment of the court-imposed fine. Ward had not been imprisoned, but alleged that he was “in imminent danger of being imprisoned pursuant to the Order of Contempt . . ." Complaint ¶ 55. A temporary restraining order, which has remained in effect throughout this lawsuit, was issued by the District Court, enjoining the State from incarcerating Ward pursuant to the contempt order. Rabasco similarly alleged the threat of imprisonment after the issuance by the state court of an order to show cause which he has not complied with. The District Court restrained further state proceedings against Rabasco.
All of the named appellees, except Ward and Rabasco, then, having been released from jail, no longer had a live controversy with appellants or other New York State officials as to either the contempt citation or the short periods of incarceration which would entitle them to injunctive relief. These New York supplemental proceedings, which follow judgments on a debt, differ in this respect from the Ohio State proceedings involved in Huffman, supra. In Huffman, the Ohio State court had closed down the federal plaintiff’s movie house for a period of time in the future. Although its decree had become final at the time the federal plaintiff instituted its federal action, the effect of the decree continued. 420 U. S., at 598. That plaintiff accordingly had the requisite standing. O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 495-496. Here, however, once the period of incarceration is served or the fine paid, the effect of the orders imposing a fine or commitment has expended itself. And, in the case where the payment of the fine satisfies the entire judgment, not only the orders in the supplemental proceedings but the original judgment as well is rendered functus officio. As the complaint does not allege, and as the District Court did not find, that these appellees were threatened with further or repeated proceedings, only Ward and Rabasco had the necessary standing to seek injunctive relief. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974). Appellees Ward and Rabasco do have standing, since they are subject to pending proceedings in the state courts. Since Ward and Rabasco have standing, and since their standing, unlike that of the plaintiff in Steffel v. Thompson, supra, is predicated on the existence of a pending, and not merely a threatened, proceeding, we deal with appellants’ Younger contentions.
The District Court decided that our holdings in Younger and Huffman did not mandate dismissal of the complaint in this case, because the action sought to be enjoined in Younger was a criminal prosecution, and the action sought to be enjoined in Huffman was for the abatement of a civil nuisance and therefore closely akin to a criminal proceeding. This was not an implausible reading of our holdings in those cases, since in Huffman, the most recent of the two, we had reserved the applicability of abstention to civil cases generally in this language:
“Informed by the relevant principles of comity and federalism, at least three Courts of Appeals have applied Younger when the pending state proceedings were civil in nature. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F. 2d 244 (CA5 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F. 2d 769 (CA4 1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F. 2d 603 (CA7 1972). For the purposes of the case before us, however, we need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation. It suffices to say that for the reasons heretofore set out, we conclude that the District Court should have applied the tests laid down in Younger in determining whether to proceed to the merits of appellee’s prayer for relief against this Ohio civil nuisance proceeding.” 420 U. S., at 607.
We now hold, however, that the principles of Younger and Huffman are not confined solely to the types of state actions which were sought to be enjoined in those cases. As we emphasized in Huffman, the “ 'more vital consideration’ ” behind the Younger doctrine of nonintervention lay not in the fact that the state criminal process was involved but rather in
“ 'the notion of “comity,” that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.’ ” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 601, quoting Younger, 401 U. S., at 44.
This is by no means a novel doctrine. In Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the watershed case which sanctioned the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a sword as well as a shield against unconstitutional conduct of state officers, the Court said:
“But the Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a state court. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148.” Id., at 162.
These principles apply to a case in which the State’s contempt process is involved. A State’s interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords the opportunity to pursue federal claims within it, is surely an important interest. Perhaps it is not quite as important as is the State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws, Younger, supra, or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in Huffman, supra. But we think it is of sufficiently great import to require application of the principles of those cases. The contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a State’s judicial system, cf. Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N. Y. 534, 539, 47 N. E. 918, 920 (1897). Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a finding of contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature, we think the salient fact is that federal-court interference with the State’s contempt process is “an offense to the State’s interest . . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding,” Huffman, supra, at 604. Moreover, such interference with the contempt process not only “unduly interfere[s] with the legitimate activities of the Stat[e],” Younger, supra, at 44, but also “can readily be interpreted ‘as reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles,’ ” Huffman, supra, at 604.
The District Court relied upon our decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), to justify its refusal to dismiss appellees’ suit, and it spoke of the possibility that a debtor in the position of appellees might be “thrown in jail without an actual hearing” (emphasis added). But Gerstein explained the reason for the inapplicability of Younger to that case in a way which clearly distinguishes it from this:
“The District Court correctly held that respondents’ claim for relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.” 420 U. S., at 108 n. 9. (Emphasis added.)
Here it is abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings. No more is required to invoke Younger abstention. There is no support in Gerstein or in our other cases for the District Court's belief that the state courts must have an actual hearing (to which a recalcitrant defendant would presumably be brought by force) in order for Younger and Huffman to apply. Appellees need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577 (1973), and their failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate. Presumptively, therefore, the principles which underlie Younger call for dismissal of the action.
II
We noted in Huffman that Younger principles do not apply, even where otherwise applicable,
“in those cases where the District Court properly finds that the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the challenged statute is ‘ “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” ’ ” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 611.
We think it wholly impossible to say that the New York statutes in question here met the second part of this exception. Nor is the first part of the exception either alleged in appellees’ complaint or proved by their evidence. While some paragraphs of the complaint could be construed to make such allegations as to the creditors, there are no comparable allegations with respect to appellant justices who issued the contempt orders. This exception may not be utilized unless it is alleged and proved that they are enforcing the contempt procedures in bad faith or are motivated by a desire to harass. Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 619 (1968). There are neither allegations, proof, nor findings to that effect here.
We conclude that the District Court erred in enjoining enforcement of the New York Judiciary Law’s contempt procedures for the reasons of federalism and comity enunciated in Younger and Huffman. Its judgment is accordingly
Reversed.
There originally were three named plaintiffs. Subsequent to the bringing of this suit, five additional named plaintiffs were added. We conclude, infra, at 331-333, that not all of the named plaintiffs had the requisite standing to seek the relief sought.
The issuance of the subpoena is authorized by N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 5223 and 5224 (McKinney 1963). These subpoenas are issued by the creditor’s attorney, acting, however, as an officer of the court, cf. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 2308 (a) (McKinney 1974).
N. Y. Jud. Law § 757 (1) (McKinney 1975) .
§§ 770, 772, 773. The fine was payable to the Public Loan Co. in reduction of its judgment.
§ 756.
See n. 14, infra.
See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5701 (a) (2) (McKinney 1963); Rudd v. Rudd, 45 App. Div. 2d 22, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 136 (1974).
Since we find that the District Court erred in reaching the merits of the injunctive claim, we need not decide whether the District Court’s action in granting partial summary judgment was proper, when neither party had moved for summary judgment and when the state defendants had not yet answered the complaint.
While several of the named appellees, upon payment of the fine, had satisfied the underlying default judgment, this is not true in all of the cases. Appellee Vail, for example, owed, pursuant to the default judgment, $534.36. His payment of the contempt fine of $250 plus costs, did not satisfy the full default judgment. As to him, and the other appellees similarly situated, since the underlying action on the debt, to which the contempt proceedings were ancillary, had not ended, it is conceivable that the prospect of further contempt orders in the underlying action could have given Vail the requisite constitutional standing to seek to enjoin the contempt processes as unconstitutional. But standing cannot be based on such speculative conjectures which are neither alleged nor proved. Since the complaint does not allege the likelihood, or even the possibility, of future contempt orders, none of the appellees, excepting Ward and Rabasco, have standing. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493-499 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973).
The District Court read Younger as applying “to civil proceedings only when intervention would disrupt the very interests which would underlie a state’s criminal laws.” Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 958.
Neither Ex parte Young, nor the cases cited by it, expressly premised this conclusion on § 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 335, or its successor sections (now 28 U. S. C. § 2283). These cases, rather, are “an application of the reason underlying the Act,” Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 135 (1941), and reflect the applicability, wholly independent of a statutory codification, of the longstanding policies which inhere in the notions of comity and federalism, see Younger, 401 U. S., at 43-45; 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *411-412.
Contempt in these cases, serves, of course, to vindicate and preserve the private interests of competing litigants, People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 101 N. Y. 245, 247-249, 4 N. E. 259, 259-261 (1886), but its purpose is by no means spent upon purely private concerns. It stands in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory, Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N. Y. 534, 539, 47 N. E. 918, 920 (1897) (“The interest in maintaining respect for the action of courts, and of orderly jurisprudence, forbids that litigants should be permitted, under plea of hardship or injustice, real or pretended, to nullify or set at nought orders or decrees, however improvidently made, even if it may seem certain that the court acted in granting them under misapprehension or mistake”); cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 443 (1911); King v. Barnes, 113 N. Y. 476, 21 N.E. 182 (1889).
As we did in Huffman, we save for another day the question of “the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation,” 420 U. S., at 607.
The most propitious moment would have been at the hearing on the order to show cause. Even after the order of contempt had been issued, a motion to vacate pursuant to N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5015 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) was available, and it would have been possible to seek a stay or a temporary restraining order on the fine and commitment, see N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 2201 (McKinney 1974); Rudd v. Rudd, 45 App. Div. 2d 22, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 136 (1974). Should the state courts ultimately have sustained the validity of the state statutory system, appellees would have had final recourse, available as of right, to this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
It does not appear settled in New York whether persons faced with civil contempt will be assigned counsel if indigent, see Rudd v. Rudd, supra; but cf. In re Smiley, 36 N. Y. 2d 433, 330 N. E. 2d 53 (1975) (no inherent power in courts to direct provision of counsel or to require the compensation of retained counsel in private suits; no “risk of loss of liberty or grievous forfeiture”). In any case, the relevant datum is that the due process contentions concerning assigned counsel, as with the other contentions, could have been presented to the New York State courts by the same parties or their attorneys who, instead, chose to ignore the pending state-court proceedings by filing this suit in federal court.
Appellees Vail and McNair, apart from their request for declaratory and injunctive relief, also sought damages for alleged past violations of their constitutional rights stemming from the brief periods of incarceration. Appellants, however, are no longer involved in this aspect of the lawsuit, having been dismissed by the District Court on grounds of judicial immunity. Appellees have not challenged the District Court’s dismissal of the state-court justices from those counts, and none of the parties here have addressed the issue of the availability of damages to these appellees. The issue of damages is therefore not before us, and we intimate no opinion as to the applicability of Younger-Huffman principles to a § 1983 suit seeking only such relief in the District Court. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 607 n. 19, 609 n. 21.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations