Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether rejection of a subdivision proposal deprived appellant of its property without just compensation contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
h — I
This appeal is taken from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a property owner’s complaint for money damages for an alleged “taking” of its property. In 1975, appellant submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo County Planning Commission. Under appellant’s proposal, the subject property, at least part of which was planted with corn, would be subdivided into 159 single-family and multifamily residential lots.
The Yolo County Planning Commission rejected the subdivision plan, however, and the Board of Supervisors of the county affirmed that determination. The Board found numerous reasons why appellant’s tentative subdivision map was neither “consistent with the General Plan of the County of Yolo, nor with the specific plan of the County of Yolo embodied in the Zoning Regulations for the County.” App. 73. Appellant focuses our attention on four of those reasons. See id., at 45-46 (fourth amended complaint). First, the Board criticized the plan because it failed to provide for access to the proposed subdivision by a public street: the city of Davis, to which the subdivision would adjoin, refused to permit the extension of Cowell Boulevard into the development. See id., at 74. Even ignoring this obstacle, “[t]he map presented ma[de] no provision for any other means of access to the subdivision,” and the Board calculated that relying on an extension of Cowell Boulevard alone would “constitute] a real and substantial danger to the public health in the event of fire, earthquake, flood, or other natural disaster.” Id., at 77.
Second, the Board found that appellant’s “Tentative Map as presented [did] not provide for sewer service by any governmental entity”:
“The only means for provision of sewer services by the El Macero interceptor sewer require that the proposed subdivision anne[x] to the existing Community Services Area. Said annexation is subject to Local Agency Formation Commission jurisdiction. The Board finds that no proceedings currently are pending before LAFCO for the annexation of the proposed subdivision.” Id., at 75.
Third, the Board rejected the development plan because “[t]he level of [police] protection capable of being afforded to the proposed site by the [Yolo County] Sheriff’s Department is not intense enough to meet the needs of the proposed subdivision.” Id., at 76. Fourth, the Board found inadequate the provision for water service for the reason that there was “no provision made in the proposed subdivision for the provision of water or maintenance of a water system for the subdivision by any governmental entity.” Ibid.
After this rebuff, appellant filed the present action and, on the same day, a petition for a writ of mandate. The mandate action, which is still pending, seeks to set aside the Board’s decision and to direct the Board to reconsider appellant’s subdivision proposal. See id,., at 32-33 (amended petition for writ of mandate). This action, in contrast, seeks declaratory and monetary relief. In it, appellant accuses appellees County of Yolo and city of Davis of “restricting the Property to an open-space agricultural use by denying all permit applications, subdivision maps, and other requests to implement any other use,” id., at 46, and thereby of appropriating the “entire economic use” of appellant’s property “for the sole purpose of [providing] ... a public, open-space buffer,” id., at 51. In particular, the fourth amended complaint challenges the Board’s decision with respect to the adequacy of public access, sanitation services, water supplies, and fire and police protection. Because appellees denied these services, according to the complaint, “none of the beneficial uses” allowed even for agricultural land would be suitable for appellant’s property. Id., at 52. The complaint alleged, in capital letters and “Without limitation by the foregoing ENUMERATION,” that “ANY APPLICATION FOR A ZONE CHANGE, VARIANCE OR OTHER RELIEF WOULD BE FUTILE.” Id., at 58. The complaint also alleged that appellant had “exhausted all of its administrative remedies” and that its seven causes of action were “ripe” for adjudication. Id., at 58, 59.
In response to these charges appellees demurred. Pointing to “its earlier Order Sustaining Demurrers and Granting Leave to Amend,” the California Superior Court contended that “the property had obvious other uses than agriculture under the Yolo County Code,” id., at 115, and referenced sections permitting such uses, among others, as ranch and farm dwellings and agricultural storage facilities, see Yolo County Code §§8-2.502, 8-2.503. The court rejected appellant’s “attemp[t] to overcome that defect by alleging as conclusion-ary fact that each and every principal use and each and every multiple accessory use is no longer possible so that the property does have no value as zoned.” App. 115. It concluded that, irrespective of the insufficiency of appellant’s factual allegations, monetary damages for inverse condemnation are foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274-277, 598 P. 2d 25, 29-31 (1979), aff’d, 447 U. S. 255 (1980). App. 116, 118.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. It “accepted] as true all the properly pled factual allegations of the complaint,” id., at 126, and did “not consider whether the complaint was barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or by res judicata,” id., at 125-126. But it “f[ou]nd the decision in Agins to be controlling herein,” id., at 130:
“In that case the [California] Supreme Court specifically and clearly established, for policy reasons, a rule of law which precludes a landowner from recovering in inverse condemnation based upon land use regulation. We emphasize that the Court did not hold that regulation cannot amount to a taking without compensation, it simply held that in such event the remedy is not inverse condemnation. The remedy instead is an action to have the regulation set aside as unconstitutional. Plaintiff has filed a mandate action in the trial court which is currently pending. That is its proper remedy. The claim for inverse condemnation cannot be maintained.” Id., at 130-131 (citation and footnote omitted).
In the alternative, the California Court of Appeal determined that appellant would not be entitled to monetary relief even if California law provided for this remedy:
“In any event, even if an inverse condemnation action were available in a land use regulation situation, we would be constrained to hold that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. Pared to their essence, the allegations are that plaintiff purchased property for residential development, the property is zoned for residential development, plaintiff submitted an application for approval of development of the property into 159 residential units, and, in part at the urging of the City, the County denied approval of the application. In these allegations plaintiff is not unlike the plaintiffs in Agins ... [a case in which] both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts which would establish an unconstitutional taking of private property.
“The plaintiff’s claim here must fail for the same reasons the claims in Agins failed. Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively intensive residential development and the application was denied. The denial of that particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal to permit any development, and plaintiff concedes that the property is zoned for residential purposes in the County general plan and zoning ordinance. Land use planning is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A governmental entity is not required to permit a landowner to develop property to [the] full extent he might desire or be charged with an unconstitutional taking of the property. Here, as in Agins, the refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.” Id,., at 132-133 (citation omitted).
The California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for hearing, and appellant perfected an appeal to this Court. Because of the importance of the question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory takings, we noted probable jurisdiction. 474 U. S. 917 (1985). On further consideration of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, aided by briefing and oral argument, we find ourselves unable to address the merits of this question.
I — I I — I
The regulatory takings claim advanced by appellant has two components. First, appellant must establish that the regulation has in substance “taken” his property — that is, that the regulation “goes too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922). See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 178 (1979). Second, appellant must demonstrate that any proffered compensation is not “just.”
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes. As Justice Holmes emphasized throughout his opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 416, “this is a question of degree — and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.” Accord, id., at 413. To this day we have no “set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.” Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962). Instead, we rely “as much [on] the exercise of judgment as [on] the application of logic.” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979). Our cases have accordingly “examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors — such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action — that have particular significance.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 175. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (“ad hoc, factual inquiries”); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958) (“question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case”). Until a property owner has “obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,” “it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests ha[ve] been destroyed.” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, 186, 190, n. 11 (1985). As we explained last Term:
“[T]he difficult problem [is] how to define “too far,” that is, how to distinguish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physical possession. . . . [Resolution of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the Commission’s application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the value of respondent’s property and investment-backed profit expectation. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to respondent’s property.” Id., at 199-200 (footnote omitted).
Accord, id., at 191.
For similar reasons, a court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide “just compensation” until it knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative body intends to provide. See id., at 195 (“[T]he State’s action here is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking” (footnote omitted)). The local agencies charged with administering regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the other. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, for example, we recognized that the Landmarks Preservation Commission, the administrative body primarily responsible for administering New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, had authority in appropriate circumstances to authorize alterations, remit taxes, and transfer development rights to ensure the landmark owner a reasonable return on its property. See 438 U. S., at 112-115, and n. 13. Because the railroad had “not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure” than its proposed 50-plus story office building, id., at 137; see id., at 137, n. 34, and because its development rights in the airspace above its Grand Central Station Terminal were transferable “to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which ha[d] been found suitable for the construction of a new office building,” id., at 137, we concluded that “the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law ha[d] not effected a ‘taking’ of [the railroad’s] property,” id., at 138. Whether the inquiry asks if a regulation has “gone too far,” or whether it seeks to determine if proffered compensation is “just,” no answer is possible until a court knows what use, if any, may be made of the affected property.
Our cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it. Thus, in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), we held that zoning ordinances which authorized the development of between one and five single-family residences on appellants’ 5-acre tract did not effect a taking of their property on their face, and, because appellants had not made application for any improvements to their property, the constitutionality of any particular application of the ordinances was not properly before us. See id., at 260. Similarly, in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621 (1981), we dismissed the appeal because it did not appear that the city’s rezoning and adoption of an open space plan had deprived the utility of all beneficial use of its property. See id., at 631-632, and n. 12. Because the California Court of Appeal had “not decided whether any taking in fact ha[d] occurred, . . . further proceedings [were] necessary to resolve the federal question whether there has been a taking at all.” Id., at 633. As a consequence, the judgment was not final for purposes of our jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Ibid. Most recently, in Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, we held that the developer’s failure either to seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property in accordance with its proposed plat, or to avail itself of an available and facially adequate state procedure by which it might obtain “just compensation,” meant that its regulatory taking claim was premature.
Here, in comparison to the situations of the property owners in the three preceding cases, appellant has submitted one subdivision proposal and has received the Board’s response thereto. Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to receive the Board’s “final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S., at 191. In Agins, San Diego Gas & Electric, and William son Planning Comm’n, we declined to reach the question whether the Constitution requires a monetary remedy to redress some regulatory takings because the records in those cases left us uncertain whether the property at issue had in fact been taken. Likewise, in this case, the holdings of both courts below leave open the possibility that some development will be permitted, and thus again leave us in doubt regarding the antecedent question whether appellant’s property has been taken. The judgment is therefore
Affirmed.
The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment prohibition applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 236, 239, 241 (1897). See also Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, 175, n. 1 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 623, n. 1 (1981).
“25. In determining that Plaintiff’s land could only be used for agricultural purposes, notwithstanding its general planning and zoning designation for residential use and its suitability therefor, County determined that (i) the Property lacked access by means of suitable public streets, a condition resulting from City’s deliberate refusal to permit or approve available access; (ii) the [Property lacked sanitary sewer service, a condition resulting directly from the wrongful acts of City, County and District above alleged[;] (iii) the Property lacked adequate water supply, a finding directly contrary to the fact (in evidence before County) that there are proven sources of supply on the Property and in the vicinity thereof which serve the immediately adjacent residential areas[;] and (iv) that the Property lacked adequate fire and police services, conditions attributable in part to refusal on part of County and City to provide such services.” App. 51-52.
In California, “those factual allegations of the complaint which are properly pleaded are deemed admitted by defendant’s demurrer.” Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 746, 614 P. 2d 728, 730 (1980). “However,” a demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged therein.” Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 713, 433 P. 2d 732, 745 (1967) (citations omitted). See, e. g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591, 487 P. 2d 1241, 1245 (1971); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 327, 444 P. 2d 481, 495 (1968); Sych v. Insurance Co. of North America, 173 Cal. App. 3d 321, 326, 220 Cal. Rptr. 692, 695 (1985); Read v. City of Lynwood, 173 Cal. App. 3d 437, 442, 219 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1985). Thus, one intermediate California appellate court has sustained a demurrer to a complaint alleging a regulatory taking on jurisdictional grounds, notwithstanding an “allegation in [appellants’] complaint that they ‘have exhausted their administrative remedies’”; for “while a demurrer admits all material facts which are properly pleaded, it does not admit conclusions of fact or law alleged therein. Appellants’ conclusionary statement that they exhausted their administrative remedies therefore cannot avail them.” Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 251, 146 Cal. Rptr. 428, 432 (1978) (citation omitted). Cf. Hecton v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, 58 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657, 130 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232 (1976) (same; allegations of taking and damage).
We understand the Superior Court to have sustained the demurrer both because the complaint failed properly to plead facts amounting to a taking and because California law does not provide a monetary remedy for a regulatory taking. The Superior Court, after explaining these two reasons, concluded simply that “[t]he complaint fails to state a proper cause of action for inverse condemnation.” App. 116. Although Justice White’s dissent treats the first reason as dicta and the second as the actual basis of decision, see post, at 355-356, since the Superior Court did not rest its holding on only one of its two stated reasons, it is appropriate to treat them as alternative bases of decision.
In answer to appellant’s 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim, the California Court of Appeal similarly held that a monetary judgment was foreclosed by Agins, and that “[e]ven if a cause of action for monetary damages could be stated under the Civil Rights Act based upon the regulation of the use of property, the allegations would be insufficient in this case:
“Plaintiff seeks compensation because the County refused approval of the intensive development it desires, but that refusal does not mean that other, less intensive uses would also be denied. Accordingly plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish an uncompensated taking of its property.” App. 135.
We accept for the purposes of deciding this case that any taking was for a public purpose, as alleged in the complaint. See id., at 50. See also id., at 51, 60.
A property owner is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain this determination. See Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S., at 205-206 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 749 (1947).
Appellant’s current complaint — as authoritatively construed by the California Court of Appeal — alleged the denial of only one intense type of residential development. Appellant does not contend that only improvements along the lines of its 159-home subdivision plan would avert a regulatory taking. Rather, the complaint alleged that appellant was deprived of all beneficial use of its property. See App. 51, 60, 65. The California Court of Appeal, whose opinion on matters of local law and local pleading we must respect, cf. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 259-260, n. 5 (1980), apparently rejected what the Superior Court labeled a “conclusionary” allegation of futility, and explained that appellant could seek an administrative application of the Yolo County General Plan and Zoning Ordinances to its property which, for aught that appears, would allow development to proceed.
Justice White’s dissent reluctantly concludes that our understanding of the Court of Appeal’s decision is “plausible” and “sensible,” but insists that the Court of Appeal’s decision is “most properly read as taking as true all of the allegations in the complaint, including the allegations of futility, and as rejecting those allegations as insufficient as a matter of substantive takings law.” Post, at 363. We disagree. Both state courts upheld ap-pellees’ demurrer on the ground that not all development had been foreclosed. Thus, the Superior Court apparently accepted appellant’s submission that its property was restricted to agricultural use but held that, even so, valuable use might still be made of the land. The Court of Appeal was unwilling to concede even this much: it noted that appellant’s property was zoned residential and held that valuable residential development was open to it. These holdings that there is no total prohibition against the productive use of appellant’s land cannot possibly be reconciled with the allegations in the complaint that “any beneficial use” is precluded, App. 46, and that future applications would be futile, id., at 58. In view of the fact that these allegations were necessarily rejected by the state courts, and that the parties’ briefs disclose a permissible basis for this disposition in settled California demurrer law, see n. 3, supra; see also Brief for Respondents in 3 Civil 22306 (Cal. Ct. App., Third App. Dist., July 10, 1984), pp. 25, 27; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint in No. 36655 (Cal. Super. Ct., Yolo County, Dec. 18, 1981), 4 Clerk’s Tr., pp. 888-889, 912, n. 2, 914, it does not matter that the state courts neglected to “expressly disapprove” the deficient allegations or to detail the particular reasons why, see post, at 357.
Remarkably, the dissent implies that the Court of Appeal accepted the complaint’s allegations that local regulations denied appellant all beneficial use of its property and that further regulatory proceedings would be fruitless, but nonetheless required it to file further “useless” applications to state a taking claim. Ibid. Whatever purpose such a requirement might serve, futile reapplications are not contemplated by the Court of Appeal. To begin with, this requirement is not, as the dissent maintains, suggested by the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the decisions of the California Supreme Court and of this Court in Agins. See App. 132. To the contrary, the Court of Appeal relied on the decisions in Agins to illustrate that the property owners there — as here — had not “attempt[ed] to obtain approval to . . . develop the land” in accordance with applicable zoning regulations and for this reason had “failed to allege facts which would establish an unconstitutional taking of private property.” Id., at 132-133. See 447 U. S., at 259-263; 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P. 2d 25, 31 (1979). The implication is not that future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not yet been made. The dissent’s supposition that the Court of Appeal accepted the allegations of taking and futility is further contradicted by the court’s express denial that submission of a less intensive application would be futile: “the refusal of the [appellees] to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development.” App. 133.
Appellant is thus in the same position Mr. and Mrs. Agins would have occupied if they had requested and been denied the opportunity to build five Victorian mansions for their single-family residences, or if San Diego Gas & Electric Co. had asked and been denied the option of building a nuclear powerplant. Rejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews. In this case, of course, we have statements from both courts below dispelling any doubt on this point.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations