Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the initiative for rate increases remains with the railroads. But in the absence of special permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission, a railroad seeking an increase must provide at least 30 days’ notice to the Commission and the public before putting the new rate into effect. 49 U. S. C. § 6 (3). During that 30-day period, the Commission may suspend the operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven months pending an investigation and decision on the lawfulness of the new rates. 49 XL S. C. § 15 (7). At the end of the seven-month period, the carrier may put the suspended rate into effect unless the Commission has earlier completed its investigation and found the rate unlawful.
Proceeding under this regulatory scheme, on December 13, 1971, substantially all of the railroads in the United States requested Commission authorization to file on 5 days’ notice a 2.5% surcharge on nearly all freight rates. The railroads sought a January 1, 1972, effective date for the new rates. The surcharge was proposed as an interim emergency measure designed to produce some $246 million annually in increased revenues pending adoption of selective rate increases on a permanent basis.
As justification for the proposed surcharge, the railroads alleged increasing costs and severely inadequate revenues. In its last general revenue increase case, less than two years earlier, the Commission had found:
“[T]he financial condition of the railroad industry as a whole, and the financial status of many individual carriers by rail, must be found to be at a dangerously low level. The precipitous decline in working capital and serious loss of liquidity has reduced many carriers to a truly marginal operation. This has been most clearly demonstrated by the recent bankruptcy application of the Penn Central. We think it undeniable that a number of other roads are approaching a similar financial crisis.” Ex parte Nos. 265/267, Increased Freight Rates, 1970 and 1971, 339 I. C. C. 125, 173.
The railroads alleged that, since the close of that proceeding, their costs had increased by over $1 billion on an annual basis, including $305 million in increased wages, while economic indicators such as decreased working capital and increased debt obligations pointed toward an ever-worsening financial condition.
In an order dated December 21, 1971, the Commission acknowledged the need, particularly of some carriers, for increased revenues, but it concluded that five days’ notice and a January 1, 1972, effective date “would preclude the public from effective participation.” Ex parte No. 281, Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 1972, 340 I. C. C. 358, 361. The Commission authorized the railroads to refile the 2.5% surcharge with not less than 30 days’ notice, and an effective date no earlier than February 5, 1972.
On January 5, 1972, the railroads refiled the surcharge, to become effective on February 5, 1972. Shippers, competing carriers, and other interested persons requested the Commission to suspend the tariff for the statutory seven-month period. Various environmental groups, including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), two of the appellees here, protested that failure to suspend the surcharge would cause their members “economic, recreational and aesthetic harm.” Specifically, they claimed that the rate structure would discourage the use of “recyclable” materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other extractive activities. The members of these environmental groups were allegedly forced to pay more for finished products, and their use of forests and streams was allegedly impaired because of unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials, and the accumulation of otherwise recyclable solid and liquid waste materials. The railroads replied that since this was a general rate increase, recyclable materials would not be made any less competitive relative to other commodities, and that in the past general rate increases had not discouraged the movement of scrap materials.
The Commission issued an order on February 1, 1972, shortly before the surcharge would have automatically become effective. It recognized that “the railroads have a critical need for additional revenue from their interstate freight rates and charges to offset, in part, recently incurred increased operating costs,” and announced its decision not to suspend the 2.5% surcharge for the seven-month statutory period. In anticipation of the proposed permanent selective increases to be filed by the railroads and to avoid further complication of the tariff rates, the Commission specified that its refusal to suspend was conditioned upon the carriers’ setting an expiration date for the surcharge of no later than June 5, 1972. The Commission ordered the investigation into the railroads’ rates which had been instituted by its December 21 order to be held in abeyance until the carriers requested permission to file the indicated permanent rate increases on a selective basis. With respect to the ap-pellees’ environmental arguments, the Commission found that “the involved general increase will have no significant adverse effect on the movement of traffic by railway or on the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the [National] Environmental Policy Act of 1969.”
The proposed permanent selective increases, averaging 4.1%, were subsequently filed with the Commission, and various parties again requested that these proposed rates also be suspended. By order served March 6, 1972, the Commission did not grant the railroads’ request to have the selective increases go into effect on April 1, 1972, as they had sought but it allowed the carriers to republish their rates to become effective on May 1, 1972, upon not less than 45 days’ notice to the public. The carriers did republish the rates, and on April 24, 1972, the Commission entered an order suspending the proposed selective increase for the full seven-month period allowed by statute, or to and including November 30, 1972. The investigation into the increased rates was continued. Since the selective increases were to supplant the temporary surcharge, and since they had been suspended, the Commission modified its February 1 order and authorized the railroads to eliminate the June 5 expiration date for the surcharge and to continue collecting the surcharge until November 30, 1972.
I
On May 12, 1972, SCRAP filed the present suit against the United States and the Commission in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, along with other relief, a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the Commission’s February 1 and April 24 orders allowing the railroads to collect the 2.5% surcharge.
SCRAP stated in its amended complaint that it was “an unincorporated association formed by five law students, ... in September, 1971. Its primary purpose is to enhance the quality of the human environment for its members, and for all citizens . . . .” To establish standing to bring this suit, SCRAP repeated many of the allegations it had made before the Commission in Ex parte 281. It claimed that each of its members “suffered economic, recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad freight structure, as modified by the Commission’s actions to date in Ex Parte 281.” Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for finished products, that each of its members “[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes,” and that these uses have been adversely affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and that this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure, and that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums which must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials.
The main thrust of SCRAP'S complaint was that the Commission's decisions of February 1 and April 24, insofar as they declined to suspend the 2.5% surcharge, were unlawful because the Commission had failed to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). NEPA requires such a statement in “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment Ibid. SCRAP contended that because of its alleged adverse impact upon recycling, the Commission’s action with respect to the surcharge constituted a major federal action significantly affecting the environment.
Three additional environmental groups, also appellees here, were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs, and a group of railroads, appellants here, intervened as defendants to support the 2.5% surcharge. After a single district judge had denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and SCRAP’S motion for a temporary restraining order, a statutory three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2284, 2325, to decide the motion for a preliminary injunction and the cross-motion to dismiss the complaint.
On July 10, 1972, the District Court filed an opinion, 346 F. Supp. 189, and entered an injunction prohibiting the Commission “from permitting,” and the railroads “from collecting” the 2.5% surcharge “insofar as that surcharge relates to goods being transported for purposes of recycling, pending further order of this court.”
The court first rejected the contention that the appel-lees were without standing to sue because they allegedly had no more than “a general interest in seeing that the law is enforced,” id., at 195, and distinguished our recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, on the basis that, unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club, the environmental groups here had alleged that their members used the forests, streams, mountains and other resources in the Washington area and that this use was disturbed by the environmental impact caused by nonuse of recyclable goods.
Second, the court found that its power to grant an injunction was not barred by our decision in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 667, where we held that in enacting 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7), Congress had intentionally vested “in the Commission the sole and exclusive power to suspend” and withdrew “from the judiciary any pre-existing power to grant injunctive relief.” The court reasoned that NEPA “implicitly confers authority on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action taken in violation of NEPA's procedural requirements” “so long as the review is confined to a determination as to whether the procedural requisites of NEPA have been followed.” 346 F. Supp., at 197 and n. 11.
Finally, turning to the merits, the court concluded that the Commission’s April 24 decision not to suspend the surcharge for the statutory seven-month period was a “ ‘major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’ ” Id., at 199. On the premise that an environmental impact statement is required “whenever the action arguably will have an adverse environmental impact,” id., at 201, the court held that “the danger of an adverse impact is sufficiently real to require a statement in this case.” Ibid.
The District Court declined to stay its injunctive order pending appeal to this Court, and on July 19, 1972, The Chief Justice, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, denied applications to stay the preliminary injunction. 409 U. S. 1207. On December 18, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals filed by the United States, the Commission, and the railroads. 409 U. S. 1073.
II
The appellants challenge the appellees’ standing to sue, arguing that the allegations in the pleadings as to standing were vague, unsubstantiated, and insufficient under our recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, supra. The appellees respond that unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club, their pleadings sufficiently alleged that they were “adversely affected” or “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702, and they point specifically to the allegations that their members used the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that this use was disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods brought about by a rate increase on those commodities. The District Court found these allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. We agree.
The petitioner in Sierra Club, “a large and long-established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations,” 405 U. S., at 739, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving the creation of an extensive ski-resort development in the scenic Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club claimed standing to maintain its “public interest” lawsuit because it had “ ‘a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country ....’” Id., at 730. We held those allegations insufficient.
Relying upon our prior decisions in Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, we held that § 10 of the APA conferred standing to obtain judicial review of agency action only upon those who could show “that the challenged action had caused them 'injury in fact/ and where the alleged injury was to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated’ by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated.” 405 U. S., at 733.
In interpreting “injury in fact” we made it clear that standing was not confined to those who could show “economic harm,” although both Data Processing and Barlow had involved that kind of injury. Nor, we said, could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency’s action any person who had in fact suffered injury. Rather, we explained: “Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.” Id,, at 734. Consequently, neither the fact that the appellees here claimed only a harm to their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area, nor the fact that all those who use those resources suffered the same harm, deprives them of standing.
In Sierra Club, though, we went on to stress the importance of demonstrating that the party seeking review be himself among the injured, for it is this requirement that gives a litigant a direct stake in the controversy and prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders. No such specific injury was alleged in Sierra Club. In that case the asserted harm “will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and ski resort,” id.,, at 735, yet “[tjhe Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the . . . development.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.
Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal action of which the petitioner complained in Sierra Club, the challenged agency action in this case is applicable to substantially all of the Nation’s railroads, and thus allegedly has an adverse environmental impact on all the natural resources of the country. Rather than a limited group of persons who used a picturesque valley in California, all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here. But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the cases on which we relied in Sierra Club demonstrated the patent fact that persons across the Nation could be adversely affected by major governmental actions. See, e. g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F. 2d 1093, 1097 (interests of consumers affected by decision of Secretary of Agriculture refusing to suspend registration of certain pesticides containing DDT); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630, 631-632 (interests of consumers of oleomargarine in fair labeling of product regulated by Federal Security Administration). To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.
But the injury alleged here is also very different from that at issue in Sierra Club because here the alleged injury to the environment is far less direct and perceptible. The petitioner there complained about the construction of a specific project that would directly affect the Mineral King Valley. Here, the Court was asked to follow a far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees complained — a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of nonre-cyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area. The railroads protest that the appel-lees could never prove that a general increase in rates would have this effect, and they contend that these allegations were a ploy to avoid the need to show some injury in fact.
Of course, pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency’s action. And it is equally clear that the allegations must be true and capable of proof at trial. But we deal here simply with the pleadings in which the appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be affected. If, as the railroads now assert, these allegations were in fact untrue, then the appellants should have moved for summary judgment on the standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that the allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of fact. We cannot say on these pleadings that the ap-pellees could not prove their allegations which, if proved, would place them squarely among those persons injured in fact by the Commission’s action, and entitled under the clear import of Sierra Club to seek review. The District Court was correct in denying the appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege sufficient standing to bring this lawsuit.
Ill
We need not reach the issue whether, under conventional standards of equity, the District Court was justified in issuing a preliminary injunction, because we have concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction in any event.
The District Court enjoined the Commission from “permitting,” and the railroads from “collecting,” the 2.5%' interim surcharge on recyclable commodities. Finding that NEPA implicitly conferred authority “on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action taken in violation of NEPA’s procedural requirements,” 346 F. Supp., at 197, it concluded that our decision in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, did not affect judicial power to issue an injunction in the circumstances of this case. We cannot agree.
In Arrow, the Commission had suspended a railroad’s proposed rates for the statutory seven-month period, and the railroad had voluntarily deferred the proposed rate for an additional five months. When the Commission had not reached a final decision within that period, the railroad announced its intent to adopt the new rates. In a suit brought to enjoin the railroad from effectuating that change, we held that the courts were without power to issue such an injunction. From the language and history of § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, we concluded that Congress had vested exclusive power in the Commission to suspend rates pending its final decision on their lawfulness, and had deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant such relief. The factual distinctions between the present cases and Arrow are inconsequential.
It is true that the injunction in Arrow was sought after the statutory seven-month period had expired and thus represented an attempt to extend judicially the suspension period, while here the injunction was issued during the suspension period. But Arrow was grounded on the lack of power in the courts to grant any injunction before the Commission had finally determined the lawfulness of the rates, and that holding did not depend on the fact that the availability of the Commission’s power of suspension had passed. Indeed, the federal court decisions cited and approved in Arrow involved instances where the courts had been asked to enjoin rates during the statutory sevenmonth period. See, e. g., M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 236 F. 573, aff’d, 239 F. 718; Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913; Bison S. S. Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 63; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605, 609—610, acated in part as moot, 364 U. S. 280; Carlsen v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 398.
Similarly, there is no significance in the fact that, unlike Arrow, the injunction in this litigation ran against the Commission as well as the railroads. The only way in which the Commission could comply with the court’s order would be to exercise its power of suspension and suspend the surcharge. The injunction constitutes a direct interference with the Commission’s discretionary decision whether or not to suspend the rates. It would turn Arrow into a sheer formality and effectively amend § 15 (7) if a federal court could accomplish by injunction against the Commission what it could not accomplish by injunction directly against the railroads. And, again, the federal court decisions on which Arrow relied were for the most part cases in which the courts had held that they were without power to compel the Commission to grant a rate suspension. See, e. g., Bison S. S. Corp. v. United States, supra; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, supra; Carlsen v. United States, supra; cf. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, supra. Thus, the only arguably significant distinction between the present litigation and Arrow is that here the Commission allegedly failed to comply with NEPA. However, we cannot agree with the District Court that NEPA has amended § 15 (7) sub silentio and created an implicit exception to Arrow so that judicial power to grant in-junctive relief in this case has been revived. NEPA, one of the recent major federal efforts at reversing the deterioration of the country’s environment, declares "that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” 42 U. S. C. § 4331. To implement these lofty purposes, Congress imposed a number of responsibilities upon federal agencies, most notably the requirement of producing a detailed environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). But nowhere, either in the legislative history or the statutory language, is there any indication that Congress intended to restore to the federal courts the power temporarily to suspend railroad rates, a power that had been clearly taken away by § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The statutory language, in fact, indicates that NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute. Thus, 42 U. S. C. §4335 specifies that “[t]he policies and goals set forth in [NEPA] are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies,” and 42 U. S. C. § 4334 instructs that the Act “shall [not] in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency . . . .” Rather than providing for any wholesale overruling of prior law, NEPA requires all federal agencies to review their “present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of [NEPA] • and shall propose to the President . . . such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in [NEPA].” 42 U. S. C. §4333. It would be anomalous if Congress had provided at one and the same time that federal agencies, which have the primary responsibility for the implementation of NEPA, must comply with present law and ask for any necessary new legislation, but that the courts may simply ignore what we described in Arrow as “a clear congressional purpose to oust judicial power . . . 372 U. S., at 671 n. 22.
The District Court pointed to nothing either in the language or history of NEPA that suggests a restoration of previously eliminated judicial power. While it relied primarily on the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 449 F. 2d 1109, and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 463 F. 2d 783, neither case supports an injunction under the circumstances of this case. Calvert Cliffs’ held that a federal court had power to review rules promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission, and there the court ordered further consideration of the rules on the ground that there had not been compliance with NEPA. In Committee for Nuclear Responsibility it was held that federal courts had jurisdiction to consider whether an executive decision to conduct a nuclear test had satisfied the procedural requirements of NEPA. The question here, however, is not whether there is general judicial power to determine if an agency has complied with NEPA, and to grant equitable relief if it has not, cf. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., supra, at 671 n. 22; Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, but rather whether in a specific context NEPA sub silentio revived judicial power that had been explicitly eliminated by Congress. Calvert Cliffs’ and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility have nothing to say on this issue, for neither was concerned with a specific statute that restricts the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions.
Our conclusion that the District Court lacked the power to grant the present injunction is confirmed by the fact that each of the policies that we identified in Arrow as the basis for § 15 (7) would be substantially undermined if the courts were found to have suspension powers simply because noncompliance with NEPA was alleged.
First, Arrow found that the Commission had been granted exclusive suspension powers in order to avoid the diverse results that had previously been reached by the courts. District courts had differed as to the existence and scope of any power to grant interim relief, with the consequence that the uniformity of rates had been jeopardized, and different shippers, carriers, and areas of the country had been subjected to disparate treatment. Similarly, since a suit to enjoin a national rate increase on NEPA grounds could be brought in any federal district court in the country, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 2284, 2321-2325, the result might easily be that the courts would "[reach] diverse results, . . . [engendering] confusion and [producing] competitive inequities.” 372 U. S., at 663. In short, a rate increase allowed in New York might be disallowed in New Jersey.
Second, we stressed in Arrow that § 15 (7) represents a careful accommodation of the various interests involved. The suspension period was limited as to time to prevent excessive harm to the carriers, for the revenues lost during that period could not be recouped from the shippers. On the other hand, Congress was aware that if the Commission did not act within the suspension period, then the new rates would automatically go into effect and the shippers would have to pay increased rates that might eventually be found unlawful. To mitigate this loss, Congress authorized the Commission to require the carriers to keep detailed accounts and eventually to repay the increased rates if found unlawful. To allow judicial suspension for noncompliance with NEPA, would disturb this careful balance of interests. A railroad may depend for its very financial life on an increased rate, and the rate may be perfectly just and reasonable. Granting an injunction against that rate based on the Commission’s alleged noncompliance with NEPA, although the Commission had determined not to suspend the rate, would deprive the railroad of vitally needed revenues and result in an unjustified windfall to shippers.
Finally, we found in Arrow that any survival of a judicial power to grant interim injunctive relief would represent an undesirable interference with the orderly exercise of the Commission’s power of suspension. Similarly, to grant an injunction in the present context, even though not based upon a substantive consideration of the rates, would directly interfere with the Commission’s decision as to when the rates were to go into effect, and would ignore our conclusion in Arrow that “Congress meant to foreclose a judicial power to interfere with the timing of rate changes which would be out of harmony with the uniformity of rate levels fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” 372 U. S., at 668. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F. 2d 783, 788, where, on the basis of alleged noncompliance with NEPA, an injunction was sought against a Commission order refusing to suspend rates:
“The basis of the decision in Arrow — that to permit judicial interference with the Commission’s suspension procedures would invite the very disruption in the orderly review of the lawfulness of proposed tariffs that Congress meant to preclude — applies with equal force to the issue now before us.”
Accordingly, because the District Court granted a preliminary injunction suspending railroad rates when it lacked the power to do so, its judgment must be reversed and the cases remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Title 49 U. S. C. § 6 (3) provides: “No change shall be made in the rates, fares, and charges or joint rates, fares, and charges which have been filed and published by any common carrier in compliance with the requirements of this section, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public published as aforesaid, which shall plainty state the changes proposed to be made in the schedule then in force and the time when the changed rates, fares, or charges will go into effect; and the proposed changes shall be shown by printing new schedules, or shall be plainly indicated upon the schedules in force at the time and kept open to public inspection: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, allow' changes upon less than the notice herein specified, or modify the requirements of this section in respect to publishing, posting, and filing of tariffs, either in particular instances or by a general order applicable to special or peculiar circumstances or conditions: Provided further, That the Commission is authorized to make suitable rules and regulations for the simplification of schedules of rates, fares, charges, and classifications and to permit in such rules and regulations the filing of an amendment of or change in any rate, fare, charge, or classification without filing complete schedules covering rates, fares, charges, or classifications not changed if, in its judgment, not inconsistent with the public interest.”
Title 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) provides in pertinent part: “Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new . . . rate, fare, or charge, . . . the Commission shall have . . . authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, [or] charge . . . ; and pending such hearing and the decision thereon the Commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may from time to time suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, [or] charge . . . , but not for a longer period than seven months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate, fare, [or] charge . . . goes into effect, the Commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made within the period of suspension, the proposed change of rate, fare, [or] charge . . . shall go into effect at the end of such period; but in case of a proposed increased rate or charge for or in respect to the transportation of property, the Commission may by order require the interested carrier or carriers to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and upon completion of the hearing and decision may by further order require the interested carrier or carriers to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified. At any hearing involving a change in a rate, fare, [or] charge . . . after September 18, 1940, the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed changed rate, fare, [or] charge . . . is just and reasonable, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over all other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.”
Other statutory provisions giving suspension powers to the Commission include 49 U. S. C. §§ 316 (g), 318 (c) (Motor Carrier Act); 49 U. S. C. §§907 (g), (i) (Water Carrier Act); 49 U. S. C. § 1006 (e) (Freight Forwarders Act).
Figures reported to the Commission indicated that the net working capital of the Class I railroads for the 12 months ending September 30, 1971, was only $75.4 million, approximately $33.7 million less than the year-end 1970 figure. Long-term debt maturing within one year from September 30, 1971, was $43.6 million higher than on December 31, 1970. Equipment obligations at the end of 1970 were $4,448 million, or almost twice the total in 1960.
The order of the ICC is unreported.
The Commission also imposed as a condition on its refusal to suspend the exclusion of increased rates "on freight in trailer bodies, semi-trailers, vehicles or containers on flat cars, on export and import traffic.” Since such increases had been proposed only by the western and southern carriers and not by the eastern carriers, such increases would, in the Commission’s view, have disrupted existing port relationships.
Finally, the Commission conditioned its action on the provision that the proposed surcharge would not apply to shipments originating prior to February 5,1972, and moving under transit arrangements.
The March 6 and April 24 orders of the ICC are unreported.
Section 102, 42 U. S. C. §4332, provides in pertinent part:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
“(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
“ (iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
“(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
“Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public . . . and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.”
The Environmental Defense Fund, National Parks and Conservation Association, and Izaak Walton League of America intervened as plaintiffs. The allegations as to standing made by each of these groups were similar to those made by SCRAP. EDF, for example, alleged as follows:
“EDF has a nationwide membership of over 32,000 persons composed of scientists, educators, lawyers and other citizens dedicated to the protection of our environment and the wise use of our natural resources. Each of EDF’s members has a personal interest in the maintenance of a safe, healthful, productive environment as free from waste substances as is possible. EDF's members have contributed financially to EDF in part so that they may obtain adequate representation of their legally protected environmental interests, which representation they could not otherwise individually afford. Each of EDF’s members has under § 101 (c) of NEPA, ‘a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment,’ which responsibility they fulfill in part by becoming a member of and contributing to EDF.
“The increased freight rates and charges in Ex Parte 281 and the continuance of the underlying rate structure, which discriminate against movement of secondary (recyclable) materials, will cause EDF members individualized injury and adversely affect them in one or more of their activities and pastimes. Specifically, each EDF member: (i) has been or will be caused to pay more for products in the market place, made more expensive by both the non-use of recycled materials in their manufacture, and the need to use comparatively more energy in processing primary raw materials as opposed to secondary (recyclable) materials; (ii) uses the nation’s forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational and aesthetic purposes. These uses have been and will continue to be adversely affected to the extent that the freight rate structure, as modified thus far in Ex Parte 281, encourages destruction of virgin timber, the unnecessary extraction of nonrenewable resources, and the discharge and accumulation of otherwise recyclable materials.”
The court dismissed as moot that part of the complaint relating to the Commission’s February 1 order because that order had expired by its own terms on June 5. Since the environmental groups have not appealed from the judgment below, we have before us for review only the District Court’s action with regard to the Commission’s April 24 order that allowed the surcharge to continue until November 30, 1972.
The court also concluded that since the Commission had taken no final action with respect to the 4.1% selective increase, the lawfulness of that tariff was not ripe for review. The court did, however, retain jurisdiction over the case to review the final order of the Commission.
While subsequent events do not bear directly on the validity of the District Court’s action in granting the preliminary injunction, they do highlight the problems that hover in the background of this litigation.
On October 4, 1972, the Commission served its report and order in Ex parte 281 approving, with some exceptions, the general increases filed by the railroads. Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 1972, 341 I. C. C. 290. In that report, although the Commission gave extensive consideration to environmental aspects of the rate increases, it declined to include a formal environmental impact statement because it concluded that its actions “will neither actually nor potentially significantly affect the quality of the human environment Id., at 314.
The selective increases were to become effective on October 23, 1972, but the Commission delayed until November 12 the effective date for rate increases on recyclable commodities in order to allow the submission of comments by interested parties. Upon the submission of critical comments, the Commission, in an unreported order served on November 8, reopened the rate proceeding in Ex parte 281 for further evaluation of the rates on recyclable commodities, and ordered the proposed selective tariff increases on those commodities suspended for the full seven-month period authorized by statute — until June 10, 1973. Accordingly, with respect to recyclable commodities on which the proposed selective increase had been suspended, the Commission extended the expiration date of the 2.5% surcharge until June 10, 1973, the expiration date for the suspension of the selective increases. But the Commission acknowledged that the power to collect the surcharge on these recyclable commodities was barred by the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court in the present case and which is the subject of the present appeals. In short, the temporary 2.5% surcharge would have been in effect throughout this period on recyclable commodities but for the District Court’s resilient preliminary injunction. Whether the Commission deliberately continued the surcharge beyond the time it would have been supplanted by the selective increases in order to give the surcharge and the District Court’s injunction continuing effect and thus avoid mooting this litigation, and whether the Commission acted beyond its powers under 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) by suspending the selective increases for a second seven-month period and by treating the District Court’s injunction as having continuing effect, are questions not raised here. No party now maintains that these cases are moot. Cf. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515.
Both sets of appellees filed motions in the District Court: SCRAP sought a preliminary injunction against the Commission’s October 4 order, and EDF and the other intervening plaintiffs ■sought leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint and requested other relief. On January 9, 1973, the court deferred consideration of the EDF motions and denied SCRAP’S request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that as a result of the Commission’s November 8 order, neither the selective rate increases nor the temporary surcharge could be assessed on recyclable commodities. Consequently, the court found, no injunctive relief was justified as to those materials. While the permanent rate increase approved by the Commission in Ex parte 281 was then being collected on shipments of all other commodities, and although the Commission had concededly failed to file an impact statement, the court concluded that “the danger of an adverse impact appears to be sufficiently speculative . . . that it would be unsound to grant preliminary relief.” The court continued: “The record indicates that many railroads are in dire financial straits — some on the verge of bankruptcy — and badly need the revenues now being obtained under the Commission’s rate increase. The increase amounts to some $340 million per year, and were this revenue flow halted it could not easily be recouped should it later appear that no NEPA statement was necessary.” The merits of neither the Commission’s October 4 order nor the District Court’s January 9 decision are before us, and we therefore express no opinion on them.
On May 7, 1973, the Commission served its final environmental impact statement relating to the selective rate increases on recyclable commodities. It concluded that the proposed increases would have no significant adverse effect on the environment. Contending that the impact statement was inadequate, EDF and SCRAP sought to enjoin collection of the selective rate increases. On June 7, 1973, the District Court temporarily enjoined the railroads from collecting the selective increases on recyclable commodities. On June 8, 1973, The Chief Justice, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, stayed the District Court’s injunction pending further order of this Court.
Like the petitioner in Sierra Chib, the appellees here base their standing to sue upon the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 702, which provides:
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof;”
As in Sierra Club, it is unnecessary to reach any question concerning the scope of the “zone of interests” test or its application to this ease. It is undisputed that the “environmental interest” that the appellees seek to protect is within the interests to be protected by NEPA, and it is unnecessary to consider the various allegations of economic harm on which the appellees also relied in their pleadings and which the Government contends are outside the intended purposes of NEPA.
The Government urges us to limit standing to those who have been “significantly” affected by agency action. But, even if we could begin to define what such a test would mean, we think it fundamentally misconceived. “Injury in fact” reflects the statutory requirement that a person be “adversely affected” or “aggrieved,” and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation' — even though small — from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186; a $5 fine and costs, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420; and a $1.50 poll tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663. While these cases were not dealing specifically with § 10 of the APA, we see no reason to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of “adversely affected” or “aggrieved.” As Professor Davis has put it: “The basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation.” Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613. See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§22.09-5, 22.09-6 (Supp. 1970).
The railroads object to the fact that the allegations were not more precise — that no specific “forest” was named, that there was no assertion of the existence of any lumbering camp or other extractive facility in the area. They claim that they had no way to answer such allegations which were wholly barren of specifics. But, if that were really a problem, the railroads could have moved for a more definite statement, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (e), and certainly normal civil discovery devices were available to the railroads.
Similarly, the District Court cannot be faulted for failing to take evidence on the issue of standing. This case came before the court on motions to dismiss and for a preliminary injunction. If the railroads thought that it was necessary to take evidence, or if they believed summary judgment was appropriate, they could have moved for such relief.
EDF suggests that the April 24 order of the Commission was in fact a final order finding the surcharge "just and reasonable,” not simply a refusal to suspend the surcharge. But the Commission’s reference to the “just and reasonable” nature of the surcharge was a preliminary assessment commonly made in suspension orders. See, e. g., the suspension orders quoted in Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 530, 531; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977, 978-979. It did not represent a final determination by the Commission that any particular rate was just and reasonable. Indeed the Commission made it clear in its February 1 order that the surcharge was not considered a prescribed rate within the meaning of Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, and was subject to complaint and investigation under the Act.
An alternative ground for avoiding the Arrow decision, which was suggested but not relied on by the District Court, was that the surcharge here was an "agency-made” rate, not a “carrier-made” rate. Moss v. CAB, 430 F. 2d 891, which was cited by the court is, however, plainly inapposite. There the CAB suspended the rates proposed by the carriers, but suggested in their place “a complete and innovative scheme for setting all passenger rates for the continental United States.” Id., at 899. It was clear that when the carriers filed the rates suggested by the Board they would not be suspended. “Even a cursory reading of the order makes it clear that the Board told the carriers what rates to file; it set forth a step-by-step formula requiring major changes in rate-making practices and in rates which it expected the carriers to adopt.” Id., at 899-900. Here, by contrast, the level and structure of the rates were proposed entirely by the carriers. While the Commission suggested an expiration date for the surcharge, this was simply to make the surcharge expire when the general selective increases went into effect. This expiration date and the other standard conditions attached to the Commission’s refusal to suspend the surcharge did not, in any meaningful sense, transform the carrier-made rate into a Commission-made rate.
See n. 8, supra.
See Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F. 2d 412, 420; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 43, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1119; City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160; Cohen v. Price Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 1236, 1241.
The argument that NEPA implicitly restored to the courts the injunctive power that § 15 (7) had divested is similar to a contention rejected in Arrow itself. There the petitioners claimed that congressional adoption of the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, had implicitly altered §15 (7). They claimed that the proposed new railroad rates would drive the barge lines out of existence, contrary to the congressional declaration of concern for the protection of water carriers threatened by rail competition. The Court concluded that “nothing in the National Transportation Policy, enacted many years after . . . §15(7), indicates that Congress intended to revive a judicial power which . . . was extinguished when the suspension power was vested in the Commission.” Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 673. In addition, the Court noted that, as is also true with NEPA, the mandate was directed not to the courts but to the Commission. There is nothing about NEPA that makes it any more amenable for finding an implicit amendment of § 15 (7), than the National Transportation Policy was.
Indeed Calvert Cliffs' indicated that the requirements of § 102 of NEPA, see n. 8, supra, did not have to be complied with, if such compliance was precluded by another statutory provision. 146 U. S. App. D. C., at 39, 449 F. 2d, at 1115. And Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, in another context, endorsed a principle, equally applicable here, that “repeal by implication is disfavored.” 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 382, 463 F. 2d 783, 785.
In view of our conclusion that there was no power to grant the preliminary injunction, it is unnecessary for us to reach the other questions posed by the parties. For example, the Government and the railroads urge that, because of the pressures of time, an environmental impact statement is not required at the suspension stage of a rate proceeding, and, in any event, a decision by the Commission whether or not to suspend rates is not subject to judicial review. See Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F. 2d 783; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977; M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 236 F. 573; Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605; Carlsen v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 398. The appellees in turn contend that some compliance -with NEPA is possible at the suspension stage, and that such compliance is required if the statute is to be enforced “to the fullest extent possible.” See 42 U. S. C. §4332. And they urge that there is, or should be, an exception to the general principle of nonreviewability of suspension decisions for those cases where the Commission has acted beyond its statutory authority, or in violation of a clear statutory command or a procedural requirement, a standard that the appellees view as broad enough to encompass alleged noncompliance with NEPA. See Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 530, 532; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, supra, at 982 (Doyle, J., concurring); Long Island R. Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 795. We express no view on any of these issues.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations