f Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After administrative hearings, the respondent Pedreiro, an alien, was ordered deported under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. . He petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the deportation order, declare it void and issue a temporary injunction restraining its execution pending final district court action. In part he contended that there was no legal evidence to support the order and that in violation of due process he had been compelled to incriminate himself in the hearings. Relief was sought only against the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of New York. The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that either the Attorney General or the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was an indispensable party and should have been joined. This holding made it unnecessary for the District Court to pass on another ground ' urged for dismissal, that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 precluded judicial review of deportation orders by any method except habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both contentions of the Government. 213 F. 2d 768. In doing so it followed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which had held that deportation orders entered under the 1952 Immigration Act can be judicially reviewed in actions for declaratory relief under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rubinstein v. Brownell, 92 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 206 F. 2d 449, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 346 U. S. 929. But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that habeas corpus is the only way such deportation orders can be attacked. Batista v. Nicolls, 213 F. 2d 20. Because of this conflict among the circuits and the contention that allowing judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus conflicts with Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, we granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 882.
The Heikkila case, unlike this one, dealt with a deportation order under the Immigration Act of 1917. That Act provided that deportation orders of the Attorney General should be “final” and had long been interpreted as precluding any type of judicial review except by habeas corpus. Heikkila contended that this narrow right of review of deportation orders under the 1917 Act had been broadened by § 10 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes review of agency action by any appropriate method “except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review . . . .” Because this Court had construed the word “final” in the 1917 Act as precluding any review except by habeas corpus, it held that the Administrative Procedure Act gave no additional remedy since § 10 excepted statutes that precluded judicial review. The Court carefully pointed out, however, that it did not consider whether the same result should be reached under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act “which took effect after Heikkila’s complaint was filed.” Consequently Heikkila.does not control this case and we must consider the effect of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act on the right to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that “Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.” And § 12 of the Act provides that “No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.” In the subsequent 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act there is no language which “expressly” supersedes or modifies the expanded right of review granted by § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. But the 1952 Immigration Act does provide, as did the 1917 Act, that deportation orders of the Attorney General shall be “final.” The Government contends that we should read this as expressing a congressional purpose to give the word “final” in the 1952 Act precisely the same meaning Heikkila gave “final” in the 1917 Act and thereby continue to deprive deportees of all right of judicial review except by habeas corpus. We cannot accept this. contention.
Such a restrictive construction of the finality provision of the present Immigration Act would run counter to § 10 and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Their purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes like the 1952 Immigration Act. And as the Court said in the Heikkila case, the Procedure Act is to be given a “hospitable” interpretation. In that case the Court also referred to ambiguity in the provision making deportation orders of the Attorney General “final.” It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the ambiguous word “final” in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring to finality in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or in part. And it would certainly not be in keeping with either of these Acts to require a person ordered deported to go to jail in order to obtain review by a court, j
The legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act supports respondent’s right to full judicial review of this deportation order. The sponsors of the Administrative Procedure Act were Representative Walter in the House and Senator McCarran in the Senate. They were also the sponsors of the 1952 Immigration Act. While the latter Act was under consideration in the House, an amendment was proposed which provided for liberal judicial review of deportation orders. Representative Walter assured the House that the proposed amendment was not needed. He said: “Now, we come to this question of the finality of the decision of the Attorney General. That language means that it is a final decision as far as the administrative branch of the Government is concerned, but it is not final in that it is not the last remedy that the alien has. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable.” With reference to the same problem Senator McCarran assured the Senate that “the Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill.” It is argued that these assurances by the chairmen of the committees in charge of the bills were but isolated statements and that other legislative history is sufficient to refute them. We cannot agree. Our holding is that there is a right of judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus and that the remedy sought here is an appropriate one.
] We also reject the Government’s contention that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is an indispensable party to an action for declaratory relief of this kind. District Directors are authorized by regulation to issue warrants of deportation, to designate the country to which an alien shall be deported, and to determine when his mental or physical condition requires the employment of a person to accompany him. The regulations purport to make these decisions of the District Director final. It seems highly appropriate, therefore, that the District Director charged with enforcement of a deportation order should represent the Government’s interest. Otherwise in order to try his case an alien might be compelled to go to the District of Columbia to obtain jurisdiction over the Commissioner. To impose this burden on an alien about to be deported would be completely inconsistent with the basic policy of the Administrative Procedure Act to facilitate court review of such administrative action. We know of no necessity for such a harsh rule. Undoubtedly the Government’s defense can be adequately presented by the District Director who is under the supervision of the Commissioner.
It is argued, however, that the Commissioner should be an indispensable party because a judgment against a District Director alone would not be final and binding in other immigration districts. But we need not decide the effect of such a judgment. We cannot assume that a decision on the merits in a court of appeals on a question of this kind, subject to review by this Court, would be lightly disregarded by the immigration authorities. Nor is it to be assumed that a second effort to have the same issue decided in a habeas corpus proceeding would do any serious harm to the Government. In habeas corpus proceedings district courts would have the duty to consider previous court decisions on the same matter. And even though in extraordinary circumstances new matters not previously adjudicated may arise in habeas corpus proceedings, this is no adequate reason for subjecting an alien to the great burden of having to go with his witnesses to the District of Columbia, which may be far distant from his home, in order to contest his deportation. Our former cases have established a policy under which indispensability of parties is determined on practical considerations. See, e. g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U. S. 490. That policy followed here causes us to conclude that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is not an indispensable party.
Affirmed
66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq.
60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009.
39 Stat. 889, as amended, 54 Stat. 1238.
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 232, note 4.
98 Cong. Rec. 4416.
98 Cong. Rec. 5778.
Compare Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F. 2d 280; Rodriguez v. Landon, 212 F. 2d 508.
8 CFR §§ 243.1, 243.2.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations