Per Curiam.
After argument, we continued this cause to enable the petitioner to apply for a certificate or other expression from the appropriate California courts to show whether the judgments rested on adequate and independent state grounds or whether decision of the federal question was necessary to the judgments rendered. 340 U. S. 622 (1951). Such expressions have been obtained.
The Supreme Court has informed us that its refusal to grant a writ of certiorari from the default judgment entered by the Superior Court was based upon petitioner’s failure to utilize the proper channel of review, namely, his failure to appeal from the default judgment. Inasmuch as our jurisdiction to review state court judgments extends only to final judgments rendered “by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” 28 U. S. C. § 1257, we have no jurisdiction to review the proceedings arising from the default judgment.
The District Court of Appeal has informed us that the decision of the federal question was essential to its denial of the application for writ of prohibition, and that its judgment did not rest upon an independent state ground. The expression we have received from the California Supreme Court is also susceptible of the interpretation that its denial of a hearing from the judgment of the District Court of Appeal was based upon an adequate state ground. We do not consider the force of that statement since it is clear that the judgment properly before us is that of, the District Court of Appeal, which did decide the federal question. See American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19, 20-21 (1923). We have jurisdiction over that judgment. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 565-568 (1947); Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8 (1931), and cases cited at 14.
The presence of jurisdiction upon petition for writ of certiorari does not, of course, determine the exercise of that jurisdiction, for the issuance of the writ is discretionary. In this case petitioner could have obtained review of the final adjudication of the merits by appealing from the default judgment. The California Supreme Court has apparently refrained from taking action because of the existence of that remedy. In these circumstances we think it advisable not to exercise our jurisdiction. The writ is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted. Cf. Loftus v. Illinois, 337 U. S. 935 (1949); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431 (1948); Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806 (1948).
Writ dismissed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Clark dissent.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations