Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has statutory power to grant motor carriers temporary operating authority “without hearings or other proceedings” when the authority relates to a “service for which there is an immediate and urgent need” and where there is “no carrier service capable of meeting such need.” Interstate Commerce Act § 210a, 52 Stat. 1238, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 310a. The ICC processes applications for such authority under rules promulgated in 1965. 49 CFR pt. 1131. Among other things, those rules require that an applicant accompany his application with supporting statements of shippers that contain information “designed to establish an immediate and urgent need for service which cannot be met by existing carriers.” Id., § 1131.2 (c). Each such supporting statement “must contain at least” 11 items of information including the following:
“(8) Whether efforts have been made to obtain the service from existing motor, rail, or water carriers, and the dates and results of such efforts.
“(9) Names and addresses of existing carriers who have either failed or refused to provide the service, and the reasons given for any such failure or refusal.”
Appellant American Farm Lines (AFL) filed an application for temporary operating authority. The application was accompanied by a supporting statement of the Department of Defense (DOD). The ICC Temporary Authorities Board denied the application on the ground that the “applicant has not established that there exists an immediate and urgent need for any of the service proposed.” Division I of the ICC (acting as an Appellate Division) reversed the Board and granted AFL temporary authority. Protesting carriers sought review of this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. A single judge of the District Court temporarily restrained the operation of the ICC order and the ICC thereupon ordered postponement of the operation of its grant. At that time numerous petitions for reconsideration were pending before the Commission and the stay order did not direct the Commission to stay its hand with respect to them. The record was indeed not filed with the court until much later. Meanwhile, the Commission granted the petitions and reopened the proceeding to receive a further supporting statement of DOD. This took the form of the verified statement of Vincent F. Caputo, DOD Director for Transportation and Warehousing Policy, which was submitted as a purported reply to the pending petitions for reconsideration. Based upon this statement, the ICC entered a new order granting the AFL application. A single judge of the District Court restrained the operation of the new order. Thereafter a three-judge District Court conducted a full hearing on the merits. The ICC admitted at that stage that its first order “may not have been based upon evidence to support its conclusion,” but argued that there was no infirmity in the new order. The three-judge court set aside both orders. 298 F. Supp. 1006. Both AFL and ICC appealed to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 884.
I
The first alleged error in the case is the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to require strict compliance with its own rules. The rules in question, unlike some of our own, do not involve “jurisdictional” problems but only require certain information to be set forth in statements filed in support of applications of motor carriers for temporary operating authority.
The Caputo statement asserted that part of the tremendous volume of traffic that DOD moved in the territories involved had to be moved “in the most expeditious manner possible,” and that, since air transport was prohibitively expensive “except in the most extreme emergencies,” there was an “imperative” need for the most expeditious motor carrier service. The need for this expeditious transport did not rest merely on a desire to obtain the most efficient service, but in addition rested on the need to coordinate arrival times of shipments with factory production schedules and with ship-loading or airlift times for overseas shipments. The particular inadequacies in existing service were pointed out, namely, the delays inherent in joint-line service, regular-route service, and the use of single drivers. The statement did not assert that none of the existing carriers provided sufficiently expeditious service to meet DOD needs; rather it claimed that the carriers providing satisfactory service in the territories in question were so few in number that the additional services of AFL were required to meet DOD’s transportation needs.
Concededly, the Caputo statement did not give the dates of DOD’s efforts to secure service from other existing carriers, or a complete list of the names and addresses of the carriers who failed or refused to provide service, as required by the terms of subsections (8) and (9), 49 CFR § 1131.2 (c). Such a complete listing of this information, given the volume of traffic involved, would indeed have been a monumental undertaking.
The failure of the Caputo statement to provide these particular specifics did not prejudice the carriers in making precise and informed objections to AFL’s application. The briefest perusal of the objecting carriers’ replies, which cover some 156 pages in the printed record of these appeals, belies any such contention. Neither was the statement so devoid of information that it, along with the replies of the protesting carriers, could not support a finding that AFL’s service was required to meet DOD’s immediate and urgent transportation needs. In our view, the District Court exacted a standard of compliance with procedural rules that was wholly unnecessary to provide an adequate record to review the Commission’s decision.
The Commission is entitled to a measure of discretion in administering its own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems necessary to resolve quickly and correctly urgent transportation problems. It is argued that the rules were adopted to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals; in opposition it is said the rules were intended primarily to facilitate the development of relevant information for the Commission’s use in deciding applications for temporary authority.
We agree with the Commission that the rules were promulgated for the purpose of providing the “necessary information” for the Commission “to reach an informed and equitable decision” on temporary authority applications. ICC Policy Release of January 23, 1968. The Commission stated that requests for temporary authority would be turned down “if the applications do not adequately comply with [the] . . . rules.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The rules were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion as in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; nor is this a case in which an agency required by rule to exercise independent discretion has failed to do so. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260; Yellin v. United States, 374 U. S. 109. Thus there is no reason to exempt this case from the general principle that “[i]t is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 205 F. 2d 763, 764. And see NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F. 2d 126, 129; Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F. 2d 233; McKenna v. Seaton, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 50, 259 F. 2d 780.
We deal here with the grant of temporary authority similar to that granted in Estes Express Lines v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 842, aff’d, 394 U. S. 718. There the grant of temporary authority was upheld even though there may not have been literal compliance with subsections (8) and (9) of the Commission’s rules. That result was in line with § 210a (a) of the Act which was designed to provide the Commission with a swift and procedurally simple ability to respond to urgent transportation needs. That functional approach is served by treating (8) and (9) not as inflexible procedural conditions but as tools to aid the Commission in exercising its discretion to meet “an immediate and urgent need” for services where the existing service is incapable of meeting that need. Unlike some rules, the present ones are mere aids to the exercise of the agency’s independent discretion.
II
After the Commission issued its first order, petitions for reconsideration were filed and before they were passed upon, some carriers filed suit and a single judge temporarily restrained operation of that first order. It was after that order issued and over a month before the case was argued to the three-judge court that the Commission granted the petitions for rehearing and reopened the record and received the Caputo verified statement.
The District Court held that the pendency of the review proceedings deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to reopen the administrative record.
Congress has provided as respects some regulatory systems that the agency may modify any finding up until the record is filed with a court. Such is the provision of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (d) and § 160 (e), which provides that any subsequent changes in the record will be made only at the direction of the court. A similar provision is included in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c) and in § 11. of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (c). And a like provision is included in the review by the courts of appeals of orders of other designated federal agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2347 (c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). But there is no such requirement in the Interstate Commerce Act. It indeed empowers the Commission “at any time to grant rehearings as to any decision, order, or requirement and to reverse, change, or modify the same.”
The power of the Commission to grant rehearings is not limited or qualified by the terms of 49 U. S. C. § 17 (6) or § 17 (7). Thus in § 17 (6) it is said, “Rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration may be granted if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear.” And § 17 (7) provides that if after rehearing or reconsideration the original decision, order, or requirement appears “unjust or unwarranted,” the Commission may “reverse, change, or modify” the same. These broad powers are plainly adequate to add to the findings or firm them up as the Commission deems desirable, absent any collision or interference with the District Court.
Unless Congress provides otherwise, “[wjhere a motion for rehearing is in fact filed there is no final action until the rehearing is denied.” Outland v. CAB, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 284 F. 2d 224, 227. In multi-party proceedings, such as the present one, some may seek judicial review and others may seek administrative reconsideration. “That both tribunals have jurisdiction does not mean, of course, that they will act at cross purposes.” Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 324, 327, 248 F. 2d 646, 649. The concept “of an indivisible jurisdiction which must be all in one tribunal or all in the other may fit” some statutory schemes, ibid., but it does not fit this one.
This power of the Commission to reconsider a prior decision does not necessarily collide with the judicial power of review. For while the court properly could provide temporary relief against a Commission order, its issuance does not mean that the Commission loses all jurisdiction to complete the administrative process. It does mean that thereafter the Commission is “without power to act inconsistently with the court’s jurisdiction.” Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 160. When the Commission made the additional findings after its first order was stayed by the court, it did not act inconsistently with what the court had done. It did not interfere in the slightest with the court’s protective order. What the Commission did came before the court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before the record was filed with it. Moreover, the Commission in light of the District Court's stay, by express terms, directed AFL not to perform operations under the first order and made the second order effective only on further order of the Commission. Since by the Act the Commission never lost jurisdiction to pass on petitions for rehearing, and since the stay order did not forbid it from acting on those pending petitions, it was not necessary for the Commission to seek permission of the court to make those rulings.
The Commission reopened the record merely to remedy a deficiency in it before any judicial review of the merits had commenced and fully honored the stay order of the District Court. It therefore acted in full harmony with the court’s jurisdiction.
Reversed.
Section 210a(a) provides in part:
“To enable the provision of service for which there is an immediate and urgent need to a point or points or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such need, the Commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. 2
49 CFR § 1131.4 (b) (2) defines the statutory term “immediate and urgent need” as follows:
“An immediate and urgent need justifying a grant of temporary authority will be determined to exist only where it is established that there is or soon will be an immediate transportation need which reasonably cannot be met by existing carrier service. Such a showing may involve a new or relocated plant, different method of distribution, new or unusual commodities, an origin or destination not presently served by carriers, a discontinuance of existing service, failure of existing carriers to provide service, or comparable situations which require new motor carrier service before an application for permanent authority can be filed and processed.”
See 49 CFR § 1131.2(c).
AFL is a federation of agricultural marketing cooperatives created in 1964 to provide transportation for its members. By-virtue of § 203 (b) (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 921, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5), AFL may transport freight for its members without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC. In 1965 § 203 (b) (5) was construed to exempt from the certification requirement any freight transportation by an agricultural cooperative for shippers other than its own members to the extent that such nonmember transportation is incidental and necessary to its principal transportation activities. See Northwest Agricultural Cooperative Assn. v. ICC, 350 F. 2d 252. The next year, AFL began transporting freight for DOD. In 1968-1969 AFL’s ability to continue serving DOD was restricted by two events. First, certain competing carriers obtained injunctions prohibiting AFL from making two consecutive movements for DOD and from transporting freight for any nonmember except when going to pick up, or returning from delivery of, a member’s freight. Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. American Farm Lines, 415 F. 2d 747. Second, § 203 (b) (5) was amended to restrict the exemption for agricultural cooperatives to those whose transportation for nonmembers does not exceed 15% of their total annual interstate transportation, measured by tonnage. See 82 Stat. 448, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). AFL had transported 74,155,685 pounds for DOD between December 1966 and June 1968, and, in an effort to continue providing this service, applied to the ICC in May 1968 for temporary operating authority. The authority sought was to transport general commodities, including Class A and B explosives moving on government bills of lading over irregular routes between points in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas on the one hand, and points in Washington, California, Nevada, Utah,, and Arizona on the other.
AFL has applied to the ICC for a certificate of permanent authority. It was estimated at oral argument that final action on this application will not be taken by ICC before mid-1971. Meanwhile the ICC may extend the temporary authority. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 436.
The precise chronology of these events is shown in n. 9, infra.
ICC is not appealing from the District Court's decision setting aside' the first order.
It was once proposed that the same requirement be written into the law respecting those orders of the Commission reviewed by the courts of appeal as distinguished from the three-judge district courts. See H. R. Rep. No. 1619, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. But the ICC was deleted from the measure. Id., at 1. And the Act as approved covered only other designated agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2342 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
See Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484.
The District Court’s stay was issued October 2, 1968. On October 9, the Commission stayed the effective date of its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 5, 1968, the Commission reopened the proceeding before it and directed AFL, in light of the District Court's order, “not to perform” any operations under its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 12, 1968, the Commission advised the District Court of its action. On December 20, 1968, the Commission entered its second order which authorized commencement of service by AFL only on further notice by the ICC. On December 31, 1968, a supplemental complaint was filed in the District Court challenging the Commission’s second order. On January 6, 1969, a single judge of the District Court stayed that order. On March 26, 1969, the District Court entered its judgment now being reviewed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations