Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In New Jersey, workers engaged in an economic strike are eligible for public assistance through state welfare programs. Employers whose plants were struck instituted this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief against such eligibility. Before the .case was tried, the labor dispute- was settled and the strike came to an end. The question presented is whether a “case” or “controversy” still exists, within the meaning of Art. Ill, § 2, of the • Constitution, and of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202.
I
A collective-bargaining agreement between petitioners Super Tire Engineering Company and Supercap Corporation, affiliated New Jersey corporations, and Teamsters Local Union No. 676, the certified collective-bargaining representative for the two corporations’ production and maintenance employees, expired on May 14, 1971. Because ¿ new agreement had not as yet been reached, the employees promptly went out on strike. Some four weeks later, with the strike continuing, the two corporations, and their president and chief executive officer, filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of- New Jersey against various New Jersey officials.
The complaint alleged that many of the striking employees had received and would continue to receive pub-lie assistance through two New Jersey public welfare programs, pursuant to regulations issued and administered by the named defendants. The petitioners sought a declaration that these interpretive regulations, according benefits, to striking workers, were null and void because they constituted an interference with the federal labor policy of free collective bargaining expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq., and with other federal policy pronounced in provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935, viz., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a)(8)(C), ¿06 (e)(1), and 607 (b)(1)(B)'. The petitioners also sought injunctive relief against the New Jersey welfare administrators’ making public, funds available to labor union members engaged in the strike.
With their complaint, the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The supporting affidavit by the individual petitioner recited the expiration of .the collective-bargaining agreement, the failure of the parties to reach a new agreement, the commencement and continuation of the strike, the application by many of the strikers for state welfare benefits, and their receipt of such benefits from the beginning of the strike to the date of the affidavit. The affiant further stated that the availability of these benefits interfered with and infringed upon free collective bargaining as guaranteed by Congress and “hardened the resolve of the said strikers to remain out of work in support of their bargaining demands,” App. 32, and, in addition, that
“the current strike will undoubtedly be of longer duration than would have otherwise been the case; that the impact of the grant of welfare benefits and public assistance to the strikers involved has resulted in the State of New Jersey subsidizing one party to the current labor dispute; and that such subsidization by the State has resulted in upsetting the economic balance between employer and employees otherwise obtained in such a labor dispute.” Ibid.
At the hearing held on June 24- on the motion for preliminary injunction, the union, now a respondent here, was permitted to intervene. App. 37. Counsel for the union contended that “this entire matter . . . has been mooted” because “these employees voted to return to work and are scheduled to return to work tomorrow morning.” App. 39. The District Court, nonetheless, proceeded to the merits of the dispute and, on the basis of the holding in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F. 2d 989 (CA1 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 933 (1971), ruled that the appropriate forum for the petitioners’ claim was the Congress, and that the New Jersey practice of according aid to striking workers was not violative of thé Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. App. 45-46. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by a divided vote, did not reach the merits but remanded the case.with instructions to vacate and dismiss for mootness. 469 F. 2d 911, 922 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider the mootness issue. 414 U. S. 817 (1973).
n
The respondent union invites us to conclude that this controversy between the petitioners and the State became moot when the particular economic strike terminated upon the execution of the new collective-bargaining agreement and the return of the strikers to work in late June. That conclusion, however, is appropriate with respect to only one aspect of the lawsuit, that is, the request for injunctive relief made in the context of official state action during the pendency of the strike.
The petitioners here have sought, from the very beginning,, declaratory relief as well as an injunction. Clearly, the District Court had “the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 254 (1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 166 (1973); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 468-A69 (1974). Thus, even though the case for an injunction dissolved with the subsequent settlement of the strike and the strikers’ return to wofk, the parties to the principal controversy, that is, the corporate petitioners and the New Jersey officials, may still retain sufficient interests and injury as. to justify the award of declaratory relief! The question is “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having advérse legal interests, of sufficiént immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941), And ' since this case involves governmental action, we must ponder the broader consideration whether the short-term, nature of that action makes the issues presented here “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” so that peti-. tioners are adversely affected by government “without a chance of redress.” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911).
' A. We hold that the facts here provide full and complete satisfaction of the. requirement of the Constitution's Art. Ill, § 2, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, that a case or controversy exist between the parties. Unlike the situations that prevailed in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363 (1960), on which the Court of Appeals' majority chiefly relied, and. in Harris v. Battle, 348 U. S. 803 (1954), the challenged governmental activity in the present, case is not contingent, has not' evaporated or disappeared, and,- by' its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well, be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.
In both Harris and Oil Workers k state statute authorized the Governor to take immediate possession of a public utility in the event of a strike or work stoppage that interfered with the public interest. The seizure was not automatic for every public utility labor dispute. It took effect only upon the exercise of the Governor’s discretion. In each case the Court held the controversy to be moot because both the seizure and the strike had terminated prior to the time the case reached this. Court, The governmental action challenged was the authority to seize the !public utility, and it was clear that a seizure would not recur except in circumstances where (a) there was another strike or' stoppage, and (b) in the judgment of'the Governor, the public interest required it. The question was thus posed in a situation where the threat of governmental action was two steps removed from reality. "This made the recurrence of a seizure so remote and speculative that there, was no tangible prejudice to the existing interests of the parties and, therefore, there was a “want of a subject matter” on which any judgment' of this Court could operate. Oil Workers, 361 U. S., at 371. This was particularly apparent in Oil Workers because, although the union had sought both declaratory and injunctive relief,, the decision the Court was asked'to review “upheld only the validity of an injunction, an injunction that expired by its own terms more than three years ago.” Ibid.
The present case has a decidedly different .posture. As in Harris and Oil Workers, the strike here was settled before the litigation reached this’ Court. But, unlike those cases, thq challenged governmental action has not ceased. The . New, Jersey governmental action does not rest on the distant contingencies of another strike and the discretionary act of an official. Rather, New Jersey has declared positively that able-bodied striking workers who are engaged, .individually and collectively, in an economic dispute with their employer are eligible for economic benefits. This policy is fixed and definite. It is not contingent upon executive discretion. Employees know that if they go out on strike, public funds are available. The petitioners’ claim is that this eligibility affects the collective-bargaining relationship, both in the context of a live labor dispute when a collective-bargaining agreement is in process of formulation, and in the ongoing collective relationship, so that the economic balance between labor and management, carefully formulated and preserved by Congress in the federal labor statutes, is altered by the State’s beneficent policy toward strikers. It cannot be doubted that the availability of state welfare assistance for striking workers in New Jersey pervades every work stoppage, affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement, • and is a factor lurking in the background of every incipient labor contract. The question, of course, is whether Congress, explicitly or implicitly, has ruled out such assistance in its calculus of laws regulating labor-management disputes. In this sense petitioners allege a colorable claim of injury from an extant and fixed policy directive of the State of New Jersey. That claim deserves a hearing.
The decision in- Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U. S. 74 (1963), is not to the contrary. .In that case the Court adjudicated the merits of the same statutory scheme that had been challenged earlier in Oil Workers. It reached the merits even though the Governor had terminated the seizure of the public utility. His executive order, however, recited that the labor dispute “remains unresolved.” The Court’s rationale was that, since the labor dispute had not ended, “[tjhere thus exists in the present case not merely the speculative possibility of invocation of the King-Thompson Act in some future labor dispute, but the presence of an existing unresolved dispute which continues subject to all the provisions of the Act. Cf. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U. S. 498, 514-516; United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632.” 374 U. S., at 78. The existence of the strike was important in that it rendered concrete the likelihood of state action prejudicial to the interests of the union. It was the remoteness of the threat of state action that convinced the Court in Oil Workers to hold that case moot. In the case now before us, the state action is not at all contingent. Under the petitioners’ view of the case, it is immediately and directly injurious to thé corporate petitioners’ economic positions. Pidiere such state action or its imminence adversely affects the status of private parties, the courts should be available to render appropriate relief and judgments affecting the parties’ rights and interests:
B. If we were to condition our review on the existence of an economic strike, this case most certainly would be of the type presenting an issue “capable-of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S., at 515; Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F. 2d 449 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 858 and 879 (1973); ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F. 2d, at 991. To require the presence of an active and live labor dispute would tax the litigant too much by arbitrarily slighting claims of adverse injury from concrete governmental action (of the immediate threat thereof). It is sufficient, therefore, that the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest. Otherwise, a state policy affecting a collective-bargaining arrangement, except one involving a fine or other penalty, could be adjudicated only rarely, and the. purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act would be frustrated.
Certainly, the pregnant appellants in Roe v. Wade, supra, and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), had long since outlasted their pregnancies by the time their cases reached this Court. Yet we h'ad no difficulty in rejecting suggestions of' mootness. 410 U. S., at. 125 and 187. Similar and consistent results were reached in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n, 8 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969), cases concerning various challenges to state election laws. The important ingredient' in these cases was governmental action directly affecting, and continuing to affect, the behavior of citizens in our society.
The issues here are no different. Economic' strikes are of comparatively short duration. There are exceptions, of course; See, for example, Local 888, UAW v. NLRB, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 300 F. 2d 699, cert. denied sub nom. Kohler Co. v. Local 888, UAW, 370 U. S. 911 (1962)., But the great majority of economic strikes do not last long enough for complete judicial review of the controversies they engender. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Analysis of Work Stoppages 1971, TableA 3, p. 16 (1973). A strike that lasts six weeks, as this'one did, may seem long, but its termination, like pregnancy at nine months and elections spaced at year-long or biennial intervals, should not preclude challenge to state policies that-have had their impact and that continue in force, unabated and unreviewed. The judiciary must not close the door to the resolution of the important* questions these concrete ■disputes present. '
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the controversy.
Zi * so ordered¡
Super Tire Engineering Company is engaged in the business of truck tire sales and service and the manufacture-and sale of industrial polyurethane tires and wheels. Supercap Corporation is engaged in the business of truck tire recapping and repairing.
The named defendants were Lloyd W. McCorkle, Commissioner of the Department of Institutions and Agencies of the State of New Jersey; Irving J. Engelman, Director of the Division of Public Welfare of the Department of Institutions and .Agencies of the State of New Jersey; Fred L. Streng, Director of the Camden County, New Jersey, Welfare Board; and Juanita E. Dicks, Welfare Director of the Municipal Welfare Department of the City of Camden, New Jersey.
The General Public Assistance Law, N. J.' Stat. Ann. •§ 44:8-107 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974), a state program, and the Assistance for Dependent Children Law (ADC), N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974), a federal-state program created by § 402 of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602.
Effective June 30, 1971, New Jersey elected no longer to participate in the unemployed parent segment of the AEDC program, and enacted, in its place, the Assistance to Families of the- Working Poor program, N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:13-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974).
The Regulations (M. A. 1.006/revised Mar. 1957), issued by the New. Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies under the General Public Assistance Law, provided in pertinent part:
“A. Citation of Statute and Constitution
“Chapter 156, P. L. 1947 (R. S. 44:8-108) defines reimbursable public assistance as ‘assistance rendered to needy persons not otherwise provided for under the laws of this State, where such persons are willing to work but are unable to secure employment due either to physical disability or inability to find employment.’
“The Constitution of New Jersey 1947, Article I, paragraph 19, guarantees that ‘Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively.’
“B. Interpretation and Policy
“It may be inferred from the quoted section of the statute that persons unwilling to work are ineligible for public assistance. However, for purposes of public administration, the phrase ‘unwilling to work’ must be defined as objectively as possible.
“. . . The Constitutional guarantee of the ‘right to organize and bargain colleetivély’ implies the right of the individual to participate in a bona -fide labor dispute as between.the employer and the' collective bargaining unit by which the individual is represented. Moreover, a ‘strike,’ when lawfully authorized and conducted, is recognized as an inherent and lawful element of the process of bargaining collectively and of .resolving labor disputes. Accordingly, when an individual is participating in a lawful ‘strike,’ he may not be considered merely because of. such participation, as refusing to work without just cause.
“C. Regulations
“Based on the foregoing statement of interpretation and' policy, the following regulations are established:
“4. No individual shall be presumed to be unwilling to work, or to be wrongfully refusing to accept suitable employment, merely because he is participating in a lawful labor dispute.
“5. An individual who is participating in a lawful labor.dispute, and who is 'needy, has the same right to apply far public assistance, for himself and his dependents, as any other individual who is needy.
“6. In the ease "of an applicant for public assistance who is participating iñ a lawful labor dispute, there shall be an investigation of need and other conditions of eligibility, and an evaluation of income, and resources, in the same way and to the same extent as in all other cases. In such instances, 'strike benefits’ or other payments available to the individual from the labor union or other source; shall be considered a resource and shJUL be determined and accounted for.”
. The record is not clear as to the eligibility of strikers under. New Jersey’s newly enacted program 'of Assistance to Families of' the Working Poor. Petitioners state that striking workers are eligible for benefits under that program. Brief for Petitioners 4 n. 1. The respondents concede this, as “a matter of administrative application.-” Tr. of Oral Arg.. 46.
The complaint also alleged that the inclusion of -striking workers in these programs was contrary to. New Jersey law. .
All the strikers returned to work by Monday, June 28, 1971, and normal operations at the corporate petitioners’ plants were then resumed.
-Although the threat of seizure'in Oil Workers constituted a far more severe form of governmental- action, going as it did to cripple any strike, the features of that .action were inexorably contingent, serving to make it more remote and speculative.
It 'may not 'appropriately be argued that there is an element of discretion present here, in the making of the determination of individual “need" for welfare benefits. That determination has no measurable effect on th? rights of the corporate petitioners. Instead, it is the basic eligibility for- assistance that allegedly prejudices those petitioners’ economic position.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations