Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all States and political subdivisions covered by § 4 of the Act must submit any proposed change affecting voting, for preclearance by the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. At issue in this appeal is whether a county board of education in a covered State must seek approval of a rule requiring its employees to take unpaid leaves of absence while they campaign for elective office. Resolution of this question necessitates two related inquiries: first, whether a rule governing leave for employee candidates is a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and second, whether a county school board is a “political subdivision” within the purview of the Act.
I
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Appellee, a Negro, is employed as Assistant Coordinator of Student Personnel Services by appellant Dougherty County Board of Education (Board). In May 1972, he announced his candidacy for the Georgia House of Representatives. Less than a month later, on June 12, 1972, the Board adopted Rule 58 without seeking prior federal approval. Rule 58 provides:
“POLITICAL OFFICE. Any employee of the school system who becomes a candidate for any elective political office, will be required to take a leave of absence, without pay, such leave becoming effective upon the qualifying for such elective office and continuing for the duration of such political activity, and during the period of service in such office, if elected thereto.”
Appellee qualified as a candidate for the Democratic primary in June 1972, and was compelled by Rule 58 to take a leave of absence without pay. After his defeat in the August primary, appellee was reinstated. Again in June 1974, he qualified as a candidate for the Georgia House and was forced to take leave. He was successful in both the August primary and the November general election. Accordingly, his leave continued through mid-November 1974. Appellee took a third leave of absence in June 1976, when he qualified to run for re-election. When it became clear in September that he would be unopposed in the November 1976 election, appellee was reinstated. As a consequence of those mandatory leaves, appellee lost pay in the amount of $2,810 in 1972, $4,780 in 1974, and $3,750 in 1976.
In June 1976, appellee filed this action in the Middle District of Georgia alleging that Rule 58 was a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” adopted by a covered entity and therefore subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5 of the Act. Appellee averred that he was the first Negro in recent memory, perhaps since Reconstruction, to run for the Georgia General Assembly from Dougherty County. The Board did not contest this fact, and further acknowledged that it was aware of no individual other than appellee who had run for public office while an employee of the Dougherty County Board of Education.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the three-judge District Court held that Rule 58 should have been submitted for federal approval before implementation. 431 F. Supp. 919 (1977). In so ruling, the court correctly declined to decide the ultimate question that the Attorney General or the District of Columbia court would face on submission of the Rule for preclearance under § 5 — whether the change in fact had a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 383-385 (1971). Rather, the District Court confined its review to the preliminary issue whether Rule 58 had the “potential” for discrimination and hence was subject to § 5. Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 534 (1973). In concluding that the Rule did have such potential, the District Court interpreted Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Georgia v. United States, supra, to mandate preclearance of any modification by a covered State or political subdivision “which restricts the ability of citizens to run for office.” 431 F. Supp., at 922. The court reasoned that Rule 58 was such a modification because:
“By imposing a financial loss on [Board] employees who choose to become candidates, [the Rule] makes it more difficult for them to participate in the democratic process and, consequently, restricts the field from which the voters may select their representatives.” Ibid.
The District Court therefore enjoined enforcement of Rule 58 pending compliance with the preclearance requirements of § 5. We noted probable jurisdiction. 435 U. S. 921 (1978). Since we find Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, and United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110 (1978), dispositive of the issues presented in this appeal, we affirm.
II
Section 5 provides that whenever a covered State or political subdivision “shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,” it may not implement that change until it either secures a determination from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” or submits the change to the Attorney General and he interposes no objection within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (emphasis added). Although §14 (c)(1) expansively defines the term “voting” to “include all action necessary to make a vote effective,” 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Í (c)(1), the Act itself nowhere amplifies the meaning of the phrase “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” Accordingly, in our previous constructions of § 5, we have sought guidance from the history and purpose of the Act.
A
This Court first considered the scope of the critical language of § 5 in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), involving consolidated appeals in three cases from Mississippi and one from Virginia. After canvassing the legislative history of the Act, we concluded that Congress meant “to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way.” 393 U. S.,. at 566. Conceived after “nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 328 (1966), the Voting Rights Act was, as Allen emphasized, “aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.” 393 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted). To effectuate the “articulated purposes of the legislation,” id., at 570, the Allen Court held that the phrase “standard, practice, or procedure” must be given the “broadest possible scope,” id., at 567, and construed it to encompass candidate qualification requirements. Id., at 570 (Whitley v. Williams, companion case decided with Allen, supra). The Court concluded that any enactment which burdens an independent candidate by “increasing the difficulty for [him] to gain a position on the general election ballot” is subject to § 5 since such a measure could “undermine the effectiveness” of voters who wish to elect nonaffiliated representatives. 393 U. S., at 565.
In subsequent cases interpreting § 5, we have consistently adhered to the principles of broad construction set forth in Allen. In Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U. S. 358 (1969), this Court held that an Alabama statute requiring independent candidates to declare their intention to seek office two months earlier than under prior procedures imposed “increased barriers” on candidacy and therefore warranted § 5 scrutiny. Id., at 366. Similarly, in contexts other than candidate qualification, we have interpreted § 5 expansively to mandate preclearance for changes in the location of polling places, Perkins v. Matthews, supra; alterations of municipal boundaries, Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); Petersburg v. United States, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), summarily aff’g 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972); Perkins v. Matthews, supra; and reapportionment and redistricting plans, Georgia v. United States, supra.
Had Congress disagreed with this broad construction of § 5, it presumably would have clarified its intent when re-enacting the statute in 1970 and 1975. Yet, as this Court observed in Georgia v. United States, “[a]fter extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any substantive modification of § 5.” 411 U. S., at 533 (footnote omitted). Again in 1975, both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, in recommending extension of the Act, noted with approval the “broad interpretations to the scope of Section 5” in Allen and Perkins v. Matthews. S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 16 (1975) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 9 (1975) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). Confirming the view of this Court, the Committee Reports stated, without qualification, that “[s]ection 5 of the Act requires review of all voting changes prior to implementation by the covered jurisdictions.” S. Rep. 15; H. R. Rep. 8 (emphasis added).
The Attorney General’s regulations, in force since 1971, reflect an equally inclusive understanding of the reach of § 5. They provide that “[a] 11 changes affecting voting, even though the change appears to be minor or indirect,” must be submitted for prior approval. 28 CFR § 51.4 (a) (1977). More particularly, the regulations require preclearance of “[a]ny alteration affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates or obtain a position on the ballot in primary or general elections or to become or remain officeholders.” §51.4 (c)(4). Pursuant to these regulations, the Attorney General, after being apprised of Rule 58, requested its submission for § 5 clearance. Given the central role of the Attorney General in formulating and implementing § 5, this interpretation of its scope is entitled to particular deference. United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U. S., at 131; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S., at 391. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S., at 536-539.
B
Despite these consistently expansive constructions of § 5, appellants contend that the Attorney General and District Court erred in treating Rule 58 as a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” rather than as simply “a means of getting a full days work for a full days pay — nothing more and nothing less.” Brief for Appellants 20. In appellants’ view, Congress did not intend to subject all internal personnel measures affecting political activity to federal superintendence.
The Board mischaracterizes its policy. Rule 58 is not a neutral personnel practice governing all forms of absenteeism. Rather, it specifically addresses the electoral process, singling out candidacy for elective office as a disabling activity. Although not in form a filing fee, the Rule operates in precisely the same fashion. By imposing substantial economic disincentives on employees who wish to seek elective office, the Rule burdens entry into elective campaigns and, concomitantly, limits the choices available to Dougherty County voters. Given the potential loss of thousands of dollars by employees subject to Rule 58, the Board’s policy could operate as a more substantial inhibition on entry into the elective process than many of the filing-fee changes involving only hundreds of dollars to which the Attorney General has successfully interposed objections. That Congress was well aware of these objections is apparent from the Committee Reports supporting extension of the Act in 1975. S. Rep. 16-17; H. R. Rep. 10.
In Georgia v. United States, we observed that “[s]ection 5 is not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather with the reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters.” 411 U. S., at 531. The reality here is that Rule 58’s impact on elections is no different from that of many of the candidate qualification changes for which we have previously required preclearance. See Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U. S. 358 (1969); Allen, 393 U. S., at 551. Moreover, as a practical matter, Rule 58 implicates the political process to the same extent as do other modifications that this Court and Congress have recognized § 5 to encompass, such as changes in the location of polling places, Perkins v. Matthews, and alterations in the procedures for casting a write-in vote, Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra.
We do not, of course, suggest that all constraints on employee political activity affecting voter choice violate § 5. Presumably, most regulation of political involvement by public employees would not be found to have an invidious purpose or effect. Yet the same could be said of almost all changes subject to § 5. According to the most recent figures available, the Voting Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division processes annually some 1,800 submissions involving over 3,100 changes and interposes objections to less than 2%. Attorney General Ann. Rep. 159-160 (1977). Approximately 91% of these submissions receive clearance without further exchange of correspondence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53. Thus, in determining if an enactment triggers § 5 scrutiny, the question is not whether the provision is in fact innocuous and likely to be approved, but whether it has a potential for discrimination. See Georgia v. United States, supra, at 534; Perkins v. Matthews, supra, at 383-385; Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 555-556, n. 19, 558-559, 570-571.
Without intimating any views on the substantive question of Rule 58’s legitimacy as a nonracial personnel measure, we believe that the circumstances surrounding its adoption and its effect on the political process are sufficiently suggestive of the potential for discrimination to demonstrate the need for preclearance. Appellee was the first Negro in recent years to seek election to the General Assembly from Dougherty County, an area with a long history of racial discrimination in voting. Less than a month after appellee announced his candidacy, the Board adopted Rule 58, concededly without any prior experience of absenteeism among employees seeking office. That the Board made its mandatory leave-of-absence requirement contingent on candidacy rather than on absence during working hours underscores the Rule’s potential for inhibiting participation in the electoral process.
Plainly, Rule 58 erects “increased, barriers” to candidacy as formidable as the filing date changes at issue in Hadnott v. Amos, supra, at 366 (2 months), and Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 551 (20 days). To require preclearance of Rule 58 follows directly from our previous recognition that § 5 must be given “the broadest possible scope,” Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 567, encompassing the “subtle, as well as the obvious,” forms of discrimination. 393 U. S., at 565. Informed by similarly expansive legislative and administrative understandings of the perimeters of § 5, we hold that obstacles to candidate qualification such as the Rule involved here are “standard [s], practice [s], or procedure's] with respect to voting.”
Ill
Section 5 applies to all changes affecting voting made by “political subdivision [s]” of States designated for coverage pursuant to § 4 of the Act. Although acknowledging that the Board is a political subdivision under state law, appellants contend that it does not meet the definition of that term as employed in the Voting Rights Act. They rely on § 14 (c) (2) of the Act, 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 19731 (c)(2), which defines “political subdivision” as
“any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”
Because the Board is neither a county, parish, nor entity which conducts voter registration, appellants maintain that it does not come within the purview of § 5.
This contention is squarely foreclosed by our decision last Term in United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110 (1978). There, we expressly rejected the suggestion that the city of Sheffield was beyond the ambit of § 5 because it did not itself register voters and hence was not a political subdivision as the term is defined in § 14 (c) (2) of the Act. Rather, the “language, structure, history, and purposes of the Act persuade [d] us that § 5, like the constitutional provisions it is designed to implement, applies to all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdictions . . . 435 U. S., at 118. Accordingly, we held that once a State has been designated for coverage, § 14 (c)(2)'s definition of political subdivision has no “operative significance in determining the reach of § 5.” 435 U. S., at 126.
Appellants attempt to distinguish Sheffield on the ground that the Board, unlike the city of Sheffield, does not itself conduct elections. Since the Board has no direct responsibilities in conjunction with the election of public officials, appellants argue that it does not “exercise control” over the voting process, id., at 127, and is not therefore subject to §5.
Sheffield provides no support for such a cramped reading of the term “control.” Our concern there was that covered jurisdictions could obviate the necessity for preclearance of voting changes by the simple expedient of “allowing local entities that do not conduct voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral process.” 435 U. S., at 125. We thus held that the impact of a change on the elective process, rather than the adopting entity’s registration responsibilities, was dispositive of the question of § 5. coverage. Here, as the discussion in Part II, supra, indicates, a political unit with no nominal electoral functions can nonetheless exercise power over the process by attaching a price tag to candidate participation. Appellants’ analysis would hence achieve what Sheffield sought to avert; it would enable covered jurisdictions to circumvent the Act by delegating power over candidate qualification to local entities that do not conduct elections or voter registration. A State or political subdivision, by de jacto delegation, “thereby could achieve through its instru-mentalities what it could not do itself without preclearance.” 435 U. S., at 139 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). If only those governmental units with official electoral obligations actuate the preclearance requirements of § 5, the Act would be “nullified] ... in a large number of its potential applications.” 435 U. S., at 125 (footnote omitted).
Nothing in the language or purpose of the Act compels such an anomalous result. By its terms, § 5 requires preclearance whenever a political subdivision within a covered State adopts a change in a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting. No requirement that the subdivision itself conduct elections is stated in § 5 and none is fairly implied. As this Court has observed, § 5 of the Voting Rights Act reflects Congress’ firm resolve to end “the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308. Whether a subdivision adopting a potentially discriminatory change has some nominal electoral functions bears no relation to the purpose of § 5. That provision directs attention to the impact of a change on the electoral process, not to the duties of the political subdivision that adopted it. To make coverage under § 5 turn on whether the State has confided in the Dougherty County Board of Education some formal responsibility for the conduct of elections, when the Board clearly has the power to affect candidate participation in those elections, would serve no purpose consonant with the objectives of the federal statutory scheme.
Nor would appellants’ interpretation of § 5 comport with any ascertainable congressional intent. The legislative history of the 1975 extension, the statute which is controlling here, leaves no doubt but that Congress intended all electoral changes by political entities in covered jurisdictions to trigger federal scrutiny. Both the supporters and opponents of the proposed extension appear to have shared the common understanding that under § 5 no covered jurisdiction may enforce a change affecting voting without obtaining prior approval. See Hearings on S. 407 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 75-76 (1975) (testimony of Arthur Flemming, Chairman of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights) (e. g., § 5 applies “to changes in voting laws, practices, and procedures that affect every stage of the political process”) ; Hearings on H. R. 939 et al. before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1975) (testimony of Arthur Flemming); 121 Cong. Rec. 23744 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (“Any changes, so far as election officials [are] concerned, which [are] made in precincts, county districts, school districts, municipalities, or State legislatures . . . [have] to be submitted”); id., at 24114 (remarks of Sen. Allen). Moreover, both the House and Senate Committees and witnesses at the House and Senate hearings referred to § 5’s past and prospective application to school districts. See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 23744 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis); Hearings on S. 407, supra, at 467-470 (testimony of George Korbel, EEOC Regional Attorney); Hearings on H. R. 939, supra, at 387-390 (testimony of George Korbel); S. Rep. 27-28; H. R. Rep. 19-20. Yet none of these discussions suggests that direct supervision of elections by a school board is a prerequisite to its coverage under the Act. To the contrary, a fair reading of the legislative history compels the conclusion that Congress was determined in the 1975 extension of the Act to provide some mechanism for coping with all potentially discriminatory enactments whose source and forms it could not anticipate but whose impact on the electoral process could be significant. Rule 58 is such a change.
Because we conclude that Rule 58 is a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting enacted by an entity subject to § 5, the judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Stewart dissents for the reasons expressed in Part I of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Powell.
79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Section 5 provides in part:
“Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in [§ 4 (a) of the Act] based upon determinations made under the first sentence of [§ 4 (b) of the Act] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, . . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, . . . and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. . . .”
79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b. Georgia has been designated a covered jurisdiction pursuant to §4. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965).
The Solicitor General and counsel for appellants advise us that appellee was also on unpaid leave during his participation in the annual 214-month sittings of the Georgia General Assembly in 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4 n. Ip Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Appellee did not challenge this application of Rule 58 below. We therefore do not consider whether preclearance is required for a policy governing mandatory leaves during the interval in which an employee is actually absent due to legislative responsibilities.
Jurisdiction was predicated on 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 28 U. S. C. § 2284, and 28 U. S. C. § 1343. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554-563 (1969).
For example, we noted that Attorney General Katzenbach, who played a substantial role in drafting the Act, testified that the term “practice” in § 5 “was intended to be all-inclusive . . . .” Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 192 (1965), quoted in Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 566-567, and n. 31.
The protean strategies of racial discrimination that led Congress to adopt the Voting Rights Act have been often discussed by this Court, see United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110, 118-121 (1978); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308-315, and need not be reviewed here.
Shortly before the commencement of this litigation, counsel for appellee brought Rule 58 to the attention of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Two and one-half months after appellee filed his complaint, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger informed the Superintendent of the Dougherty County School System that Rule 58 should be submitted for preclearance. Appellants made no response.
See U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After 134-137 (1975) {e. g., $360 fee for Commissioner in Mobile, Alabama, in 1973; $818 fee for Mayor in Rock Hill, South Carolina, in 1973).
In addition, the Committees relied heavily on findings by the United States Commission on Civil Rights in The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, supra, at 131-142, a document which reviewed at some length the barriers to qualification, including fifing fees, faced by minority candidates. See S. Rep. 21, 24; H. R. Rep. 12, 16.
As this Court has recognized in its decisions invalidating certain filing-fee schemes under the Fourteenth Amendment, “we would ignore reality” were we not to acknowledge that a financial barrier to candidacy “falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates,” since it “tends to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing.” Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 144 (1972) (filing fees of $1,424.60 for County Commissioner, $1,000 for Commissioner of General Land Office, and $6,300 for County Judge). See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974) (filing fee of $701.60 for County Supervisor).
For a review of voting rights litigation in the city of Albany, the county seat of Dougherty County containing 80% of its population, see Paige v. Gray, 399 F. Supp. 459, 461-463 (MD Ga. 1975), vacated in part, 538 F. 2d 1108 (CA5 1976), on remand, 437 F. Supp. 137, 149-158 (MD Ga. 1977).
The dissent suggests, post, at 53, that Rule 58 is directed only toward barring “the expenditure of public funds to support the candidacy of an employee whose time and energies may be devoted to campaigning, rather than counseling schoolchildren.” Insofar as the Board is concerned about its employees’ failure to discharge their contractual obligations while standing for office, it has a variety of means to vindicate its interest. The Board may, for example, prescribe regulations governing absenteeism, or may terminate or suspend the contracts of employees who willfully neglect their professional responsibilities. See Ga. Code § 32-2101c (1975); Ransum v. Chattooga County Board of Education, 144 Ga. App. 783, 242 S. E. 2d 374 (1978). What it may not do is adopt a rule that explicitly and directly burdens the electoral process without preclearance.
See Ga. Code §§32-901, 23-1716 (1975); Campbell v. Red Bud Consolidated School Dist., 186 Ga. 541, 548, 198 S. E. 225, 229 (1938); Ty Ty Consolidated School Dist. v. Colquitt Lumber Co., 153 Ga. 426, 427, 112 S. E. 561 (1922).
Section 4 (a) makes continued coverage under the Act turn on whether discriminatory tests or devices have been used “anywhere in the territory” of a State or political subdivision for a prescribed number of years. 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). In Sheffield, we concluded that the territorial reach of the substantive requirements of § 5 was meant to be coterminous with the jurisdictional provisions of §4 (a). 435 U. S., at 120-129.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations