Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants in this case challenge the holding of the Court of Appeals that a state official loses his qualified immunity from suit for deprivation of federal constitutional rights if he is found to have violated the clear command of a state administrative regulation.
I
The present controversy arose when appellee Gregory Scherer, who was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol as a radio-teletype operator, applied for permission from the Patrol to work as well for the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office as a reserve deputy. To avoid conflicts of interest, an order of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles required that proposed outside employment of Patrol members be approved by the Department. A letter from appellee’s troop commander, Capt. K. S. Sconiers, dated September 1, 1977, granted appellee permission to accept the part-time work. The letter noted that permission would be rescinded “should [the] employment interfere . . . with your duties with [the] department.” 543 F. Supp. 4, 8 (ND Fla. 1981). Later that month, Capt. Sconiers informed appellee by memorandum that permission to accept the employment was revoked. As Capt. Sconiers explained at trial, his superiors in the Highway Patrol had determined that appellee’s reserve deputy duties could conflict with his duties at the Highway Patrol.
Appellee continued to work at the second job, despite the revocation of permission. Oral discussions and an exchange of letters among appellee and his superiors ensued. Sgt. Clark, appellee’s immediate superior, advised appellee that he was violating instructions; appellee explained that he had invested too much money in uniforms to give up his part-time work. Lt. Wiggins, the next highest officer in the chain of command, then orally and by memorandum ordered appellee to quit his part-time job. Appellee explained to Lt. Wiggins that he saw no conflict between the two jobs and would not quit his second job.
Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins had submitted memoranda to Capt. Sconiers that described appellee’s continued employment and their conversations with appellee. Appellee also wrote to Capt. Sconiers explaining that he saw no reason to resign his outside employment. So advised, Capt. Sconiers recommended to Col. J. E. Beach, director of the Florida Highway Patrol, that appellee be suspended for three days for violation of the dual-employment policy. Capt. Sconiers submitted a number of documents, including his own letters approving appellee’s request and rescinding the approval; ap-pellee’s letter of request and subsequent letter explaining his refusal to quit his job; and the memoranda of Sgt. Clark and Lt. Wiggins. On the basis of these documents, Col. Beach on October 24, 1977, ordered that appellee’s employment with the Florida Highway Patrol be terminated.
On November 10, 1977, appellee filed an appeal with the Florida Career Service Commission. Before the Commission had heard appellee’s administrative appeal from his dismissal, appellee and the Department settled the dispute. The settlement reinstated appellee with backpay. But friction between appellee and his superiors continued, and in January 1979, after appellee was suspended from the Patrol, he resigned “to avoid further harassment and to remove a cloud over his employability.” Id., at 11.
Appellee then filed the present suit against appellants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, seeking relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee’s complaint alleged that appellants in 1977 had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discharging appellee from his job without a formal pre-termination or a prompt post-termination hearing. Appel-lee requested a declaration that his rights had been violated and an award of money damages.
The District Court granted the requested relief for violation of appellee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that appellee had a property interest in his job and that the procedures followed by appellants to discharge appellee were constitutionally “inadequate” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 14. Further, the court declared unconstitutional Florida’s statutory provisions governing removal of state employees, Fla. Stat. §110.061 (1977). Finally, the District Court concluded that appellants had forfeited their qualified immunity from suit under §1983 because appellee’s “due process rights were clearly established at the time of his October 24, 1977, dismissal.” Id., at 16.
Five days after entry of the District Court’s order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Weisbrod v. Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (1981). The Court of Appeals there held that Florida officials in 1978 had-violated no well-established due process rights in discharging a permanent state employee without a pretermination or a prompt post-termination hearing. On motion for reconsideration, the District Court found that Weisbrod required it to vacate its prior holding that appellants had forfeited their immunity by violating appellee’s clearly established constitutional rights. The court nevertheless reaffirmed its award of monetary damages. It reasoned that proof that an official had violated clearly established constitutional rights was not the “sole way” to overcome the official’s claim of qualified immunity. Applying the “totality of the circumstances” test of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974), the District Court held that “if an official violates his agency’s explicit regulations, which have the force of state law, [that] is evidence that his conduct is unreasonable.” 543 F. Supp., at 19. In this respect, the court noted that the personnel regulations of the Florida Highway Patrol clearly required “a complete investigation of the charge and an opportunity [for the employee] to respond in writing.” Id., at 20. The District Court concluded that appellants in discharging appellee had “followed procedures contrary to the department’s rules and regulations”; therefore, appellants were “not entitled to qualified immunity because their belief in the legality of the challenged conduct was unreasonable.” Ibid. The court explicitly relied upon the official violation of the personnel regulation, stating that “[i]f [the] departmental order had not been adopted . . . prior to [appellee’s] dismissal, no damages of any kind could be awarded.” Ibid. The District Court’s order amending the judgment did not discuss the issue whether appellants violated appellee’s federal constitutional rights. On that issue, the District Court relied upon its previous opinion; the court did not indicate that the personnel regulation was relevant to its analysis of appellee’s rights under the Due Process Clause.
The District Court also amended its judgment declaring the Florida civil service statute unconstitutional. The State’s motion for reconsideration had informed the court that the statute had been repealed by the Florida Legislature. The District Court therefore declared unconstitutional the provisions of the newly enacted civil service statute, Fla. Stat., ch. 110 (1982 and Supp. 1983), insofar as “they fail to provide a prompt post-termination hearing.” Id., at 21.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court’s opinion. Scherer v. Graham, 710 F. 2d 838 (CA11 1983). We noted probable jurisdiction, 464 U. S. 1017 (1983), to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly had declared the Florida statute unconstitutional and denied appellants’ claim of qualified immunity. Appellants do not seek review of the District Court’s finding that appellee’s constitutional rights were violated. As appellee now concedes that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Florida statute enacted in 1981, we consider only the issue of qualified immunity. We reverse.
II
In the present posture of this case, the District Court’s decision that appellants violated appellee’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is undisputed. This finding of the District Court—based entirely upon federal constitutional law—resolves the merits of appellee’s underlying claim for relief under § 1983. It does not, however, decide the issue of damages. Even defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard. The precise standard for determining when an official may assert the qualified immunity defense has been clarified by recent cases, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). The present case requires us to consider the application of the standard where the official’s conduct violated a state regulation as well as a provision of the Federal Constitution.
The District Court’s analysis of appellants’ qualified immunity, written before our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, rests upon the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding appellee’s separation from his job. This Court applied that standard in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 247-248. As subsequent cases recognized, Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 322, the “totality of the circumstances” test comprised two separate inquiries: an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the defendant official’s conduct in light of the governing law, and an inquiry into the official’s subjective state of mind. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard. Under Harlow, officials “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 457 U. S., at 818. Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the “objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.” Ibid.(footnote deleted). No other “circumstances” are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity.
Appellee suggests, however, that the District Court judgment can be reconciled with Harlow in two ways. First, appellee urges that the record evinces a violation of constitutional rights that were clearly established. Second, in appellee’s view, the District Court correctly found that, absent a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, appellants’ violation of the state administrative regulation— although irrelevant to the merits of appellee’s underlying constitutional claim — was decisive of the qualified immunity question. In our view, neither submission is consistent with our prior cases.
A
Appellee contends that the District Court’s reliance in its qualified immunity analysis upon the state regulation was “superfluous,” Brief for Appellee 19, because the federal constitutional right to a pretermination or a prompt post-termination hearing was well established in the Fifth Circuit at the time of the conduct in question. As the District Court recognized in rejecting appellee’s contention, Weisbrod v. Donigan, 651 F. 2d 334 (CA5 1981), is authoritative precedent to the contrary. The Court of Appeals in that case found that the State had violated no clearly established due process right when it discharged a civil service employee without any pretermination hearing.
Nor was it unreasonable in this case, under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, for the Department to conclude that appellee had been provided with the fundamentals of due process. As stated above, the District Court found that appellee was informed several times of the Department’s objection to his second employment and took advantage of several opportunities to present his reasons for believing that he should be permitted to retain his part-time employment despite the contrary rules of the Patrol. Appel-lee’s statement of reasons and other relevant information were before the senior official who made the decision to discharge appellee. And Florida law provided for a full evi-dentiary hearing after termination. We conclude that the District Court correctly held that appellee has demonstrated no violation of his clearly established constitutional rights.
B
Appellee’s second ground for affirmance in substance is that upon which the District Court relied. Appellee submits that appellants, by failing to comply with a clear state regulation, forfeited their qualified immunity from suit for violation of federal constitutional rights.
Appellee makes no claim that the appellants’ violation of the state regulation either is itself actionable under § 1983 or bears upon the claim of constitutional right that appellee asserts under §1983. And appellee also recognizes that Harlow v. Fitzgerald makes immunity available only to officials whose conduct conforms to a standard of “objective legal reasonableness.” 457 U. S., at 819. Nonetheless, in appel-lee’s view, official conduct that contravenes a statute or regulation is not “objectively reasonable” because officials fairly may be expected to conform their conduct to such legal norms. Appellee also argues that the lawfulness of official conduct under such a statute or regulation may be determined early in the lawsuit on motion for summary judgment. Appellee urges therefore that a defendant official’s violation of a clear statute or regulation, although not itself the basis of suit, should deprive the official of qualified immunity from damages for violation of other statutory or constitutional provisions.
On its face, appellee’s reasoning is not without some force. We decline, however, to adopt it. Even before Harlow, our cases had made clear that, under the “objective” component of the good-faith immunity test, “an official would not be held liable in damages under § 1983 unless the constitutional right he was alleged to have violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 498 (emphasis added); accord, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.
We acknowledge of course that officials should conform their conduct to applicable statutes and regulations. For that reason, it is an appealing proposition that the violation of such provisions is a circumstance relevant to the official’s claim of qualified immunity. But in determining what circumstances a court may consider in deciding claims of qualified immunity, we choose “between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 813-814. Appellee’s submission, if adopted, would disrupt the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 506-507; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 814, 818-819. Yet, under appellee’s submission, officials would be liable in an indeterminate amount for violation of any constitutional right — one that was not clearly defined or perhaps not even foreshadowed at the time of the alleged violation — merely because their official conduct also violated some statute or regulation. And, in § 1983 suits, the issue whether an official enjoyed qualified immunity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a state administrative regulation, questions that federal judges often may be unable to resolve on summary judgment.
Appellee proposes that his new rule for qualified immunity be limited by requiring that plaintiffs allege clear violation of a statute or regulation that advanced important interests or was designed to protect constitutional rights. Yet, once the door is opened to such inquiries, it is difficult to limit their scope in any principled manner. Federal judges would be granted large discretion to extract from various statutory and administrative codes those provisions that seem to them sufficiently clear or important to warrant denial of qualified immunity. And such judgments fairly could be made only after an extensive inquiry into whether the official in the circumstances of his decision should have appreciated the applicability and importance of the rule at issue. It would become more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate the possible legal consequences of their conduct, but also for trial courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted litigation.
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money damages. Such officials as police officers or prison wardens, to say nothing of higher level executives who enjoy only qualified immunity, routinely make close decisions in the exercise of the broad authority that necessarily is delegated to them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, “often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can only comply with or enforce them selectively.” See P. Schuck, Suing Government 66 (1983). In these circumstances, officials should not err always on the side of caution. “[Officials with a broad range of duties and authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication of office.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 246.
I — I I — < H — I
A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. As appellee has made no such showing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
One memorandum reported to Capt. Sconiers that appellee had continued to work at his second job; a second had been addressed by Lt. Wiggins to appellee; other memoranda summarized Lt. Wiggins’ and Sgt. Clark’s discussions with appellee.
Appellant Ralph Davis was Executive Director of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles at the time of appellee’s discharge from employment. Appellant Chester Blakemore succeeded Davis to that position and is a party only in his official capacity. Appellant Col. J. Eldridge Beach is Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, a division of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; as noted above, he held that position at the time of appellee’s discharge.
The complaint also alleged that appellants, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, had coerced appellee to accept an inadequate settlement and had infringed upon appellee’s right of privacy guaranteed by the First and Ninth Amendments.
The District Court rejected appellee’s other constitutional claims.
The District Court relied in part on the reasoning of Williams v. Treen, 671 F. 2d 892 (CA5 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1126 (1983), that had held that official conduct in violation of an explicit and clearly established state regulation was per se unreasonable. 671 F. 2d, at 899.
These regulations specified in pertinent part:
“Upon receiving a report of... a violation of Department or Division rules and regulations . . . , the Director shall order a complete investigation to determine the true facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense. The completed investigation report will also contain a written statement made by the employee against whom the complaint was made. If after a thorough study of all information concerning the violation, the Director decides that a . . . dismissal will be in order, he will present the employee in writing with the reason or reasons for such actions.” General Order No. 43, §1.C (Sept. 1, 1977), quoted in 543 F. Supp., at 19-20.
The Florida civil service statute now in force replaced the statute under which appellee’s employment was terminated. As the current state statute was never applied to appellee, he lacks standing to question its constitutionality. Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969).
Appellee’s concession does not deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction over the remaining issue in the case. In cases where the Court of Appeals has declared a state statute unconstitutional, this Court may decide the “Federal questions presented,” 28 U. S. C. §1254(2). Cf. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 263 (1944); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173 (1979). Under § 1254(2), the Court retains discretion to decline to consider those issues in the case not related to the declaration that the state statute is invalid. In the present casé, however, we choose to consider the important question whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals properly denied appellants’ good-faith immunity from suit.
As we discuss below, it is contested whether these constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of appellants’ conduct.
We see no reason to doubt, as does the partial dissent, that the Court of Appeals in Weisbrod had full knowledge of its own precedents and correctly construed them.
As the partial dissent explains at some length, the decisions of this Court by 1978 had required “some kind of a hearing,” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 570, n. 7 (1972), prior to discharge of an employee who had a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. But the Court had not determined what kind of a hearing must be provided. Such a determination would require a careful balancing of the competing interests — of the employee and the State — implicated in the official decision at issue. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). As the Court had considered circumstances in which no hearing at all had been provided prior to termination, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), or in which the requirements of due process were met, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976); Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 624 (1977), there had been no occasion to specify any minimally acceptable procedures for termination of employment. The partial dissent cites no case establishing that appellee was entitled to more elaborate notice, or a more formal opportunity to respond, than he in fact received.
State law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process Clause when the property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. Appellee’s property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee does not contend here that the procedural rules in state law govern the constitutional analysis of what process was due to him under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Harlow, the Court acknowledged that officials may lose their immunity by violating “clearly established statutory . . . rights.” 457 U. S., at 818. This is the case where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for violation of those statutory rights, as in Harlow itself, see id., at 820, n. 36, and as in many §1983 suits, see, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980) (holding that § 1983 creates cause of action against state officials for violating federal statutes). For the reasons that we discuss, officials sued for violations of rights conferred by a statute or regulation, like officials sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the statutory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages. And if a statute or regulation does give rise to a cause of action for damages, clear violation of the statute or regulation forfeits immunity only with respect to damages caused by that violation. In the present case, as we have noted, there is no claim that the state regulation itself or the laws that authorized its promulgation create a cause of action for damages or provide the basis for an action brought under § 1983.
Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our cases have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. Neither federal nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulation — of federal or of state law — unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.
Officials would be required not only to know the applicable regulations, but also to understand the intent with which each regulation was adopted. Such an understanding often eludes even trained lawyers with full access to the relevant legislative or administrative materials. It is unfair and impracticable to require such an understanding of public officials generally.
Appellee urges as well that appellants’ violation of the personnel regulation constituted breach of their “ministerial” duty — established by the regulation — to follow various procedures before terminating appellee’s employment. Although the decision to discharge an employee clearly is discretionary, appellee reasons that the Highway Patrol regulation deprived appellants of all discretion in determining what procedures were to be followed prior to discharge. Under this view, the Harlow standard is inapposite because this Court’s doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions.
Appellee’s contention mistakes the scope of the “ministerial duty” exception to qualified immunity in two respects. First, as we have discussed, breaeh of a legal duty created by the personnel regulation would forfeit official immunity only if that breach itself gave rise to the appellee’s cause of action for damages. This principle equally applies whether the regulation created discretionary or ministerial duties. Even if the personnel regulation did create a ministerial duty, appellee makes no claim that he is entitled to damages simply because the regulation was violated. See supra, at 193-194, and n. 12.
In any event, the rules that purportedly established appellants’ “ministerial” duties in the present ease left to appellants a substantial measure of discretion. Cf. Amy v. The Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 138 (1871); Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845). Appellants were to determine, for example, what constituted a “complete investigation” and a “thorough study of all information” sufficient to justify a decision to terminate ap-pellee’s employment. See n. 6, supra. And the District Court’s finding that appellants ignored a clear legal command does not bear on the “ministerial” nature of appellants’ duties. A law that fails to specify the precise action that the official must take in each instance creates only discretionary authority; and that authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is abused. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, supra.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations