Per Curiam.
Petitioner, an inmate of the Illinois State Penitentiary, asks us to review an order dismissing his civil rights action against the respondent corrections officers and directing him to pay counsel fees of $400 for services rendered by the Attorney General of Illinois in representing the respondents in that action.
After granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a constitutional violation, the District Court ordered petitioner to show cause why fees of $400 should not be taxed against him under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because he did not respond to that order, the fee award was entered. A motion to reconsider was later denied on the ground that petitioner’s suit was “meritless.” The Court of Appeals disposed of the novel question presented by petitioner by affirming the fee award in an unpublished order. We now grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
On September 20, 1977, petitioner was charged with a violation of prison regulations and placed in segregation. At a disciplinary hearing two days later, petitioner admitted that he and two other inmates had consumed a homemade alcoholic beverage; his punishment was confinement to segregation for 10 days, demotion to C-grade, and loss of 30 days’ statutory good time.
Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies and then filed a complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on the form used by prisoners who are not represented by counsel. The facts stated on the form raised two federal questions of arguable merit: (1) the decision to place petitioner in a segregation cell on September 20, 1977, was not preceded by a hearing and was not justified by any emergency or other necessity; (2) two of the officers who conducted the disciplinary hearing after petitioner had been in segregation for two days were biased against him. Respondents, represented by the State Attorney General’s Office, moved to dismiss the complaint, but filed no affidavits denying or explaining the facts alleged by petitioner. After allowing petitioner to file various amendments and additional papers, the District Court dismissed the complaint without taking any evidence. Thereafter the fee award was made.
In its order affirming the action of the District Court, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords a prisoner certain minimum procedural safeguards before disciplinary action may be taken against him. Because the record did not reveal a violation of those safeguards at the hearing on September 22, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint had been properly dismissed. However, the Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked the fact, clearly stated in petitioner's brief on appeal, that the disciplinary hearing did not take place until two days after petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20. Nothing in the papers filed on behalf of the respondents purports to justify or explain the segregation of petitioner for two days in advance of the disciplinary hearing.
II
Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois, was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded'' are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ....'' Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F. 2d 83, 86 (CA7 1980); French v. Heyne, 547 F. 2d 994, 996 (CA7 1976). Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, supra, at 520-521. And, of course, the allegations of the complaint are generally taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 322 (1972).
Applying these principles to petitioner’s amended complaint, we conclude that all but one of its allegations were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. Petitioner’s allegations of bias and procedural irregularities in the September 22 hearing, unequal treatment, and cruel and unusual punishment, even when liberally construed, were insufficient to require any further proceedings in the District Court. We therefore affirm the dismissal of these claims.
Petitioner’s allegation that he had been confined unnecessarily to segregation is of a different character. It can be construed as a contention that his confinement to segregation violated due process because it took place without a prior hearing. It is clear from the facts alleged in the amended complaint that petitioner was confined in segregation for two days before a hearing was held. Indeed, petitioner expressly stated this claim in procedural due process terms in his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F. 2d 625, 633 (CA7), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 959 (1977). The amended complaint alleged that segregation was unnecessary in petitioner’s case because his offense did not involve violence and he did not present a “clear and present danger.” There is no suggestion in the record that immediate segregation was necessitated by emergency conditions. Defendants did make the unsworn assertion that petitioner was placed in segregation on “temporary investigative status,” but the significance of this designation is unclear and it does not, without more, dispose of petitioner’s procedural due process claim. The District Court, in dismissing the amended complaint, merely concluded that temporary segregation pending investigation was not actionable. The court cited an Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation which authorized segregation of prisoners pending investigation of disciplinary matters, where required “in the interest of institutional security and safety.” In the absence of any showing that concern for institutional security and safety was the basis for immediate segregation of petitioner without a prior hearing, this regulation does not justify dismissal of petitioner’s suit for failure to state a claim.
Our discussion of this claim is not intended to express any view on its merits. We conclude merely that the amended complaint was adequate at least to require some response from the defendants, by way of affidavit or otherwise, to petitioner’s claim that he was unjustifiably placed in segregation without a prior hearing. Although petitioner’s pleadings are prolix and lacking in stylistic precision, this is not a case like Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), in which a pro se litigant’s detailed recitation of the facts reveals on its face the insufficiency of the complaint. We cannot say with assurance that petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S., at 521. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have reversed the dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings.
Ill
The award of attorney’s fees entered against petitioner must be vacated.
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), we held that the defendant in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the District Court finds “that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id., at 421. Although arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we can perceive no reason for applying a less stringent standard. The plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. As we stated in Christiansburg:
“To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” 434 U. S., at 422.
No such finding supported the fee award in this case.
These limitations apply with special force in actions initiated by uncounseled prisoners. Faithful adherence to the principles of Haines v. Kerner dictates that attorney’s fees should rarely be awarded against such plaintiffs. The fact that a prisoner’s complaint, even when liberally construed, cannot survive a motion to dismiss does not, without more, entitle the defendant to attorney’s fees. An unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims. As the Court noted in Christiansburg, even if the law or the facts are somewhat questionable or unfavorable at the outset of litigation, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. 434 U. S., at 422.
Despite the lower court’s conclusion to the contrary, the allegations of petitioner’s amended complaint are definitely not meritless in the Christiansburg sense. Even those allegations that were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim deserved and received the careful consideration of both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone, “groundless” or “without foundation” as required by Christiansburg.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It %s so ordered.
The Chief Justice would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument.
Justice Stewakt would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint. He substantially agrees, however, with what is said in Part III of the Court’s per curiam opinion, and for those reasons would reverse the judgment insofar as it affirmed the award of attorney’s fees entered against the petitioner.
The order entered by District Judge McMillen on October 18, 1978, reads as follows:
“On August 7, 1978, we ordered plaintiff to show cause within twenty (20) days thereof why defendants’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $400 should not be taxed against plaintiff under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because plaintiff has not complied with or otherwise responded to that order, we hereby tax defendants’ fees in the amount of $400 against him pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988.”
On December 5, 1978, Judge McMillen entered the following order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration:
“On October 18, 1978, we ordered that the defendants’ attorneys fees in the amount of $400 should be taxed against the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider said action. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is denied and attorneys fees in the amount of $400 will be taxed against the plaintiff, as the suit was meritless.”
Rule 35 (c)(1) of the Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit identifies those decisions warranting publication:
“A published opinion will be filed when the decision
“(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing, rule of law;
“(ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest;
“(in) criticizes or questions existing law;
“(iv) constitutes a significant and nonduplieative contribution to legal literature
“(A) by a historical review of law,
“(B) by describing legislative history, or
“(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law;
“(v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has published an opinion supporting the judgment or order; or
“(vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedienee to specific directions of that Court.”
When a decision does not satisfy these criteria, it is to be filed as an unpublished order. Circuit Rule 35 (e)(2). Unpublished orders may not be cited as precedent in any federal court within the Seventh Circuit. Circuit Rule 35 (b) (2) (iv).
Although petitioner’s appeal was decided in an unpublished order purportedly having no precedential significance, three members of the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Fairchild and Judges Swygert and Bauer, nonetheless voted to rehear the case en banc. Judge Swygert filed a written dissent from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
It is unclear from the record whether this sentence included the two days petitioner spent in segregation prior to the disciplinary hearing, or whether he was sentenced to 10 days’ segregation in addition to the time already served. There apparently is also some confusion with respect to the exact sentence imposed on petitioner at the hearing. The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint indicates that petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in segregation. The Court of Appeals’ order, on the other hand, states that he was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The petition for writ of certiorari and respondents’ brief in opposition filed in this Court are similarly inconsistent on this point. The record seems to indicate that petitioner was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The uncertainty with respect to petitioner’s posthearing segregation is not, however, material to our decision in this case.
Petitioner also alleged that respondents violated their own procedural regulations, and that it was a denial of equal protection of the laws and cruel and unusual punishment to impose a more severe sentence on him than on the other two inmates involved in the incident, since he had confessed to drinking and they had not.
As the Court of Appeals noted:
“The Supreme Court has delineated the standard to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has been afforded his minimum due process rights. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 . . . (1974). The prisoner is entitled to (1) advance written notice of the charges against him or her; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided that to do so will not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals, before a sufficiently impartial hearing board; (3) a written statement by the fact finder of ‘the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action taken.’ ”
The Court reaffirmed the principles of Haines in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976):
“As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded/ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” ’ Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957).”
In a document entitled, “Response to: Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment/& Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment,” petitioner alleged:
“Placement in Segregation: Plaintiff was placed in Segregation on September 20, 1977, with no hearing what-so-ever. No reasons provided him as to why it was necessary to place him in segregation. No Resident Information Report issued him, stating he was being placed in segregation, under investigation status.” Response, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Petitioner thereafter asserted that “[classification to segregation must comply with procedural due process.” Id., at 4, 7. Petitioner went on to assert that his placement in segregation on September 20 was “completely unnecessary, because plaintiff posed no immediate threat to the safety and security of the institution. . . .” Id., at 8. Later in the response, petitioner discussed his due process claim in detail. Id., at 15-16.
In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, respondents asserted:
“Plaintiff's placement in segregation cellhouse on September 20, 1977 on temporary investigative status pending hearing of the resident information reports on September 22, 1977 does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. No disciplinary sanctions constituting a grievous loss were imposed prior to a disciplinary hearing. The transfer of a resident from one cell to another does not trigger due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 .. . (1976).”
The District Court’s order dismissing petitioner’s complaint stated:
“Plaintiff complains that his placement in segregation between the evening of September 20 and his hearing on September 22 was ‘unnecessary’ because no violence was involved in the incident. We find that his temporary placement in segregation pending the hearing, which was brought within the required 72 hour period, is not actionable. See A. R. 804 (G), effective December 1, 1976.”
This regulation, Administrative Regulation § 804 (II) (G), provides, in pertinent part:
“It is recognized that incidents occur which, in the interest of institutional security and safety, require that a resident be removed from the general population and placed in a holding unit pending the completion of an investigation. As the holding unit functions in the same manner as a segregation unit (except that single celling is not required in the holding unit), a resident must be provided with the same procedural safeguards and services as are required by this regulation relative to placements, conditions and services in a segregation unit.”
The dissenting opinion rests on the alternative and somewhat inconsistent grounds that prehearing solitary confinement was (a) proper punishment for an offense that was already adequately proved, (b) necessary in order to forestall the development of a contrived defense, and (c) harmless because petitioner subsequently received a fair hearing. The record reveals that these grounds are not sufficient to justify the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
On the basis of petitioner’s admission that he had been drinking, plus unsworn allegations in the reports of the corrections officers, the dissent concludes that petitioner was intoxicated on September 20 and that he posed a threat to prison security and safety sufficiently serious to warrant immediate segregation.
There is little doubt that some intoxicated prisoners may pose a threat to prison security justifying segregation without a hearing. The problem in this case is that the record does not establish, and the District Court did not find, that petitioner was in fact intoxicated or that his condition presented a threat to institutional security. Indeed, at no point in this litigation have the respondents asserted, by affidavit or otherwise, that petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20 because of such security concerns.
The dissent also speculates that inmates suspected of violations of prison regulations, if allowed to remain in the general prison population pending disciplinary proceedings, will fabricate alibi defenses and intimidate potential witnesses. Post, at 22. This danger would apparently justify automatic investigative segregation of all inmate suspects. Ironically, however, even the Administrative Regulation cited by the District Court, see n. 11, supra, does not purport to justify such blanket segregation. Moreover, automatic investigative segregation is particularly inappropriate for an inmate, like petitioner, who has already admitted guilt; fabrication of alibis or intimidation of witnesses seems unlikely in such a case. While investigative concerns might, in particular cases, justify prehearing segregation, nothing in the present record suggests that these concerns were at work in this case.
Either the institutional security or the investigative justification postulated by the dissent might well be dispositive had the District Court made appropriate findings. The respondents did not, however, present these justifications to the District Court and the District Court accordingly made no such findings. The record is entirely consistent with the possibility that an inmate who admittedly had been drinking posed no threat at all to prison security and had no intent to deny the facts, but did want an opportunity to establish mitigating circumstances before being placed in solitary confinement. The dissent’s emphasis upon petitioner’s admission confuses the distinction, previously recognized by this Court, between the question of guilt and the question of appropriate punishment. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 483-484 (1972).
Finally, even if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless actionable. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266-267 (1978). “Because the right to procedural due process is 'absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed . . . the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Id., at 266 (footnote omitted).
As Judge Swygert noted in his dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc, see n. 3, supra, the District Court dismissed petitioner’s claims only after detailed consideration resulting in a seven-page opinion. According to Judge Swygert:
“It is quite evident from the detailed treatment given by the district court to the issues raised by plaintiff’s complaint that the suit was not groundless or meritless. That fact is corroborated by this court’s treatment of the same issues on appeal.”