Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the. issue whether a beneficiary of the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may refuse a home visit by the caseworker without risking the termination, of benefits.
The New York State and City social services commissioners appeal from a judgment and decree of a divided three-judge District Court holding invalid and unconstitutional in application § 134 of the New York Social Services Law, § 175 of the New York Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance, and §§ 351.10 and 351.21 of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, and granting injunctive relief. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (SDNY 1969). This Court noted probable jurisdiction but, by a divided vote, denied a requested stay. 397 U. S. 904.
The District Court majority held that a mother receiving AFDC relief may refuse, without forfeiting her. right to that relief, the periodic home visit which the cited New York statutes and regulations 'prescribe as a condition for the continuance of assistance under the program. The beneficiary’s thesis, and that of the District Court majority, is that home visitation is a search and, when not consented to or when not supported by a warrant based on probable cause, violates the beneficiary’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Judge McLean, in dissent, thought it unrealistic to regard the home visit as a search; felt that the requirement of a search warrant to issue only upon a showing of probable cause would make the AFDC program “in effect another criminal statute” and would “introduce a hostile arm’s length element into the relationship’-’ between worker and mother, “a relationship which can be effective only when it is based upon mutual confidence and trust”; and concluded that the majority’s holding struck “a damaging blow” to an important social welfare program. 303 F. Supp., at 946.
I
The case comes to us on the pleadings and supporting affidavits and without the benefit of testimony which an extended hearing would have provided. The pertinent facts, however, are not in dispute.
Plaintiff Barbara James is the mother of a son, Maurice, who was born in May 1967. They reside in New York City. Mrs. James first applied for AFDC assistance shortly before Maurice’s birth. A caseworker made a visit to her apartment at that time without objection. The assistance was authorized.
Two years later, on May 8, 1969, a caseworker wrote Mrs. James that she would visit her home on May 14. Upon receipt of this advice, Mrs. James telephoned the worker that, although she was willing to supply information “reasonable and relevant” to her need for public assistance, any discussion was not to take place at her home. The -worker told Mrs. James that she was required by law to visit in her home and that refusal to permit the visit would result in the termination of assistance. Permission was still denied.
On May 13 the City Department of Social Services sent Mrs. James a notice of intent to discontinue assistance because of the visitation refusal. The notice advised the beneficiary of her right to a hearing before a review officer. The hearing was requested and was held on-May 27. Mrs. James appeared with an attorney at that hearing. They continued, to refuse permission for a worker to visit the James home, but again expressed willingness to cooperate and to permit visits elsewhere. The review officer ruled that the refusal was a proper ground for the termination of assistance. His written decision stated:
“The home visit which Mrs. James refuses to permit is for the purpose of determining if there are any changes in her situation that might affect her . eligibility to continue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social services which the Department of Social Services can provide to the family.”
A notice of termination issued on Juné 2.
Thereupon, without seeking a hearing at the state level, Mrs. James, individually and on behalf of Maurice, and purporting to act on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, instituted the present civil rights suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged the denial of rights guaranteed to her under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under Subchapters IV and XVI of the Social Security Act and regulations issued thereunder. She further alleged that she and her son have no income, resources, or support other than the benefits received under the AFDC program. She asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. A temporary restraining order was issued on June 13, James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (SDNY 1969), and the three-judge District Court was convened.
II
The federal aspects of the AFDC program deserve mention. They are provided for in Subchapter IV, Part A, of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. V). Section 401 of. the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. V), specifies its purpose, namely, “encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life . . . The same section authorizes the federal appropriation for payments to States that qualify. Section 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides that a state plan, among other things, must “provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”; must “provide that the State agency will make such reports ... as the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] may from time to time require”; must “provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid”; and must “provide that where the State agency has reason to believe’ that the home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for' the child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child it shall bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agencies in the State . . . Section 405, 42 U. S. C. § 605, provides that..
“Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any páyments of aid . . . made with respect to a child are not being or may not be used in the best interests of the child, the State agency may provide for such counseling and guidance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds by the relative ... in order to assure use of such payments in the best interests, of such child, and may provide for advising such relative that continued failure to so use such payments will result in substitution therefor of protective payments ... or in seeking the appointment of a guardian ... or in. the imposition of criminal or civil penalties . . .. .”
III
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home, as this case appears to do, an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the home: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ; . . .” This Court has characterized that right as “basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). And over the years the Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling. See, for example, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 (1970). In Camara Mr. Justice White, after noting that the “translation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines, for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” went on to observe,
“Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” 387 U. S., at 528-529.
He pointed out, too, that one’s Fourth Amendment protection sübsists apart from his being suspected of criminal behavior. 387 U. S., at 530.
IV
This natural and quite proper protective attitude, however, is not a factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that we. are not concerned here with any search by the New York social service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. It is true that the governing statute and regulations appear to make mandatory the initial home visit and the subsequent periodic “contacts” (which may include home visits) for the inception and continuance of aid. It is also true that the caseworker’s posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context. We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and .that the bene-Sciary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If iorisent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.
V
If however, we were to assume that a caseworker’s home visit, before or subsequent to the beneficiary’s initial qualification for. benefits, somehow (perhaps because the average beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit), and despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment’s standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). And Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed in Terry that “the specific content and incidents of this, right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.” 392 U. S., at 9.
There are a number of factors that compel us to conclude that the home visit proposed for Mrs. James is not unreasonable:
1. The public’s interest in .this particular segment of the area of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the dependent child whose family requires such aid for that child.. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public’s concern. The dependent . child’s. needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the . mother claims as her rights.
2. The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit; from the aid it dispenses. . Surely it is not unreasonable, in the Fourth Amendment sense or in any other sense of that term, that the State have at its command a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and. considerate application, of achieving that, assurance.
3. One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker,, has not only an interest but an obligation.
4. The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations is upon the home, upon “close contact” with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient “to a condition of self-support,” and upon the relief of his distress. The. federal emphasis is no different. It is upon “assistance and rehabilitation,” upon maintaining and strengthening family life, and upon “maximum self-support and personál independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §601 (1964 ed., Supp. V); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 479 (1970), and id., at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It requires cooperation from the state agency upon specified standards and in specified ways. And it is concerned about any possible exploitation of the child.
5. The home visit, it is true, is not required by federal statute or regulation. But it has been noted that the visit is “the heart of welfare administration”; that it affords “a personal, rehabilitative orientation, unlike that. of most federal programs”; and that the “more pronounced service orientation” effected by Congress with the 1956 amendments to the Social Security Act “gave redoubled importance to the practice of home visiting.” Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 Yale L. J. 746, 748 (1970). The home visit is an established routine in States besides New York.
6. The means employed by the New York agency are significant. Mrs. James received written notice several days in advance of the intended home visit. The date was specified. Section 134-a of the New York Social Services Law, effective April 1, 1967, and set forth, in n. 2, supra, sets the tone. Privacy is emphasized. The applicant-recipient is made the primary source of information as to eligibility. Outside informational sources, other than public records, aré to be consulted only with the beneficiary’s consent. Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snooping in the home are forbidden. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §§ 2200 (a) and 2300; 18 NYCRR §§351.1, 351.6, and 351.7. All this minimizes any “burden” upon the homeownér’s right against unreasonable intrusion.
7. Mrs. James, in fact, on this record presents no specific complaint of any unreasonable intrusion of her home and nothing that supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity. She complains of no proposed visitation at an awkward or retirement hour. She suggests no forcible entry. She refers to no snooping. She describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of any kind. She alleges only, in general and nonspecific terms, that on previous visits and, on information and belief, on visitation at the home of other aid recipients, “questions concerning personal relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility.” Paradoxically, this same complaint could be. made of a conference held elsewhere than in the home, and yet this is what is sought by Mrs. James. The same complaint could be made of the census taker’s questions. See Me. Justice Makshall’s opinion, as United States Circuit Judge, in United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F. 2d 462 (CA2 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S, 962. What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms, and to avoid questions of any kind.
8. We are not persuaded, as Mrs.- James would have us be, that all information pertinent to the issue of eligibility can be obtained by the agency through an interview at a place other than the home, or, as the District Court majority suggested, by examining a lease or a birth certificate, or . by periodic medical examinations, or by interviews with school personnel. 303 F. Supp., at 943. Although these secondary sources might be helpful, they would not always assure verification of actual residence or-of actual physical presence in the home, which are requisites for AFDC benefits, or of impending medical needs. And, of course, little children, such as Maurice James, are not yet registered in school.
9. The visit is not one by police or uniformed authorrity. It is made by "a caseworker of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility. As has already been stressed, the program concerns dependent children and the. needy families of those children. It does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime. The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need.
10. The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a byproduct of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal investigative aspect. And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, then, even assuming that the evidence discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.
11. The warrant procedure, which the plaintiff appears to claim to be so precious to her, even if civil in nature, is not without its seriously objectionablé features in the welfare context. If a warrant could be obtained (the plaintiff affords us little help as to how it would be obtained), it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its execution would require no notice, it would justify entry by force, and its hours for execution would not be so limited as those prescribed for home visitation. The warrant necessarily would imply conduct either criminal or out of compliance with an asserted governing standard. Of course, the force behind the warrant argument, welcome to the one asserting it, is the fact that it would have to rest upon probable cause, and probable cause in the welfare context, as Mrs. James concedes, requires more than the mere need of the caseworker to see the child in the home and to have assurance that the child is there and is receiving the benefit of the aid that has been authorized for it. In this setting, the warrant argument is out of place.
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal Revenue Service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a tapayer’s income tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent’s review some, proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If thé taxpayer refuses, . there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his “rights” in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer’s own making. So here Mrs. James has the “right” to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid,' similar to the taxpayer’s resultant additional tax, flows' from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.
VI
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and its companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), both by a divided. Court, are not inconsistent with our result here. Those cases concerned, respectively, a refusal of entry to city housing inspectors checking for a violation of a building’s occupancy permit, and a refusal of entry to a fire department representative interested in compliance with a city’s fire code. In each case a majority of this Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred prosecution for refusal to permit the desired warrantless inspection. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), a case that reáched an opposing result and that concerned a request by a health officer for entry in order to check the source of a rat infestation, was pro tanto overruled. Both Frank and Camara involved dwelling quarters. See had to do with a commercial warehouse.
But the facts of the three cases are significantly different from those before us. Each concerned a true search, for violations. Frank was a criminal prosecution for the owner’s refusal to permit entry. So, too, was See. Cam-ara had to do with a writ of prohibition sought to prevent an already pending criminal prosecution. The community welfare aspects, of course, were highly important, but each case arose in a criminal context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed.
In contrast, Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home visit and is not about to be so prosecuted. Her wishes in that respect are fully honored. We. have not been told, and have not found, that her refusal is made a criminal act by any applicable New York or federal statute. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised a similar negative choice initially and refrained frorp applying for AFDC benefits. If a statute made her refusal a criminal offense, and if this case were one concerning her prosecution under that statute, Camara and See would have conceivable pertinency.
VII
Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge, under all conceivable circumstances. The early morning maás raid upon homes of welfare recipients is not unknown. See Parrish v. Civil Service Comm’n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 Yale L. J. 1347 (1963). But that is not this case. Facts of that kind present another cáse for another day.
We therefore conclude that the home visitation as structured by the New York statutes and regulations is a reasonable administrative tool; that it serves a valid and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program; that, it'is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and that it violates no right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal.
It is so , ordered.
Mr. Justice White concurs in the judgment and joins the opinion of the Court with the exception of Part IV thereof.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 256 n. 1 (1970), the Court observed that AFDC is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid but administered by the States according to regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See New York Social Services Law §§ 343-362 (1966 and Supp. 1969-1970). Aspects of AFDC have been considered in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).
“§ 134. Supervision.
“The public welfare officials responsible . . ..'for investigating any. application for public assistance and care, shall maintain close contact with persons granted public assistance and care. Such persons shall be visited as frequently as is provided by the rules of the board' and/or regulations of the department or required by the circumstances of the case, in order that any treatment-or service tending to restore such persons to a condition of self-support and to relieve their distress may be rendered and in order that assistance or care may be given only in such amount and as long as necessary. The circumstances of a person receiving continued care shall be re-investigated as frequently as the rules of the board or regulations of the department may require.”
Section 134-a, as added by Laws 1967, c. 183, effective April 1, 1967, provides:
“In accordance with regulations- of the department, any investigation or- reinvestigation of eligibility . . . shall be limited to those factors reasonably necessary to insure that expenditures shall be in accord with applicable provisions of this chapter and the rules of the board and regulations of the department and shall be conducted in siich manner so as not to violate any civil right of the applicant or recipient. In making such investigation or reinvfestigation, sources of information, other than public records, shall be consulted only with the permission of the applicant or recipient. However, if such permission is not granted by the applicant or recipient, the appropriate public welfare official may deny, suspend or discontinue public assistance or care until such time as he may- be satisfied that such applicant or recipient is eligible therefor.”
“Mandatory visits must be made in accordance with law that requires that persons be visited at least once .every three months if they are receiving . . . Aid to Dependent Children . . .
4 “Section 351.10. Required, home . visits and contacts. Social investigation as defined and described . . . shall be made of each application or- reapplication for public assistance or-care as the basis for determination of initial eligibility.
“a. Determination of initial eligibility, shall include contact with the applicant and at least one home visit which shall be made promptly in accordance with agency policy. . . .”
“Section 351.21. Required contacts. Contacts with recipients and collateral sources shall be adequate as to content and frequency and shall include home visits, office interviews, correspondence, reports oh resources and other necessary documentation.”
Section 3.69.2 of Title 18 provides in part: “(c) Welfare of child or minor. A child or minor shall be considered to be eligible for ADC if his home situation is one in which his physical, mental and moral well-being will be safeguarded and his religious faith preserved and protected. (1) In determining the ability of a parent or relative to care for the child so that this purpose is achieved, the home shall be judged by the same standards as are applied to self-maintaining families in the community. When, at the time of application, a home does not meet the usual standards of health and decency but the welfare of the child is not endangered, ADC shall be granted and defined services provided in an effort to improve the situation. Where appropriate, consultation or direct service shall be requested from child welfare.”
No issue of procedural due process is raised in. this case. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), and Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U. S. 280 (1970).
The federal regulations require only periodic redeterminations of eligibility. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 2200 (d). But they also require verification of eligibility by making field- investigations “including home visits” in a selected sample of cases. Pt. II, §6200 (a)(3).
See, e. g., Ala., Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. 1-8 (B) (1968 rev.); Ariz., Regulations promulgated pursuant to Rev. Stat. Ann. §46-203 (1956), Reg. 3-203.6 (1968); Ark. Stat. Ann. §83-131 (1960); Cal. State Dept, of Social Welfare. Handbook, C-012.50 (1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119-9-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967), as amended, Laws 1969, c. 279; Fla. Public Assistance c. 100; Ga. Division of Social Administration — Public Assistance Manual, pt. III, §V (D)(2), pt. VIII (A) (1) (b) (1969); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §4-7 (1967); Ind. Ann. Stat. §52-1247 (1964), Dept. Pub. Welfare, Rules & Regs., Reg. 2-403 (1965); Mich. Public Assistance Manual, Item 243 (3) (F) (Rqv.) (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 7177 (1942) (Laws of 1940, c. 294); Mo. Public Assistance Manual, Dept, of Welfare, § III (1969); Nebraska, State Plan and Manual Regulations, pt. IX, §§ 5760, 5771; N. J., Manual of Administration, Division of Public Welfare, pt. II, §§2120, 2122 (1969); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-13 (1953), Health and Social Services Dept. Manual, §§211.5, 272.11; S, C. Dept, of Public Welfare Manual, Vol. IV (D)(2); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §28-7-7 (1967) (formerly S. D. Code §55.3805); Tenn. Code Ann. §14-309 (1955), Public Assistance Manual, Vol. II, p. 212 (1968 rev.); Wis. Stat. § 49.19 (2) (1967).
It is true that the record contains 12 affidavits, all essentially identical, of aid recipients (other than Mrs. James) which recite that a caseworker “most often” comes without notice; that when he does, the plans the recipient had for that time cannot be carried out; that the visit is “very embarrassing to me if the caseworker, comes when I have company”; and that the caseworker “sometimes asks very personal questions” in front of children.
We have examined Mrs. James’ case record with the New York City Department of Social Services, which, as an exhibit, accompanied defendant Wyman’s answer. It discloses numerous interviews from the time of the initial one on April 27, 1967, until the attempted termination in June 1969. The record is revealing as to Mrs. James’ failure ever really to satisfy the requirements for eligibility; as to constant and repeated demands; as to attitude toward the caseworker; as to reluctance to cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency. There are indications that all was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The picture is a sad and unhappy one.
§ 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V); § 349B1 of the New York Social Services Law.
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Social Services Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the bargaining representative for the social service staff" employed in the New York City Department of Social Services,- recites that “caseworkers are either badly trained or untrained” and that “[generally, a case-. worker is not only poorly trained, but also young and inexperienced . . . Despite this astonishing description by the union of the. lack of qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must assume that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty.
See, for example, New York Social Services Law § 145.
New York Code Crim. Proc. § 801.
See Appendix II to this opinion.