Justice Powell
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor join.
The question in this case is whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a state employee from suing the State in federal court under the Jones Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688.
I
The Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation operates a free automobile and passenger ferry between Point Bolivar and Galveston, Texas. Petitioner Jean Welch, an employee of the State Highway Department, was injured while working on the ferry dock at Galveston. Relying on § 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, she filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Highway Department and the State of Texas.
The District Court dismissed the action as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 533 F. Supp. 403, 407 (1982). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, with each judge writing separately. 739 F. 2d 1034 (1984). On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 780 F. 2d 1268 (1986). The court recognized that Farden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), held that an employee of a state-operated railroad company may bring an action in federal court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60. Farden is relevant to this case because the Jones Act applied the remedial provisions of the FELA to seamen. See 46 U. S. C. § 688(a). The court nevertheless concluded that “the broad sweep of the Farden decision, although it has not been overruled, has overtly been limited by later decisions as its full implications have surfaced.” 780 F. 2d, at 1270. The court relied on our holding that “Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985). The Court of Appeals found no unmistakable expression of such an intention in the Jones Act. The court also held that Texas has not consented to suit under the Jones Act. 780 F. 2d, at 1273-1274 (citing Lyons v. Texas A & M University, 545 S. W. 2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), writ refused, n.r.e. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 811 (1986), and now affirm.
II
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
The Court has recognized that the significance of the Amendment “lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill” of the Constitution. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984) (Pennhurst II). Accordingly, as discussed more fully in Part V of this opinion, the Court long ago held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen’s own State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment refer only to suits by citizens of another State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 (1890). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 280 (1973). For the same reason, the Court has held that the Amendment bars suits in admiralty against the States, even though such suits are not, strictly speaking, “suits in law or equity.” Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (Eleventh Amendment bars in personam actions against a State by its citizens); Ex parte New York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503 (1921) (Eleventh Amendment bars actions in rem against vessel owned by the State and employed exclusively for governmental purposes). See Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 683, n. 17 (1982) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 706-710 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). See infra, at 488-490.
The Court has recognized certain exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. If a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). But, because “[constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights,” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673, the Court will find a waiver by the State “only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Ibid, (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909)). Moreover, “[a] State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99 (emphasis in original). Thus, a State does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immunity in its own courts. Id., at 99, n. 9.
We also have recognized that the Eleventh Amendment “necessarily [is] limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). Consequently, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States’ consent when it acts pursuant to its power “ ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation’ the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ibid, (quoting U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 5). As the Court of Appeals noted in this case, we have required that “Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 243. We have been unwilling to infer that Congress intended to negate the States’ immunity from suit in federal court, given “the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.” Pennhurst II, supra, at 99. Moreover, the courts properly are reluctant to infer that Congress has expanded our jurisdiction. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation”).
Ill
We now apply these principles to the Jones Act. We note that the question whether the State of Texas has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity is not before us. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the State has not consented to Jones Act suits in federal court. The petition for certiorari does not address this issue, and we do not regard it as fairly included in the questions on which certiorari was granted. Indeed, at oral argument counsel for petitioner conceded that the question of express waiver by the State “is not before the Court. . . Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. We therefore have no occasion to consider petitioner’s argument in her brief on the merits that the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6252-19 (Vernon, 1970, as amended 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 50) constitutes an express waiver of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Brief for Petitioner 29-34. We accept the holdings of the Court of Appeals and the District Court that it does not.
Petitioner’s remaining argument is that Congress has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the Jones Act. We assume, without deciding or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U. S. 226, 252 (1985). Petitioner’s argument fails in any event because Congress has not expressed in unmistakable statutory language its intention to allow States to be sued in federal court under the Jones Act. It is true that the Act extends to “[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment,” § 33 (emphasis added). But the Eleventh Amendment marks a constitutional distinction between the States and other employers of seamen. Because of the role of the States in our federal system, “[a] general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 246. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). See also Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S., at 285. In Scanlon the Court held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, which provides remedies for “any recipient of Federal assistance,” does not contain the unmistakable language necessary to negate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. For the same reasons, we hold today that the general language of the Jones Act does not authorize suits against the States in federal court.
IV
In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), the Court considered whether an employee of a state-owned railroad could sue the State in federal court under the FELA. The Court concluded that the State of Alabama had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id., at 186. It reasoned that Congress evidenced an intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by making the FELA applicable to “every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States____” § 1, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 51. The Court mistakenly relied on cases holding that general language in the Safety Appliance Act, §§ 2, 6, and the Railway Labor Act, § 151 et seq., made those statutes applicable to the States. It reasoned that it “should not presume to say, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, that [Congress] intended to exclude a particular group of [railroad] workers from the benefits conferred by the Act.” Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., supra, at 190. But, as discussed above, the constitutional role of the States sets them apart from other employers and defendants. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 246; Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 342-343; Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra. As the dissenting opinion in Parden states:
“It should not be easily inferred that Congress, in legislating pursuant to one article of the Constitution, intended to effect an automatic and compulsory waiver of rights arising under another. Only when Congress has clearly considered the problem and expressly declared that any State which undertakes given regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense.” 377 U. S., at 198-199 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
Although our later decisions do not expressly overrule Parden, they leave no doubt that Parden’& discussion of congressional intent to negate Eleventh Amendment immunity is no longer good law. In Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare the Court emphasized that “Parden was premised on the conclusion that [the State]. . . had consented to suit in the federal courts . . . .” 411 U. S., at 281, n. 1. The Court refused to extend the reasoning of Parden to “infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution.” Id., at 285. In subsequent cases the Court consistently has required an unequivocal expression that Congress intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 242; Pennhurst II, supra, at 99; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 342-345. Accordingly, to the extent that Parden v. Terminal Railway, supra, is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled.
V
Today, for the fourth time in little more than two years, see Papasan v. Attain, 478 U. S. 265, 293 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 74 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting), four Members of the Court urge that we overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), and the long line of cases that has followed it. The rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, the doctrine is “a natural evolution from the very nature of our institutions.” Lile, Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 Va. L. Rev. 95, 97 (1916). It follows that “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). Although the doctrine is not rigidly observed in constitutional cases, “[w]e should not be . . . unmindful, even when constitutional questions are involved, of the principle of stare decisis, by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court as an institution transcending the moment can alone be brought to bear on the difficult problems that confront us.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Despite these time-honored principles, the dissenters — on the basis of ambiguous historical evidence — would flatly overrule a number of major decisions of the Court, and cast doubt on others. See n. 27, infra. Once again, the dissenters have placed in issue the fundamental nature of our federal system.
A
The constitutional foundation of state sovereign immunity has been well described by Justice Marshall in his separate opinion in Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279 (1973):
“It had been widely understood prior to ratification of the Constitution that the provision in Art. Ill, § 2, concerning ‘Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State’ would not provide a mechanism for making States unwilling defendants in federal court. The Court in Chisholm, however, considered the plain meaning of the constitutional provision to be controlling. The Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding, see, e. g., Hans v. Louisiana .... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the federal judicial power generally, and ‘it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.’” Id., at 291-292 (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citations omitted).
Although the dissent rejects the Court’s reading of the historical record, there is ample support for the Court’s rationale, which has provided the basis for many important decisions.
1
Justice Brennan has argued at length that “[a] close examination of the historical records” demonstrates that “[tjhere simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 259 (dissenting opinion). In his dissent today, he repeats and expands this historical argument. Post, at 504-516. The dissent concedes, as it must, that three of the most prominent supporters of the Constitution — Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall — took the position that unconsenting States would not be subject to suit in federal court. The Court has relied on these statements in the past. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 660-662, n. 9; Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 323-325 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., at 12-14. Although the dissenters would read these statements to apply only to cases in which no federal question is presented, see post, at 504-509; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 268, 276-278, the statements themselves do not suggest such a limitation. Moreover, the delicate problem of enforcing judgments against the States, that was raised by both Federalists and anti-Federalists, would have arisen in cases presenting a federal question as well as in other cases.
It is true, as the Court observed in Hans, supra, at 14, that opinions on this question differed during the ratification debates. Among those who disagreed with Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall were Edmund Randolph and James Wilson, both of whom supported ratification. Opponents of ratification, including Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Richard Henry Lee, feared that the Constitution would make unconsenting States subject to suit in federal court. Despite the strong rhetoric in the dissent, these statements fall far short of demonstrating a consensus that ratification of the Constitution would abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States. Indeed, the representations of Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall that the Constitution did not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity may have been essential to ratification. For example, the New York Convention appended to its ratification resolution a declaration of understanding that "the Judicial Power of the United States in cases in which a State may be a party, does not extend to criminal Prosecutions, or to authorize any Suit by any Person against a State.” 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 194 (1894). At most, then, the historical materials show that — to the extent this question was debated — the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous.
2
No one doubts that the Eleventh Amendment nullified the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Chisholm was an original action in assumpsit, filed by the South Carolina executor of a South Carolina estate, to recover money owed to the estate by Georgia. The Court held, over a dissent by Justice Iredell, that it had jurisdiction. The reaction to Chisholm was swift and hostile. The Eleventh Amendment passed both Houses of Congress by large majorities in 1794. Within two years of the Chisholm decision, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified by the necessary 12 States.
The dissent, observing that jurisdiction in Chisholm itself was based solely on the fact that Chisholm was not a citizen of Georgia, argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to cases presenting a federal question. The text of the Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or SubjectsofanyForeignState.” (Emphasisadded.) Federal-question actions unquestionably are suits “in law or equity”; thus the plain language of the Amendment refutes this argument. Nor does the dissenting opinion offer any satisfactory explanation for the rejection, by an overwhelming margin, of an amendment offered by Senator Gallatin that would have allowed citizens to sue the States for causes of action arising under treaties.
3
The Court’s unanimous decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity. Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, brought an action against the State in federal court alleging that its failure to pay interest on certain bonds violated the Contract Clause. The Court considered substantially the same historical materials relied on by the dissent and unanimously held that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court observed:
“Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.” Id., at 15.
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Harlan agreed with the other eight Members of the Court that “a suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial power of the United States extends, unless the State itself consents to be sued.” Id., at 21.
Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 519, the fundamental principle enunciated in Hans has been among the most stable in our constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, the dissent is simply wrong in asserting that the doctrine lacks a clear rationale, post, at 519. Because of the sensitive problems “inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other,” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S., at 294 (Marshall, J., concurring in result), the doctrine of sovereign immunity plays a vital role in our federal system. The contours of state sovereign immunity are determined by the structure and requirements of the federal system. The rationale has been set out most completely in the Court’s unanimous opinion, per Chief Justice Hughes, in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934). First, the United States may sue a State, because that is “inherent in the Constitutional plan.” Id., at 329. Absent such a provision, “‘the permanence of the Union might be endangered.’” Ibid, (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 581 (1922)). Second, States may sue other States, because a federal forum for suits between States is “essential to the peace of the Union.” Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at 328. Third, States may not be sued by foreign states, because “[controversies between a State and a foreign State may involve international questions in relation to which the United States has a sovereign prerogative.” 292 U. S., at 331. Fourth, the Eleventh Amendment established “an absolute bar” to suits by citizens of other States or foreign states. Id., at 329. Finally, “[protected by the same fundamental principle [of sovereign immunity], the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them by their own citizens . . . .” Ibid. The Court has never questioned this basic framework set out in Monaco v. Mississippi.
The dissenters offer their unsupported view that the principle of sovereign immunity is “‘pernicious’” because it assertedly protects States from the consequences of their illegal conduct and prevents Congress from “‘tak[ing] steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve national goals within its constitutional authority.’” Post, at 521 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Of course, the dissent’s assertion that our cases construing the Eleventh Amendment deprive Congress of some of its constitutional power is simply question-begging. Moreover, as noted supra, at 475, Congress clearly has authority to limit the Eleventh Amendment when it acts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S., at 456. The dissent’s statement that sovereign immunity “protect[s] the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct” erroneously suggests that aggrieved individuals are left with no remedy for harmful state actions. Relief often may be obtained through suits against state officials rather than the State itself, or through injunctive or other prospective remedies. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Municipalities and other local government agencies may be sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). In addition, the States may provide relief by waiving their immunity from suit in state court on state-law claims. That States are not liable in other circumstances is a necessary consequence of their role in a system of dual sovereignties. Although the dissent denies that sovereign immunity is “‘required by the structure of the federal system,’” post, at 520 (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 302), the principle has been deeply embedded in our federal system from its inception.
B
As a fallback position, the dissent argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application to suits in admiralty against unconsenting States. Post, at 497-504. This argument also is directly contrary to long-settled authority, as well as the Court’s recognition that the Eleventh Amendment affirms “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity,” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 98; Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at 329.
1
In Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490 (1921), a unanimous Court held that unconsenting States are immune from in personam suits in admiralty brought by private citizens. Today the dissent asserts that the Court’s opinion in Ex parte New York, No. 1, “did not attempt to justify its obliteration” of the traditional distinction between admiralty cases and cases in law or equity. Post, at 500. On the contrary, the Court expressly recognized the distinction, see 256 U. S., at 497, and provided a reasoned basis for its holding:
“That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” Ibid, (citations omitted).
The Court has adhered to this rule in subsequent cases. In re New York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503 (1921), held that a private citizen may not bring an admiralty action in rem against a vessel owned by a State. The Court concluded that “ ‘[t]o permit a creditor to seize and sell [a government-owned vessel] to collect his debt would be to permit him in some degree to destroy the government itself.’” Id., at 511 (quoting Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149, 150 (1879)). More recently, in Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), eight Members of the Court reaffirmed the settled rule that the Eleventh Amendment bars admiralty actions against the State or its officials seeking damages to be paid from the state treasury. Id., at 698-699 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 706-710 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). To be sure, Justice Stevens’ opinion states that “we need not decide the extent to which a federal district court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction over property before the court may adjudicate the rights of claimants to that property as against sovereigns that did not appear and voluntarily assert any claim that they had to the res.” Id., at 697. Of course, that statement has no application to an action in personam, such as Welch’s suit under the Jones Act.
2
The dissent suggests that In re New York, No. 1, decided in 1921, overruled settled law to the effect that the Constitution does not bar private citizens from bringing admiralty suits against the States. Post, at 500. The dissent concedes that the Court “ ‘did not pass on the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment in admiralty’” prior to 1921. Post, at 499 (citation omitted). It nevertheless asserts that dicta in United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (1809), and Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828), support the “holding” of United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (No. 14,647) (CC Pa. 1809), that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits in admiralty. In fact these early cases cast considerable doubt on the dissent’s position.
United States v. Peters was a suit against the heirs of David Rittenhouse, who had served as treasurer of the State of Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary War. While Rittenhouse was treasurer, the State had seized a British vessel and sold it as a prize of war. Rittenhouse had deposited most of the proceeds in his own account, and had not turned them over to the State at the time of his death. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court turned on the facts that “the suit was not instituted against the state, or its treasurer, but against the executrixes of David Rittenhouse,” and that the State “had neither possession of, nor right to, the property.” 5 Cranch, at 139-141. Indeed, language in the Court’s opinion suggests that an action against the State would have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment:
“The [eleventh] amendment simply provides, that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a state. The state cannot be made a defendant to a suit brought by an individual; but it remains the duty of the courts of the United States to decide all cases brought before them by citizens of one state against citizens of a different state, where a state is not necessarily a defendant.” Id., at 139.
Thus, Peters does not support the dissenters’ position.
The dissent’s reliance on Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, supra, also is misplaced. Madrazo, a Spanish subject, sued the Governor of Georgia in admiralty to obtain possession of a cargo of slaves or the proceeds from their sale. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment applies “where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by his name, but by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character.” Id., at 123-124. Although Madrazo argued that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits in admiralty, the Court carefully avoided the question. Instead, it held that the District Court where the action was filed had no jurisdiction regardless of whether the Eleventh Amendment applied.
Madrazo then filed an original admiralty proceeding directly against Georgia in this Court. Once again the Court avoided the question whether the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits in admiralty. Instead, the Court concluded that the case was not an admiralty action, but was “a mere personal suit against a state, to recover proceeds in its possession.” Ex parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627, 632 (1833). This rather strained conclusion was contrary to “the assumption of all concerned” that the action was maritime in nature. D. Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, p. 105, n. 98 (1985).
On balance, the early cases in fact indicate that unconsenting States were immune from suits in admiralty. At the very least, they demonstrate that the dissent errs in suggesting that the amenability of States to suits in admiralty was “settled,” post, at 499. We therefore decline to overrule precedents that squarely reject the dissenters’ position.
C
In deciding yet another Eleventh Amendment case, we do not write on a clean slate. The general principle of state sovereign immunity has been adhered to without exception by this Court for almost a century. The dissent nevertheless urges the Court to ignore stare decisis and overrule the long and unbroken series of precedents reaffirming this principle. If the Court were to overrule these precedents, a number of other major decisions also would have to reconsidered. As we have stated, supra, at 478-479, the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law. For this reason, “any departure from the doctrine . . . demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S., at 212. The arguments made in the dissent fall far short of justifying such a drastic repudiation of this Court’s prior decisions.
VI
For the reasons we have stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 33 of the Jones Act provides in part:
“Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply .... Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” 46 U. S. C. § 688(a).
The question in Scanlon was whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, makes state agencies subject to suits for retroactive monetary relief in federal court. The Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 244-245, n. 4 (1985). Congress therefore had the power to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976).
In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), eight Members of the Court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in admiralty brought to recover damages from the State or its officials. Id., at 698-699 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 706-710 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). An action under the Jones Act unquestionably is an action to recover damages from the State.
The questions presented in the petition for certiorari are:
“1. Whether the State Department of Highways and the State of Texas are immune from a Jones Act suit in U. S. District Court by a state employee/seaman by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
“2. Whether the doctrine of implied waiver of sovereign immunity as set forth in Parden v. Terminal R. R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) is still viable.” Pet. for Cert, i (parallel citations omitted).
The argument for such an authority starts from the proposition that the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, either under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. See D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 142-145 (1970). By ratifying the Constitution, the argument runs, the States necessarily consented to suit in federal court with respect to enactments under either Clause.
Because Eleventh Amendment immunity “partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar,” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974), we have no occasion to consider the State’s additional argument that Congress did not intend to afford seamen employed by the States a remedy under the Jones Act.
As the dissenting opinion in Parden observed, these cases do not support the Court’s holding on the Eleventh Amendment issue. 377 U. S., at 200, n. 2 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ.). California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), was a suit against the National Railroad Adjustment Board that expressly reserved the Eleventh Amendment question. Id., at 568, n. 16 (“The contention of the State that the Eleventh Amendment. . . would bar an employee . . . from enforcing an award ... in a suit against the State in a United States District Court ... is not before us under the facts of this ease”). United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), was a suit brought by the United States, against which the States are not entitled to assert sovereign immunity. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140-141 (1965). Finally, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275, 280-282 (1959), involved an interstate compact that expressly permitted the bistate corporation to sue and be sued.
As discussed, supra, at 475 and n. 5, we have no occasion in this case to consider the validity of the additional holding in Parden, that Congress has the power to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause to the extent that the States are engaged in interstate commerce.
We address today only two principal arguments raised by the dissent: that citizens may bring federal-question actions against the States in federal court, see infra, at 480-488, and that citizens may bring admiralty suits against the States, see infra, at 488-493.
Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall took this position in response to suggestions that the Clause in Article III, § 2, extended the federal judicial power to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State.” James Madison, often described as the “father of the Constitution,” addressed the effect of the first Clause during the Virginia Convention:
“[The Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation [the Clause] can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.
“It appears to me that this [Clause] can have no operation but this — to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it.” 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533 (2d ed. 1861).
The same day, John Marshall said to the Virginia Convention:
“I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called to the bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. ... I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.” Id., at 555-556.
Later that year, Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. . . . [T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. ... To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.” The Federalist No. 81, pp. 548-549 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
The dissent relies heavily on later statements in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 382-383, 412 (1821), and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 857-858 (1824). Of course the possibility that Marshall changed his views on sovereign immunity after the Constitution was ratified, or espoused a broader view of sovereign immunity only to secure ratification, does not imply that the views he expressed at the Virginia Convention should be disregarded. In any event, the dissent places too much weight on Cohens and Osborn. In Cohens, it was the State that began criminal proceedings against the Cohenses. It had long been understood that sovereign immunity did not prevent persons convicted of crimes from appealing. See D. Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, p. 99 (1985). Accordingly, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohens distinguished a writ of error, which is but “a continuation of the same suit,” from an independent suit against the State. 6 Wheat., at 409. Thus, as the Court properly noted in both Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 19 (1890), and Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 327 (1934), the statements quoted in today’s dissent were unnecessary to the decision in Cohens. In Osborn, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to a suit against a state official, a holding that is not at issue today. Thus, the statement quoted by the dissent, post, at 509, is dictum.
Both Wilson and Randolph had served on the Committee of Detail that added the Clause in Article III, § 2, extending the judicial power to controversies between a State and citizens of another State. As a Member of the Court, Wilson sided with the majority in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Randolph, while Attorney General of the United States, argued the ease for Chisholm.
A leading historian has concluded:
“The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissispation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted.” 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 91 (1923).
The New York Convention also stated its understanding that “every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same.” 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 191 (1894). This view later was embodied in the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the States, or to the people, powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution. Of course, the Constitution does not expressly abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States. Thus the principle that States cannot be sued without their consent is broadly consistent with the Tenth Amendment.
President Adams did not notify Congress that the Amendment had been ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the States until January 1798. 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 260 (1899).
The dissent states that Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia is “generally regarded as embodying the rationale of the Eleventh Amendment.” Post, at 513. As the dissent itself observes, post, at 515-516, Justice Iredell’s opinion rests primarily on the absence of a statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the Court in cases such as Chisholm’s. To the extent that Justice Iredell discussed the constitutional question, his opinion is consistent with the more recent decisions of this Court:
“So much, however, has been said on the Constitution, that it may not be improper to intimate that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against the State for the recovery of money.” 2 Dall., at 449 (emphasis added).
The dissent does not attempt to explain these remarks, except to observe that they were unnecessary to Justice Iredell’s decision.
The dissent’s principal textual argument rests on the similarity between the language of the Amendment and the language of the State-Citizen Diversity Clauses in Article III. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 286-287 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This argument cannot explain why Congress chose to apply the Amendment to “any suit in law or equity” rather than any suit where jurisdiction is predicated solely on diversity of citizenship. Instead, the dissent reads the Amendment to accomplish even less than its plain language suggests. As the Court long has recognized, the speed and vigor of the Nation’s response to Chisholm suggests that the Eleventh Amendment should be construed broadly so as to further the federal interests that the Court misapprehended in Chisholm. The dissent also has some difficulty explaining the Clause in Article III, §2, that extends the federal judicial power “to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.” Although arguments analogous to those in the dissent would suggest that this Clause abrogated the sovereign immunity of the United States, the dissent stops short of such an extreme conclusion.
In an effort to explain the overwhelming rejection of Gallatin’s amendment, the dissent suggests that Congress would have enumerated all the Article III heads of jurisdiction if it had intended to bar federal-question actions against the States. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 287, n. 40. The dissent also speculates, without citing a shred of historical evidence, that the Senate may have rejected the proposed amendment to avoid giving the impression that it was barring federal-question actions not based on a treaty. Finally, the dissent observes that federal courts had no general original federal-question jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The dissent thus implies that the question was regarded as unimportant at the time. But the dissent also concedes that Senator Gallatin’s proposed amendment was so unpopular that its adoption might have resulted in a constitutional convention. Ibid. This concession hardly is consistent with the dissent’s assertion that adoption of the Gallatin amendment would have had no practical significance.
In this ease, for example, Welch is not without a remedy: She may file a workers’ compensation claim against the State under the Texas Tort Claims Act, ch. 292, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 874, amended by ch. 50, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 77. See Brief for Respondents 34-35.
The opinion was written by Justice Pitney for a strong Court that included Justices Holmes and Brandéis. Chief Justice White, who died 13 days before the decision was announced, presumably concurred in the result and the reasoning.
The dissent insists that In re New York, No. 2, does not support our holding. Post, at 500-501, n. 5. As noted supra, at 473, n. 3, eight Members of the Court recently have thought otherwise. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), Justice Stevens’ opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Blackmun, explains that In re New York, No. 2, holds:
“[A]n action — otherwise barred as an in personam action against the State — cannot be maintained through seizure of property owned by the State. Otherwise, the Eleventh Amendment could easily be circumvented; an action for damages could be brought simply by first attaching property that belonged to the State and then proceeding in rem.” 458 U. S., at 699.
Justice White’s- opinion in Treasure Salvors, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, reads In re New York, No. 2, even more broadly, as holding that “sovereign immunity bars process against a res in the hands of state officers.” 458 U. S., at 709.
The dissent suggests that a distinction may exist between admiralty suits based on a statute and other admiralty suits against the States. The only argument the dissent advances in favor of this distinction is that “admiralty is not mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment.” Post, at 502, But that observation — as well as the arguments that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a principle of sovereign immunity — applies to ail admiralty suits. The perceived distinction is simply unsound.
The trial in United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (No. 14,647) (CC Pa. 1809), occurred after the Court’s decision in Peters. Peters therefore cannot possibly have “supported” the holding of Bright in the sense of approval or endorsement. Bright was an officer of the Pennsylvania state militia who defended the Rittenhouse home against federal soldiers attempting to enforce the judgment in Peters. Circuit Justice Washington’s remarks, that the dissent characterizes as the “holding” of the case, post, at 498, actually were part of his charge to the jury. The Court had no opportunity to consider Justice Washington’s statements, because it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from Bright’s conviction.
The Court noted that the action was between a State and a foreign subject, an action within the Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution and § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80. Thus, the Court concluded that, “if the 11th amendment. . . does not extend to proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,” Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet., at 124, because it was a suit between a State and a foreign subject. This conclusion is surprising in view of the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80, conferred original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of such actions on the Court. Congress had conferred admiralty jurisdiction on the district courts in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 76-77. Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., at 394-402, already had indicated that the Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III is not exclusive. See D. Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, p. 105, n. 98 (1985).
It is of course true, as the dissent observes, that Justice Story’s treatise on the Constitution observed that a suit in admiralty is not, strictly speaking, a suit in law or equity. Post, at 499 (quoting 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 560-561 (1833)). Justice Story, however, merely observed that “[i]t has been doubted whether [the eleventh] amendment extends to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” id,., at 560, and cited only the cases discussed above. Moreover, Justice Story was noted for his expansive view of the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e. g., De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (CC Mass. 1815); Note, 37 Am. L. Rev. 911, 916 (1903) (“It was said of the late Justice Story, that if a bucket of water were brought into his court with a corn cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States over it”).
In addition, the dissent accords little weight to early cases applying the general admiralty principle that maritime property belonging to a sovereign cannot be seized. E. g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812); L'Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238 (1816); The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283 (1822). See Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S., at 709-710, and n. 6 (opinion of White, J.).
The dissent is written as if the slate had been clean since Ham was decided 97 years ago. As noted above, Ham has been reaffirmed in case after case, often unanimously and by exceptionally strong Courts. The two principal holdings of Ham that the dissent challenges are that the federal judicial power does not extend either to suits against States that arise under federal law, or to suits brought against a State by its own citizens. If these holdings were rejected, the Court would overrule at least 17 cases, in addition to Ham itself. Twelve of these cases relied on both of these principles. See Papasan v. Attain, 478 U. S. 265 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18 (1933); Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490 (1921); Ex parte New York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503 (1921); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311 (1920); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899). Four of them rested on the principles Hans established for determining when Congress has extended the federal judicial power to include actions against States under federal law. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U. S. 226 (1985); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151 (1909); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900). Finally, one would be overruled only to the extent the Court rejected the principle that the federal judicial power does not extend to suits against States by their own citizens. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89 (1984).
Repudiation of these principles also might justify reconsideration of a variety of other cases that were concerned with this Court’s traditional treatment of sovereign immunity. E. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911).
Apart from rhetoric, the dissent relies on two arguments: (i) the “historical record,” and (ii) the perceived “pernicious[ness]” of the principle of sovereign immunity. As we have noted, the fragments of historical evidence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution are as supportive of Hans v. Louisiana as they are of the dissent. In attaching weight to this ambiguous history, it is not immaterial that we are a century further removed from the events at issue than were the Justices who unanimously agreed in Hans. Not one of the 17 cases the dissent would overrule concludes that the historical evidence calls into question the principle of state sovereign immunity or justifies the ignoring of stare decisis. As for the view that it would be “pernicious” to protect States from liability for their “unlawful conduct,” we have noted above that an aggrieved citizen such as petitioner in fact has a bundle of possible remedies. See supra, at 488, and n. 19.