Me. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon in this case to remove ambiguities from a previous opinion which, while clear enough to the trial court, appears to have conveyed a triplicity of meaning to the Court of Appeals. A year ago Accardi was here contesting the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he attacked the refusal of the Board of Immigration Appeals to grant his application for suspension of deportation. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954). The sole foundation of his claim was that “the Attorney General [is doing] precisely what the regulations forbid him to do: dictating the Board’s decision.” 347 U. S. 260, at 267. We remanded the petition to the trial court for a hearing on the question of “the Board’s alleged failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to existing valid regulations.” It was alleged on information and belief that the Attorney General had prepared prior to the Board’s decision “a list of one hundred individuals whose deportation he sought . . .” as “unsavory characters”; that Accardi’s name was among the group; and that the “list . . . was circulated by the Department of Justice among all of its employees connected with the Immigration Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals” with the result that “since that time it has been impossible for [Accardi] to secure fair consideration of his case.” We concluded that, if Accardi could prove that the Board had not exercised its own discretion in the matter, he should receive “a new hearing before the Board without the burden of previous proscription by the list.”
On the remand, the District Court, after a full hearing, found that the Board members “reached their individual and collective decision on the merits, free from any dictation or suggestion . . .” and again dismissed the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting, 219 F. 2d 77. The opinion of the court based its conclusion on the ground that the “Attorney General’s statements [had] unconsciously influence[d] the Board members so that they felt obliged not to exercise their discretion and, without doing so, to decide against Accardi.” The chief judge, concurring in the result, thought that our prior opinion merely required Accardi to prove “that there was a list as alleged, that he was on it, and that this fact was known to the Board.” The dissenting judge, on the other hand, read our opinion as meaning “no more . . . than that [Accardi’s] allegations sufficiently charged ‘dictation’ by the Attorney General,” entitling Accardi to a hearing on the question of “whether the Board’s denial of discretionary relief represented its own untrammelled decision or one dictated by the Attorney General.” P. 90. He concluded that the finding of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous. We agree with the dissenting judge both as to the interpretation of our prior opinion and its application to the facts of this case.
The opinion of the court recognized that, before Accardi was entitled to another Board hearing, he had to prove that a majority of the Board not only knew of the “list” but were affected by it. However, the opinion concluded that the Board’s position that its judgment had not been affected by “the list” was incredible. We find nothing incredible in the uncontradicted testimony produced before the trial judge through a number of witnesses including the Board members. The record shows that in fact there was no list, as such, and hence that one could not have been circulated among the members of the Board; that the fanfare of publicity complained of was in connection with the Attorney General’s “deportation program”; that this program was never publicly related to Accardi until after the Board’s decision; that only one Board member knew Accardi was covered by the program, while two others and the Chairman never had such knowledge until after their decision; that the fifth member asserted that he “may have known [of Accardi’s inclusion in the program] but . . . couldn’t say”; and that no person in the Department of Justice ever directly or indirectly approached any Board member as to the matter. It seems to us that the record fully supports the District Court’s conclusion that the Board’s decision represented the free and undictated decision of each member. Among the eight witnesses who gave testimony concerning the matter, was the Attorney General. He testified that there was no list; that his investigation “indicated that [Accardi] was a racketeer and that is the reason [he] moved to deport him”; that he “never at any time discussed this matter with any member of the [Board].” In the face of such evidence, we do not believe that speculation on the effect of subconscious psychological pressures provides sufficient justification for rejecting the District Court’s finding as clearly erroneous.
Accardi emphasizes the trial court’s finding that the Board had notice of the program and of his inclusion therein. This “notice,” at most, was given only to the calendar clerk of the Board so that the hearing of certain cases might be expedited. The testimony that it was not furnished to members of the Board or the Chairman is undisputed.
We believe that Accardi has had the hearing required by our previous opinion and that he has failed to prove his case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, joined issue thus:
“We do not think that [the] validity [of the Board’s order] can be impeached by showing that [the Attorney General] overinfluenced members of his own staff whose opinion in any event would be only advisory.” 347 U. S., at 270.