Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was brought in the District Court for the Western District of South Carolina. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U. S. C. § 1332. The petitioner, a resident of North Carolina, sued respondent, a South Carolina corporation, for damages for injuries allegedly caused by the respondent’s negligence. He had judgment on a jury verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and directed the entry of judgment for the respondent. 238 F. 2d 346. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 999, and subsequently ordered reargument, 355 U. S. 950.
The respondent is in the business of selling electric power to subscribers in rural sections of South Carolina. The petitioner was employed as a lineman in the construction crew of a construction contractor. The contractor, R. H. Bouligny, Inc., held a contract with the respondent in the amount of $334,300 for the building of some 24 miles of new power lines, the reconversion to higher capacities of about 88 miles of existing lines, and the construction of 2 new substations and a breaker station. The petitioner was injured while connecting power lines to one of the new substations.
One of respondent’s affirmative defenses was that, under the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, the petitioner — because the work contracted to be done by his employer was work of the kind also done by the respondent’s own construction and maintenance crews— had the status of a statutory employee of the respondent and was therefore barred from suing the respondent at law because obliged to accept statutory compensation benefits as the exclusive remedy for his injuries. Two questions concerning this defense are before us: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing judgment for respondent without a remand to give petitioner an opportunity to introduce further evidence; and (2) whether petitioner, state practice notwithstanding, is entitled to a jury determination of the factual issues raised by this defense.
I.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that there is no particular formula by which to determine whether an owner is a statutory employer under § 72-111. In Smith v. Fulmer, 198 S. C. 91, 97, 15 S. E. 2d 681, 683, the State Supreme Court said:
“And the opinion in the Marchbanks case [Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825, said to be the “leading case” under the statute] reminds us that while the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there are so many different factual situations which may arise that no easily applied formula can be laid down for the determination of all cases. In other words, ‘it is often a matter of extreme difficulty to decide whether the work in a given case falls within the designation of the statute. It is in each case largely a question of degree and of fact.' ”
The respondent's manager testified on direct examination that three of its substations were built by the respondent’s own construction and maintenance crews. When pressed on cross-examination, however, his answers left his testimony in such doubt as to lead the trial judge to say, “I understood he changed his testimony, that they had not built three.” But the credibility of the manager’s testimony, and the general question whether the evidence in support of the affirmative defense presented a jury issue, became irrelevant because of the interpretation given § 72-111 by the trial judge. In striking respondent’s affirmative defense at the close of all the evidence he ruled that the respondent was the statutory employer of the petitioner only if the construction work done by respondent’s crews was done for somebody else, and was not the statutory employer if, as the proofs showed, the crews built facilities only for the respondent’s own use. “My idea of engaging in the business is to do something for somebody else. What they [the respondent] are doing — and everything they do about repairing lines and building substations, they do it for themselves.” On this view of the meaning of the statute, the evidence, even accepting the manager’s testimony on direct examination as true, lacked proof of an essential element of the affirmative defense, and there was thus nothing for the petitioner to meet with proof of his own.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s construction of § 72-111. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, among others, in Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825, and Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S. C. 479, 8 S. E. 2d 878, the Court of Appeals held that the statute granted respondent immunity from the action if the proofs established that the respondent’s own crews had constructed lines and substations which, like the work contracted to the petitioner’s employer, were necessary for the distribution of the electric power which the respondent was in the business of selling. We ordinarily accept the interpretation of local law by the Court of Appeals, cf. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, 534, and do so readily here since neither party now disputes the interpretation.
However, instead of ordering a new trial at which the petitioner might offer his own proof pertinent to a determination according to the correct interpretation, the Court of Appeals made its own determination on the record and directed a judgment for the respondent. The court noted that the Rural Electric Cooperative Act of South Carolina authorized the respondent to construct, acquire, maintain, and operate electric generating plants, buildings, and equipment, and any and all kinds of property which might be necessary or convenient to accomplish the purposes for which the corporation was organized, and pointed out that the work contracted to the petitioner’s employer was of the class which respondent was empowered by its charter to perform.
The court resolved the uncertainties in the manager’s testimony in a manner largely favorable to the respondent: “The testimony with respect to the construction of the substations of Blue Ridge, stated most favorably to the . . . [petitioner], discloses that originally Blue Ridge built three substations with its own facilities, but that all of the substations which were built after the war, including the six it was operating at the time of the accident, were constructed for it by independent contractors, and that at the time of the accident it had no one in its direct employ capable of handling the technical detail of substation construction.” 238 F. 2d 346, 350.
The court found that the respondent financed the work contracted to the petitioner’s employer with a loan from the United States, purchased the materials used in the work, and entered into an engineering service contract with an independent engineering company for the design and supervision of the work, concluding from these findings that “the main actor in the whole enterprise was the Cooperative itself.” Ibid.
Finally, the court held that its findings entitled the respondent to the direction of a judgment in its favor. “. . . [Tjhere can be no doubt that Blue Ridge was not only in the business of supplying electricity to rural communities, but also in the business of constructing the lines and substations necessary for the distribution of the product . . . .” Id., at 351.
While the matter is not adverted to in the court’s opinion, implicit in the direction of verdict is the holding that the petitioner, although having no occasion to do so under the District Court’s erroneous construction of the statute, was not entitled to an opportunity to meet the respondent’s case under the correct interpretation. That holding is also implied in the court’s denial, without opinion, of petitioner’s motion for a rehearing sought on the ground that “. . . [T]he direction to enter judgment for the defendant instead of a direction to grant a new trial denies plaintiff his right' to introduce evidence in contradiction to that of the defendant on the issue of defendant’s affirmative defense, a right which he would have exercised if the District Judge had ruled adversely to him on his motion to dismiss, and thus deprives him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on a factual issue.”
We believe that the Court of Appeals erred. We do not agree with the petitioner’s argument in this Court that the respondent’s evidence was insufficient to withstand the motion to strike the defense and that he is entitled to our judgment reinstating the judgment of the District Court. But the petitioner is entitled to have the question determined in the trial court. This would be necessary even if petitioner offered no proof of his own. Although the respondent’s evidence was sufficient to withstand the motion under the meaning given the statute by the Court of Appeals, it presented a fact question, which, in the circumstances of this case to be discussed infra, is properly to be decided by a jury. This is clear not only because of the issue of the credibility of the manager’s vital testimony, but also because, even should the jury resolve that issue as did the Court of Appeals, the jury on the entire record — consistent with the view of the South Carolina cases that this question is in each case largely one of degree and of fact — might reasonably reach an opposite conclusion from the Court of Appeals as to the ultimate fact whether the respondent was a statutory employer.
At all events, the petitioner is plainly entitled to have an opportunity to try the issue under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. His motion to dismiss the affirmative defense, properly viewed, was analogous to a defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal of an action after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence. Under Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in such case “the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.” The respondent argues, however, that before the trial judge ruled on the petitioner’s motion, the petitioner’s counsel, in effect, conceded that he had no other evidence to offer and was submitting the issue of whether the respondent was a statutory employer on the basis of the evidence already in the case. The judge asked petitioner’s counsel: “In the event I overrule your motion, do you contemplate putting up any testimony in reply?” Counsel answered: “We haven’t discussed it, but we are making that motion. I frankly don’t know at this point of any reply that is necessary. I don’t know of any evidence in this case — .” The interruption which prevented counsel’s completion of the answer was the trial judge’s comment: “I am inclined to think so far it is a question of law but I will hear from Mr. Walker [respondent’s counsel] on that. I don’t know of any issue of fact to submit to the jury. It seems to me under the testimony here there has been — I don’t know of any conflict in the testimony, so far as that’s concerned, so far.” The judge turned to respondent’s counsel and there followed a long colloquy with him, at the conclusion of which the judge dismissed the defense upon the ground that under his interpretation of the statute the defense was not sustained without evidence that the respondent’s business involved the doing of work for others of the kind done by the petitioner’s employer for the respondent. Upon this record it plainly cannot be said that the petitioner submitted the issue upon the evidence in the case and conceded that he had no evidence of his own to offer. The petitioner was fully justified in that circumstance in not coming forward with proof of his own at that stage of the proceedings, for he had nothing to meet under the District Court’s view of the statute. He thus cannot be penalized by the denial of his day in court to try the issue under the correct interpretation of the statute. Cf. Fountain v. Filson, 336 U. S. 681; Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U. S. 801; Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U. S. 571; Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212.
II.
A question is also presented as to whether on remand the factual issue is to be decided by the judge or by the jury. The respondent argues on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Adams v. Da- vison-Paxon Co., 230 S. C. 532, 96 S. E. 2d 566, that the issue of immunity should be decided by the judge and not by the jury. That was a negligence action brought in the state trial court against a store owner by an employee of an independent contractor who operated the store’s millinery department. The trial judge denied the store owner’s motion for a directed verdict made upon the ground that § 72-111 barred the plaintiff’s action. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was for the judge and not the jury to decide on the evidence whether the owner was a statutory employer, and that the store owner had sustained his defense. The court rested its holding on decisions, listed in footnote 8, infra, involving judicial review of the Industrial Commission and said:
“Thus the trial court should have in this case resolved the conflicts in the evidence and determined the fact of whether . . . [the independent contractor] was performing a part of the 'trade, business or occupation’ of the department store-appellant and, therefore, whether . . . [the employee’s] remedy is exclusively under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” 230 S. C., at 543, 96 S. E. 2d, at 572.
The respondent argues that this state-court decision governs the present diversity case and “divests the jury of its normal function” to decide the disputed fact question of the respondent’s immunity under § 72-111. This is to contend that the federal court is bound under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, to follow the state court’s holding to secure uniform enforcement of the immunity created by the State.
First. It was decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, therefore, first examine- the rule in Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co. to determine whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act is administered in South Carolina by its Industrial Commission. The South Carolina courts hold that, on judicial review of actions of the Commission under § 72-111, the question whether the claim of an injured workman is within the Commission’s jurisdiction is a matter of law for decision by the court, which makes its own findings of fact relating to that jurisdiction. The South Carolina Supreme Court states no reasons in Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co. why, although the jury decides all other factual issues raised by the cause of action and defenses, the jury is displaced as to the factual issue raised by the affirmative defense under § 72-111. The decisions cited to support the holding are those listed in footnote 8, which are concerned solely with defining the scope and method of judicial review of the Industrial Commission. A State may, of course, distribute the functions of its judicial machinery as it sees fit. The decisions relied upon, however, furnish no reason for selecting the judge rather than the jury to decide this single affirmative defense in the negligence action. They simply reflect a policy, cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, that administrative determination of “jurisdictional facts” should not be final but subject to judicial review. The conclusion is inescapable that the Adams holding is grounded in the practical consideration that the question had theretofore come before the South Carolina courts from the Industrial Commission and the courts had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue of immunity without the aid of juries. We find nothing to suggest that this rule was announced as an integral part of the special relationship created by the statute. Thus the requirement appears to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108, and not a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. The situation is therefore not analogous to that in Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, where this Court held that the right to trial by jury is so substantial a part of the cause of action created by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that the Ohio courts could not apply, in an action under that statute, the Ohio rule that the question of fraudulent release was for determination by a judge rather than by a jury.
Second. But cases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to the effect that the federal courts should conform as near as may be — in the absence of other considerations — to state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear substantially on the question whether the litigation would come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to apply a particular local rule. E. g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198. Concededly the nature of the tribunal which tries issues may be important in the enforcement of the parcel of rights making up a cause of action or defense, and bear significantly upon achievement of uniform enforcement of the right. It may well be that in the instant personal-injury case the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were “outcome” the only consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court should follow the state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work here. The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence — if not the command — of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. Jacob v. New York, 315 U. S. 752. The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations, see, e. g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule — not bound up with rights and obligations— which disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91. Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court.
We think that in the circumstances of this case the federal court should not follow the state rule. It cannot be gainsaid that there is a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts. In Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, the trial judge in a personal-injury negligence action brought in the District Court for Arizona on diversity grounds directed a verdict for the defendant when it appeared as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The federal judge refused to be bound by a provision of the Arizona Constitution which made the jury the sole arbiter of the question of contributory negligence. This Court sustained the action of the trial judge, holding that “state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a federal court” because that function “is not in any sense a local matter, and state statutes which would interfere with the appropriate performance of that function are not binding upon the federal court under either the Conformity Act or the 'rules of decision’ Act.” Id., at 94. Perhaps even more clearly in light of the influence of the Seventh Amendment, the function assigned to the jury “is an essential factor in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides.” Id., at 95. Concededly the Herron case was decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, but even when Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, was governing law and allowed federal courts sitting in diversity cases to disregard state decisional law, it was never thought that state statutes or constitutions were similarly to be disregarded. Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291. Yet Herron held that state statutes and constitutional provisions could not disrupt or alter the essential character or function of a federal court.
Third. We have discussed the problem upon the assumption that the outcome of the litigation may be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. But clearly there is not present here the certainty that a different result would follow, cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, or even the strong possibility that this would be the case, cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra. There are factors present here which might reduce that possibility. The trial judge in the federal system has powers denied the judges of many States to comment on the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses, and discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to him to be against the weight of the evidence. We do not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.
The Court of Appeals did not consider other grounds of appeal raised by the respondent because, the ground taken disposed of the case. We accordingly remand the case to the Court of Appeals for the decision of the other questions, with instructions that, if not made unnecessary by the decision of such questions, the Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the District Court for a new trial of such issues as the Court of Appeals may direct.
Reversed and remanded.
S. C. Code, 1952, provides:
“§ 72-111. Liability of owner to workmen of subcontractor.
“When any person, in this section and §§ 72-113 and 72-114 referred to as 'owner/ undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§72-113 to 72-116 referred to as ‘subcontractor’) for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be hable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him.”
“§ 72-121. Employees’ rights under Title exclude all others against employer.
“The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.”
“§ 72-123. Only one remedy available.
“Either the acceptance of an award under this Title or the procurement and collection of a judgment in an action at law shall be a bar to proceeding further with the alternate remedy.”
In earlier proceedings the case was dismissed on the ground that the respondent, a nonprofit corporation, was immune from tort liability under South Carolina law. 118 F. Supp. 868. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial. 215 F. 2d 542.
The trial judge, in spite of his action striking the defense, permitted the respondent to include the affirmative defense as a ground of its motions for a directed verdict and judgment non obstante veredicto.
S. C. Code, 1952, § 12-1025.
The only remarks thereafter made by the petitioner’s counsel reiterated his statement that he pressed his motion to dismiss the affirmative defense.
The decision came down several months after the Court of Appeals decided this case.
See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208; West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U. S. 223; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198; Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. 2d 754.
Knight v. Shepherd, 191 S. C. 452, 4 S. E. 2d 906; Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S. C. 363, 25 S. E. 2d 235; McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S. C. 173, 41 S. E. 2d 872; Miles v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 212 S. C. 424, 48 S. E. 2d 26; Watson v. Wannamaker & Wells, Inc., 212 S. C. 506, 48 S. E. 2d 447; Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S. C. 438, 49 S. E. 2d 718; Holland v. Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co., 214 S. C. 195, 51 S. E. 2d 744; Younginer v. Jones Construction Co., 215 S. C. 135, 54 S. E. 2d 545; Horton v. Baruch, 217 S. C. 48, 59 S. E. 2d 545.
Cf. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153; 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws, §594.1; Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws, pp. 699-701.
Our conclusion makes unnecessary the consideration of — and we intimate no view upon — the constitutional question whether the right of jury trial protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment embraces the factual issue of statutory immunity when asserted, as here, as an affirmative defense in a common-law negligence action.
The Courts of Appeals have expressed varying views about the effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins on judge-jury problems in diversity cases. Federal practice was followed in Gorham v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn., 114 F. 2d 97 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1940); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F. 2d 144 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1942); McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co., 128 F. 2d 660 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1942); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F. 2d 62 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1943); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Duncan, 221 F. 2d 703 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1955). State practice was followed in Cooper v. Brown, 126 F. 2d 874 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1942); Gutierrez v. Public Service Interstate Transportation Co., 168 F. 2d 678 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1948); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Glasgow, 208 F. 2d 908 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1953); Pierce Consulting Engineering Co. v. City of Burlington, 221 F. 2d 607 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1955); Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 231 F. 2d 922 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956).
This Court held in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 should prevail over a contrary state rule.
“The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.” § 5, Art. 18.
Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F. 2d 144, decided after Eñe R. Co. v. Tompkins, held that an almost identical provision of the Oklahoma Constitution was not binding on a federal judge in a diversity case.
Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464, is not contrary. It was there held that the federal court should follow the state rule defining the evidence sufficient to raise a jury question whether the state-created right was established. But the state rule did not have the effect of nullifying the function of the federal judge to control a jury submission as did the Arizona constitutional provision which was denied effect in Herron. The South Carolina rule here involved affects the jury function as the Arizona provision affected the function of the judge: The rule entirely displaces the jury without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding of immunity.