Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six schooldays each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer’s efforts to adjust respondent’s work schedule in light of his belief fulfill its obligation under § 701 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board’s collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days’ leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. See, e. g., App. 98-99. With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three days’ annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher’s annual or accumulated leave.
The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for “necessary personal business.” Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for “[a]ny religious activity,” id., at 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, or “[a]ny religious observance.” Id., at 96, 100. Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal.
The limitations on the use of personal business leave spawned this litigation. Until the 1976-1977 year, Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days granted in the contract and then taking unauthorized leave. His pay was reduced accordingly. In 1976, however, respondent stopped taking unauthorized leave for religious reasons, and began scheduling required hospital visits on church holy days. He also worked on several holy days. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook repeatedly asked the school board to adopt one of two alternatives. His preferred alternative would allow use of personal business leave for religious observance, effectively giving him three additional days of paid leave for that purpose. Short of this arrangement, respondent suggested that he pay the cost of a substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances. Petitioner has consistently rejected both proposals.
In 1973 Philbrook filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the school board and the Ansonia Federation of Teachers. After exhausting the available administrative avenues, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that the prohibition on the use of “necessary personal business” leave for religious observance violated §§ 703(a)(1), (2) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2(a)(l), (2), and seeking both damages and injunc-tive relief.
After a 2-day trial, the District Court concluded that Philbrook had failed to prove a case of religious discrimination because he had not been placed by the school board in a position of violating his religion or losing his job.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that a prima facie case of discrimination is established when an employee shows that
“ ‘(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.’ ” 757 F. 2d 476, 481 (1985), quoting Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F. 2d 1022, 1026 (CA5 1984).
Philbrook established his case, the court held, by showing that he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the employer’s attendance requirements, that the employer was aware of the belief, and that he suffered a detriment— namely, a loss of pay — from the conflict. The court then assumed that the employer’s leave policy constituted a reasonable accommodation to Philbrook’s belief. It held, however, that “[w]here the employer and the employee each propose a reasonable accommodation, Title VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the hardship that would result from Philbrook’s suggestions.
We granted certiorari to consider the important questions of federal law presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals. 474 U. S. 1080 (1986). Specifically, we are asked to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Philbrook established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and in opining that an employer must accept the employee’s preferred accommodation absent proof of undue hardship. We find little support in the statute for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, but we agree that the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved without further factual inquiry. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for additional findings.
As we noted in our only previous consideration of § 701(j), its language was added to the 1972 amendments on the floor of the Senate with little discussion. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 74, n. 9 (1977). See 118 Cong. Rec. 705-706 (1972). In Hardison, supra, at 84, we determined that an accommodation causes “undue hardship” whenever that accommodation results in “more than a de minimis cost” to the employer. Hardison had been discharged because his religious beliefs would not allow him to work on Saturdays and claimed that this action violated the employer’s duty to effect a reasonable accommodation of his beliefs. Because we concluded that each of the suggested accommodations would impose on the employer an undue hardship, we had no occasion to consider the bounds of a prima facie case in the religious accommodation context or whether an employer is required to choose from available accommodations the alternative preferred by the employee. The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship, and we agreed.
Petitioner asks us to establish for religious accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the plaintiff’s prima facie case and shifting production burdens. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). But the present case raises no such issue. As in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983), the defendant here failed to persuade the District Court to dismiss the action for want of a prima facie case, and the case was fully tried on the merits. We held in Aikens that these circumstances place the ultimate Title VII question of discrimination vel non directly before the court. “Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer-relevant.” Id., at 715. We may therefore proceed to the question whether the employer’s proposed accommodation of respondent’s religious practices comports with the statutory mandate of §701(j).
In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals assumed that the employer had offered a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. This alone, however, was insufficient in that court’s view to allow resolution of the dispute. The court observed that the duty to accommodate “cannot be defined without reference to undue hardship.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. It accordingly determined that the accommodation obligation includes a duty to accept “the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” Ibid. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F. 2d 772, 776 (CA9 1986) (Title VII does not dictate that “an employer must accept any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed by an employee . . .”). Because the District Court had not considered whether Philbrook’s proposals would impose undue hardship, the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of those proposals.
We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it “demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship. As Hardison illustrates, the extent of undue hardship on the employer’s business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship. Once the Court of Appeals assumed that the school board had offered to Philbrook a reasonable alternative, it erred by requiring the Board to nonetheless demonstrate the hardship of Phil-brook’s alternatives.
The legislative history of § 701(j), as we noted in Hardison, supra, at 74-75, and n. 9, is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation. To the extent it provides any indication of congressional intent, however, we think that the history supports our conclusion. Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became §701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with “flexibility” and “a desire to achieve an adjustment.” 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F. 2d 141, 145-146 (CA5 1982). See also American Postal Workers, supra, at 777. Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment. We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.
The remaining issue in the case is whether the school board’s leave policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question. We- think that there are insufficient factual findings as to the manner in which the collective-bargaining agreements have been interpreted in order for us to make that judgment initially. We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a reasonable one. In enacting § 701(j), Congress was understandably motivated by a desire to assure the individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work. Generally speaking, “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid leave] is merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.” Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 145 (1977).
But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. A provision for paid leave “that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 75 (1984). Such an arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis of reasonableness. Whether the policy here violates this teaching turns on factual inquiry into past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. The school board contends that the necessary personal business category in the agreement, like other leave provisions, defines a limited purpose leave. Philbrook, on the other hand, asserts that the necessary personal leave category is not so limited, operating as an open-ended leave provision that may be used for a wide range of secular purposes in addition to those specifically provided for in the contract, but not for similar religious purposes. We do not think that the record is sufficiently clear on this point for us to make the necessary factual findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court. The latter court on remand should make the necessary findings as to past and existing practice in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreements.
It is so ordered.
The reasonable accommodation duty was incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religion. Title VIPs central provisions make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion ...,”§ 703(a)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion_” § 703(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(2). Section 701(j), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), was added in 1972 to illuminate the meaning of religious discrimination under the statute. It provides that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Absence for reasons not contemplated by the contract resulted in a proportionate deduction from pay; since 1971, 1/180 of annual salary had been deducted for each day of unexcused absence. App. 84, 90, 93, 97, 101.
The suggested accommodation would reduce the financial costs to Philbrook of unauthorized absences. In 1984, for example, a substitute cost $30 per day, and respondent’s loss in pay from an unauthorized absence was over $130.
Philbrook’s complaint also alleged that petitioner Board’s policies and practices violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment. Because the Court of Appeals remanded the Title VII claim for further proceedings, it did not address Philbrook’s First Amendment claims, and we have no occasion to consider them here.
Judge Pollack, Senior District Judge of the Southern District of New York sitting by designation, dissented. He agreed with the District Court that “[t]he School Board’s policy neither deprives the plaintiff of employment opportunities nor adversely affects his employment status.” 757 F. 2d, at 489. Accordingly, he found that the policy did not “ ‘discriminate’ within Title VH’s use and meaning of that term . . . .” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals found support for its decision in the EEOC’s guidelines on religious discrimination. 757 F. 2d, at 485, and n. 7. Specifically, the guidelines provide that “when there is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer . . . must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with re-speet to his or her employment opportunities.” 29 CFR § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1986). Though superficially consistent with the burden imposed by the Court of Appeals, this guideline, by requiring the employer to choose the option that least disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities, contains a significant limitation not found in the court’s standard. To the extent that the guideline, like the approach of the Court of Appeals, requires the employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. We have, of course, noted that EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U. S. 63, 76, n. 11. (1977).