Me. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the Federal Trade Commission challenged the right of the Standard Oil Company, under the Robinson-Patman Act, to sell gasoline to four comparatively large “jobber” customers in Detroit at a less price per gallon than it sold like gasoline to many comparatively small service station customers in the same area. The company’s defenses were that (1) the sales involved were not in interstate commerce and (2) its lower price to the jobbers was justified because made to retain them as customers and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Commission, with one member dissenting, ordered the company to cease and desist from making such a price differential. 43 F. T. C. 56. The Court of Appeals slightly modified the order and required its enforcement as modified. 173 F. 2d 210. We granted certiorari on petition of the company because the case presents an important issue under the Robinson-Patman Act which has not been settled by this Court. 338 U. S. 865. The case was argued at our October Term, 1949, and reargued at this term. 339 U. S. 975.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we agree with the court below that the sales were made in interstate commerce but we agree with petitioner that, under the Act, the lower price to the jobbers was justified if it was made to retain each of them as a customer and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
I. Facts.
Reserving for separate consideration the facts determining the issue of interstate commerce, the other material facts are summarized here on the basis of the Commission’s findings. The sales described are those of Red Crown gasoline because those sales raise all of the material issues and constitute about 90% of petitioner’s sales in the Detroit area.
Since the effective date of the Robinson-Patman Act, June 19, 1936, petitioner has sold its Red Crown gasoline to its “jobber” customers at its tank-car prices. Those prices have been 1 y2$ per gallon less than its tank-wagon prices to service station customers for identical gasoline in the same area. In practice, the service stations have resold the gasoline at the prevailing retail service station prices. Each of petitioner’s so-called “jobber” customers has been free to resell its gasoline at retail or wholesale. Each, at some time, has resold some of it at retail. One now resells it only at retail. The others now resell it largely at wholesale. As to resale prices, two of the “jobbers” have resold their gasoline only at the prevailing wholesale or retail rates. The other two, however, have reflected, in varying degrees, petitioner’s reductions in the cost of the gasoline to them by reducing their resale prices of that gasoline below the prevailing rates. The effect of these reductions has thus reached competing retail service stations in part through retail stations operated by the “jobbers” and in part through retail stations which purchased gasoline from the “jobbers” at less than the prevailing tank-wagon prices. The Commission found that such reduced resale prices “have resulted in injuring, destroying, and preventing competition between said favored dealers and retail dealers in respondent’s [petitioner’s] gasoline and other major brands of gasoline . . . .” 41 E. T. C. 263, 283. The distinctive characteristics of these “jobbers” are that each (1) maintains sufficient bulk storage to take delivery of gasoline in tank-car quantities (of 8,000 to 12,000 gallons) rather than in tank-wagon quantities (of 700 to 800 gallons) as is customary for service stations; (2) owns and operates tank wagons and other facilities for delivery of gasoline to service stations; (3) has an established business sufficient to insure purchases of from one to two million gallons a year; and (4) has adequate credit responsibility. While the cost of petitioner’s sales and deliveries of gasoline to each of these four “jobbers” is no doubt less, per gallon, than the cost of its sales and deliveries of like gasoline to its service station customers in the same area, there is no finding that such difference accounts for the entire reduction in price made by petitioner to these “jobbers,” and we proceed on the assumption that it does not entirely account for that difference.
Petitioner placed its reliance upon evidence offered to show that its lower price to each jobber was made in order to retain that jobber as a customer and in good faith to meet an equally low price offered by one or more competitors. The Commission, however, treated such evidence as not relevant.
II. The Sales Were Made in Interstate Commerce.
In order for the sales here involved to come under the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, they must have been made in interstate commerce. The Commission and the court below agree that the sales were so made. 41 F. T. C. 263, 271, 173 F. 2d 210, 213-214.
Facts determining this were found by the Commission as follows: Petitioner is an Indiana corporation, whose principal office is in Chicago. Its gasoline is obtained from fields in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming. Its refining plant is at Whiting, Indiana. It distributes its products in 14 middle western states, including Michigan. The gasoline sold by it in the Detroit, Michigan, area, and involved in this case, is carried for petitioner by tankers on the Great Lakes from Indiana to petitioner’s marine terminal at River Rouge, Michigan. Enough gasoline is accumulated there during each navigation season so that a winter’s supply, is available from the terminal. The gasoline remains for varying periods at the terminal or in nearby bulk storage stations, and while there it is under the ownership of petitioner and en route from petitioner’s refinery in Indiana to its market in Michigan. “Although the gasoline was not brought to River Rouge pursuant to orders already taken, the demands of the Michigan territory were fairly constant, and the petitioner’s customers’ demands could be accurately estimated, so the flow of the stream of commerce kept surging from Whiting to Detroit.” 173 F. 2d at 213-214. Gasoline delivered to customers in Detroit, upon individual orders for it, is taken from the gasoline at the terminal in interstate commerce en route for delivery in that area. Such sales are well within the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. Any other conclusion would fall short of the recognized purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act to reach the operations of large interstate businesses in competition with small local concerns. Such temporary storage of the gasoline as occurs within the Detroit area does not deprive the gasoline of its interstate character. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495. Compare Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 570, with Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U. S. 257, 268.
III. There Should Be a Finding as to Whether or Not Petitioner’s Price Reduction Was Made in Good Faith to Meet a Lawful Equally Low Price of a Competitor.
Petitioner presented evidence tending to prove that its tank-car price was made to each “jobber” in order to retain that “jobber” as a customer and in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor. Petitioner sought to show that it succeeded in retaining these customers, although the tank-car price which it offered them merely approached or matched, and did not undercut, the lower prices offered them by several competitors of petitioner. The trial examiner made findings on the point but the Commission declined to do so, saying:
“Based on the record in this case the Commission concludes as a matter of law that it is not material whether the discriminations in price granted by the respondent to the said four dealers were made to meet equally low prices of competitors. The Commission further concludes as a matter of law that it is unnecessary for the Commission to determine whether the alleged competitive prices were in fact available or involved gasoline of like grade or quality or of equal public acceptance. Accordingly the Commission does not attempt to find the facts regarding those matters because, even though the lower prices in question may have been made by respondent in good faith to meet the lower prices of competitors, this does not constitute a defense in the face of affirmative proof that the effect of the discrimination was to injure, destroy and prevent competition with the retail stations operated by the said named dealers and with stations operated by their retailer-customers.” 41 F. T. C. 263, 281-282.
The court below affirmed the Commission’s position. There is no doubt that under the Clayton Act, before its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, this evidence would have been material and, if accepted, would have established a complete defense to the charge of unlawful discrimination. At that time the material provisions of § 2 were as follows:
“Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.” (Emphasis added within the first proviso.) 38 Stat. 730-731, 15 U. S. C. (1934 ed.) § 13.
The question before us, therefore, is whether the amendments made by the Robinson-Patman Act deprived those facts of their previously recognized effectiveness as a defense. The material provisions of § 2, as amended, are quoted below, showing in italics those clauses which bear upon the proviso before us. The modified provisions are distributed between the newly created subsections (a) and (b). These must be read together and in relation to the provisions they supersede. The original phrase “that nothing herein contained shall prevent” is still used to introduce each of the defenses. . The defense relating to the meeting of the price of a competitor appears only in subsection (b). There it is applied to discriminations in services or facilities as well as to discriminations in price, which alone are expressly condemned in subsection (a). In its opinion in the instant case, the Commission recognizes that it is an absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination for a seller to prove, under § 2 (a), that its price differential makes only due allowances for differences in cost or for price changes made in response to changing market conditions. 41 F. T. C. at 283. Each of these three defenses is introduced by the same phrase “nothing . . . shall prevent,” and all are embraced in the same word “justification” in the first sentence of § 2 (b). It is natural, therefore, to conclude that each of these defenses is entitled to the same effect, without regard to whether there also appears an affirmative showing of actual or potential injury to competition at the same or a lower level traceable to the price differential made by the seller. The Commission says, however, that the proviso in § 2 (b) as to a seller meeting in good faith a lower competitive price is not an absolute defense if an injury to competition may result from such price reduction. We find no basis for such a distinction between the defenses in § 2 (a) and (b).
The defense in subsection (b), now before us, is limited to a price reduction made to meet in good faith an equally low price of a competitor. It thus eliminates certain difficulties which arose under the original Clayton Act. For example, it omits reference to discriminations in price “in the same or different communities . . .” and it thus restricts the proviso to price differentials occurring in actual competition. It also excludes reductions which undercut the “lower price” of a competitor. None of these changes, however, cut into the actual core of the defense. That still consists of the provision that wherever a lawful lower price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith meet that lower price. Actual competition, at least in this elemental form, is thus preserved.
Subsections 2 (a) and (b), as amended, are as follows:
“Sec. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: . . . And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time ... in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned ....
“(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.” (Emphasis added in part.) 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) and (b).
This right of a seller, under § 2 (b), to meet in good faith an equally low price of a competitor has been considered here before. Both in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, and in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, evidence in support of this defense was reviewed at length. There would have been no occasion thus to review it under the theory now contended for by the Commission. While this Court did not sustain the seller’s defense in either case, it did unquestionably recognize the relevance of the evidence in support of that defense. The decision in each case was based upon the insufficiency of the seller’s evidence to establish its defense, not upon the inadequacy of its defense as a matter of law.
In the Corn Products case, supra, after recognizing that the seller had allowed differentials in price in favor of certain customers, this Court examined the evidence presented by the seller to show that such differentials were justified because made in good faith to meet equally low prices of a competitor. It then said:
“Examination of the testimony satisfies us, as it did the court below, that it was insufficient to sustain a finding that the lower prices allowed to favored customers were in fact made to meet competition. Hence petitioners jailed to sustain the. burden of showing that the price discriminations were granted for the purpose of meeting competition.” (Emphasis added.) 324 U. S. at 741.
In the Staley case, supra, most of the Court’s opinion is devoted to the consideration of the evidence introduced in support of the seller’s defense under § 2 (b). The discussion proceeds upon the assumption, applicable here, that if a competitor’s “lower price” is a lawful individual price offered to any of the seller’s customers, then the seller is protected, under § 2 (b), in making a counteroffer provided the seller proves that its counteroffer is made to meet in good faith its competitor’s equally low price. On the record in the Staley case, a majority of the Court of Appeals, in fact, declined to accept the findings of the Commission and decided in favor of the accused seller. This Court, on review, reversed that judgment but emphatically recognized the availability of the seller’s defense under § 2 (b) and the obligation of the Commission to make findings upon issues material to that defense. It said:
"Congress has left to the Commission the determination of fact in each case whether the person, charged with making discriminatory prices, acted in good faith to meet a competitor’s equally low prices. The determination of this fact from the evidence is for the Commission. See Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn., 273 U. S. 52, 63; Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 73. In the present case, the Commission’s finding that respondents’ price discrimina-tions were not made to meet a 'lower’ price and consequently were not in good faith, is amply supported by the record, and we think the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside this portion of the Commission’s order to cease and desist.
“In appraising the evidence, the Commission recognized that the statute does not place an impossible burden upon sellers, but it emphasized the good faith requirement of the statute, which places the burden of proving good faith on the seller, who has made the discriminatory prices. . . .
“. . . We agree with the Commission that the statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of. a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor. Nor was the Commission wrong in holding that respondents failed to meet this burden.” 324 U. S. at 758, 759-760.
See also, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 721-726; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 43; and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 92. All that petitioner asks in the instant case is that its evidence be considered and that findings be made by the Commission as to the sufficiency of that evidence to support petitioner’s defense under § 2 (b).
In addition, there has been widespread understanding that, under the Robinson-Patman Act, it is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination for the seller to show that its price differential has been made in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor. This understanding is reflected in actions and statements of members and counsel of the Federal Trade Commission. Representatives of the Department of Justice have testified to the effectiveness and value of the defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. We see no reason to depart now from that interpretation.
The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, “Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.” Staley Mjg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 135 F. 2d 453, 455. We need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Pat-man Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a competitor. For example, if a large customer requests his seller to meet a temptingly lower price offered to him by one of his seller’s competitors, the seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business survival, to meet that price rather than to lose the customer. It might be that this customer is the seller’s only available market for the major portion of the seller’s product, and that the loss of this customer would result in forcing a much higher unit cost and higher sales price upon the seller’s other customers. There is nothing to show a congressional purpose, in such a situation, to compel the seller to choose only between ruinously cutting its prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one, or refusing to meet the competition and then ruinously raising its prices to its remaining customers to cover increased unit costs. There is, on the other hand, plain language and established practice which permits a seller, through § 2 (b), to retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily changing the seller’s price to its other customers.
In a case where a seller sustains the burden of proof placed upon it to establish its defense under § 2 (b), we find no reason to destroy that defense indirectly, merely because it also appears that the beneficiaries of the seller’s price reductions may derive a competitive advantage from them or may, in a natural course of events, reduce their own resale prices to their customers. It must have been obvious to Congress that any price reduction to any dealer may always affect competition at that dealer’s level as well as at the dealer’s resale level, whether or not the reduction to the dealer is discriminatory. Likewise, it must have been obvious to Congress that any price reductions initiated by a seller’s competitor would, if not met by the seller, affect competition at the beneficiary’s level or among the beneficiary’s customers just as much as if those reductions had been met by the seller. The proviso in § 2 (b), as interpreted by the Commission, would not be available when there was or might be an injury to competition at a resale level. So interpreted, the proviso would have such little, if any, applicability as to be practically meaningless. We may, therefore, conclude that Congress meant to permit the natural consequences to follow the seller’s action in meeting in good faith a lawful and equally low price of‘its competitor.
In its argument here, the Commission suggests that there may be some situations in which it might recognize the proviso in § 2 (b) as a complete defense, even though the .seller’s differential in price did injure competition. In support of this, the Commission indicates that in each case it must weigh the potentially injurious effect of a seller’s price reduction upon competition at all lower levels against its beneficial effect in permitting the seller to meet competition at its own level. In the absence of more explicit requirements and more specific standards of comparison than we have here, it is difficult to see how an injury to competition at a level below that of the seller can thus be balanced fairly against a justification for meeting the competition at the seller’s level. We hesitate to accept § 2 (b) as establishing such a dubious defense. On the other hand, the proviso is readily understandable as simply continuing in effect a defense which is equally absolute, but more limited in scope than that which existed under § 2 of the original Clayton Act.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Federal Trade Commission to make findings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Me. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Specifically under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13. For the material text of § 2 (a) and (b) see pp. 242-243, infra.
The company contended before the Commission that the price differential allowed by it to the jobbers made only due allowance for differences in the cost of sale and delivery of gasoline to them. It did not, however, pursue this defense in the court below and does not do so here.
About 150 of these stations are owned or leased by the customers independently of petitioner. Their operators buy all of their gasoline from petitioner under short-term agreements. The other 208 stations are leased or subleased from petitioner for short terms.
Not denying the established industry practice of recognizing such dealers as a distinctive group for operational convenience, the Commission held that petitioner’s classification of these four dealers as “jobbers” was arbitrary because it made “no requirement that said jobbers should sell only at wholesale.” 41 F. T. C. at 273. We use the term “jobber” in this opinion merely as one of convenience and identification, because the result here is the same whether these four dealers are wholesalers or retailers.
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, relates only to persons “engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce . . . where either or any of the purchases involved ... are in commerce . . . .” 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §13 (a). “Commerce” is defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act as including “trade or commerce among the several States . . . .” 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 12.
The Fair Labor Standards Act cases relied on by petitioner are not inconsistent with this result. They hold that, for the purposes of that statute, interstate commerce ceased on delivery to a local distributor. Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U. S. 572; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra. The sales involved here, on the other hand, are those of an interstate producer and refiner to a local distributor.
The trial examiner concluded:
“The recognition by respondent [petitioner] of Ned’s Auto Supply Company as a jobber or wholesaler [which carried with it the tank-car price for gasoline], was a forced recognition given to retain that company’s business. Ned’s Company at the time of recognition, and ever since, has possessed all qualifications required by respondent [petitioner] for recognition as a jobber and the recognition was given and has ever since been continued in transactions between the parties, believed by them to be bona fide in all respects (Conclusion of Fact 2, under § IX, R. 5098-5099.)
“The differentials on its branded gasolines respondent [petitioner] granted Ned’s Auto Supply Company, at all times subsequent to March 7, 1938, and Stikeman Oil Company, Citrin-Kolb Oil Company and the Wayne Company [the four jobbers], at all times subsequent to June 19, 1936, were granted to meet equally low prices offered by competitors on branded gasolines of comparable grade and quality.” (Conclusion of Fact, under § X, R. 5104.)
“Now as to the contention that the discriminatory prices here complained of were made in good faith to meet a lower price of a competitor. While the Commission made no finding on this point, it assumed its existence but held, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, that this was not a defense.
“We agree with the Commission that the showing of the petitioner that it made the discriminatory price in good faith to meet competition is not controlling in view of the very substantial evidence that its discrimination was used to affect and lessen competition at the retail level.” 173 F. 2d at 214,217.
In contrast to that factual situation, the trial examiner for the Commission in the instant case has found the necessary facts to sustain the seller’s defense (see note 7, supra), and yet the Commission refuses, as a matter of law, to give them consideration.
In the Corn Products ease, the same point of view was expressed by the Court of Appeals below: “We think the evidence is insufficient to sustain this affirmative defence.” 144 F. 2d 211, 217 (C. A. 7th Cir.). The Court of Appeals also indicated that, to sustain this defense, it must appear not only that the competitor’s lower price was met in good faith but that such price was lawful.
The Staley case was twice before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In 1943 the case was remanded by that court to the Commission for findings as to wherein the discriminations occurred and how they substantially lessened competition and promoted monopoly and also “for consideration of the defense [under §2 (b)] urged by the petitioners, and for findings in relation thereto.” 135 F. 2d 453, 456. In 1944, a majority of the court decided in favor of the seller. 144 F. 2d 221. One judge held that the complaint was insufficient under § 2 (a) and that, therefore, he need not reach the seller’s defense under § 2 (b). He expressly stated, however, that he did not take issue with the basis for the conclusion that the seller’s price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. Id., at 227-231. His colleague held squarely that the seller’s defense of meeting competition in good faith under § 2 (b) had been established. Id., at 221-225. The third judge found against the seller both under § 2 (a) and (b). Id., at 225-227. The important point for us is that the Court of Appeals, as well as this Court, unanimously recognized in that ease the materiality of the seller’s evidence in support of its defense under § 2 (b), even though the “discriminations ‘have resulted, and do result, in substantial injury to competition among purchasers ....’” Id., at 222.
In cease and desist orders, issued both before and after the order in the instant case, the Commission has inserted saving clauses which recognize the propriety of a seller making a price reduction in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, even though the seller’s discrimination may have the effect of injuring competition at a lower level. See In re Ferro Enamel Corp., 42 F. T. C. 36; In re Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 31 F. T. C. 986; In re Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 28 F. T. C. 186.
See also, the statement filed by Walter B. Wooden, Assistant Chief Counsel, and by Hugh E. White, Examiner for the Commission, with the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1941:
“The amended Act now safeguards the right of a seller to discriminate in price in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, but he has the burden of proof on that question. This right is guaranteed by statute and could not be curtailed by any mandate or order of the Commission. . . . The right of self defense against competitive price attacks is as vital in a competitive economy as the right of self defense against personal attack.” The Basing Point Problem 139 (TNEC Monograph 42,1941).
In regard to the Commission’s position on § 2 (b), urged in the instant case, Allen C. Phelps, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel and Chief of the Export Trade Division of the Commission, testified before the Subcommittee on Trade Policies of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in January, 1949, that “This position, if upheld in the courts, in my judgment will effectively and completely erase section 2 (b) from the Robinson-Patman Act.” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 66. See also, pp. 274r-275.
Herbert A. Bergson, then Assistant Attorney General, testifying for the Department, January 25, 1949, said: “The section [2 (b)] presently permits sellers to justify otherwise forbidden price discrimi-nations on the ground that the lower prices to one set of buyers were made in good faith to meet the equally low prices of a competitor.” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 77. See also, report on S. 236 by Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General, to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Id., at 320. Mr. Bergson added the following in June, 1949: “While we recognize the competitive problem which arises when one purchaser obtains advantages denied to other purchasers, we do not believe the solution to this problem lies in denying to sellers the opportunity to make sales in good faith competition with other sellers.” Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 12.
Attention has been directed again to the legislative history of the proviso. This was “considered in the Corn Products and Staley cases. See especially, 324 U. S. at 752-753. We find that the legislative history, at best, is inconclusive. It indicates that it was the purpose of Congress to limit, but not to abolish, the essence of the defense recognized as absolute in § 2 of the original Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, where a seller’s reduction in price had been made “in good faith to meet competition . . . .” For example, the legislative history recognizes that the Robinson-Patman Act limits that defense to price differentials that do not undercut the competitor’s price, and the amendments fail to protect differentials between prices in different communities where those prices are not actually competitive. There is also a suggestion in the debates, as well as in the remarks of this Court in the Staley case, supra, that a competitor’s lower price, which may be met by a seller under the protection of §2 (b), must be a lawful price. And see, S. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate and report to it on chain-store operators and F. T. C. Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
In the report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, which drafted the clause which became § 2 (b), there appears the following explanation of it:
“This proviso represents a contraction of an exemption now contained in section 2 of the Clayton Act which permits discriminations without limit where made in good faith to meet competition. It should be noted that while the seller is permitted to meet local competition, it does not permit him to cut local prices until his competitor has first offered lower prices, and then he can go no further than to meet those prices. If he goes further, he must do so likewise with all his other customers, or make himself liable to all of the penalties of the act, including treble damages. In other words, the proviso permits the seller to meet the price actually previously offered by a local competitor. It permits him to go no further.” H. R. Rep. No. 2287,74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16.
See also, 80 Cong. Rec. 6426, 6431-6436, 8229, 8235.
Somewhat changing this emphasis, there was a statement made by the managers on the part of the House of Representatives, accompanying the conference report, which said that the new clause was a “provision relating to the question of meeting competition, intended to operate only as a rule of evidence in a proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission . . . .” Ii. R. Rep. No. 2951,74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7. The Chairman of the House Conferees also received permission to print in the Record an explanation of the proviso. 80 Cong. Rec. 9418. This explanation emphasizes the same interpretation as that put on the proviso in the Staley case to the effect that the lower price which lawfully may be met by a seller must be a lawful price. That statement, however, neither justifies disregarding the proviso nor failing to make findings of fact where evidence is offered that the prices met by the seller are lawful prices and that the meeting of them is in good faith.
It has been suggested that, in theory, the Robinson-Patman Act as a whole is inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1327-1350; Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301; Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 137; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 273.