Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we determine the appealability of an interlocutory order issued by a district court sitting as a court of appeals in bankruptcy.
I
In 1984, O’Sullivan’s Fuel Oil Co., Inc., filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. Although the case began as a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, in 1986 the Bankruptcy Court converted it into a liquidation under Chapter 7. Petitioner Connecticut National Bank (CNB) is successor in interest to one of O’Sullivan’s creditors. Respondent Thomas M. Germain is trustee of O’Sullivan’s estate.
On June 1, 1987, Germain sued CNB in Connecticut state court, seeking to hold the bank liable for various torts and breaches of contract. CNB removed the suit to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which, pursuant to local rule, automatically referred the proceeding to the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation. Ger-main then filed a demand for a jury trial. CNB moved to strike Germain’s demand. The Bankruptcy Court denied CNB’s motion, In re O’Sullivan’s Fuel Oil Co., 103 B. R. 388 (Conn. 1989), and the District Court affirmed, Germain v. Connecticut Nat. Bank, 112 B. R. 57 (Conn. 1990).
CNB then tried to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 926 F. 2d 191 (1991). The Second Circuit held that a court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction over interlocutory orders in bankruptcy only when a district court issues the order after having withdrawn a proceeding or case from a bankruptcy court, and not when the district court acts in its capacity as a bankruptcy court of appeals. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 905 (1991), and now reverse and remand.
HH H — I
Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over [interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States” under 28 U. S. C. § 1292. CNB contends that § 1292(b) applies by its terms in this case, and that the Second Circuit therefore could have exercised discretionary jurisdiction over its appeal. Germain argues that § 1292 does not apply at all in this case because Congress limited § 1292 through 28 U. S. C. § 158(d), which deals with bankruptcy jurisdiction. CNB responds that nothing in § 158(d) limits §1292. We agree with CNB.
Bankruptcy appeals are governed for the most part by §158. This section comprises four subsections, three of which concern us here. Subsection (a) gives the district courts authority to hear appeals from final and interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy courts. The District Court, as we have noted, had jurisdiction under this- provision to hear CNB’s appeal from the Bankruptcy Court. Subsection (b) permits the judicial council of any circuit to establish a bankruptcy appellate panel to fill the role of the district courts under subsection (a). Subsection (d), which is pivotal in this case, provides:
“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.”
Neither this subsection nor any other part of § 158 mentions interlocutory orders entered by the district courts in bankruptcy. The parties agree, as they must, that § 158 did not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals.
Germain contends that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction under § 1292 either, for § 158(d), in his view, precludes jurisdiction under § 1292 by negative implication. Ger-main reasons as follows: Although §§ 1291 and 1292 appear to cover the universe of decisions issued by the district courts — with § 1291 conferring jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts, and § 1292 conferring jurisdiction over certain interlocutory ones — that cannot in fact be so. If § 1291 did cover all final decisions by a district court, he argues, that section would render § 158(d) superfluous, since a final decision issued by a district court sitting as a bankruptcy appellate court is still a final decision of a district court. If § 158(d) is to have effect, Germain contends, then that section must be exclusive within its own domain, which he defines as the universe of orders issued by district courts sitting pursuant to § 158(a) as courts of appeals in bankruptcy. When a district court enters an order in that capacity, Germain concludes, only § 158(d) can confer jurisdiction, and if it does not, nothing else can. Germain claims to find support for his view in his reading of the legislative history of § 158(d).
Contrary to Germain’s contention, we need not choose between giving effect on the one hand to §1291 and on the other to § 158(d), for the statutes do not pose an either-or proposition. Section 1291 confers jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts” acting in any capacity. Section 158(d), in contrast, confers jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts when they act as bankruptcy appellate courts under § 158(a), and also confers jurisdiction over final decisions of the appéllate panels in bankruptcy acting under § 158(b). Sections 1291 and 158(d) do overlap, therefore, but each section confers jurisdiction over cases that the other section does not reach.
Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no “positive repugnancy” between two laws, Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842), a court must give effect to both. Because giving effect to both §§ 1291 and 158(d) would not render one or the other wholly superfluous, we do not have to read § 158(d) as precluding courts of appeals, by negative implication, from exercising jurisdiction under §1291 over district courts sitting in bankruptcy. We similarly do not have to read § 158(d) as precluding jurisdiction under §1292. While courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous, in this case that canon does not apply.
In any event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. See, e. g., United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-242 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 102-103 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 6 Cranch 53, 68 (1810). When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: “judicial inquiry is complete.” Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981); see also Ron Pair Enterprises, supra, at 241.
Germain says that legislative history points to a different result. But we think that judicial inquiry into the applicability of § 1292 begins and ends with what § 1292 does say and with what § 158(d) does not. Section 1292 provides for review in the courts of appeals, in certain circumstances, of “[ijnterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States.” Section 158(d) is silent as to review of interlocutory orders. Nowhere does § 1292 limit review to orders issued by district courts sitting as trial courts in bankruptcy rather than appellate courts, and nowhere else, whether in § 158(d) or any other statute, has Congress indicated that the unadorned words of § 1292 are in some way limited by implication. “It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer . . . that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.” Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202 (1819); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U. S. 589, 598 (1988). There is no reason to infer from either § 1292 or § 158(d) that Congress meant to limit appellate review of interlocutory orders in bankruptcy proceedings. So long as a party to a proceeding or case in bankruptcy meets the conditions imposed by § 1292, a court of appeals may rely on that statute as a basis for jurisdiction.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
That section provides in relevant part:
“(a)... [T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
“(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;
“(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof...;
“(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.
“(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order. ...”