Per Curiam.
The State of Alabama brought suit against appellant MTM in state court under the Alabama nuisance law, Ala. Code, Tit. 7, §§ 1081-1108 (1958), seeking to enjoin the continued operation of a nuisance by MTM. It alleged that because of convictions for violations of local obscenity laws by the Pussycat Adult Theater, an enterprise owned by MTM in Birmingham, Ala., the theater constituted a nuisance under this statute. After a hearing on the complaint, the state court issued a temporary injunction under the nuisance law, closing the theater.
After issuance of the temporary injunction and while action on the request for a permanent injunction was pending in state court, appellant filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. It asked the federal court to enjoin enforcement of the state-court temporary injunction and to declare the Alabama nuisance law unconstitutional. Appellant claimed that the challenged statutory provisions and the state-court temporary injunction infringed its First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A three-judge federal court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 to consider appellant’s complaint. Without resolving the constitutional merits of the complaint, the three-judge court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. In view of the pendency of the state proceedings, the three-judge District Court applied the test enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and concluded that federal intervention as requested by appellant would be improper.
Appellant has brought the case directly to this Court, asserting that jurisdiction exists under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and arguing that the requirements of Younger v. Harris, supra, did not preclude relief on these facts. We noted probable jurisdiction over this appeal and set this case for argument in tandem with Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., ante, p. 592. 415 U. S. 974 (1974).
Unless jurisdiction over this direct appeal from the three-judge court decision below is conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1253, we are without authority to entertain it. Section 1253 provides:
■ “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
Appellant argues that its complaint presented a "suit. . . required ... to be heard” by a three-judge court and that the dismissal of its complaint seeking injunctive relief constituted “an order . . . denying ... an interlocutory or permanent injunction” within the meaning of § 1253.
In Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974), we recently discussed in some detail the question of what constitutes an order “denying” injunctive relief for purposes of § 1253. There we held that direct appeal to this Court under § 1253 did not lie from the order of a three-judge court dismissing a complaint because of an absence of standing where the three-judge court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claim presented. Although our decision rested at least partially on the ground that a three-judge court was not “required” where the ground for decision below was an absence of standing, 419 U. S., at 100, we also explored the question of whether an order of a three-judge court “denies” an injunction, for purposes of § 1253, where there is no adverse resolution of the constitutional claims presented. Although noting that certain decisions of this Court and a literal reading of § 1253 might be taken to support the notion that a denial of injunctive relief on any basis by a three-judge court is within the purview of § 1253, we concluded that stare decisis is entitled to less than its usual weight in this area, and that “the opaque terms and prolix syntax” of this statute were not capable of literal reading. 419 U. S., at 96-97. In focusing on the question of whether direct review by this Court under § 1253 is available in the absence of a three-judge court decision resting on resolution of the constitutional merits of a complaint, we stated:
“Mercantile argues that § 1253 should be read to limit our direct review of three-judge-court orders denying injunctions to those that rest upon resolution of the constitutional merits of the case. There would be evident virtues to this rule. It would lend symmetry to the Court’s jurisdiction since, in reviewing orders granting injunctions, the Court is necessarily dealing with a resolution of the merits. While issues short of the merits — such as justiciability, subject-matter jurisdiction, equitable jurisdiction, and abstention — are often of more than trivial consequence, that alone does not argue for our reviewing them on direct appeal. Discretionary review in any case would remain available, informed by the mediating wisdom of a court of appeals. Furthermore, the courts of appeals might in many instances give more detailed consideration to these issues than this Court, which disposes of most mandatory appeals in summary fashion.” 419 U. S., at 99.
The conflicting decisions of this Court on the question of whether § 1253 jurisdiction attaches where a three-judge federal court fails to reach the merits of a constitutional claim for injunctive relief do not provide a consistent answer to this question. Compare Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972), with Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm’n, 393 U. S. 83 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 395 U. S. 826 (1969); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970). See Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 95 n. 11; 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 110.03 [3], pp. 76-79 (2d ed. 1973). It is certain that the congressional policy behind the three-judge court and direct-review apparatus-— the saving of state and federal statutes from improvident doom at the hands of a single judge — will not be impaired by a narrow construction of § 1253. A broad construction of the statute, on the other hand, would be at odds with the historic congressional policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court in the interest of sound judicial administration. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250-251 (1941); Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 98.
In light of these factors, we conclude that a direct appeal will lie to this Court under § 1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court denying interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief only where such order rests upon resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim presented below.
In the instant case, the three-judge court below did not reach the merits of appellant’s constitutional attack on the Alabama statute and instead based its order on the impropriety of federal intervention under our decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). In such circumstances, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The correctness of the application of Younger on these facts by the District Court is for the Court of Appeals to determine. Accordingly, we vacate the order before us and remand this case to the District Court so that a fresh order may be entered and a timely appeal prosecuted to the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Nuisance is defined in § 1091 of this Act as “any place . . . upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, and the personal property and contents used in conducting or maintaining any such place for any such purpose.” The remainder of the law consists of detailed procedural provisions governing the maintenance of a nuisance action.
In addition to MTM, Mobile Bookstore was a plaintiff below and is an appellant in the immediate action. There are no material differences in the facts surrounding Mobile’s participation in this action and those surrounding MTM’s participation. For simplicity, MTM and Mobile are hereinafter referred to collectively as appellant.
Although expedited appeal of the temporary injunction was available in state courts under Ala. Code, Tit. 7, §§ 757, 1057 (1958), appellant initiated no state-court appeal prior to the three-judge court’s decision on the merits. At the request of appellant, hearing on the permanent injunction in state court was deferred pending outcome of the federal suit.
The decision of the three-judge court is reported at 365 F. Supp. 1182.
We, of course, express no view on the correctness of the lower court’s holding.
The question of jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 was not raised in the Jurisdictional Statement, the Motion to Dismiss, or in the initial briefs filed in this case. At oral argument in light of our intervening decision in Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974), handed down after the filing of briefs in this case and on the day that this case was orally argued, it was suggested from the bench that supplemental briefs addressed to the issue of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 in light of Gonzalez, supra, be submitted. Appellant has submitted a brief attempting to distinguish Gonzalez, supra, which we have considered in resolving this jurisdictional question. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 305-306 (1962). While our normal practice under Rule 16 (6) of this Court has been to postpone notation of probable jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits where jurisdictional problems are presented, our intervening decision in Gonzalez, supra, squarely raised the jurisdictional question encountered here after we had noted probable jurisdiction in the case.
There is no occasion for us to decide in this case the circumstances under which a single judge may dismiss the complaint without convening a three-judge court where the ground for such dismissal rests solely on the impropriety of federal intervention. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 457 n. 7 (1974); Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 100.
See Stamler v. Willis, 393 U. S. 407 (1969); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427, 431 (1970).