Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners in this case, tenants living in low-income housing projects owned by respondent, brought suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that respondent overbilled them for their utilities and thereby violated the rent ceiling imposed by the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, and the implementing regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The District Court, 605 F. Supp. 532 (WD Va. 1984), and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 771 F. 2d 833 (1985), concluded that petitioners did not have a cause of action under § 1983. We granted certiorari and now reverse.
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Respondent is one of many public housing authorities (PHA’s) established throughout the country under the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 60 Stat. 888, 42 U. S. C. §1401 et seq., (1970 ed.), to provide affordable housing for low-income people. In 1969, the Housing Act was amended in a fundamental respect: the Brooke Amendment, Pub. L. 91-152, §213, 83 Stat. 389, imposed a ceiling for rents charged to low-income people living in public housing projects, and, as later amended, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400, provides that a low-income family “shall pay as rent” a specified percentage of its income. HUD has consistently considered “rent” to include a reasonable amount for the use of utilities, which is defined by regulation as that amount equal to or less than an amount determined by the PHA to be a reasonable part of the rent paid by low-income tenants.
In their suit against respondent, petitioners alleged that respondent had overcharged them for their utilities by failing to comply with the applicable HUD regulations in establishing the amount of utility service to which petitioners were entitled. Thus, according to petitioners, respondent imposed a surcharge for “excess” utility consumption that should have been part of petitioners’ rent and deprived them of their statutory right to pay only the prescribed maximum portion of their income as rent. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent on petitioners’ § 1983 claim, holding that a private cause of action was unavailable to enforce the Brooke Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying primarily on two of its earlier decisions, Perry v. Housing Authority of Charleston, 664 F. 2d 1210 (1981), and Phelps v. Housing Authority of Woodruff, 742 F. 2d 816 (1984), the Court of Appeals held that while the Brooke Amendment confers certain rights on tenants, these rights are enforceable only by HUD, not by the individual tenant: “[T]he situation is very analogous to the one in which a trustee [that is, HUD], not the cestui que trust, must bring suit.” 771 F. 2d, at 836.
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Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), held that §1983 was available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of the State. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), however, recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to remedy statutory violations: where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immupities within the meaning of § 1983. In Pennhurst, a § 1983 action did not lie because the statutory provisions were thought to be only statements of “findings” indicating no more than a congressional preference — at most a “nudge in the preferred direc-tio[n],” 451 U. S., at 19, and not intended to rise to the level of an enforceable right. In Sea Clammers, an intent to foreclose resort to § 1983 was found in the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by Congress, a scheme that itself provided for private actions and left no room for additional private remedies under § 1983. Similarly, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984), held that allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the Education of the Handicapped Act’s administrative remedies would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme, which itself allowed private parties to seek remedies for violating federal law. Under these cases, if there is a state deprivation of a “right” secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. “We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation of a federally secured right. Ibid.
Here, the Court of Appeals held that the statute and the Brooke Amendment clearly manifested congressional intention to vest in HUD the exclusive power to enforce the benefits due housing project tenants and hence the intention to foreclose both a private cause of action under the Housing Act and any private enforcement under § 1983. For the Court of Appeals, the barrier was not the lack of statutory right or its quality or enforceability — “the plaintiffs under 42 U. S. C. § 1437a have certain rights,” 771 F. 2d, at 837 — but the fact that Congress had not intended tenants to have the authority themselves to sue: “HUD alone may, as quasi trustee, take legal action, for the right is explicitly tailored not to allow the beneficiaries, the low cost housing tenants, to do so.” Ibid.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ rather summary conclusion that the administrative scheme of enforcement foreclosed private enforcement. The Court of Appeals merely relied on one of its prior cases which had referred to HUD’s authority to enforce the annual contributions contracts between PHA’s and HUD, see 42 U. S. C. § 1437c, to conduct audits and to cut off funds. HUD undoubtedly has considerable authority to oversee the operation of the PHA’s. We are unconvinced, however, that respondent has overcome its burden of showing that “the remedial devices provided in [the Housing Act] are sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Sea Clammers, supra, at 20. They do not show that “Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Smith v. Robinson, supra, at 1004-1005, n. 9. Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD, but there have also been both congressional and agency actions indicating that enforcement authority is not centralized and that private actions were anticipated. Neither, in our view, are the remedial mechanisms provided sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a §1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants’ rights secured by federal law.
In 1981, Congress changed the maximum percentage of income' that could be paid as “rent” from 25 percent to 30 percent. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400. In making this change, Congress gave the Secretary of HUD discretion to raise tenants’ rent incrementally over a 5-year period to ease the burden on low-income tenants during the transition. § 322(i), 95 Stat. 404. To avoid a potential multitude of litigation over the way in which the Secretary implemented the phased-in rate increase, Congress specifically made the Secretary’s decisions effectuating the phase-in immune from judicial review. § 322(i)(3). At congressional hearings in which this specific and limited exception to judicial review was discussed, HUD representatives explained that this exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to enforce their rights under the Housing Act in federal court other than the limited exception concerning the phase-in. Apparently dissatisfied with even a temporary preclusion of judicial review, Congress repealed it two years later. Pub. L. 98-181, § 206(e), 97 Stat. 1181.
Also at odds with the holding that HUD has exclusive authority to enforce the Brooke Amendment is the enactment in 1985 of 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), which directed HUD to continue its longstanding regulatory requirement that each PHA provide formal grievance, procedures for the resolution of tenant disputes with the PHA arising out of their lease or PHA regulations. These procedures, which Congress ordered continued, include informal and formal hearings and administrative appeals, conducted within each PHA by impartial decisionmakers, to consider adverse decisions taken against tenants by the PHA. Congress’ aim was to provide a “decentralized, informal, and relatively non-adversarial administrative process” for resolving tenant-management disputes. Samuels v. District of Columbia, 248 U. S. App. D. C. 128, 133, 770 F. 2d 184, 189 (1985). The procedures are open to individual grievances but not to class actions. See 24 CFR § 966.51(b) (1986). HUD itself has never provided a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about the alleged failures of PHA’s to abide by their annual contribution contracts, the Brooke Amendment, or HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the task of reviewing PHA grievance procedure decisions. Moreover, § 966.57(c) of HUD’s grievance procedure regulations provides that a decision terminating a grievance proceeding shall in no way affect the rights of a tenant either to seek “trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter. ” HUD thus had no thought that its own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it had established foreclosed resort to the courts by tenants who claimed that a PHA was not observing the commands of the Brooke Amendment.
There is other evidence clearly indicating that in HUD’s view tenants have the right to bring suit in federal court to challenge housing authorities’ calculations of utility allowances. Among HUD’s 1982 proposed regulations was § 865.476(d), 47 Fed. Reg. 35249, 35254 (1982), which would have confined tenant utility-allowance challenges to the procedures available in state court. The final regulation, however, contained no such limitation and contemplated that tenants could challenge PHA actions in federal as well as state courts. 24 CFR § 965.473(e) (1985). As the comment accompanying the final regulation explained, the proposal to limit challenges to state-court actions had been abandoned. The final “provision does not preclude Federal court review.” 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984). HUD’s opinion as to available tenant remedies under the Housing Act is entitled to some deference by this Court. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 865 (1985); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
In both Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, the statutes at issue themselves provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy. There is nothing of that kind found in the Brooke Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing Act. Indeed, the only private remedy provided for is the local grievance procedures which the Act now requires. These procedures are not open to class grievances; and even if tenants may grieve about a PHA’s utility allowance schedule, which petitioners dispute, the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982).
The Court of Appeals and respondents rely on HUD’s authority to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off federal funds. But these generalized powers are insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 704-707 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420 (1970). HUD has the authority to audit, but it does not do so frequently and its own Handbook requires audits only every eight years. There are no other mechanisms provided to enable HUD to effectively oversee the performance of the some 3,000 local PHA’s across the country. The statute does not require and HUD has not provided any formal procedure for tenants to bring to HUD’s attention alleged PHA failures to abide by the Brooke Amendment and HUD regulations. Hence, there will be little occasion to exercise HUD’s power to sue PHA’s to enforce the provisions of the annual contributions contracts. Respondent asserts PHA’s must annually file their utility allowance schedules with HUD and that HUD must approve them, but the final regulations eliminated HUD’s duty to approve these schedules before their effective date. 24 CFR § 965.473(d) (1986). Review of the schedules would be done in the course of audits or reviews of PHA operations.
Lastly, it is said that tenants may sue on their lease in state courts and enforce their Brooke Amendment rights in that litigation. Perhaps they could, but the state-court remedy is hardly a reason to bar an action under § 1983, which was adopted to provide a federal remedy for the enforcement of federal rights.
In sum, we conclude that nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners’ § 1983 claim against respondent.
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Although the Court of Appeals read the Brooke Amendment as extending to housing project tenants certain rights enforceable only by HUD, respondent asserts that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the interim regulations gave the tenants any specific or definable rights to utilities, that is, no enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983. We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD interim regulations, in effect when this suit began, expressly required that a “reasonable” amount for utilities be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to charge, an interpretation to which HUD has adhered both before and after the adoption of the Brooke Amendment. HUD’s view is entitled to deference as a valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the course of amending that provision has not disagreed with it.
Respondent nevertheless asserts that the provision for a “reasonable” allowance for utilities is too vague and amorphous to confer on tenants an enforceable “right” within the meaning of § 1983 and that the whole matter of utility allowances must be left to the discretion of the PHA, subject to supervision by HUD. The regulations, however, defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utilities, have the force of law, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 294-295 (1979), they specifically set out guidelines that the PHAs were to follow in establishing utility allowances, and they require notice to tenants and an opportunity to comment on proposed allowances. In our view, the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
“[42 U. S. C.] § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
The Brooke Amendment in its present form reads as follows:
“§ 1437a. Rental payments
“(a) Families included; amount
“Dwelling units assisted under this chapter shall be rented only to families who are lower income families at the time of their initial occupancy of such units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter (other than a family assisted under section 1437f(o) of this title) the highest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:
“(1) 30 per centum of the family’s monthly adjusted income;
“(2) 10 per centum of the family’s monthly income; or
“(3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family’s actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family’s housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated.” 42 U. S. C. § 1437a (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
The language of the original Brooke Amendment required that low-income tenant’s rent “may not exceed one-fourth of the family’s income, as defined by the Secretary.”
The complaint was filed December 8, 1982. The regulations in effect at that time defined “contract rent,” that is, the amount actually charged to low-income tenants, as follows:
“Contract rent means the rent charged a tenant for the use of the dwelling accommodation and equipment (such as ranges and refrigerators but not including furniture), services, and reasonable amounts of utilities determined in accordance with the PHA’s [public housing authority’s] schedule of allowances for utilities supplied by the project. Contract rent does not include charges for utility consumption in excess of the public housing agency’s schedule of allowances for utility consumption, or other miscellaneous charges . . . .” 24 CFR § 860.403 (1982).
The relevant regulations were originally promulgated as an interim rule on September 9,1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 59502 (1980). As there noted, HUD had previously regulated the way in which utility charges were dealt with in HUD’s Local Housing Authority Management Handbook, pt. 2, §9, Controlling Utility Consumption and Costs (1963). Ibid. On August 13, 1982, HUD published a proposed rule to amend the interim regulations, commenting as follows with respect to the inclusion of utilities in the calculation of rent:
“In administering the low-income public housing program under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, HUD historically has considered ‘rent’ to include shelter cost plus a reasonable amount for utilities. As a result, even prior to adoption of the ‘Brooke Amendment’ in 1969 (limiting the amount of ‘rent’ chargeable to public housing tenants to a stated percentage of income, then 25 percent), HUD provided for a system under which allowances were established as part of the rent schedule showing the amounts of electricity in kilowatt-hours to which tenants were entitled.” 47 Fed. Reg. 35249-35250 (1982).
The regulation was finally amended on August 7, 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 31399 (1984). The Supplementary Information section of the published regulation contains a discussion which underscores the fact that HUD has traditionally treated “rent” to include a reasonable amount of utility usage. Id., at 31400. That section also provides an overview of the development of the utility regulations at issue here.
The dissent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute.
The applicable regulations, 24 CFR §865.470 et seq. (1983), require housing authorities like respondent to, inter alia, recalculate their utility allowances on the basis of current data, to set the allowances in such a fashion that 90 percent of a particular authority’s dwelling units do not pay surcharges, and to review tenant surcharges quarterly and consider revision of the allowances if more than 26 percent of any category of units are being surcharged.
The complaint also contained a claim against respondent for breach of paragraph 4 of the standard lease agreement providing:
“Utilities: Management Agent agrees to furnish at no charge to the Resident the following utilities as reasonably necessary: hot and cold water, gas for cooking, and electricity for lighting and general household appliances and heat at appropriate times of the year, and also range and refrigerator. Resident will be required to pay for all excess consumption of utilities above the monthly allocated amount as developed by the Authority and determined by the individual check meter servicing the leased unit. The schedule of allocations and charges for excess consumption is posted on the bulletin board of each Housing Development office.” Record, Exh. H.
The original complaint asked for both injunctive relief and recovery of whatever amount respondent allegedly overcharged petitioners. Pursuant to new HUD regulations, respondent revised its allowances for reasonable utility use. Petitioners are now seeking only recovery of alleged past improper charges. Brief for Petitioners 8.
Petitioners asserted that while their right to sue on the lease derives from state law, the lease claim is controlled by federal law and hence is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
The court acknowledged that its conclusion that the Brooke Amendment created no enforceable rights in petitioners conflicted with the See-ond Circuit’s decision in Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority, 755 F. 2d 1074 (1985). The court stated, however, that this decision “must yield to the authority of Perry and Phelps, supra, from our own circuit.” 771 F. 2d, at 837, n. 8.
In response to a question by Congressman Vento concerning the reason for the exception to judicial review, a representative of HUD explained that this limited exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to protect their rights other than limiting their right to challenge the Secretary’s actions in implementing the phase-in:
“Mr. Vento. Well, has this been a special problem? Usually we don’t exempt people from going to the district court unless there has been some problem that has developed. Has there been that type of a problem in the past?
“Mr. Hovde. I will call upon Mr. Hipps for a response.
“Mr. Hipps. In direct answer to your question, yes, we have had a lot of litigation involving tenants rights over the past several years. The provision that you have raised a question about is addressed only at the 5-year phase in of the increase, and is not intended, as I understand, to eliminate any tenants rights beyond that point.” Hearings on Housing and Community Development Amendments before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 654 (1981).
Petitioners assert that the grievance mechanism is not available for challenges to the general utility allowance schedules. They rely on HUD statements to this effect, the first in 1984 in connection with the issuance of formal regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31407:
“Some legal services organizations recommended that grievance procedures should apply to the utility allowance provisions. Grievance procedures under former Part 866 (now Part 966) apply to individual, not class, grievances so that challenges to the general utility allowance schedules would be precluded. The Department believes that procedures to be followed on claims for individual relief under § 965.479 should be left to PHA determination.”
The second statement by HUD was in connection with proposing new grievance hearing regulations in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 26528:
“(a) Purpose of informal hearing. (1) The grievance procedure shall provide the Family an opportunity for an informal hearing to review proposed PHA adverse action. The purpose of the informal hearing shall be to review whether the proposed adverse action by the PHA is in accordance with, the lease, or with the law, HUD regulations or PHA rules.
“(2) PHA action or non-action concerning general policy issues or class grievances (including determination of the PHA’s schedules of allowances for PHA-furnished utilities or of allowances for Tenant-purchased utilities) does not constitute adverse action by the PHA, and the PHA is not required to provide the opportunity for a hearing to consider such issues or grievances.”
United States Dept, of Housing and Urban Development, Field Office Monitoring of Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) 6-1 (Handbook 7460.7, Rev. Sept. 9, 1985).
HUD explained, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984), as follows:
“In a related issue, legal service organizations expressed concern about the absence of any HUD review of the PHA’s allowance determination.
“HUD’s regulatory reform goals include the removal of unnecessary reviews and approvals of actions by responsible parties having equal or greater information at hand. This is particularly appropriate in the case of public housing in view of the ’37 Act’s injunction that ‘[I]t is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.’ 42 U. S. C. 1437. The Department believes that the definition of standards in § 965.476, combined with the record and notice provisions added to § 965.473, should adequately assure the reasonableness of PHA determinations so as to obviate the necessity or usefulness of HUD review and approval before implementation of PHA-determined allowances.”
We thus reject respondent’s argument that the Brooke Amendment’s rent ceiling applies only to the charge for shelter and that the HUD definition of rent as including a reasonable charge for utilities is not authorized by the statute.
The dissent misconstrues our discussion of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the enactment of the grievance procedures as codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Our conclusion that low-income tenants have a right to a reasonable amount of utilities does not come from these two congressional Acts. Rather, these Acts and their history show that Congress did not close the courthouse door to low-income tenants by establishing an alternative enforcement mechanism.
The dissent is also quite wrong in concluding that HUD’s “regulations indicate that while it did not have the authority finally to resolve the question, HUD viewed utilities determinations as a matter for state rather than federal courts.” Post, at 440. It is true that the 1982 proposed regulations would have confined review of PHA utility allowances to state forums, but it was never indicated that the governing law was state rather than federal law; and in the final regulations, even the provision making PHA determinations final unless overturned in state courts was deleted. HUD thus abandoned any attempt to foreclose resort to federal courts and surely negated any conclusion that PHA determinations were not judicially re viewable. The Supplemental Information section to HUD’s final regulations contains the following revealing discussion, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984):
“C. Review of PHA Decisions by State Courts
“The National Housing Law Project and other legal service groups challenged, as illegal, proposed § 865.476(d) which would make PHA determinations of allowances and revisions thereof final unless found, upon review pursuant to such procedures as may be available under State or local law, to be arbitrary or capricious.
“The commenters challenged HUD’s power .(1) to prescribe a standard of review for State courts, and (2) to divest Federal court of jurisdiction over cases involving questions of compliance with Federal statutes and regulations.
“State procedures for review of actions by administrative bodies created under State law frequently have provided a forum for review of agency determinations that involve questions of Federal law. Such State law proceedings may be more accessible to public housing tenants in some localities than a Federal court. Moreover, the Department believes that State courts are fully competent to review determinations by authorities created under State law.
“Nevertheless, the Department also recognizes that some plaintiffs may prefer to challenge PHA determinations in Federal rather than State court and that the Department’s power to preclude access to Federal court is doubtful. The Department also recognizes that not all States may have adopted procedures providing for judicial review of administrative action. Accordingly, this provision (transferred to § 965.473(e)) has been revised (i) to expand the standard of review to ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ (compare Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 706(2)), and (ii) to state that such standard of review will govern ‘except where a different standard of review is applicable in review procedures governed by applicable State law.’ This provision does not preclude Federal court review.”
Petitioners also argue that the District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their breach-of-lease claims given the federal nature of the rights contained in their leases. In light of our decision that petitioners have a § 1983 claim, the District Court can certainly exercise pendent jurisdiction over petitioners’ breach-of-lease claims. We offer no opinion as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to consider only their breach-of-lease claims irrespective of their § 1983 claim.