Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this litigation is the right to possession of a “Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square” described in a 1763 treaty between the King of England and the Catawba Head Men and Warriors. The tract, comprising 144,000 acres and 225 square miles, is located near the northern border of South Carolina; some 27,000 persons now claim title to different parcels within the tract. The specific question presented to us is whether the State’s statute of limitations applies to the Tribe’s claim. The answer depends on an interpretation of a statute enacted by Congress in 1959 to authorize a division of Catawba tribal assets. See 25 U. S. C. §§931-938. We hold that the State’s statute applies, but we do not reach the question whether it bars the Tribe’s claim.
Simply stated, the Tribe claims that it had undisputed ownership and possession of the land before the first Nonintercourse Act was passed by Congress in 1790; that the Nonintercourse Act prohibited any conveyance of tribal land without the consent of the United States; and that the United States never gave its consent to a conveyance of this land. Accordingly, the Tribe’s purported conveyance to South Carolina in 1840 is null and void. Among the defenses asserted by petitioners is the contention that, even if the Tribe’s claim was valid before passage and enactment of the Catawba Division of Assets Act, § 5 of the Act made the state statute of limitations applicable to the claim. Because that is the only contention that we review, it is not necessary to describe much of the historical material in the record.
I
In 1760 and 1763, the Tribe surrendered to Great Britain its aboriginal territory in what is now North and South Carolina in return for the right to settle permanently on the “Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square” that is now at issue. For purposes of this summary judgment motion, it is not disputed that the Tribe retained title to the land when the Non-intercourse Acts were passed.
By 1840, the Tribe had leased most, if not all, of the land described in the 1763 treaty to white settlers. In 1840, the Tribe conveyed its interest in the “Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square” to the State of South Carolina by entering into the “Treaty of Nation Ford.” In that treaty, the State agreed, in return for the “Tract,” to spend $5,000 to acquire a new reservation, to pay the Tribe $2,500 in advance, and to make nine annual payments of $1,500 in the ensuing years. In 1842, the State purchased a 630-acre tract as a new reservation for the Tribe, which then apparently had a membership of about 450 persons. This land is still held in trust for the Tribe by South Carolina.
The Tribe contends that the State did not perform its obligations under the treaty — it delayed the purchase of the new reservation for over 2/4 years; it then spent only $2,000 instead of $5,000 to purchase the new land; and it was not actually “new” land because it was located within the original 144,000-acre tract. Still more importantly, as noted, the Tribe maintains that this entire transaction was void because the United States did not consent to the conveyance as required by the Nonintercourse Act.
At various times during the period between 1900 and 1943, leaders of the Tribe applied to the State for citizenship and for a “final settlement of all their claims against the State.” Petitioners argue that these claims merely sought full performance of the State’s obligations under the 1840 treaty, but, for purposes of our decision, we accept the Tribe’s position that it was then asserting a claim under the Nonintercourse Acts and thus challenging the treaty itself. In any event, both state officials and representatives of the Federal Government took an interest in the plight of the Tribe.
In response to this concern, on December 14, 1943, the Tribe, the State, and the Office of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which was intended to provide relief for the Tribe, but which, did not require the Tribe to release its claims against the State. Pursuant to that agreement, the State purchased 3,434 acres of land at a cost of $70,000 and conveyed it to the United States to be held in trust for the Tribe. The Federal Government agreed to make annual contributions of available sums for the welfare of the Tribe and to assist the Tribe with education, medical benefits, and economic development. For its part, the Tribe agreed to conduct its affairs on the basis of the Federal Government’s recommendations; it thereafter adopted a Constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 476.
In 1953, Congress decided to make a basic change in its policies concerning Indian affairs. The passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108 on August 1, 1953, marked the beginning of the “termination era” — a period that continued into the mid-1960’s, in which the Federal Government endeavored to terminate its supervisory responsibilities for Indian tribes. Pursuant to that policy, the Federal Government identified the Catawba Tribe as a likely candidate for the withdrawal of federal services. Moreover, members of the Tribe desired an end to federal restrictions on alienation Of their lands in order to facilitate financing for homes and farm operations. Accordingly, after discussions with representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in which leaders of the Tribe were assured that any claim they had against the State would not be jeopardized by legislation terminating federal services, the Tribe adopted a resolution supporting such legislation and authorizing a distribution of tribal assets to the members of the Tribe. After receiving advice that the Tribe supported legislation authorizing the disposal of the tribal assets and terminating federal responsibility for the Tribe and its individual members, Congress enacted the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act, 73 Stat. 592, 25 U. S. C. §§ 931-938. The Act provides for the preparation of a tribal membership roll, § 931; the tribal council’s designation of sites for church, park, playground, and cemetery purposes, § 933(b); and the division of remaining assets among the enrolled members of the Tribe, § 933(f). The Act also provides for the revocation of the Tribe’s Constitution and the termination of federal services for the Tribe, § 935. It explicitly states that state laws shall apply to members of the Tribe in the same manner that they apply to non-Indians. Ibid. Pursuant to that Act, the 3,434-acre reservation that had been acquired as a result of the 1943 Memorandum of Understanding was distributed to the members of the Tribe; the Secretary of the Interior revoked the Tribe’s Constitution, effective July 1, 1962.
In 1980, the Tribe commenced this action seeking possession of the 225-square-mile tract and trespass damages for the period of its dispossession. All of the District Judges for the District of South Carolina recused themselves, and Judge Willson of the Western District of Pennsylvania was designated to try the case. After the development of a substantial record of uncontested facts, Judge Willson granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. His order of dismissal was initially reversed by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 718 F. 2d 1291 (1983); sitting en banc, the full Court of Appeals adopted the panel’s opinion. 740 F. 2d 305 (1984). Because of the importance of the case, we requested the views of the Solicitor General of the United States and granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1134 (1985). We now reverse.
II
Section 5 of the Catawba Act is central to this dispute. As currently codified, it provides:
“The constitution of the tribe adopted pursuant to sections 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466 to 470, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476 to 478, and 479 of this title shall be revoked by the Secretary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction. Nothing in this subchapter, however, shall affect the status of such persons as citizens of the United States.” 25 U. S. C. §935.
This provision establishes two principles in unmistakably clear language. First, the special federal services and statutory protections for Indians are no longer applicable to the Catawba Tribe and its members. Second, state laws apply to the Catawba Tribe and its members in precisely the same fashion that they apply to others.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this reading of the Act. For it concluded that the word “them” in the second sentence of § 5 could refer to the individual Indians who are members of the Tribe and not encompass the Tribe itself. Relying on the canon that doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the Indians, it thus held that the language in § 5 about the inapplicability of federal Indian statutes and the applicability of state laws did not reach the Tribe itself.
The canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress. It seems clear to us that the antecedent of the words “them” and “their” in the second sentence of § 5 is the compound subject of the first clause in the sentence, namely, “the tribe and its members.” To read the provision otherwise is to give it a contorted construction that abruptly divorces the first clause from the second and the third, and that conflicts with the central purpose and philosophy of the Termination Act. According the statutory language its ordinary meaning, moreover, is reinforced by the fact that the first sentence in the section provides for a revocation of the Tribe’s Constitution. It would be most incongruous to preserve special protections for a tribe whose constitution has been revoked while withdrawing protection for individual members of that tribe.
Without special federal protection for the Tribe, the state statute of limitations should apply to its claim in this case. For it is well established that federal claims are subject to state statutes of limitations unless there is a federal statute of limitations or a conflict with federal policy. Although federal policy may preclude the ordinary applicability of a state statute of limitations for this type of action in the absence of a specific congressional enactment to the contrary, County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226 (1985), the Catawba Act clearly suffices to reestablish the usual principle regarding the applicability of the state statute of limitations. In striking contrast to the situation in County of Oneida, the Catawba Act represents an explicit redefinition of the relationship between the Federal Government and the Catawbas; an intentional termination of the special federal protection for the Tribe and its members; and a plain statement that state law applies to the Catawbas as to all “other persons or citizens.”
That the state statute of limitations applies as a consequence of terminating special federal protections is also supported by the significance we have accorded congressional action redefining the federal relationship with particular Indians. We have long recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by Indians, state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claims. Similarly, we have emphasized that Termination Acts subject members of the terminated tribe to “the full sweep of state laws and state taxation.” These principles reflect an understanding that congressional action to remove restraints on alienation and other federal protections represents a fundamental change in federal policy with respect to the Indians who are the subject of the particular legislation.
The Court of Appeals found support for its conclusion about the nonapplicability of the state statute of limitations in § 6 of the Catawba Act, which provides that nothing in the statute affects the rights of the Tribe under the laws of South Carolina. The thrust of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning was that, if a state law was inapplicable to the Tribe or its members before the effective date of the Act, its application after the effective date necessarily violates § 6. But such a reading contradicts the plain meaning of § 5’s reference to the applicability of state laws. In our view § 6 was merely intended to remove federal obstacles to the ordinary application of state law. Section 6 cannot be read to preserve, of its own force, a federal tribal immunity from otherwise applicable state law without defeating a basic purpose of the Act and negating explicit language in § 5. Most fundamentally, § 6 simply does not speak to the explicit redefinition of the federal relationship with the Catawbas that is the basis for the applicability of the state statute of limitations.
Finally, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the assurance to the Tribe that the status of any claim against South Carolina would not be affected by the legislation. Even assuming that the legislative provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to warrant reliance on the legislative history, we believe that the Court of Appeals misconceived the import of this assurance. We do not accept petitioners’ argument that the Catawba Act immediately extinguished any claim that the Tribe had before the statute became effective. Rather, we assume that the status of the claim remained exactly the same immediately before and immediately after the effective date of the Act, but that the Tribe thereafter had an obligation to proceed to assert its claim in a timely manner as would any other person or citizen within the State’s jurisdiction. As a result, unlike the Court of Appeals, we perceive no contradiction between the applicability of the state statute of limitations and the assurance that the status of any state claims would not be affected by the Act.
We thus conclude that the explicit redefinition of the federal relationship reflected in the clear language of the Catawba Act requires the application of the state statute of limitations to the Tribe’s claim.
HH HH I — I
The District Court held that respondent’s claim is barred by the South Carolina statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals’ construction of the 1959 federal statute made it unnecessary for that court to review the District Court’s interpretation of state law. Because the Court of Appeals is in a better position to evaluate such an issue of state law than we are, we remand the case to that court for consideration of this issue.
It is so ordered.
The 1763 Treaty of Fort Augusta was entered into by the Catawbas and British and colonial officials, and provides, in relevant part:
“And We the Catawba Head Men and Warriors in Confirmation of an Agreement heretofore entered into with the White People declare that we will remain satisfied with the Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square a Survey of which by our consent and at our request has been already begun and the respective Governors and Superintendant on their Parts promise and engage that the aforesaid survey shall be compleated and that the Catawbas shall not in any respect be molested by any of the King’s subjects within the said Lines but shall be indulged in the usual Manner of hunting Elsewhere.” XI Colonial Records of North Carolina 201-202 (1763), reprinted in App. 35.
Respondent, Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of South Carolina in 1975. Like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we assume that respondent is the successor in interest of the Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina. For convenience, we refer to respondent as the “Tribe” throughout this opinion.
See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4,1 Stat. 138. The Act, now codified at 25 U. S. C. § 177, states in relevant part:
“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”
Petitioners include the State of South Carolina and approximately 76 other parties who are named as defendants in the complaint; they were sued as representatives of a class that was alleged to consist of the approximately 27,000 persons who claim an interest in the disputed land.
An 1825 War Department chart indicated that the Catawbas totaled 450 persons. 2 American State Papers 545 (1925).
See 1920 S. C. Acts 1700, Joint Res. No. 904, § 1.
In 1930, a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings in Rock Hill, South Carolina, which is located in the 144,000-acre tract. Senator Thomas of Oklahoma wrote that the “subcommittee . . . found some hundred and seventy-five remnants of this band located on a tract of practically barren rock and gradually starving to death.” Division of Tribal Assets of Catawba Indian Tribe, Hearings on H. R. 6128, before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (unpublished), Insert 5, at 3 (Minutes of State and Federal Conference, Oct. 21, 1958) (6 Record Ex. 56), quoting Feb. 10, 1932, letter, Senator Thomas to Commissioner Rhoads.
Preliminary drafts of the Memorandum of Understanding contained a provision extinguishing the Tribe’s reservation claim (6 Record Ex. 49), but that provision was deleted. The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior emphasized that the agreement should not use “a contract under the Johnson-O’Malley Act in order to deprive the Indian tribe of claims which it might be able to enforce in the courts.” United States Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Id., Ex. 50, p. 3.
The State also agreed to appropriate at least $9,500 annually for three years for the benefit of the Tribe and to extend to Catawbas the rights and privileges of all citizens, including admission to public schools. Ibid.
That Resolution declared: “[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.” H. R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 67 Stat. B132.
According to one compilation, between 1954 and 1962, Congress passed 12 separate “Termination Acts,” the 11th of which was the Catawba Act. See F. Prucha, The Great Father 1048 (1984). The termination policy has been criticized by various commentators. See, e. g., Cornell, The New Indian Politics, 10 Wilson Q. 113, 121 (1986); F. Prucha, supra, at 1046-1059; Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 American Indian L. Rev. 139 (1977); Preloznik & Felsenthal, The Menominee Struggle to Maintain Their Tribal Assets and Protect Their Treaty Rights Following Termination, 51 N. D. L. Rev. 53 (1975). The ultimate legislative wisdom of the termination policy is, of course, not before the Court.
In September 1954, a House Study Subcommittee on Indian Affairs reported that the Catawba Tribe was one of the groups able to take responsibility for their affairs and therefore was ready for termination of federal services. H. R. Rep. No. 2680, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1954). In contrast to the report made by Senator Thomas in 1930, n. 7, supra, the Reports accompanying the Act concluded that the Catawbas had been able to merge into the general community and had been able to attain an economic position comparable to that of non-Indians. See S. Rep. No. 863, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959) (“The Catawba Indians have advanced economically . . . during the past 14 years, and have now reached a position that is comparable to their non-Indian neighbors”); H. R. Rep. No. 910, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959) (same). Most adult male Catawbas were employed at the time: 47% were in industry, 20% in skilled labor, 7% in the Armed Services, 15% in odd jobs, 5% retired, and 6% on the welfare rolls. S. Rep., at 4; H. R. Rep., at 5.
See 105 Cong. Rec. 5462 (1959) (statement of Rep. Hemphill); App. 102.
The resolution adopted at the meeting of the Tribe on January 3,1959, expressly noted that “nothing in this legislation shall affect the status of any claim against the State of South Carolina by the Catawba Tribe. ” Id., at 103.
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, 444 (1975); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199-200 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 504-505 (1973).
See Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U. S. 753, 774 (1985) (“[E]ven though ‘legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians,’ DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, 447 (1975), courts cannot ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a ‘fair appraisal,’ Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. [658, 673 (1979)], clearly runs counter to a tribe’s later claims”); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 732 (1983) (canon of construction regarding certain Indian claims should not be applied “when application would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent”); Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S. 608, 618-619 (1980); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S., at 447 (“A canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent”).
Respondent argues that the scope of the Act was merely to terminate the specific federal services arising from the 1943 Memorandum of Understanding. Such a limited interpretation cannot be reconciled with the broader language of the Act (“The tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians”; “all statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them”; “the laws of the several states shall apply to them in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction”) (emphasis added).
See, e. g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 266-267 (1985); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 483-484 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 462 (1975); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 703-704 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, 463 (1947); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, 97 (1941); O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318, 322-323 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 397-398 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 617 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 277 (1830).
See, e. g., Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U. S. 431, 439 (1928) (“With the issue of the patent, the title not only passed from the United States but the prior trust and the incidental restrictions against alienation were terminated. This put an end to the authority theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction — so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there”); Dickson v. Luck Land Co., 242 U. S. 371, 375 (1917) (“With those restrictions [of Congress] entirely removed and the fee simple issued it would seem that the situation was one in which all questions pertaining to the disposal of the lands naturally would fall within the scope and operation of the laws of the State”); United States v. Waller, 243 U. S. 452, 461-462 (1917) (“We cannot escape the conviction that the plain language of this act evidences the intent and purpose of Congress to make such lands allotted to mixed-blood Indians subject to alienation with all the incidents and rights which inhere in full ownership in persons of full capacity”); Schrimpscher v. Stockton, 183 U. S. 290, 296 (1902) (after a treaty removed restraints from alienation of land by certain Wyandotte Indians, state statute of limitations ran against Indians, even though Indians later asserted claim of a prior federal treaty violation; after removal of restraints on alienation, the Indian’s heirs “were chargeable with the same diligence in beginning an action for their recovery as other persons having title to lands”).
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 389 (1976). See also United States v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641, 647, n. 7 (1977) (“[M]embers of tribes whose official status has been terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act”); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972) (terminated members of Tribe must bring action to invalidate allegedly fraudulent conveyance under same laws as other citizens).
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968), the Court concluded that the Menominee Termination Act did not terminate the Tribe’s hunting and fishing rights. The Court emphasized that the Termination Act must be read in pari materia with an Act passed in the same Congress that preserved hunting and fishing rights. Id., at 411. In this ease, of course, there is no similar contemporaneous statute. Moreover, in Menominee, the Court was concerned about a “backhanded” abrogation of treaty rights, id., at 412; no comparable abrogation is at issue here.
As currently codified, §6 provides:
“Nothing in this subehapter shall affect the rights, privileges, or obligations of the tribe and its members under the laws of South Carolina.” 25 U. S. C. §936.
It is an “elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979). See also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U. S. 237, 249 (1985); United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’ Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an entire section”).
See 718 F. 2d 1291, 1296 (1983) (quoting Bureau of Indian Affairs official’s assurance that “‘any claim the Catawbas had against the State would not be jeopardized by carrying out a program with the Federal Government’ ”).
See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 484-485, n. 13 (1986); Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 224, n. 10 (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487 (1949).