Mr. Justice Jackson
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Minton join.
These cases present unsuccessful attempts, by two different procedures, to enforce the view of the Department of Justice as to construction of the Act of January 2, 1951 which prohibits shipment of gambling machines in interstate commerce but includes incidental registration and reporting provisions. Two indictments charge Denmark and Braun severally with engaging in the business of dealing in gambling devices without registering with the Attorney General and reporting sales and deliveries. Both indictments were dismissed. The other proceeding is a libel to forfeit five gambling machines seized by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents from a country club in Tennessee. It also was dismissed.
The three cases, here on Government appeals, are similar in features which led to their dismissal and which raise constitutional issues. The indictments do not allege that the accused dealers, since the effective date of the Act or for that matter at any other time, have bought, sold or moved gambling devices in interstate commerce, or that the devices involved in their unreported sales have, since the effective date of the Act or at any other time, moved in interstate commerce or ever would do so. The libel does not show that the country club’s machines were at any time transported in or in any way affect interstate commerce.
Section 2 of the Act prohibits transportation of gambling devices in interstate commerce except to any state which exempts itself or its subdivision by state law. Section 3 requires every manufacturer and dealer in gambling devices annually to register his business and name and monthly to file detailed information as to each device sold and delivered during the preceding month. Section 6 provides criminal penalties for failure to register or for violation of the transportation section, and § 7 authorizes forfeiture of devices sold in violation of the Act.
The information requirements are not expressly limited to persons engaged or transactions occurring in interstate commerce or conditioned on any connection therewith. Neither does the Act by any specific terms direct its application to transactions such as we have here.
Appellees contend, first, that the Act should not be construed to reach dealers, transactions or machines unless shown to have some relation to interstate commerce; second, construed otherwise, the Act exceeds the power delegated to Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution; third, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
The Government answers, first, that the statute, literally read, reaches all dealers and transactions and the possession of all unreported devices without reference to interstate commerce; second, to make effective the prohibition of transportation in interstate commerce, Congress may constitutionally require reporting of all intrastate transactions; and, third, while Congress, by oversight, left an inappropriate and confusing phrase in the Act, the defect is not fatal inasmuch as the Attorney General has power to supplement the Act by regulations which will cure its indefiniteness.
We do not intimate any ultimate answer to the appel-lees’ constitutional questions other than to observe that they cannot be dismissed as frivolous, nor as unimportant to the the nature of our federation. No precedent of this Court sustains the power of Congress to enact legislation penalizing failure to report information concerning acts not shown to be in, or mingled with, or found to affect commerce. The course of decision relied on by the Government on analysis falls short of the holding asked of us here. Indeed, we find no instance where Congress has attempted under the commerce power to impose reporting duties under penal sanction which would raise the question posed by these proceedings. It is apparent that the Government’s pleadings raise, and no doubt were intended to raise, a far-reaching question as to the extent of congressional power over matters internal to the individual states.
Of course, Congress possesses not only power to regulate commerce among the several states but also an inexact power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated powers. In some instances Congress has left to an administrative body, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the National Labor Relations Board, the power to decide on a case-to-case basis whether the particular intrastate activity affects interstate commerce so as to warrant exercise of the power to reach into intrastate affairs. Decisions under this type of legislation give the Government no support, for no such determination is required by this Act, and the Government asserts no such finding by anyone is necessary. In other statutes Congress has set up economic regulations which lay hold of activities in interstate commerce but also include intrastate activities so intermingled therewith that separation is impractical or impossible. Of course, decisions upholding legislation requiring information in aid of the taxing power afford no support here, because the taxing power penetrates and permeates every activity, intrastate or interstate, within the Nation. While general statements, out of these different contexts, might bear upon the subject one way or another, it is apparent that the precise question tendered to us now is not settled by any prior decision.
The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. This is not because we would avoid or postpone difficult decisions. The predominant consideration is that we should be sure Congress has intentionally put its power in issue by the legislation in question before we undertake a pronouncement which may have far-reaching consequences upon the powers of the Congress or the powers reserved to the several states. To withhold passing upon an issue of power until we are certain it is knowingly precipitated will do no great injury, for Congress, once we have recognized the question, can make its purpose explicit and thereby necessitate or avoid decision of the question. Judicial abstention is especially wholesome where we are considering a penal statute. Our policy in constitutional cases is reinforced by the long tradition and sound reasons which admonish against enlargement of criminal statutes by interpretation.
This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to Acts of Congress. This is not, a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power. The rational and practical force of the presumption is at its maximum only when it appears that the precise point in issue here has been considered by Congress and has been explicitly and deliberately resolved. But the presumption can have little realism when responsible congressional committees and leaders, in managing a bill, have told Congress that the bill will not reach that which the Act is invoked in this Court to cover.
We do not question that literal language of this Act is capable of the broad, unlimited construction urged by the Government. Indeed, if it were enacted for a unitary system of government, no other construction would be appropriate. But we must assume that the implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a major premise of all congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein. Against the background of our tradition and system of government, we cannot say that the lower courts, which have held as a matter of statutory construction that this Act does not reach purely intrastate matters, have not made a permissible interpretation. We find in the text no unmistakable intention of Congress to raise the constitutional questions implicit in the Government’s effort to apply the Act in its most extreme impact upon affairs considered normally reserved to the states.
Judges differ as to the value of legislative history in statutory construction, but the Government often relies upon it to sustain its interpretation of statutes. However, in this case its reference to legislative history is conspicuously meager and unenlightening. On the other hand, for what it is worth, appellees point out much that was reported by responsible committees and said by proponents of this antigambling-device legislation to indicate that Congress did not intend to raise the issues here presented and was not aware it was doing so. For example, Senator Johnson, sponsor of the bill which eventually became this Act, declared that “. . . it keeps the Federal Government out of State and local police powers; no Federal official is going to become an enforcement officer in any State or locality.” The committee handling the bill reported: “On the other hand, the committee desires to emphasize that Federal law enforcement in the field of gambling cannot and should not be considered a substitute for State and local law enforcement in this field.” But here it was the Federal Bureau of Investigation which entered a country club and seized slot machines not shown ever to have had any connection with interstate commerce in any manner whatever. If this is not substituting federal for state enforcement, it is difficult to know how it could be accomplished. A more local and detailed act of enforcement is hardly conceivable. These cases, if sustained, would substantially take unto the Federal Government the entire pursuit of the gambling device.
No committee appears to have anticipated this, for the then Attorney General informed the committee, and it reported itself in agreement with the view, that “Actually enforcement against those people who gamble or use these machines wrongfully in the States is left with the States, and with the local officials, and there is absolutely no intention on the part of the Federal Government, express or otherwise, in this bill or anything that accompanies it, to get us into a prohibition era.” It is impossible to reconcile statements of this kind, on which the Congress may have placed reliance, with the Government’s present interpretation of the Act.
As we have indicated, the present indictments and libel are so framed as to apply in extreme form the most expansive interpretation of this Act. All that we would decide at present is a question of statutory construction. We think the Act does not have the explicitness necessary to sustain the pleadings which the Government has drafted in these cases. On this ground alone, we would affirm the judgments below.
Judgments affirmed.
64 Stat. 1134, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 1171-1177.
In pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in a State, the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States from any place outside of such State, the District of Columbia, or possession: Provided, That this section shall not apply to transportation of any gambling device to a place in any State which has enacted a law providing for the exemption of such State from the provisions of this section, or to a place in any subdivision of a State if the State in which such subdivision is located has enacted a law providing for the exemption of such subdivision from the provisions of this section. . . .” 64 Stat. 1134, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1172.
“Upon first engaging in business, and thereafter on or before the 1st day of July of each year, every manufacturer of and dealer in gambling devices shall register with the Attorney General his name or trade name, the address of his principal place of business, and the addresses of his places of business in such district. On or before the last day of each month every manufacturer of and dealer in gambling devices shall file with the Attorney General an inventory and record of all sales and deliveries of gambling devices as of the close of the preceding calendar month for the place or places of business in the district. The monthly record of sales and deliveries of such gambling devices shall show the mark and number identifying each article together with the name and address of the buyer or consignee thereof and the name and address of the carrier. Duplicate bills or invoices, if complete in the foregoing respects, may be used in filing the record of sales and deliveries. For the purposes of this Act, every manufacturer or dealer shall mark and number each gambling device so that it is individually identifiable. In cases of sale, delivery, or shipment of gambling devices in unassembled form, the manufacturer or dealer shall separately mark and number the components of each gambling device with a common mark and number as if it were an assembled gambling device. It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer or dealer to sell, deliver, or ship any gambling device which is not marked and numbered for identification as herein provided; and it shall be unlawful for any manufacturer or dealer to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, deliver, or ship any gambling device without having registered as required by this section, or without filing monthly the required inventories and records of sales and deliveries.” 64 Stat. 1136, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1173.
“Whoever violates any of the provisions of sections 2, 3, 4, or 5 of this Act shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 64 Stat. 1135, 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1176.
“Any gambling device transported, delivered, shipped, manufactured, reconditioned, repaired, sold, disposed of, received, possessed, or used in violation of the provisions of this Act shall be seized and forfeited to the United States. All provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this Act, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof: Provided, That such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of gambling devices under this Act by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney General.” 64 Stat. 1135, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §1177.
The ambiguity in the statute arose from the following facts: In the bill originally submitted to the Senate, S. 3357, § 3 began: “. . . every manufacturer of and dealer in gambling devices shall register with the collector of internal revenue for each district in which such business is to be carried on, his name [etc.] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See 96 Cong. Rec. 13649; Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3357, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2. However, the Treasury Department wrote the House committee that since the bill did not concern the collection of revenue, the Justice Department should handle the registration of gambling devices. See H. R. Rep. No. 2769, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 14; Hearings on S. 3357, supra, at 8-9. The House committee therefore deleted from the bill the language italicized above and substituted the words “Attorney General.” See H. R. Rep. No. 2769, supra, at 8-9; 96 Cong. Rec. 13650, 14735, 15106, 15108, 16701. The deletion left without meaning the phrase “in such district,” which appeared later in the section and which had previously referred back to the district in which the business was to be carried on.
The Attorney General attempted to clarify the ambiguity by issuing Department of Justice Order No. 4173, 28 CFR, 1952 Supp., § 3. He claimed authority to issue such a regulation under R. S. § 161, 5 U. S. C. §22, which reads: “The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”
Under the liquor law enforcement statutes, the offense was only complete when the unlabeled liquor was shipped in interstate commerce. E. g., 35 Stat. 1137, as amended, 49 Stat. 1930, 18 U. S. C. § 390. See Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F. 2d 522, 524-525; Arnold v. United States, 115 F. 2d 523, 524. The marking and labeling section of the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. § 396c, specifically provided that prison-made goods must be marked “when shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” See Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 344, 352-353, where a suit for mandatory injunction under the Act alleged that the goods had been delivered in interstate commerce. A similar provision appeared in the subsequent statute. 62 Stat. 786, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1762 (a). The Lacey Act of 1900, 31 Stat. 188, required packages containing dead animals to be plainly marked “when shipped by interstate commerce.” See Rupert v. United States, 181 F. 87, 88, 91, where an indictment under the Act charged interstate shipments. The statute preventing passage of lottery tickets in interstate commerce, 62 Stat. 762, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1301, contains no labeling, marking, or information requirements. Neither do the stolen property statutes. 62 Stat. 805, 806, 807, 63 Stat. 96, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 2311-2317.
Interstate Commerce Act, 36 Stat. 550, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4), Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 357-359; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194; North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511; King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 267-276. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450, 452, 453, 454, 455, 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (6), (7), 155, 160 (a), (e), (f), as amended, 61 Stat. 138, 140, 146, 147-148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §§ 152 (6), (7), 155, 160 (a), (e), (f), Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 31, 47; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 49-50; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54, 57-58; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. Labor Board, 303 U. S. 453, 466-468; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 223-224; Labor Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 683-684.
Hours of Service Acts (Railroads), 34 Stat. 1415, 45 U. S. C. §§ 61-64, Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612; Interstate Commerce Act, 34 Stat. 584, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194; Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat. 998, as amended, Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1; Ashurst-Sumners Act (Convict-Made Goods), 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. §§ 396b, 396c, Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334; Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat. 731, 7 U. S. C. §§ 511a—511q, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1281 et seq., Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38; as amended, 55 Stat. 203, 7 U. S. C. § 1340, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186; Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. § 608c, United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., United States v. Walsh, 331 U. S. 432; United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689.
United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86; Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506; United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22.
Cf. United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, with Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 U. S. 513.
United States v. Denmark, 119 F. Supp. 647; United States v. Braun, 119 F. Supp. 646; United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 119 F. Supp. 641; United States v. 15 Mills Blue Bell Gambling Machines, 119 F. Supp. 74; United States v. 178 Gambling Devices, 107 F. Supp. 394.
The Government cites passages from the House Committee Report to the effect that slot machines and similar gambling devices are resulting in substantial revenues to Nation-wide crime syndicates. H. R. Rep. No. 2769, supra, at 4-6. The Government also refers to statements by a Congressman and the president of a company which manufactures gambling devices to the effect that these syndicates operate in every state in the Union and reap profits in the billions of dollars. Hearings on S. 3357, supra, at 10-12, 23, 28, 29, 182, 185, 191-192; 96 Cong. Rec. 13638.
96 Cong. Rec. 15107. For similar statements by Senator Johnson, see 96 Cong. Rec. 15103, 15105.
H. R. Rep. No. 2769, supra, at 5.
Ibid. See also statements by Senator Ferguson, 96 Cong. Rec. 15104; and Representatives Rogers, 96 Cong. Rec. 13643-13644, 16853; Bryson, 96 Cong. Rec. 13649; Rees, 96 Cong. Rec. 13654, and Dolliver, 96 Cong. Rec. 13638.