Mr. Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment of the Court in an opinioq in which Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join.
This case presents the question whether the warnings called for by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), must be given to a grand jury witness who is called to testify about criminal activities in which he may have been personally involved; and whether, absent such warnings, false statements made to the grand jury must be suppressed in a prosecution for perjury based on those statements.
(1)
During the course of a grand jury investigation into narcotics trafile in San Antonio, Tex., federal prosecutors assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force learned of an undercover narcotics officer's encounter with respondent in March 1973. At that time, the agent had received information that respondent, who was employed as a bartender at a local tavern, was dealing in narcotics. The agent, accompanied by an informant, met respondent at the tavern and talked for several hours. During the meeting, respondent agreed to obtain heroin for the agent, and to that end placed several phone calls from the bar. He also requested and received $650 from the agent to make the purchase. Respondent left the tavern with the money so advanced to secure the heroin. However, an hour later respondent returned to the bar without the narcotics and returned the agent’s money. Respondent instructed the agent to telephone him at the bar that evening to make arrangements for the transaction., The agent tried but was unable to contact respondent as directed. The record provides no explanation for respondent’s failure to keep his appointment. No further action was taken by the agent, and the investigatory file on the matter was closed. The agent did, however, report the information to federal prosecutors. At that time, the Government was seeking information on local drug traffic to present to a special grand jury investigating illicit traffic in the area.
Respondent was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury on May 2, 1973; this was approximately six weeks after the abortive narcotics transaction at the tavern where respondent was employed. When called into the grand jury room and after preliminary statements, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and respondent:
“Q. ... Now, you are required to answer all the questions that I ask you except for the ones that you feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you understand that?
“A. Do I answer all the questions you ask?
“Q. You have to answer all the questions except for those you think will incriminate you in the commission of a crime. Is that clear?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You don’t have to answer questions which would incriminate you. All other questions you have to answer openly and truthfully. And, of course, if you do not answer those [questions] truthfully, in other words if you lie about certain questions, you could possibly be charged with perjury. Do you understand that?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Have you contacted a lawyer in this matter?
“A. I don’t have one. I don’t have the money to get one.
“Q. Well, if you would like to have a lawyer, he cannot be inside this room. He can only be outside. You would be free to consult with him if you so chose. Now, if during the course of this investigation, the questions that we ask you, if you feel like you would like to have a lawyer outside to talk to, let me know.” App. 5-6.
During the questioning respondent admitted that he had previously been convicted of distributing drugs, that he had recently used heroin himself, and that he had purchased heroin as recently as five months previously. Despite this admitted experience with San Antonio’s heroin trafile, respondent denied knowledge of the identity of any dealers, save for a streetcorner source named Juan. Respondent steadfastly denied either selling or attempting to sell heroin since the time of his conviction 15 years before.
Respondent specifically disclaimed having discussed the sale of heroin with anyone during the preceding year and stated that he would not even try to purchase an ounce of heroin for $650. Respondent refused to amplify on his testimony when directly confronted by the prosecutor:
“Q. Mr. Mandujano, our information is that you can tell us more about the heroin business here in San Antonio than you have today. Is there anything you would like to add telling us more about who sells heroin?
“A. Well, sir, I couldn’t help you because, you know, I don’t get along with the guys and I just can’t tell you, you know.”
Following this appearance, respondent was charged by a grand jury on June 13, 1973, in a two-count indictment with attempting to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 (a)(1), 846, and for willfully and knowingly making a false material declaration to the grand jury in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623. The falsity of his statements was conceded; his sole claim was that the testimony before the grand jury should be suppressed because the Government failed to provide the warnings called for by Miranda. Following an eviden-tiary hearing, the District Court granted respondent’s motion to suppress. The court held that respondent was a “putative” or “virtual” defendant when called before the grand jury; respondent had therefore been entitled to full Miranda warnings. 365 F. Supp. 155 (WD Tex. 1973).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 496 F. 2d 1050 (CA5 1974). It recognized that certain warnings had in fact been given to respondent at the outset of his grand jury appearance. But the court agreed with the District Court that “full Miranda warnings should have been accorded Mandujano who was in the position of a virtual or putative defendant.” Id., at 1052. The essence of the Court of Appeals’ holding is:
“In order to deter the prosecuting officers from bringing a putative or virtual defendant before the grand jury, for the purpose of obtaining incriminating or perjur[i]ous testimony, the accused must be adequately apprised of his rights, or all of his testimony, incriminating and perjur[i]ous, will be suppressed/’ Id., at 1056. (Emphasis added.)
In so ruling, the court undertook to distinguish its own holding in United States v. Orta, 253 F. 2d 312 (1958), in which Judge Rives, speaking for the court, stated:
“[A grand jury witness] might answer truthfully and thereafter assert the constitutional guaranty. Under no circumstances, however, could he commit perjury and successfully claim that the Constitution afforded him protection from prosecution for that crime. As said in Glickstein v. United States, [222 U. S. 139, 142 (1911),] '. . . the immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.’ ” Id., at 314. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
In the Orta opinion, Judge Rives went on to observe:
“The only debatable question is one of the supervision of the conduct of Government representatives in the interest of fairness. In United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 1955, 225 F. 2d 113, 116, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held:
“ . . the mere possibility that the witness may later be indicted furnishes no basis for requiring that he be advised of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, when summoned to give testimony before a Grand Jury.’
“That holding is applicable to the present record. There is no showing that the Grand Jury before which Orta testified was seeking to indict him or any other person already identified.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the “totality of the circumstances” commanded suppression of all the testimony on which the charge of perjury rested.
We agree with the views expressed by Judge Rives in Orta, supra, and disagree with the Court of Appeals in the instant case; accordingly, we reverse.
(2)
The grand jury is an integral part of our constitutional heritage which was brought to this country with the common law. The Framers, most of them trained in the English law and traditions, accepted the grand jury as a basic guarantee of individual liberty; notwithstanding periodic criticism, much of which is superficial, overlooking relevant history, the grand jury continues to function as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges. “Its adoption in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice.” Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Its historic office has been to provide a shield against arbitrary or oppressive action, by insuring that serious criminal accusations will be brought only upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens acting under oath and under judicial instruction and guidance.
Earlier we noted that the law vests the grand jury with substantial powers, because “[t]he grand jury’s investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 344 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 700 (1972). Indispensable to the exercise of its power is the authority to compel the attendance and the testimony of witnesses, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443 (1972), and to require the production of evidence, United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944).
When called by the grand jury, witnesses are thus legally bound to give testimony. Calandra, supra, at 343. This principle has long been recognized. In United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (CC Va. 1807), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall drew on English precedents, aptly described by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in the 18th century, and long accepted in America as a hornbook proposition: “The public has a right to every man's evidence.” This Court has repeatedly invoked this fundamental proposition when dealing with the powers of the grand jury. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 688; Kastigar v. United States, supra, at 443; United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The grand jury’s authority to compel testimony is not, of course, without limits. The same Amendment that establishes the grand jury also guarantees that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” The duty to give evidence to a grand jury is therefore conditional; every person owes society his testimony, unless some recognized privilege is asserted.
Tinder settled principles, the Fifth Amendment does not confer an absolute right to decline to respond in a grand jury inquiry; the privilege does not negate the duty to testify but simply conditions that duty. The privilege cannot, for example, be asserted by a witness to protect others from possible criminal prosecution. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951); United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906). Nor can it be invoked simply to protect the witness' interest in privacy. “Ordinarily, of course, a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury.” Calandra, supra, at 353.
The very availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege to grand jury witnesses, recognized by this Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), suggests that occasions will often arise when potentially incriminating questions will be asked in the ordinary course of the jury’s investigation. Probing questions to all types of witnesses is the stuff that grand jury investigations are made of; the grand jury’s mission is, after all, to determine whether to make a presentment or return an indictment. “The basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings against persons believed to have committed crimes.” Costello v. United States, supra, at 362.
It is in keeping with the grand jury’s historic function as a shield against arbitrary accusations to call before it persons suspected of criminal activity, so that the investigation can be complete. This is true whether the grand jury embarks upon an inquiry focused upon individuals suspected of wrongdoing, or is directed at persons suspected of no misconduct but who may be able to provide links in a chain of evidence relating to criminal conduct of others, or is centered upon broader problems of concern to society. It is entirely appropriate — indeed imperative — to summon individuals who may be able to illuminate the shadowy precincts of corruption and crime. Since the subject matter of the inquiry is crime, and often organized, systematic crime — as is true with drug traffic — it is unrealistic to assume that all of the witnesses capable of providing useful information will be pristine pillars of the community untainted by criminality.
The Court has never ignored this reality of law enforcement. Speaking for the Court in Kastigar v. United States, Mr. Justice Powell said:
“[M]any offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.” 406 U. S., at 446.
Mr. Justice White made a similar observation in the context of a state investigation :
“[T]he very fact that a witness is called ... is likely to be based upon knowledge, or at least a suspicion based on some information, that the witness is implicated in illegal activities . . . .” Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 102 (1964) (concurring opinion).
Moreover, the Court has expressly recognized that “[t]he obligation to appear is no different for a person who may himself be the subject of the grand jury inquiry.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 10 n. 8 (1973).
There is nothing new about the Court’s recognition of this reality of grand jury inquiries. In one of the early cases dealing with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court observed: “[I]t is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the [unlawful conduct] that the facts can be ascertained.” Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 610 (1896).
Accordingly, the witness, though possibly engaged in some criminal enterprise, can be required to answer before a grand jury, so long as there is no compulsion to answer questions that are self-incriminating; the witness can, of course, stand on the privilege, assured that its protection “is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.” Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., at 562. The witness must invoke the privilege, however, as the “Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative questions.” United States v. Monia, 317 U. S., at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
“The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled’ within the meaning of the Amendment.” Id., at 427.
Absent a claim of the privilege, the duty to give testimony remains absolute.
The stage is therefore set when the question is asked. If the witness interposes his privilege, the grand jury has two choices. If the desired testimony is of marginal value, the grand jury can pursue other avenues of inquiry; if the testimony is thought sufficiently important, the grand jury can seek a judicial determination as to the bona tides of the witness’ Fifth Amendment claim, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486-487 (1951), in which case the witness must satisfy the presiding judge that the claim of privilege is not a subterfuge. If in fact “ ‘there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer,’ ” Brown v. Walker, supra, at 599, the prosecutor must then determine whether the answer is of such overriding importance as to justify a grant of immunity to the witness.
If immunity is sought by the prosecutor and granted by the presiding judge, the witness can then be compelled to answer, on pain of contempt, even though the testimony would implicate the witness in criminal activity. The reason for this is not hard to divine; Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated as much in observing that immunity is the quid pro quo for securing an answer from the witness: “Immunity displaces the danger.” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 439 (1956); see also Piemonte v. United States, 367 U. S. 556, 560 (1961). Based on this recognition, federal statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations, are so familiar that they have become part of our “ ‘constitutional fabric.’ ” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 81-82 (1973); Ullmann v. United States, supra, at 438. Immunity is the Government’s ultimate tool for securing testimony that otherwise would be protected; unless immunity is conferred, however, testimony may be suppressed, along with its fruits, if it is compelled over an appropriate claim of privilege. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). On the other hand, when granted immunity, a witness once again owes the obligation imposed upon all citizens — the duty to give testimony — since immunity substitutes for the privilege.
In this constitutional process of securing a witness’ testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are therefore imperative. The power of subpoena, broad as it is, and the power of contempt for refusing to answer, drastic as that is — and even the solemnity of the oath — cannot insure truthful answers. Hence, Congress has made the giving of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe penalties; in no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open where the law can deal with it.
Similarly, our cases have consistently — indeed without exception — allowed sanctions for false statements or perjury; they have done so even in instances where the perjurer complained that the Government exceeded its constitutional powers in making the inquiry. See, e. g., United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937).
In Bryson, a union officer was required by federal labor law to file an affidavit averring that he was not a Communist. The affidavit was false in material statements. In a collateral attack on his conviction, Bryson argued that since the statute required him either to incriminate himself or lie, he could not lawfully be imprisoned for failure to comply. This Court rejected the contention:
“[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked. Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions — lying is not one of them.” 396 U. S., at 72. (Footnote omitted.)
Even where a statutory scheme granted blanket immunity from further use of testimony, the Court has found perjured statements to fall outside the grant. In Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911), a bankrupt was indicted for perjury committed in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Act expressly conferred broad immunity on a bankrupt: “[N]o testimony given by him shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding.” Id., at 140-141. The Court rejected the bankrupt’s literalistic interpretation of the statute as conferring immunity from prosecution for perjury:
“[T]he sanction of an oath and the imposition of a punishment for false swearing are inherently a part of the power to compel the giving of testimony, they are included in that grant of authority and are not prohibited by the immunity as to self-incrimination. ... [I]t cannot be conceived that there is power to compel the giving of testimony where no right exists to require that the testimony shall be given under such circumstances and safeguards as to compel it to be truthful. . . . [T]he immunity afforded by the constitutional guarantee relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.” Id., at 141-142.
(3)
In this case, the Court of Appeals required the suppression of perjured testimony given by respondent, as a witness under oath, lawfully summoned before an investigative grand jury and questioned about matters directly related to the grand jury's inquiry. The court reached this result because the prosecutor failed to give Miranda warnings at the outset of Mandujano’s interrogation. Those warnings were required, in the Court of Appeals’ view, because Mandujano was a “virtual” or “putative” defendant — that is, the prosecutor had specific information concerning Mandujano’s participation in an attempted sale of heroin and the focus of the grand jury interrogation, as evidenced by the prosecutor’s questions, centered on Mandujano’s involvement in narcotics traffic. The fundamental error of the prosecutor, in the court’s view, was to treat respondent in such a way as to “ 'smack’ of entrapment”; as a consequence, the court concluded that “elemental fairness” required the perjured testimony to be suppressed. 496 F. 2d, at 1058, and n. 8.
The court’s analysis, premised upon the prosecutor’s failure to give Miranda warnings, erroneously applied the standards fashioned by this Court in Miranda. Those warnings were aimed at the evils seen by the Court as endemic to police interrogation of a person in custody. Miranda addressed extrajudicial confessions or admissions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment which lacked procedural safeguards. The decision expressly rested on the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; the prescribed warnings sought to negate the “compulsion” thought to be inherent in police station interrogation. But the Miranda Court simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogation as equivalents: “[T]he compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.” 384 U. S., at 461.
The Court thus recognized that many official investigations, such as grand jury questioning, take place in a setting wholly different from custodial police interrogation. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Miranda reveals a focus on what was seen by the Court as police “coercion” derived from “factual studies [relating to] police violence and the ‘third degree’ . . . physical brutality — beating, hanging, whipping — and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions. . . .” Id., at 445-446. To extend these concepts to questioning before a grand jury inquiring into criminal activity under the guidance of a judge is an extravagant expansion never remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda; the dynamics of constitutional interpretation do not compel constant extension of every doctrine announced by the Court.
The marked contrasts between a grand jury investigation and custodial interrogation have been commented on by the Court from time to time. Mr. Justice Marshall observed that the broad coercive powers of a grand jury are justified, because “in contrast to the police — it is not likely that [the grand jury] will abuse those powers.” United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 46 (1973) (dissenting opinion). See also In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
(4)
The warnings volunteered by the prosecutor to respondent in this case were more than sufficient to inform him of his rights — and his responsibilities — and particularly of the consequences of perjury. To extend the concepts of Miranda, as contemplated by the Court of Appeals, would require that the witness be told that there was an absolute right to silence, and obviously any such warning would be incorrect, for there is no such right before a grand jury. Under Miranda, a person in police custody has, of course, an absolute right to decline to answer any question, incriminating or innocuous, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975), whereas a grand jury witness, on the contrary, has an absolute duty to answer all questions, subject only to a valid Fifth Amendment claim. And even when the grand jury witness asserts the privilege, questioning need not cease, except as to the particular subject to which the privilege has been addressed. Cf. id., at 103-104. Other lines of inquiry may properly be pursued.
Respondent was also informed that if he desired he could have the assistance of counsel, but that counsel could not be inside the grand jury room. That statement was plainly a correct recital of the law. No criminal proceedings had been instituted against respondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not come into play. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972). A witness “before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his counsel . . . .” In re Groban, supra, at 333. Under settled principles the witness may not insist upon the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (d).
Respondent, by way of further explanation, was also warned that he could be prosecuted for perjury if he testified falsely. Since respondent was already under oath to testify truthfully, this explanation was redundant; it served simply to emphasize the obligation already imposed by the oath.
“Once a witness swears to give truthful answers, there is no requirement to ‘warn him not to commit perjury or, conversely to direct him to tell the truth.’ It would render the sanctity of the oath quite meaningless to require admonition to adhere to it.” United States v. Winter, 348 F. 2d 204, 210 (CA2 1965). (Emphasis added.)
See also United States v. Nickels, 502 F. 2d 1173, 1176 (CA7 1974).
Similarly, a witness subpoenaed to testify before a petit jury and placed under oath has never been entitled to a warning that, if he violates the solemn oath to “tell the truth,” he may be subject to a prosecution for perjury, for the oath itself is the warning. Nor has any case been cited to us holding that the absence of such warnings before a petit jury provides a shield against use of false testimony in a subsequent prosecution for perjury or in contempt proceedings.
In any event, a witness sworn to tell the truth before a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call for suppression of false statements made to that jury, any more than would be the case with false testimony before a petit jury or other duly constituted tribunal. In another context, this Court has refused to permit a witness to protect perjured testimony by proving a Miranda violation. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the Court held that notwithstanding a Miranda violation:
“[The Fifth Amendment] privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.” Id., at 225.
More recently, the Court reaffirmed this salutary principle:
“[T]he shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 722 (1975).
See also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954); United States v. DiGiovanni, 397 F. 2d 409, 412 (CA7 1968); Cargill v. United States, 381 F. 2d 849 (CA10 1967); United States v. DiMichele, 375 F. 2d 959, 960 (CA3 1967).
The fact that here the grand jury interrogation had focused on some of respondent's specific activities does not require that these important principles be jettisoned; nothing remotely akin to “entrapment” or abuse of process is suggested by what occurred here. Cf. Brown v. United States, 245 F. 2d 549 (CA8 1957). Assuming, arguendo, that respondent was indeed a “putative defendant,” that fact would have no bearing on the validity of a conviction for testifying falsely.
The grand jury was appropriately concerned about the sources of narcotics in the San Antonio area. The attempted heroin sale by respondent provided ample reason to believe that he had knowledge about local heroin suppliers. It was, therefore, entirely proper to question him with respect to his knowledge of narcotics trafficking. Respondent was free at every stage to interpose his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but perjury was not a permissible option. As the Tenth Circuit has held, the law provides “other methods for challenging the government’s right to ask questions.” United States v. Pommerening, 500 F. 2d 92, 100 (1974).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Count 2 of the indictment charged that the following declarations were materially false:
“Q. Have you talked to anyone about selling heroin to them during the last year?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. And you have never told anyone that you would try to get heroin to sell to them?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. No one has ever given you any money—
“A. No.
“Q. —to go buy them heroin?
“A. No, sir.”
Respondent was subsequently tried and convicted under Count 1 of the indictment for attempting to distribute heroin. The grand jury testimony was not utilized by the prosecution at that trial.
Congress’ view was expressed in the legislative history of the statute relating to false declarations before a grand jury or court, 18 U. S. C. § 1623:
“A subpena can compel the attendance of a witness before a grand jury or at trial. . . . But only the possibility of some sanction such as a perjury prosecution can provide any guarantee that his testimony will be truthful.” S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 57 (1969).
“At the outset, if a person in [police] custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. . . .
“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. . . .
“[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation ....
“[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer ■will be appointed to represent him.” 384 U. S., at 467-473.
Id., at 444 n. 4.
The right to counsel mandated by Miranda was fashioned to secure the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege in a setting thought inherently coercive. The Sixth Amendment was not implicated.
The fact that warnings were provided in this case to advise respondent of his Fifth Amendment privilege makes it unnecessary to consider whether any warning is required, as the Government asks us to determine. In addition to the warning implicit in the oath, federal prosecutors apparently make it a practice to inform a witness of the privilege before questioning begins.
Masinia v. United States, 296 F. 2d 871, 877 (CA8 1961). Cases voiding convictions for perjury involved situations where the investigatory body was acting outside its lawful authority. Brown v. United States, 245 F. 2d 549 (CA8 1957); United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929 (Colo. 1963); United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (DC 1959); United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (DC 1956). For example, in Brown v. United States, supra, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal grand jury in Nebraska had undertaken a "roving commission,” investigating matters outside its lawful power. The District Court in that case had concluded that the grand jury’s activities had come “ ‘perilously close to being a fraud on the jurisdiction of this Court.’ ” Quoted in 245 F. 2d, at 553. No such circumstances are presented by this case. We therefore have no occasion to address the correctness of the results reached by the courts in these inapposite instances.
This is not to suggest that the questioning would have been improper if the principal aim of the grand jury's investigation had centered upon respondent’s activities, rather than a general investigation into local narcotics traffic. As previously indicated, no impropriety results from summoning the target of its inquiry, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 10 n. 8 (1973); it is appropriate, in fact, to give that individual an opportunity to explain potentially damaging information before the grand jury decides whether to return an indictment.