Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for decision is whether the statutory ban on depositing “any refuse matter of any kind or description” in a navigable water covers the discharge of commercially valuable aviation gasoline.
Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act provides:
“It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States . . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 407 (1964 ed.).
The indictment charged appellee, Standard Oil (Kentucky), with violating § 13 by allowing to be discharged into the St. Johns River “refuse matter” consisting of 100-octane aviation gasoline. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment, and, for the purposes of the motion, the parties entered into a stipulation of fact. It states that the gasoline was commercially valuable and that it was discharged into the St. Johns only because a shut-off valve at dockside had been “accidentally” left open.
The District Court dismissed the indictment because it was of the view that the statutory phrase “refuse matter” does not include commercially valuable oil. The United States appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act (18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed.)). We noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U. S. 807.
This case comes to us at a time in the Nation’s history when there is greater concern than ever over pollution— one of the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis that we face in this respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretching statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange conditions. But whatever may be said of the rule of strict construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent, and legislative history. We cannot construe § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act in a vacuum. Nor can we read it as Baron Parke would read a pleading.
The statutory words are “any refuse matter of any kind or description.” We said in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482, 491, that the history of this provision and of related legislation dealing with our free-flowing rivers “forbids a narrow, cramped reading” of § 13. The District Court recognized that if this were waste oil it would be “refuse matter” within the meaning of § 13 but concluded that it was not within the statute because it was “valuable” oil. That is “a narrow, cramped reading” of § 13 in partial defeat of its purpose.
Oil is oil and whether useable or not by industrial standards it has the same deleterious effect on waterways. In either case, its presence in our rivers and harbors is both a menace to navigation and a pollutant. This seems to be the administrative construction of § 13, the Solicitor General advising us that it is the basis of prosecution in approximately one-third of the oil pollution cases reported to the Department of Justice by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.
Section 13 codified pre-existing statutes:
An 1886 Act (24 Stat. 329) made it unlawful to empty “any ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, slack, rubbish, wreck, filth, slabs, edgings, sawdust, slag, or cinders, or other refuse or mill-waste of any kind into New York Harbor” — which plainly includes valuable pre-discharge material.
An 1888 Act (25 Stat. 209) “to prevent obstructive and injurious deposits” within the Harbor of New York and adjacent waters banned the discharge of “refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other matter of any kind, other than that flowing from streets, sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state” — which also plainly includes valuable pre-discharge material. (Emphasis added.)
The 1890 Act (26 Stat. 453) made unlawful emptying into navigable waters “any ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, rubbish, wreck, filth, slabs, edgings, sawdust, slag, cinders, ashes, refuse, or other waste of any kind . . . which shall tend to impede or obstruct navigation.” Here also valuable pre-discharge materials were included.
The 1894 Act (28 Stat. 363) prohibited deposits in harbors and rivers for which Congress had appropriated money for improvements, of “ballast, refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other matter of any kind other than that flowing from streets, sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state.” (Emphasis added.) This Act also included valuable pre-discharge material.
The Acts of 1886 and 1888, then, dealt specifically with the New York Harbor; the scope of the latter was considerably broader, covering as it did the deposit of “any other matter of any kind.” The Acts of 1890 and 1894 paralleled the earlier enactments pertaining to New York, applying their terms to waterways throughout the Nation. •
The 1899 Act now before us was no more than an attempt to consolidate these prior Acts into one. It was indeed stated by the sponsor in the Senate to be “in accord with the statutes now in existence, only scattered . . . from the beginning of the statutes down through to the end” (32 Cong. Rec. 2296), and reflecting merely “[v]ery slight changes to remove ambiguities.” Id., p. 2297.
From an examination of these statutes, several points are clear. First, the 1894 Act and its antecedent, the 1888 Act applicable to the New York Harbor, drew on their face no distinction between valuable and valueless substances. Second, of the enumerated substances, some may well have had commercial or industrial value prior to discharge into the covered waterways. To be more specific, ashes and acids were banned whether or not they had any remaining commercial or industrial value. Third, these Acts applied not only to the enumerated substances but also to the discharge of “any other matter of any kind.” Since the enumerated substances included those with a pre-discharge value, the rule of ejusdem generis does not require limiting this latter category to substances lacking a pre-discharge value. Fourth, the coverage of these Acts was not diminished by the codification of 1899. The use of the term “refuse” in the codification serves in the place of the lengthy list of enumerated substances found in the earlier Acts and the catch-all provision found in the Act of 1890. The legislative history demonstrates without contradiction that Congress intended to codify without substantive change the earlier Acts.
The philosophy of those antecedent laws seems to us to be clearly embodied in the present law. It is plain from its legislative history that the “serious injury”' to our watercourses (S. Rep. No. 224, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2) sought to be remedied was caused in part by obstacles that impeded navigation and in part by pollution — “the discharge of sawmill waste into streams” (ibid.) and the injury of channels by “deposits of ballast, steam-boat ashes, oysters, and rubbish from passing vessels.” Ibid. The list is obviously not an exhaustive list of pollutants. The words of the Act are broad and inclusive: “any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever.” Only one exception is stated: “other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States.” More comprehensive language would be difficult to select. The word “refuse” does not stand alone; the “refuse” banned is “of any kind or description whatever,” apart from the one exception noted. And, for the reasons already stated, the meaning we must give the term “refuse” must reflect the present codification’s statutory antecedents.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F. 2d 369 (L. Hand, Augustus Hand, and Harrie Chase, JJ.) held that causing good oil to spill into a watercourse violated § 13. The word “refuse” in that setting, said the court, “is satisfied by anything which has become waste, however useful it may earlier have been.” Id., p. 371. There is nothing more deserving of the label “refuse” than oil spilled into a river.
That seems to us to be the common sense of the matter. The word “refuse” includes all foreign substances and pollutants apart from those “flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state” into the watercourse.
That reading of § 13 is in keeping with the teaching of Mr. Justice Holmes that a “river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.” New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342. It reads § 13 charitably as United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra, admonished.
We pass only on the quality of the pollutant, not on the quantity of proof necessary to support a conviction nor on the question as to what scienter requirement the Act imposes, as those questions are not before us in this restricted appeal.
Reversed.
30 Stat. 1152, 33 U. S. C. §407 (1964 ed.).
A man whose “fault was an almost superstitious reverence for the dark technicalities of special pleading.” XV Dictionary of National Biography, p. 226 (Stephen and Lee ed. 1937-1938).
The District Court followed the decision of the United States District Court in United States v. The Delvalle, 45 F. Supp. 746, 748, where it was said: “The accidental discharge of valuable, usable oil . . . does not constitute ... a violation of the statute.” (Emphasis added.)
The codification did not include the Acts of 1886 and 1888 which pertained only to New York. These remain in effect and are found at 33 U. S. C. §§441-451 (1964 ed.). The New York Harbor statute has been held to apply not only to waste oil which was unintentionally discharged (The Albania, 30 F.2d 727) but also to valuable oil negligently discharged. The Colombo, 42 F. 2d 211.
The decisions in the instant case below and in United States v. The Delvalle, supra, n. 3, are against the stream of authority. An unreported decision of a United States District Court in 1922 (United States v. Crouch), holding § 13 inapplicable to polluting but nonobstructing deposits, caused the Oil Pollution Act, 1924, 43 Stat. 604, 33 U. S. C. §431 et seq. (1964 ed.), to be passed. See S. Rep. No. 66, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 794, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. It is applicable to the discharge of oil by vessels into coastal waters but not to deposits into inland navigable waters; and it explicitly provides that it does not repeal or modify or in any manner affect other existing laws. 33 U. S. C. §437 (1964 ed.).
“Having dealt with the construction placed by the court below upon the Sherman Act, our jurisdiction on this appeal is exhausted. We are not at liberty to consider other objections to the indictment or questions which may arise upon the trial with respect to the merits of the charge. For it is well settled that where the District Court has based its decision on a particular construction of the underlying statute, the review here under the Criminal Appeals Act is confined to the question of the propriety of that construction.” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 206-207.