Per Curiam.
This action was brought in the District Court by six named plaintiffs seeking to have declared unconstitutional certain regulations and rules promulgated by the petitioner Board and to have the enforcement of those regulations and rules enjoined, as well as seeking other relief no longer relevant to this case. In the complaint, the named plaintiffs stated that the action was brought as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (a) and (b)(2), and further stated that “[pjlaintiff class members are all high school students attending schools managed, controlled, and maintained by the Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis.” At the time this action was brought, plaintiffs were or had been involved in the publication and distribution of a student newspaper, and they alleged that certain actions taken by petitioner Board or its subordinates, as well as certain of its rules and regulations, interfered or threatened to interfere with the publication and distribution of the newspaper in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs (respondents here) prevailed on the merits of their action in the District Court, 349 F. Supp. 605 (SD Ind. 1972), and the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting in part, affirmed, 490 F. 2d 601 (CA7 1973). Petitioners brought the case to this Court, and we granted certiorari, 417 U. S. 929 (1974). At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for petitioners that all of the named plaintiffs in the action had graduated from the Indianapolis school system; in these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or controversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs and the petitioners with respect to the validity of the rules at issue. The case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, a controversy still exists between petitioners and the present members of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). Because in our view there was inadequate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 (c), we have concluded that the case has become moot.
The only formal entry made by the District Court below purporting to certify this case as a class action is contained in that court’s “Entry on Motion for Permanent Injunction,” wherein the court “conclude [d] and ordered” that “the remaining named plaintiffs are qualified as proper representatives of the class whose interest they seek to protect.” 349 F. Supp., at 611. No other effort was made to identify the class or to certify the class action as contemplated by Rule 23 (c)(1); nor does the quoted language comply with the requirement of Rule 23 (c)(3) that “[t]he judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision ... (b)(2) . . . shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.” The need for definition of the class purported to be represented by the named plaintiffs is especially important in cases like this one where the litigation is likefy to become moot as to the initially named plaintiffs prior to the exhaustion of appellate review. Because the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to order the District Court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the complaint.
So ordered.
The named plaintiffs sought expunction from their respective records of certain information and compensatory and punitive damages against petitioners. These prayers for relief were denied by the District Court for failure of proof and no appeal was taken from this decision.