Per Curiam.
Acting under the provisions of § 487 of the Revised Statutes (35 U. S. C. § 11), the Commissioner of Patents found after hearings that petitioner, an attorney, had been guilty of gross misconduct, and entered an order barring him from practice before the United States Patent Office. Pursuant to authority granted by the same provisions, the District Court reviewed the Commissioner’s order. Concluding that the hearings had been fairly conducted after due notice of charges and that there was substantial evidence to support the findings and action of the Commissioner, the District Court affirmed the order. 69 F. Supp. 788. The Court of Appeals reversed, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 264, 173 F. 2d 405. A majority of that court thought the notice of charges inadequate and the proceedings before the Commission unfair. It also held that the District Court had too narrowly restricted its scope of review in holding that substantial evidence was sufficient to support the findings. It apparently drew a distinction between the phrases “substantial evidence” and “substantial probative evidence.” Measuring the findings by the latter phrase, it held that the Commissioner’s findings were not supported by “substantial probative evidence.” Judge Edgerton, dissenting, thought the hearings had been fairly conducted and “the result just.” He agreed with the District Court that “substantial evidence” would have been sufficient but went on to say that he thought the “proof conclusive.”
The statute under which the Commissioner acted represents congressional policy in an important field. It relates to the character and conduct of “persons, agents, or attorneys” who participate in proceedings to obtain patents. We agree with the following statement made by the Patent Office Committee on Enrollment and Disbarment that considered this case: “By reason of the nature of an application for patent, the relationship of attorneys to the Patent Office requires the highest degree of candor and good faith. In its relation to applicants, the Office . . . must rely upon their integrity and deal with them in a spirit of trust and confidence . . . .” It was the Commissioner, not the courts, that Congress made primarily responsible for protecting the public from the evil consequences that might result if practitioners should betray their high trust. Having serious doubts as to whether the Court of Appeals acted properly here in nullifying the Commissioner’s order, we granted certiorari.
After an examination of the record we are satisfied that the findings were amply . supported whether the measure be “substantial evidence” or “substantial probative evidence.” The charge of unfairness in the hearings is, we think, wholly without support.
Since the narration of evidence and discussion of the proceedings sufficiently appear in the District Court’s opinion, reiteration here can serve no good purpose either for the parties or for the law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.