Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner David Rawlings was convicted by the Commonwealth of Kentucky on charges of trafficking in, and possession of, various controlled substances. Throughout the proceedings below, Rawlings challenged the admissibility of certain evidence and statements on the ground that they were the fruits of an illegal detention and illegal searches. The trial court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky all rejected Rawlings’ challenges. We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 989, and now affirm.
I
In the middle of the afternoon on October 18, 1976, six police officers armed with a warrant for the arrest of one Lawrence Marquess on charges of drug distribution arrived at Marquess’ house in Bowling Green, Ky. In the house at the time the police arrived were one of Marquess’ housemates, Dennis Saddler, and four visitors, Keith Northern, Linda Braden, Vanessa Cox, and petitioner David Rawlings. While searching unsuccessfully in the house for Marquess, several police officers smelled marihuana smoke and saw marihuana seeds on the mantel in one of the bedrooms. After conferring briefly, Officers Eddie Railey and John Bruce left to obtain a search warrant. While Railey and Bruce were gone, the other four officers detained the occupants of the house in the living room, allowing them to leave only if they consented to a body search. Northern and Braden did consent to such a search and were permitted to depart. Saddler, Cox, and petitioner remained seated in the living room.
Approximately 45 minutes later, Railey and Bruce returned with a warrant authorizing them to search the house. Railey read the warrant to Saddler, Cox, and petitioner, and also read “Miranda” warnings from a card he carried in his pocket. At that time, Cox was seated on a couch with petitioner seated to her left. In the space between them was Cox’s handbag.
After Railey finished his recitation, he approached petitioner and told him to stand. Officer Don Bivens simultaneously approached Cox and ordered her to empty the contents of her purse onto a coffee table in front of the couch. Among those contents were a jar containing 1,800 tablets of LSD and a number of smaller vials containing benzphetamine, methamphetamine, methyprylan, and pentobarbital, all of which are controlled substances under Kentucky law.
Upon pouring these objects out onto the coffee table, Cox turned to petitioner and told him “to take what was his.” App. 62. Petitioner, who was standing in response to Officer Railey’s command, immediately claimed ownership of the controlled substances. At that time, Railey searched petitioner’s person and found $4,500 in cash in petitioner’s shirt pocket and a knife in a sheath at petitioner’s side. Railey then placed petitioner under formal arrest.
Petitioner was indicted for possession with intent to sell the various controlled substances recovered from Cox’s purse. At the suppression hearing, he testified that he had flown into Bowling Green about a week before his arrest to look for a job and perhaps to attend the local university. He brought with him at that time the drugs later found in Cox’s purse. Initially, petitioner stayed in the house where the arrest took place as the guest of Michael Swank, who shared the house with Marquess and Saddler. While at a party at that house, he met Cox and spent at least two nights of the next week on a couch at Cox’s house.
On the morning of petitioner’s arrest, Cox had dropped him off at Swank’s house where he waited for her to return from class. At that time, he was carrying the drugs in a green bank bag. When Cox returned to the house to meet him, petitioner dumped the contents of the bank bag into Cox’s purse. Although there is dispute over the discussion that took place, petitioner testified that he “asked her if she would carry this for me, and she said, ‘yes’. . . .” App. 42. Petitioner then left the room to use the bathroom and, by the time he returned, discovered that the police had arrived to arrest Marquess.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to suppress the drugs and the money and to exclude the statements made by petitioner when the police discovered the drugs. According to the trial court, the warrant obtained by the police authorized them to search Cox’s purse. Moreover, even if the search of the purse was illegal, the trial court believed that petitioner lacked “standing” to contest that search. Finally, the trial court believed that the search that revealed the money and the knife was permissible “under the exigencies of the situation.” Id., at 21. After a bench trial, petitioner was found guilty of possession with intent to sell LSD and of possession of benzphetamine, methamphetamine, methyprylan, and pentobarbital.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Disagreeing with the trial court, the appellate court held that petitioner did have “standing” to dispute the legality of the search of Cox’s purse but that the detention of the five persons present in the house and the subsequent searches were legitimate because the police had probable cause to arrest all five people in the house when they smelled the marihuana smoke and saw the marihuana seeds.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in turn affirmed, but again on a somewhat different rationale. See 581 S. W. 2d 348 (1979). According to the Supreme Court, petitioner had no “standing” because he had no “legitimate or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion” into Cox’s purse. Id., at 350, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978). Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the search uncovering the money in petitioner’s pocket, which search followed petitioner’s admission that he owned the drugs in Cox’s purse, was justifiable as incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause.
II
In this Court, petitioner challenges three aspects of the judgment below. First, he claims that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse so as to allow him to challenge the legality of the search of that purse. Second, petitioner argues that his admission of ownership was the fruit of an illegal detention that began when the police refused to let the occupants of the house leave unless they consented to a search. Third, petitioner contends that the search uncovering the money and the knife was itself illegal.
A
In holding that petitioner could not challenge the legality of the search of Cox’s purse, the Supreme Court of Kentucky looked primarily to our then recent decision in Rakas v. Illinois, supra, where we abandoned a separate inquiry into a defendant’s “standing” to contest an allegedly illegal search in favor of an inquiry that focused directly on the substance of the defendant’s claim that he or she possessed a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the area searched. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). In the present case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky looked to the “totality of the circumstances,” including petitioner’s own admission at the suppression hearing that he did not believe that Cox’s purse would be free from governmental intrusion, and held that petitioner “[had] not made a sufficient showing that his legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy were violated” by the search of the purse. 581 S. W. 2d, at 350.
We believe that the record in this case supports that conclusion. Petitioner, of course, bears the burden of proving not only that the search of Cox’s purse was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that purse. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 131, n. 1; Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389-390 (1968). At the time petitioner dumped thousands of dollars worth of illegal drugs into Cox's purse, he had known her for only a few days. According to Cox’s un contested testimony, petitioner had never sought or received access to her purse prior to that sudden bailment. Contrast Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 259 (1960). Nor did petitioner have any right to exclude other persons from access to Cox’s purse. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 149. In fact, Cox testified that Bob StaJlons, a longtime acquaintance and frequent companion of Cox’s, had free access to her purse and on the very morning of the arrest had rummaged through its contents in search of a hairbrush. Moreover, even assuming that petitioner’s version of the bailment is correct and that Cox did consent to the transfer of possession, the precipitous nature of the transaction hardly supports a reasonable inference that petitioner took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. Contrast United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 11 (1977); Katz v. United States, supra, at 352. In addition to all the foregoing facts, the record also contains a frank admission by petitioner that he had no subjective expectation that Cox’s purse would remain free from governmental intrusion, an admission credited by both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Kentucky. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text.
Petitioner contends nevertheless that, because he claimed ownership of the drugs in Cox’s purse, he should be entitled to challenge the search regardless of his expectation of privacy. We disagree. While petitioner’s ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that “arcane” concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See 439 U. S., at 149-150, n. 17. See also United States v. Salvucci, ante, at 91-92. Had petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy. Prior to Rakas, petitioner might have been given “standing” in such a case to challenge a “search” that netted those drugs but probably would have lost his claim on the merits. After Rakas, the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of priyacy held by petitioner.
In sum, we find no reason to overturn the lower court’s conclusion that petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse at the time of the search.
B
We turn, then, to petitioner’s contention that the occupants of the house were illegally detained by the police and that his admission to ownership of the drugs was a fruit of that illegal detention. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the courts below confronted this issue squarely, even though it would seem to be presented under any analysis of this case except that adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which concluded that the police officers were entitled to arrest the five occupants of the house as soon as they smelled marihuana smoke and saw the marihuana seeds.
We can assume both that this issue was properly presented in the Kentucky courts and that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by detaining petitioner and his companions in the house while they obtained a search warrant for the premises. Even given such a constitutional violation, however, exclusion of petitioner’s admissions would not be necessary unless his statements were the result of his illegal detention. As we noted in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 603 (1975), where we rejected a “but for” approach to the admissibility of such statements, “persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality.” In Brown we also set forth the standard for determining whether such statements were tainted by antecedent illegality:
“The question whether a confession is the product of a free will . . . must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. . . . The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.” Id., at 603-604 (footnotes and citations omitted).
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 218 (1979). As already noted, the lower courts did not undertake the inquiry suggested by Brown. Nevertheless, as in Brown itself, we believe that “the trial resulted in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be made.” 422 U. S., at 604.
First, we observe that petitioner received Miranda warnings only moments before he made his incriminating statements, a consideration Brown treated as important, although not dis-positive, in determining whether the statements at issue were obtained by exploitation of an illegal detention.
Second, Brown calls our attention to the “temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession. . . .” Id., at 603. In this case, petitioner and his companions were detained for a period of approximately 45 minutes. Although under the strictest of custodial conditions such a short lapse of time might not suffice to purge the initial taint, we believe it necessary to examine the precise conditions under which the occupants of this house were detained. By all accounts, the three people who chose not to consent to a body search in order to leave sat quietly in the living room or, at least initially, moved freely about the first floor of the house. Upon being informed that he would be detained until Officers Railey and Bruce returned with a search warrant, Dennis Saddler “just went on in and got a cup of coffee and sat down and started waiting” for the officers to return. Tr. 109. When asked by petitioner’s counsel whether there was “any show of force or violence by you or Dave or anybody else,” Saddler explained:
“A Oh, no. One person tried to sick my four and a half month old dog on one of the officers, (laughing)
“Q48 You’re saying that in a joking manner?
“A Yeah. He just wagged his tail.
“Q49 And other than that, that’s the most violent thing you proposed toward these police officers; is that correct?
“A Yes sir. I would — they were more or less courteous to us and were trying to be — we offered them coffee or a drink of water or whatever they wanted.” Id., at 113.
According to Saddler, petitioner’s first reaction when the officers told him that he would be detained pending issuance of a search warrant was to “[get] up and put an album on. . . .” Id., at 110. As even the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals noted: “[A]ll witnesses for both sides of this litigation agreed to the congenial atmosphere existing during the forty-five minute interval. . . .” App. 73 (Lester, J., dissenting). We think that these circumstances outweigh the relatively short period of time that elapsed between the initiation of the detention and petitioner’s admissions.
Third, Brown suggests that we inquire whether any circumstances intervened between the initial detention and the challenged statements. Here, where petitioner’s admissions were apparently spontaneous reactions to the discovery of his drugs in Cox’s purse, we have little doubt that this factor weighs heavily in favor of a finding that petitioner acted “of free will unaffected by the initial illegality.” 422 U. S., at 603. Nor need we speculate as to petitioner’s motivations in admitting ownership of the drugs, since he explained them later to Lawrence Marquess and Dennis Saddler. Under examination by petitioner’s counsel, Marquess testified as follows:
“Q1 Mr. Marquess, when you were talking to David Rawlings in the jail, and he told you that the things were dumped out on the table and that he admitted they were his, did he tell you why he did that?
"A Well, he said Vanessa [Cox] was freaking out, you know, or something.
“Q2 Did he tell you that he did that to protect her or words to that effect?
"A Well, now, I mean he said he was going to take what was his, I mean, he wasn’t going to try to pin that on her.” Tr. 130.
Saddler offered additional insight into petitioner’s motivations:
“Q114 Did Dave Rawlings make any statements to you in jail about any of these substances?
“A Yes sir.
“Q115 And would you tell the Court what statements he made?
“A Well, his main concern was whether or not Vanessa Cox was going to say anything, and he just kept talking and harping on that, and I don’t know how many times he mentioned it, you know, ‘I hope she doesn’t break,’ or hope she doesn’t talk. And I saw her walking on the sidewalk through the windows and got a little upset about that because we all thought she turned State’s evidence.” Id., at 103.
Fourth, Brown mandates consideration of “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. . . .” 422 U. S., at 604. The officers who detained petitioner and his companions uniformly testified that they took those measures to avoid the asportation or destruction of the marihuana they thought was present in the house and that they believed that a warrant authorizing them to search the house would also authorize them to search the five occupants of the house. While the legality of temporarily detaining a person at the scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant may be an open question, and while the officer’s belief about the scope of the warrant they obtained may well have been erroneous under our recent decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979), the conduct of the police here does not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion of petitioner’s statements. Contrast Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 605.
Finally, while Brown requires that the voluntariness of the statement be established as a threshold requirement, petitioner has not argued here or in any other court that his admission to ownership of the drugs was anything other than voluntary. Thus, examining the totality of circumstances present in this case, we believe that the Commonwealth of Kentucky has carried its burden of showing that petitioner’s statements were acts of free will unaffected by any illegality in the initial detention.
C
Petitioner also contends that the search of his person that uncovered the money and the knife was illegal. Like the Supreme Court of Kentucky, we have no difficulty upholding this search as incident to petitioner’s formal arrest. Once petitioner admitted ownership of the sizable quantity of drugs found in Cox’s purse, the police clearly had probable cause to place petitioner under arrest. Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa. See Bailey v. United States, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 354, 357, 389 F. 2d 305, 308 (1967); United States v. Brown, 150 U. S. App. D. C. 113, 114, 463 F. 2d 949, 950 (1972). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973); United States v. Gorman, 355 F. 2d 151, 160 (CA2 1965) (dictum), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 1024 (1966).
III
Having found no error in the lower courts’ refusal to suppress the evidence challenged by petitioner, we believe that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky should be, and the same hereby is,
Affirmed.
At petitioner’s trial, Vanessa Cox described the transfer of possession quite differently. She testified that, as she and petitioner were getting ready to leave the house, petitioner asked “would you please carry this for me” and simultaneously dumped the drugs into her purse. According to Cox, she looked into her purse, saw the drugs, and said “would you please take this, I do not want this in my purse.” Petitioner allegedly replied “okay, just a minute, I will,” and then went out of the room. At that point the police entered the house. Tr. 12-14. David Saddler, who was in the next room at the time of the transfer, corroborated Cox’s version of the events, testifying that he heard Cox say “I do not want this in my purse” and that he heard petitioner reply “don’t worry” or something to that effect. Id., at 100.
none courts specifically found that Cox did not consent to the bailment, the trial court clearly was skeptical about petitioner’s version of events:
of his own volition, David Rawlings put the contraband in the purse of Mrs. Cox just a minute before the officers knocked on the door. He had been carrying these things around Bowling Green in a bank deposit sack for days, either on his person or in his pocket, and it is unworthy of belief that just immediately before the officers knocked on the door that he put them in the purse of Vanessa Cox. It is far more plausible to believe that he saw the officers pull up out front and then elected to ‘push them off’ on Vanessa Cox, believing that search was probable, possible, and emminent [sic].” App. 21.
Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to “automatic standing” to contest the legality of the search that uncovered the drugs. See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). Our decision today in United States v. Salvucci, ante, p. 83, disposes of this contention adversely to him.
Under questioning by his own counsel, petitioner testified as follows:
“Q72 Did you feel that Vannessa [sic] Cox’s purse would be free from the intrusion of the officers as you sat there? When you put the pills in her purse, did you feel that they would be free from governmental intrusion?
“A No sir.” App. 48.
The trial court also credited this statement, noting immediately:
know what, I believe this boy tells the truth. You all wanted to bring him in here before the Court, and he said, 'no, I want a jury.’ He said 'no, I don’t understand that.’ And I don’t blame him for not understanding that. That’s the first time I've ever seen such a thing brought on before this Court, and I’ve been here for quite a few years as an attorney, of course.
“Now, no question but what the boy fully understood what was meant-by that. None at all in the Court’s mind. If you want to go ahead, you can do so.” Ibid.
But see n. 1, supra.
“The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 209-210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968), depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, [422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975)]. Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
The fruits of the search of petitioner’s person were, of course, not necessary to support probable cause to arrest petitioner.