Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the time between dismissal of military charges and a subsequent indictment on civilian criminal charges should be considered in determining whether the delay in bringing respondent to trial for the murder of his wife and two children violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
HH
The facts in this case are not in issue; a jury heard and saw all the witnesses and saw the tangible evidence. The only point raised here by petitioner involves a legal issue under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, only a brief summary of the facts is called for. In the early morning of February 17, 1970, respondent’s pregnant wife and his two daughters, aged 2 and 5, were brutally murdered in their home on the Fort Bragg, N. C., military reservation. At the time, MacDonald, a physician, was a captain in the Army Medical Corps stationed at Fort Bragg. When the military police arrived at the scene following a call from MacDonald, they found the three victims dead and MacDonald unconscious from multiple stab wounds, most of them superficial, but one a life-threatening chest wound which caused a lung to collapse.
At the time and in subsequent interviews, MacDonald told of a bizarre and ritualistic murder. He stated that he was asleep on the couch when he was awakened by his wife’s screams. He said he saw a woman with blond hair wearing a floppy hat, white boots, and a short skirt carrying a lighted candle and chanting “acid is groovy; kill the pigs.” He claimed that three men standing near the couch attacked him, tearing his pajama top, stabbing him, and clubbing him into unconsciousness. When he awoke, he found his wife and two daughters dead. After trying to revive them and covering his wife’s body with his pajama top, MacDonald called the military police. He lost consciousness again before the police arrived.
Physical evidence at the scene contradicted MacDonald’s account and gave rise to the suspicion that MacDonald himself may have committed the crime. On April 6, 1970, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) advised MacDonald that he was a suspect in the case and confined him to quarters. The Army formally charged MacDonald with the three murders on May 1, 1970. In accordance with Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 832, the Commanding General of MacDonald’s unit appointed an officer to investigate the charges. After hearing a total of 56 witnesses, the investigating officer submitted a report recommending that the charges and specifications against MacDonald be dismissed. The Commanding General dismissed the military charges on October 23, 1970. On December 5, 1970, the Army granted MacDonald’s request for an honorable discharge based on hardship.
At the request of the Justice Department, however, the CID continued its investigation. In June 1972, the CID forwarded a 13-volume report to the Justice Department recommending further investigation. Additional reports were submitted during November 1972 and August 1973. Following evaluation of those reports, in August 1974, the Justice Department presented the matter to a grand jury. On January 24, 1975, the grand jury returned an indictment charging MacDonald with the three murders.
Prior to his trial in Federal District Court, MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment, in part on the grounds that the delay in bringing him to trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals allowed an interlocutory appeal and reversed, holding that the delay between the June 1972 submission of the CID report to the Justice Department and the August 1974 convening of the grand jury violated MacDonald’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. MacDonald v. United States, 531 F. 2d 196 (CA4 1976). We granted certiorari and reversed, holding that a criminal defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Clause grounds until after the trial had been completed. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850 (1978).
MacDonald was then tried and convicted on two counts of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment. On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit again held that the indictment violated MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the indictment. 632 F. 2d 258 (1980). The court denied rehearing en banc by an evenly divided vote. 635 F. 2d 1115 (1980).
We granted certiorari, 451 U. S. 1016 (1981), and we reverse.
II
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . .” A literal reading of the Amendment suggests that this right attaches only when a formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution begins.
In United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 313 (1971), we held that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused:
“On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time. The Amendment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him.”
In addition to the period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64 (1975). Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 788-789 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.
Similarly, the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges. Any undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.
The Court identified the interests served by the Speedy Trial Clause in United States v. Marion, supra, at 320:
“Inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a defendant’s ability to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.”
See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 532-533 (1972).
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.
Once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable. At that point, the formerly accused is, at most, in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation. Certainly the knowledge of an ongoing criminal investigation will cause stress, discomfort, and perhaps a certain disruption in normal life. This is true whether or not charges have been filed and then dismissed. This was true in Marion, where the defendants had been subjected to a lengthy investigation which received considerable press attention. But with no charges outstanding, personal liberty is certainly not impaired to the same degree as it is after arrest while charges are pending. After the charges against him have been dismissed, “a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is [no longer] the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer.” United States v. Marion, 404 U. S., at 321. Following dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation.
I — I I — I
The Court of Appeals held, in essence, that criminal charges were pending against MacDonald during the entire period between his military arrest and his later indictment on civilian charges. We disagree. In this case, the homicide charges initiated by the Army were terminated less than a year after the crimes were committed; after that, there was no criminal prosecution pending on which MacDonald could have been tried until the grand jury, in January 1975, returned the indictment on which he was tried and convicted. During the intervening period, MacDonald was not under arrest, not in custody, and not subject to any “criminal prosecution.” Inevitably, there were undesirable consequences flowing from the initial accusation by the Army and the continuing investigation after the Army charges were dismissed. Indeed, even had there been no charges lodged by the Army, the ongoing comprehensive investigation would have subjected MacDonald to stress and other adverse consequences. However, once the charges instituted by the Army were dismissed, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made. He was free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue with his life.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged, and MacDonald concedes, that the delay between the civilian indictment and trial was caused primarily by MacDonald’s own legal manue-vers and, in any event, was not sufficient to violate the Speedy Trial Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
A woman generally within this description was apparently seen by the military police as they rushed to answer respondent’s call. During the course of this case, considerable suspicion has been focused upon Helena Stoeckley. Stoeckley was 19 at the time and a heavy user of heroin, opium, mescaline, LSD, marihuana, and other drugs; within days after the crime she began telling people that she was involved in the murder or that she at least had accompanied the murderers and watched them commit the crimes. She also wore mourning dress and displayed a funeral wreath on the day of the victims’ funeral. The investigation confirmed that she had been seen returning to her apartment at 4:30 on the morning following the killings in the company of men also generally fitting the descriptions given by MacDonald. Stoeckley testified at trial that she had no memory of the night in question because she was “stoned” that night. She did, however, admit that at the time of the crime she owned and frequently wore a blond wig and a pair of white boots and that she destroyed them within a few days after the crime because they might connect her with the episode.
Threads from MacDonald’s pajama top, supposedly torn in the living room, were found in the master bedroom, some under his wife’s body, and in the children’s bedroom, but not in the living room. There were 48 puncture holes in the top, yet MacDonald had far fewer wounds. The police were able to identify the bloodstains of each victim, and their location did not support MacDonald’s story. Blood matching the type of MacDonald’s children was found on MacDonald’s glasses and pajama top. Fragments of surgical gloves were found near the bodies of the victims; the gloves from which those fragments came were found under a sink in the house.
MacDonald’s discharge barred any further military proceedings against him. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
The District Court had jurisdiction because the crimes were committed on military property. 18 U. S. C. §§7(3), 1111.
In addition to the Speedy Trial Clause issue, MacDonald raised a number of issues involving the conduct of the trial and rulings of the trial judge. He also claimed that the delay in bringing him to trial resulted in a denial of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Court of Appeals declined to reach those issues. Accordingly, we do not decide those issues, instead leaving them for the Court of Appeals on remand.
Our analysis of the speedy trial claim is not to be influenced by consideration of the evidentiary basis of the jury verdict. The jury that heard all of the witnesses and saw the evidence unanimously decided that respondent murdered his wife and children. .Respondent does not challenge the jury verdict itself.
Our holding agrees with the determination made by Congress in enacting the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq. The Act, intended “to give effect to the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. . . ,” S. Rep. No. 93-1021, p. 1 (1974), provides that if charges are initially dismissed and later reinstated, the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement is not to be included in computing the time within which a trial must commence. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3161(d), 3161(h)(6).
Most of the Courts of Appeals considering this issue have also reached the conclusion that the period after dismissal of initial charges is not included in determining whether the Speedy Trial Clause has been violated. See, e. g., United States v. Hillegas, 578 F. 2d 453, 457-458 (CA2 1978); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F. 2d 1377, 1383 (CA9 1978); United States v. Martin, 543 F. 2d 577 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1050 (1977); United States v. Bishton, 150 U. S. App. D. C. 51, 55, 463 F. 2d. 887, 891 (1972). The Fifth Circuit reached a seemingly contrary result in United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 970 (1977). However in that case the court relied on unusual facts; the Government dismissed charges pending in one district in order to prosecute the defendants on those same charges in another district.
In none of the cases cited in the dissenting opinion, post, at 17-18, n. 2, from the First, Seventh, or Tenth Circuits did the Court of Appeals consider or discuss the issue before us.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967), is not to the contrary. There, under an unusual state procedure, a prosecutor was able to suspend proceedings on an indictment indefinitely. The prosecutor could activate the charges at any time and have the case restored for trial, “without further order” of the court. Id., at 214. The charges against the defendant were thus never dismissed or discharged in any real sense so the speedy trial guarantee continued to apply.
The Marion defendants were charged with operating a fraudulent home improvement business. The Court noted that the Washington Post ran a series of articles about the ongoing investigation of the business, and reported that the local United States Attorney predicted that indictments would be forthcoming. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S., at 309.
The original Court of Appeals decision concluded “that MacDonald’s military arrest was the functional equivalent of a civilian arrest” for Speedy Trial Clause purposes. United States v. MacDonald, 531 F. 2d 196, 204 (CA4 1976). Judge Craven, dissenting, disagreed with that con-elusion, stating that the military proceedings were equivalent to a grand jury investigation followed by a failure to file an indictment. Id., at 209. In its petition for certiorari, the Government expressly declined to raise the issue of whether the military investigation triggered MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights; we therefore do not express any opinion on that issue.
The initial Court of Appeals panel held that the prosecution by the Army and that by the Justice Department were conducted “by the government in its single sovereign capacity . . . .” Id., at 204. Of course, an arrest or indictment by one sovereign would not cause the speedy trial guarantees to become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by another sovereign.
There is no allegation here that the Army acted in bad faith in dismissing the charges. This is not a case where the Government dismissed and later reinstituted charges to evade the speedy trial guarantee. The Army clearly dismissed its charges because the Commanding General of MacDonald’s unit, following the recommendation of the Article 32 investigating officer, concluded that they were untrue.
There is nothing to suggest that the Justice Department acted in bad faith in not securing an indictment until January 1975. After the Army dismissed its charges, it continued its investigation at the request of the Justice Department; the Army’s initial 13-volume report was not submitted to the Justice Department until June 1972, and supplemental reports were filed as late as August 1973. Within a year, the Justice Department completed its review of the massive evidence thus accumulated and submitted the evidence to a grand jury. The grand jury returned the indictment five months later.
Plainly the indictment of an accused — perhaps even more so the indictment of a physician — for the heinous and brutal murder of his pregnant wife and two small children is not a matter to be hastily arrived at either by the prosecution authorities or by a grand jury. The devastating consequences to an accused person from the very fact of such an indictment is a matter which responsible prosecutors must weigh carefully. The care obviously given the matter by the Justice Department is certainly not any indication of bad faith or deliberate delay.