Per Curiam.
We granted certiorari in this case to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 229 F. 2d 232, reversing an order of the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, sitting in bankruptcy, which required respondent as trustee of a bankrupt’s estate to pay $27,400 to petitioner. 351 U. S. 949. The District Court’s order was based on a finding that, subsequent to the date of the adjudication of bankruptcy, the bankrupt had obtained money by fraud from the petitioner and had turned over $27,400 of that money to respondent. At the hearing before the District Court, petitioner had sought to introduce into evidence an affidavit in which the bankrupt stated that he had paid $36,000 of the money he had received from petitioner to the respondent. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court sustained respondent’s motion to strike the affidavit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had failed to prove that any specific portion of the money that he had given the bankrupt became a part of the funds in the hands of respondent. Because petitioner had not cross-appealed, the Court of Appeals held that it could not consider the action of the District Court in striking the bankrupt’s affidavit from the record.
A successful party in the District Court may sustain its judgment on any ground that finds support in the record. If the District Court was in error in striking an admissible affidavit, a cross-appeal was not a prerequisite for the Court of Appeals to rule on the admissibility of the affidavit, and finding it admissible, to find that it afforded evidence in support of the District Court judgment. United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435-436; Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 538-539. Since the Court of Appeals did not consider the admissibility and weight of the affidavit, we remand to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of those issues.
The claim in this case is that relevant admissible evidence established a constructive trust. Whether it did so or not is a question of Illinois law. The Court of Appeals, in the view it took of the case before it, did not reach this local question. On remand, that question too must be considered by the Court of Appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.