opinion: JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 138.
  Argued December 10, 1947.
  Decided February 9, 1948.
  David A. Fall and Silas Blake Axtell argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief was Myron Scott.
  Samuel D. Slade argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Herbert A. Bergson, W. Leavenworth Colby, John R. Benney and Alvin 0. West.
  Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the seeming misapplication by the court below of Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 329 U. S. 452.
  Petitioner was a seaman on S. S. Mission Soledad, a steam tanker owned and operated by the United States. He was on the main deck rounding in two blocks, an operation which followed the cradling of the boom. One block was attached to the outer end of the boom by a wire rope. The other block was being held by a shipmate, one Dudder, who stood above petitioner on the meccano deck, a structure of beams which had been erected on the main deck. Petitioner was taking in the slack by pulling on the free end of the rope which ran through the two blocks. As he pulled on the rope the two blocks were brought together. When that was done Dudder had to walk forward with the block he held at a rate of speed controlled by petitioner. The operation went forward smoothly. Petitioner would pull on the rope, Dudder would walk forward, and then petitioner would stop to coil the accumulated free line. Petitioner and Dudder had worked harmoniously, neither one jerking on the line nor interfering with the other’s function. There was no fouling of the lines; the rope was taut and ran free.
  We have only a partial account of how the injury to petitioner occurred. Dudder was not called. The only testimony we have is from petitioner and his version of the episode is uncontradicted. The block which it was Dudder’s duty to hold (and which weighed 25 or 30 pounds) was permitted to fall; it hit petitioner on the head and caused the injury for which this libel in personam, (see 41 Stat. 525, 46 U. S. C. § 742) was filed under the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185, as amended, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688. Dudder, as we have said, was standing above petitioner. It is not certain why the block fell. Petitioner was hit without warning. When hit, he was bending over coiling the line on the deck.
  The rule of res ipsa loquitur applied in Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra, means that “the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference.” Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240. We need not determine what the result would be if it were shown that petitioner was pulling on the rope when the accident happened. For the uncontradicted evidence is that he was not pulling on the rope but was bending over coiling it on the deck. A man who is careful does not ordinarily drop a block on a man working below him. Some external force might conceivably compel him to do so. But where, as here, the injured person is not implicated (Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra), the falling of the block is alone sufficient basis for an inference that the man who held the block was negligent. In short, Dudder alone remains implicated, since on the record either he or petitioner was the cause of the accident and it appears that petitioner was not responsible.
  The Jones Act makes applicable to these suits the standard of liability of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 53 Stat. 1404,45 U. S. C. § 51. Thus the shipowner becomes liable for injuries to a seaman resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of another employee. See De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U. S. 660, 665. And there is no reason in logic or experience why res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to acts of a fellow servant. See Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal. App. 404, 18 P. 2d 429; Johnson v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 104 Mo. App. 588, 592-593, 78 S. W. 275, 276. True, the doctrine finds most frequent application in cases of injuries arising from instruments or properties under the employer’s exclusive control. San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89; Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra; Lukon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 131 F. 2d 327; Sweeting v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 142 F. 2d 611. Inherent, however, in the negligence inferred in that type of case is an act or failure to act by an individual. While the acts of negligence underlying such accidents may reach higher into the management hierarchy than the one involved here, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act compels us to go no higher than a fellow servant. See Terminal R. Assn. v. Staengel, 122 F. 2d 271.
  No act need be explicable only in terms of negligence in order for the rule of res ipsa loquitur to be invoked. The rule deals only with permissible inferences from unexplained events. In this case the District Court found negligence from Dudder’s act of dropping the block since all that petitioner was doing at the time was coiling the rope. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 160 F. 2d 789, feeling that petitioner might have pulled the block out of Dudder’s hands. It reasoned that, although petitioner testified he was bending over coiling the rope when the block hit him, the concussion may have caused a lapse of memory which antedated the actual injury. The inquiry, however, is not as to possible causes of the accident but whether a showing that petitioner was without fault and was injured by the dropping of the block is the basis of a fair inference that the man who dropped the block was negligent. We think it is, for human experience tells us that careful men do not customarily do such an act.
  Petitioner presses here his claim for maintenance and cure which was rejected by both courts below. He was hospitalized by respondent for a number of weeks following the accident. He was then found unfit for sea duty and doctors of the Public Health Service recommended that he enter various government hospitals. He refused and went instead to live on the ranch of his parents. We need not decide whether an agreement between petitioner and the government doctors for out-patient treatment and rest at his home might be inferred. Cf. Rey v. Colonial Navigation Co., 116 F. 2d 580; Moyle v. National Petroleum Transport Corp., 150 F. 2d 840. For there is ample evidence to support the findings of the two lower courts that petitioner had incurred no expense or liability for his care and support at the home of his parents. See Field v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 104 F. 2d 849. On that issue we affirm the Circuit Court of Appeals. On the issue of negligence we reverse it.
  So ordered.
choices: Alabama Alaska American Samoa Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Federated States of Micronesia Florida Georgia Guam Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Marshall Islands Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Northern Mariana Islands Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Palau Pennsylvania Puerto Rico Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virgin Islands Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming United States Interstate Compact Philippines Indian Dakota