opinion: PEARSON v. DODD et al.
  No. 75-1318.
  Argued December 1,1976
  Decided January 12, 1977
  Philip G. Terrie argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
  Wrn. Roy Rice argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were John D. Daly and Thomas E. Morgan.
  Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General, Jack C. McClung, Deputy Attorney General, and C. Page Hamrick III, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of West Virginia as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
  Per Curiam.
  When appellant failed to pay 1961 real estate taxes pertaining to her one-quarter interest in the oil and gas in 68 acres of land in Kanawha County, W. Va., the interest became subject to transfer to the State under West Virginia statutory procedures that afford notice to the landowner only through the posting of a delinquency list on the county courthouse door and the publication of the list in local newspapers. W. Va. Code §§ HA-2-10a, 11A-3-2 (1974). The interest was sold to the State under these procedures in 1962. West Virginia Code § 11A-3-8 (1974) gave appellant a statutory entitlement to redeem the interest at any time within 18 months of the date of the state purchase, but appellant did not redeem during that period. The State thereafter decided to sell the interest and, as required by West Virginia law, commenced a suit in State Circuit Court to effect a sale. The suit resulted in the conveyance in 1966, by tax deed, of the oil and gas interest to appellee W. P. Dodd. The only notice of this sale was by way of publication in two local newspapers, pursuant to § 11A-4-12 (1974). Over two years later, in July 1968, appellant attempted to pay the State Auditor a sum of money to redeem the interest. Appellant then brought this action in state court to quiet title. The Circuit Court rendered judgment for appellees. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed,-W. Va.-, 221 S. E. 2d 171 (1975). We noted probable jurisdiction. 426 U. S. 946 (1976).
  The Jurisdictional Statement phrased the due process question presented by the appeal as whether notice by publication of the tax sale was constitutionally deficient, but was unclear whether the challenge was directed to the 1962 sale to the State or to the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd. At oral argument counsel for appellant made clear, however, that her challenge was not addressed to the procedures for notice attending the 1962 transfer of the interest to the State, Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23, but solely to the procedures for notice attending the 1966 sale of the interest by the State to appellee Dodd. Indeed, we were repeatedly informed that the 1962 sale to the State was not even “an issue in this case.” Id., at 22, 25,. 26. But under state law absolute title had vested in the State at the expiration of the 18-month period after the 1962 sale during which appellant might have exercised but did not exercise her Tight to redeem: § 11A-A-12 expressly provides that in such circumstance “the State has absolute title to all . . . land sold to the State for nonpayment of taxes . . . [which has] become irredeemable . . . Appellant thus has no constitutionally protected property or entitlement interest upon which she may base a challenge of constitutional deficiency in the notice provisions attending the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd. The appeal is therefore dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.
  So ordered.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations