opinion: SHAPERO v. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
  No. 87-16.
  Argued March 1, 1988
  Decided June 13, 1988
  Brennan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respects to Parts I and II, in which White, Marshall, Bláckmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 480. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 480.
  Donald, L. Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mary Janice Lintner.
  Frank P. Doheny, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joseph L. Lenihan
  Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers by C. Rufus Pennington III; for the American Bar Association by Robert MacCrate, Michael Franck, and George Kuhlman; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; and for the Florida Bar by Barry Richard and Ray Ferrero, Jr.
  Justice Brennan
  announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II and an opinion as to Part III in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy join.
  This case presents the issue whether a State may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems.
  hH
  In 1985, petitioner, a member of Kentucky’s integrated Bar Association, see Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.030 (1988), applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter that he proposed to send “to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them.” The proposed letter read as follows:
  “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time to pay them.
  “You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. for FREE information on how you can keep your home.
  “Call NOW, don’t wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.”
  The Commission did not find the letter false or misleading. Nevertheless, it declined to approve petitioner’s proposal on the ground that a then-existing Kentucky Supreme Court Rule prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements “precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.” Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i). The Commission registered its view that Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)’s ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising violated the First Amendment — specifically the principles enunciated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985) — and recommended that the Kentucky Supreme Court amend its Rules. See App. to Pet. for Cert. lla-15a. Pursuing the Commission’s suggestion, petitioner petitioned the Committee on Legal Ethics (Ethics Committee) of the Kentucky Bar Association for an advisory opinion as to the Rule’s validity. See Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.530; n. 1, supra. Like the Commission, the Ethics Committee, in an opinion formally adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bar Association, did not find the proposed letter false or misleading, but nonetheless upheld Rule 3.135(5)(b) (i) on the ground that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1984). App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a.
  On review of the Ethics Committée’s advisory opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court felt “compelled by the decision in Zauderer to order [Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i)] deleted,” 726 S. W. 2d 299, 300 (1987), and replaced it with the ABA’s Rule 7.3, which provides in its entirety:
  ‘“A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. The term ‘solicit’ includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.’” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301 (quoting ABA, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 (1984)).
  The court did not specify either the precise infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) or how Rule 7.3 cured it. Rule 7.3, like its predecessor, prohibits targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain, without a particularized finding that the solicitation is false or misleading. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve whether such a blanket prohibition is consistent with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 484 U. S. 814 (1987), and now reverse.
  II
  Lawyer advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). The First Amendment principles governing state regulation of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain are by now familiar: “Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.” Zauderer, supra, at 638 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980)). Since state regulation of commercial speech “may extend only as far as the interest it serves,” Central Hudson, supra, at 565, state rules that are designed to prevent the “potential for deception and confusion . . . may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the” perceived evil. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 (1982).
  In Zauderer, application of these principles required that we strike an Ohio rule that categorically prohibited solicitation of legal employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements containing information or advice, even if truthful and nondeceptive, regarding a specific legal problem. We distinguished written advertisements containing such information or advice from in-person solicitation by lawyers for profit, which we held in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978), a State may categorically ban. The “unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain,” we observed, are “not present” in the context of written advertisements. Zauderer, supra, at 641-642.
  Our lawyer advertising cases have never distinguished among various modes of written advertising to the general public. See, e. g., Bates, supra (newspaper advertising); id., at 372, n. 26 (equating advertising in telephone directory with newspaper advertising); In re R. M. J., supra (mailed announcement cards treated same as newspaper and telephone directory advertisements). Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to a general population his offer to represent women injured by the Daikon Shield than it could prohibit his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if petitioner’s letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, “Is your home being foreclosed on?,” rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on.” The drafters of Rule 7.3 apparently appreciated as much, for the Rule exempts from the ban “letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons . . . who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.”
  The court below disapproved petitioner’s proposed letter solely because it targeted only persons who were “known to need [the] legal services” offered in his letter, 726 S. W. 2d, at 301, rather than the broader group of persons “so situated that they might in general find such services useful.” Generally, unless the advertiser is inept, the latter group would include members of the former. The only reason to disseminate an advertisement of particular legal services among those persons who are “so situated that they might in general find such services useful” is to reach individuals who actually “need legal services of the kind provided [and advertised] by the lawyer.” But the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable.
  The court below did not rely on any such theory. See also Brief for Respondent 37 (conceding that “targeted direct mail advertising” — as distinguished from “solicitation” — “is constitutionally protected”) (emphasis in original). Rather, it concluded that the State’s blanket ban on all targeted, direct-mail solicitation was permissible because of the “serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need specific legal services.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. By analogy to Ohralik, the court observed:
  “Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a trained lawyer in a direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential client may feel overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need for the specific legal services and may have seriously impaired capacity for good judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest. Such a condition is full of the possibility of undue influence, overreaching and intimidation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301.
  Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally “overwhelmed” by his legal troubles and will have the same “impaired capacity for good judgment” regardless of whether a lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement — concededly constitutionally protected activities — or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients whose “condition” makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility. Cf. Ohralik, supra, at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“What is objectionable about Ohralik’s behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it”).
  Thus, respondent’s facile suggestion that this case is merely “Ohralik in writing” misses the mark. Brief for Respondent 10. In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference. Our decision in Ohralik that a State could categorically ban all in-person solicitation turned on two factors. First was our characterization of face-to-face solicitation as “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 641. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 457-458, 464-465. Second, “unique . . . difficulties,” Zau-derer, supra, at 641, would frustrate any attempt at state regulation of in-person solicitation short of an absolute ban because such solicitation is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny.” Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 466. See also ibid. (“[I]n-person solicitation would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the State or by the legal profession”) (footnote omitted). Targeted, direct-mail solicitation is distinguishable from the in-person solicitation in each respect.
  Like print advertising, petitioner’s letter — and targeted, direct-mail solicitation generally — “poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence” than does in-person solicitation, Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 642. Neither mode of written communication involves “the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate” or the “pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.” Ibid. Unlike the potential client with a badgering advocate breathing down his neck, the recipient of a letter and the “reader of an advertisement. . . can ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes,’” Ohralik, supra, at 465, n. 25 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971)). A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded. In short, both types of written solicitation “con-ve[y] information about legal services [by means] that [are] more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney.” Zauderer, supra, at 642. Nor does a targeted letter invade the recipient’s privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large. The invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient’s legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the discovery.
  Admittedly, a letter that is personalized (not merely targeted) to the recipient presents an increased risk of deception, intentional or inadvertent. It could, in certain circumstances, lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer’s familiarity with the case or could implicitly suggest that the recipient’s legal problem is more dire than it really is. See Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae 9. Similarly, an inaccurately targeted letter could lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she does not actually have or, worse yet, could offer erroneous legal advice. See, e. g., Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 619-620, 704 P. 2d 183, 189 (1985), summarily dism’d, 475 U. S. 1001 (1986).
  But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech. See In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. The State can regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and more precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter with a state agency, id., at 206, giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses. The “regulatory difficulties” that are “unique” to in-person lawyer solicitation, Zauderer, supra, at 641 — solicitation that is “not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny” and for which it is “difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place,” Ohralik, supra, at 466-do not apply to written solicitations. The court below offered no basis for its “belie[f] [that] submission of a blank form letter to the Advertising Commission [does not] pro-vid[e] a suitable protection to the public from overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicitation.” 726 S. W. 2d, at 301. Its concerns were presumably those expressed by the ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3:
  “State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific complaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers’ mail solicitation material. Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to know anything about the lawyer or about the prospective client’s underlying problem. Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer’s representations are misleading.” ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, pp. 93-94 (1984).
  The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 379; id:, at 387 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to “enormous new regulatory burdens called for by” Bates). As a general matter, evaluating a targeted advertisement does not require specific information about the recipient’s identity and legal problems any more than evaluating a newspaper advertisement requires like information about all readers. If the targeted letter specifies facts that relate to particular recipients (e. g., “It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on”), the reviewing agency has innumerable options to minimize mistakes. It might, for example, require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated (by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact); it could require the lawyer to explain briefly how he or she discovered the fact and verified its accuracy; or it could require the letter to bear a label identifying it as an advertisement, see id., at 384 (dictum); In re R. M. J., supra, at 206, n. 20, or directing the recipient how to report inaccurate or misleading letters. To be sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one that does not. But “[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.” Zauderer, 471 U. S., at 646.
  Ill
  The validity of Rule 7.3 does not turn on whether petitioner’s letter itself exhibited any of the evils at which Rule 7.3 was directed. See Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 463-464, 466. Since, however, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to professional advertising, see Bates, 433 U. S., at 379-381, we address respondent’s contentions that petitioner’s letter is particularly overreaching, and therefore unworthy of First Amendment protection. Id., at 381. In that regard, respondent identifies two features of the letter before us that, in its view, coalesce to convert the proposed letter into “high pressure solicitation, overbearing solicitation,” Brief for Respondent 20, which is not protected. First, respondent asserts that the letter’s liberal use of underscored, uppercase letters (e. g., “Call NOW, don’t wait”; “it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling”) “fairly shouts at the recipient . . . that he should employ Shapero.” Id., at 19. See also Brief in Opposition 11 (“Letters of solicitation which shout commands to the individual, targeted recipient in words in underscored capitals are of a different order from advertising and are subject to proscription”). Second, respondent objects that the letter contains assertions (e. g., “It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you”) that “statte] no affirmative or objective fact,” but constitute “pure salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits Shapero to nothing.” Brief for Respondent 20.
  The pitch or style of a letter’s type and its inclusion of subjective predictions of client satisfaction might catch the recipient’s attention more than would a bland statement of purely objective facts in small type. But a truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never “shou[t] at the recipient” or “gras[p] him by the lapels,” id., at 19, as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching. And so long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the First Amendment limits the State’s authority to dictate what information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal business. “[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive,” unless the State “assert[s] a substantial interest” that such a restriction would directly advance. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. Nor may a State impose a more particularized restriction without a similar showing. Aside from the interests that we have already rejected, respondent offers none.
  To be sure, a letter may be misleading if it unduly emphasizes trivial or “relatively uninformative fact[s],” In re R. M. J., supra, at 205 (lawyer’s statement, “in large capital letters, that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States”), or offers overblown assurances of client satisfaction, cf. In re Von Wiegen, 63 N. Y. 2d 163, 179, 470 N. E. 2d 838, 847 (1984) (solicitation letter to victims of massive disaster informs them that “it is [the lawyer’s] opinion that the liability of the defendants is clear”), cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1007 (1985); Bates, supra, at 383-384 (“[Advertising claims as to the quality of legal services . . . may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction”). Respondent does not argue before us that petitioner’s letter was misleading in those respects. Nor does respondent contend that the letter is false or misleading in any other respect. Of course, respondent is free to raise, and the Kentucky courts are free to consider, any such argument on remand.
  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
  The Attorneys Advertising Commission is charged with the responsibility of “regulating attorney advertising as prescribed” in the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3) (1988). The Commission’s decisions are appealable to the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association, Rule 3.135(8)(a), and are ultimately reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.135(8)(b). “Any attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of any professional act contemplated by him” also has the option of seeking an advisory opinion from a committee of the Kentucky Bar Association, which, if formally adopted by the Board of Governors, is reviewable by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Rule 3.530.
  Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided in full:
  “A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whómi R is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating'to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.”
  We reject respondent’s request that we dismiss or affirm this case because “the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted Shapero precisely the relief which he requested.” Brief for Respondent 11. The court below did, as petitioner prayed, “declare . . . rule [3.135(5)(b)(i)] void,” Motion for Review of Advisory Opinion E-310, No. 86-SC-335 (Sup. Ct. Ky.). The court’s ultimate disposition, however, was to adopt a new Rule with the same defect that petitioner identified in the old ope and to “affirm the decision of the Ethics Committee to deny [petitioner’s] request” for approval of his letter. 726 S. W. 2d 299, 301 (1987). Petitioner surely cannot be said to have prevailed below.
  Nor does the fact that petitioner never leveled his constitutional challenge specifically against Rule 7.3 mean that this case presents “federal constitutional issues [that were] raised here for the first time on review of [a] state court decisio[n],” Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). The parties briefed and argued the constitutionality of a categorical ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising, and the court below plainly considered and rejected those arguments as it adopted Model Rule 7.3. See 726 S. W. 2d, at 300.
  We also decline respondent’s invitation to dismiss this case in order to avoid interference with ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). Once the court below rendered its final judgment in this case, there was no longer any pending state judicial proceeding.