opinion: WHITE v. MARYLAND.
  No. 600.
  Argued April 16, 1963.
  Decided April 29, 1963.
  Fred E. Weisgal argued the cause and. filed a brief, for petitioner.
  Robert F. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the' cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General of Maryland.
  Per Curiam.
  Petitioner, who was sentenced to death while his co-defendant was given life, appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. 227 Md. 615, 177 A. 2d 877. We granted certiorari “limited to the point of law raised in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52.” See 371 U. S. 909.
  Petitioner was arrested on May 27, 1960, and brought before a magistrate on May 31, 1960, for a preliminary hearing. But that hearing was. postponed and not actually held until August 9,1960. At that time petitioner was not yet represented by a lawyer. When arraigned at that preliminary hearing he pleaded guilty. What Maryland calls the “arraignment” was first held September 8, 1960; but since petitioner was not represented by counsel, his arraignment was postponed and counsel appointed for him on September 9, 1960. He was finally arraigned on November 25,1960, and entered'pleas of “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity.” At his trial the plea of .guilty made at the preliminary hearing on' August 9, 1960, was introduced in evidence. Since he did not have counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing, he argued that Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, applied. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that arraignment in Alabama is “a critical stage in a criminal proceeding” where rights' are preserved or lost (368 U. S. 53-54), while.under Maryland law there was “no requirement (nor. any practical possibility under our present criminal procedure) to appoint counsel” for petitioner at the “preliminary hearing . . . nor was it necessary for appellant to enter a plea at that time.” 227 Md., at 625, 177 A. 2d, at 882.
  Whatever may be the normal function of the “preliminary hearing” under Maryland law, it was in this case as “critical” a stage as arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel.
  Wé repeat what we said in Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 55, that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: “Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to-plead intelligently.” We therefore hold that Hamilton v. Alabama governs and that the judgment below must be and is.
  Reversed.
  Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of this evidence at the trial (227 Md., at 619-620, 177 A.2d, at 879), the rationale of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra/does not rest, as we shall see, on a showing of prejudice.
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)