opinion: BLAU v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 22.
  Argued November 7, 1950.
  Decided December 11, 1950.
  Samuel D. Menin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
  Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney, John F. Davis and J. F. Bishop.
  Mr. Justice Black
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In response to a subpoena, petitioner appeared as a witness before the United States District Court Grand Jury at Denver, Colorado. There she was asked several questions concerning the Communist Party of Colorado and her employment by it. Petitioner refused to answer these questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate her. She was then taken before the district judge where the questions were again propounded and where she again claimed her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The district judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court and sentenced her to imprisonment for one year. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 180 F. 2d 103. We granted certiorari because the decision appeared to deny rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The holding below also was in conflict with recent decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Estes v. Potter, 183 F. 2d 865; Alexander v. United States, 181 F. 2d 480.
  At the time petitioner was called before the grand jury, the Smith Act was on the statute books making it a crime among other things to advocate knowingly the desirability of overthrow of the Government by force or violence; to organize or help to organize any society or group which teaches, advocates or encourages such overthrow of the Government; to be or become a member of such a group with knowledge of its purposes. These provisions made future prosecution of petitioner far more than “a mere imaginary possibility . . . .” Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 366; she reasonably could fear that criminal charges might be brought against her if she admitted employment by the Communist Party or intimate knowledge of its workings. Whether such admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a criminal statute is immaterial. Answers to the questions asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of petitioner for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act. Prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such circumstances, the Constitution gives a witness the privilege of remaining silent. The attempt by the courts below to compel petitioner to testify runs counter to the Fifth Amendment as it has been interpreted from the beginning. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas., Case No. 14,692e, decided by Chief Justice Marshall in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547; Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186; Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; cf. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698, 699.
  Reversed.
  Me. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  The grand jury’s questions which petitioner refused to answer were as follows: “Mrs. Blau, do you know the names of the State officers of the Communist Party of Colorado ?” “Do you know what the organization of the Communist Party of Colorado is, the table of organization of the Communist Party of Colorado?" “Were you ever employed by the Communist Party of Colorado ?” “Mrs. Blau, did you ever have in your possession or custody any of the books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?” “Did you turn the books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado over to any particular person?” “Do you know the names of any persons who might now have the books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?” “Could you describe to the grand jury any books and records of the Communist Party of Colorado?”
  The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U. S. Const., Amend. V.
  62 Stat. 808,18 U. S. C. § 2385.
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)