opinion: ROPER, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORRECTIONAL CENTER v. WEAVER
  No. 06-313.
  Argued March 21, 2007
  Decided May 21, 2007
  Andrea K. Spillars argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, James R. Layton, State Solicitor, and Stephen D. Hawke, Alana M. Barragdn-Scott, Heidi C. Doerhoff, and Ronald S. Ribaudo, Assistant Attorneys General.
  John H. Blume argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sheri L. Johnson, Trevor W. Morrison, Keir M. Weyble, Charles A. Weiss, Elizabeth C. Carver, John W. Rogers, K. Lee Marshall, and James R. Wyrsch
  Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
  Carter G. Phillips and Jeffrey T. Green filed a brief for Interested Former Oklahoma City Bombing Prosecutors as amici curiae urging affirmance.
  Michael C. Small and Pamela Harris filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae.
  Per Curiam.
  We granted certiorari in this case, 549 U. S. 1092 (2006), to decide whether the Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) by setting aside a capital sentence on the ground that the prosecutor’s closing statement was “unfairly inflammatory.” Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F. 3d 832, 841 (CA8 2006). Our primary concern was whether the Court of Appeals’ application of the more stringent standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, was consistent with our interpretation of that statute. Cf. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 (2006). We are now aware of circumstances that persuade us that dismissal of the writ is the appropriate manner in which to dispose of this case.
  The argument made by the prosecutor in this case was essentially the same as the argument that he made in two other cases — one of which involved respondent’s codefendant. See Shurn v. Delo, 177 F. 3d 662, 666 (CA8 1999); Newlon v. Armontrout, 693 F. Supp. 799 (WD Mo. 1988), aff’d, 885 F. 2d 1328 (CA8 1989). In each of those cases, the defendant received a death sentence. Also in each case, the defendant filed a petition seeking federal habeas relief before AEDPA’s effective date. Federal habeas relief was granted in all three cases. The State does not question the propriety of relief in the other two cases because it was clear at the time, as it is now, that AEDPA did not apply to either of them.
  Respondent argues, for the following reasons, that AEDPA should not govern his case either. Like the defendants in Newlon and Shurn, respondent filed his federal habeas petition before the effective date of AEDPA. Instead of considering respondent’s claims, however, the District Court sua sponte stayed the habeas proceedings, noting that respondent had indicated his intention to file a petition for writ of certiorari seeking this Court’s review of the state courts’ denial of postconviction relief. Though the District Court recognized that respondent was not required to seek certiorari from this Court, it concluded that, if “a state prisoner chooses to pursue writ of certiorari, he must first exhaust that remedy before filing a federal habeas corpus petition.” App. to Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 15. Thus, the District Court put respondent to a choice: He could forgo filing a petition for certiorari, or his habeas petition would be dismissed.
  Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the appointment of counsel. The District Court denied both motions, reiterating its view that if respondent sought certiorari, his federal habeas petition would be premature. When respondent notified the District Court that a petition for certiorari had been filed, the court made good on its promise: It dismissed respondent’s habeas petition “without prejudice” to his refiling “following exhaustion of his state proceedings.” Id., at 13. Though respondent had filed his habeas petition before AEDPA took effect, the District Court dismissed his petition after the statute was in force.
  Still without an attorney, respondent requested a certificate of appealability from the District Court. The court denied the request, opining that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the dismissal of respondent’s petition. Id., at 5-6. Respondent also filed a notice of appeal, which the Court of Appeals construed as a request for a certificate of appealability and rejected.
  Respondent refiled his habeas petition after this Court denied review of his state postconviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit eventually concluded that, because respondent’s petition was filed after AEDPA’s effective date, his claims must be evaluated under that statute’s strict standard of review. See Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F. 3d 1024, 1029 (2001).
  Our recent decision in Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327 (2007), conclusively establishes that the District Court was wrong to conclude that, if respondent chose to seek certiorari, he had to exhaust that remedy before filing a federal habeas petition. Lawrence clarified that “[s]tate review ends when the state courts have finally resolved an application for state postconviction relief” — even if a prisoner files a certiorari petition. Id., at 332; see also id., at 332-333 (“[W]e have said that state prisoners need not petition for certiorari to exhaust state remedies” (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 435-438 (1963))). Thus, respondent’s habeas petition, which was fully exhausted when filed, did not become unexhausted upon his decision to seek certiorari. Because the petition was not premature, the District Court had no cause to dismiss it.
  Whether this unusual procedural history leads to the conclusion, as respondent eolorably contends, that the AEDPA standard is simply inapplicable to this case, is a question we find unnecessary to resolve. Regardless of the answer to that question, we find it appropriate to exercise our discretion to prevent these three virtually identically situated litigants from being treated in a needlessly disparate manner, simply because the District Court erroneously dismissed respondent’s pre-AEDPA petition.
  Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
  It is so ordered.
  Respondent did not seek rehearing or rehearing en banc in the Court of Appeals, nor did he file a petition for writ of certiorari from the denial of the certificate of appealability. Pursuit of either would almost certainly have been futile.
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)