opinion: NELSON, aka ZIKEE v. UNITED STATES
  No. 08-5657.
  Decided January 26, 2009
  Per Curiam.
  Lawrence Nelson was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base. See 21 U. S. C. § 846. The District Court calculated Nelson’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and imposed a sentence of 360 months in prison (the bottom of the range). During sentencing, the judge explained that under Fourth Circuit precedent, “ ‘the Guidelines are considered presumptively reasonable,’ ” so that “ ‘unless there’s a good reason in the [statutory sentencing] factors ..., the Guideline sentence is the reasonable sentence.’” Pet. for Cert. 10.
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction and sentence. United States v. Nelson, 237 Fed. Appx. 819 (2007) (per curiam). It noted that within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, and rejected Nelson’s argument that the District Court’s reliance on that presumption was error. Id., at 821.
  Nelson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338 (2007). Nelson v. United States, 552 U. S. 1163 (2008).
  On remand and without further briefing, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed the sentence. 276 Fed. Appx. 331 (2008) (per curiam). The court acknowledged that under Rita, while courts of appeals “may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines,” 551 U. S., at 347, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply,” id., at 351. Instead, the sentencing court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a), explaining any variance from the former with reference to the latter. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit upheld the sentence, finding that the District Court did not treat the Guidelines as “mandatory” but rather understood that they were only advisory. 276 Fed. Appx., at 333.
  Nelson has again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, reasserting, inter alia, essentially the same argument he made before us the first time: that the District Court’s statements clearly indicate that it impermissibly applied a presumption of reasonableness to his Guidelines range. The United States admits that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting that argument following our remand; we agree.
  Our cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable. In Rita we said as much, in fairly explicit terms: “We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption. . . . [T]he sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.” 551 U. S., at 351. And in Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38 (2007), we reiterated that district judges, in considering how the various statutory sentencing factors apply to an individual defendant, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Id., at 50.
  In this case, the Court of Appeals quoted the above language from Rita but affirmed the sentence anyway after finding that the District Judge did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. That is true, but beside the point. The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable. We think it plain from the comments of the sentencing judge that he did apply a presumption of reasonableness to Nelson’s Guidelines range. Under our recent precedents, that constitutes error.
  The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)