opinion: FURMAN v. GEORGIA
  No. 69-5003.
  Argued January 17, 1972
  Decided June 29, 1972
  Anthony G. Amsterdam argued the cause for petitioner in No. 69-5003. With him on the brief were B. Clarence Mayfield, Michael Meltsner, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Jack Himmelstein, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Mr. Greenberg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 69-5030. With him on the brief were Messrs. Meltsner, Amsterdam, Nabrit, Himmelstein, and Mrs. DuBois. Melvyn Carson Bruder argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 69-5031.
  Dorothy T. Beasley, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. With her on the briefs were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ryan, Jr. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for respondent in No. 69i-5031. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Robert C. Flowers and Glenn R. Brown, Assistant Attorneys General.
  Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, and David 0. Givens, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Indiana as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 69-5003. Paul Raymond Stone filed a brief for the West Virginia Council of Churches et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. John E. Havelock, Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Alaska as amicus curiae in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. Briefs of amici curiae in all three cases were filed by Gerald H. Gottlieb, Melvin L. Wulf, and Sanford Jay Rosen for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Leo Pfeffer for the Synagogue Council of America et ah; by Chauncey Eskridge, Mario G. Obledo, Leroy D. Clark, Nathaniel R. Jones, and Vernon Jordan for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et ah; by Michael V. DiSalle for Edmund G. Brown et al.; and by Hilbert P. Zarky and Marc I. Hayutin for James V. Bennett et al.
  Together with No. 69-5030, Jackson v. Georgia, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 69-5031, Branch v. Texas, on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
  Pee Curiam.
  Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. §26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 253, 167 S. E. 2d 628 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 790, 171 S. E. 2d 501 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961). 447 S. W. 2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: “Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?” 403 U. S. 952 (1971). The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
  So ordered.
  Me. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall have filed separate opinions in support of the judgments. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black-mun, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist have filed separate dissenting opinions.
  Maine has totally abolished the death penalty, and severely limited its imposition. Based on ALI, supra, n. Rhode 98, at Island has 25.
  Miehigan, Minnesota, and wisconsln have completely abolished capital punishment. North Dakota has severely restricted its use.
  Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota were not admitted to the national death registration area until 1923, 1924, and 1930 respectively.
  South Dakota introduced the death penalty in 1939.
  Based on ALT, supra, n. 98, at 28. See also id,., at 32-34.
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)