opinion: ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF
  No. 70-5015.
  Argued December 6, 1971
  Reargued February 28, 1972
  Decided June 12, 1972
  Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Douglas and Stewart, JJ., joined, post, p. 40. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 41. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 44.
  Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioner on the reargument and J. Michael Shea argued the cause pro hac vice on the original argument. With them on the brief was P. A'. Hubbart.
  George R. GeorgiejJ, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, reargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief -were Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Gary K. Nelson of Arizona, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, W. Anthony Park of Idaho, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, James S. Erwin of Maine, Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Robert List of Nevada, Robert Morgan of North Carolina, -Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, and Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina.
  Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae on the reargument urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Greenawalt, • Hairy R. Sachse, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. Glaser. .
  Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were- filed by" William E. Hellerstein for the Legal Aid Society of New York, and by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
  Lauren Beasley, Chief Assistant Attorney General of Utah, filed á brief for the Attorney General of Utah as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
  Briefs of amici curiae were filed by John E. Havelock, Attorney General, for the State of Alaska, and by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Vann H. Lefcoe, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia.
  Mr. Justice Douglas ■
  delivered the opinion of the Court. -
  Petitioner, an indigent,'was charged in Florida- with carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months; a $1,000 fine, or both.- The trial was to a judge, and petitioner was unrepresented by counsel. He was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, and brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme • Court, alleging that, being deprived of his right to counsel, he was unable as an indigent.layman properly to raise and present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses to the charge for which he stands convicted. The Florida Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159, as respects the right to trial by jury and held that , the right to court-appointed counsel extends only to trials “for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment.” 236 So. 2d 442, 443. .
  The case is here on a petition for certiorari, whicn we granted. 401 U. S. 908. We reverse.
  The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations has been made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S: 400; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; and In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257), provides, specified standards for “all criminal prosecutions.”
  One is the requirement of a '“public trial.” In re Oliver, supra, held that the right to a “public trial” .was applicable to a state proceeding even though only a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U. S., at 272.
  . Another guarantee is the right to be informed of the nature arid cause of the accusation. Still another, the right Of .confrontation: Pointer v. Texas, supra. And another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in one’s favor. Washington v: Texas, supra. We have never limited these rights to' felonies or to lesser but serious offenses.
  In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, “We have held that due process requires that the accused have the assistance of counsel for his defense,, that he be confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he have the right to a speedy and public trial.” 388 U. S., at 18. Respecting the right to a speedy and public trial, • the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to compulsory, process for obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, “It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice to the accused of the charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf.” Junker, The Right to Counsel' in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 705 (1968).
  District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, illustrates the point. There, the offense was engaging without a license in the business of dealing in second-hand .property, an offense punishable by a' fine of. $300 or imprisonment for not more than ^90 days. The Court held that the offense was a “petty” one and could be. tried without a jury. But the conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered, because the trial court had preju-dicially restricted the right of cross-examination, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. .
  The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourtéenth, was limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, swpra, to trials where the potential punishment was imprisonment for six months or'more. But, as the various opinions' in Baldwin v. 'New York, 399 U. S. 66, make plain, the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge alone. As stated in Duncan:
  “Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judg- . ment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power — a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and* liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the. crimina^ láw in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense. against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.” 391 U. S., at 156.
  While there is historical support for limiting the “deep commitment” to trial by jury to “serious criminal cases,” there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel:
  “Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or -felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel. ...
  “[It] .appears that in at least twelve • of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious crimes . . . .” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45., 60, 64-65.
  The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that' it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be provided. See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9.
  We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.
  The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the, very existence of a fair trial. The Court in Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69 — a capital case — said:
  “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be ' heard.by counsel; Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of, evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or. evidence irrelevant to the issue, or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.”
  In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial. But we did not so limit the need of the accused for a lawyer. We said:
  “[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly sociéty. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they , can get to prepare-and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” 372 U. S., at 344. .
  Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived oF his liberty. Powell and Gideon 'suggest that there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such as In re Oliver, swpra, where the penalty is 60 days’ imprisonment:
  “Á person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge ' against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses-against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” 333 U. S., at 273 (emphasis supplied).
  The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a pétty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514; Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87.
  The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often bristle with thorny constitutional questions. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156.
  In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, dealt with juvenile delinquency and an offense which, if committed by an adult, would have carried a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months (id., at 29), but which when committed by a juvenile might lead to his detention in a state institution until he reached the age of 21.. Id., at 36-37. We said (id., at 36) that . “[ib]he juvenile needs the'assistance of counsel.to cope with problems of law, to make skilled, inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,'’ ” citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 69. The premise, of Gault is that even in prosecutions for offenses less serious than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a lawyer.
  Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
  In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967), states:.
  “For example, until legislation last year increased the number of judges, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions had four judges to process the preliminary stages of more.than 1,500 felony cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 petty offenses and an equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise too often is substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or determining how to deal with him after, conviction. The frequent result is futility and failure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed:
  “‘Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he finds great numbers of defendants being processed by harassed and overworked officials. Police have more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they take their initial looks at the files. Defense lawyers appear having had no more than time for hasty conversations with their clients: Judges face long calendars with the certain knowledge that their calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to dispose of the cases.
  “ ‘Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the criminal process, there is- scant regard for them as individuals. They are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to. be processed and sent on their way. The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.
  “ ‘Very little such observation of the administration of criminal justice in operation is required to reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills.’ ”
  That picture is seen in almost every report. “The misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and frequently irresponsible preparation on the, part of the .defense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is rush, rush.” Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid Brief Case 151,152 (1970)'.
  There is evidence of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants from this “assembly-line justice.” One study concluded that “[misdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel.” American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Mis-demeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970).
  . We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. Mr. Justice Powell suggests that these problems are raised- even in situations where there is no prospect of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S., at 73, “the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty’ matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.”
  We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be iinprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by Counsel at his trial.
  That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with which we agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414, 418:
  “We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This holding is applicable to ^,11. criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence.”
  We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state courts how to manage their affairs but only to make clear the federal" constitutional requirement. How crimes should be classified is largely a state matter. The fact that traffic charges technically fall within the category of “criminal prosecutions” does not necessarily mean.that many of them will be-brought into the class where imprisonment actually occurs.
  The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice states:
  “As a matter of sound judicial administration it is preferable to disregard the characterization of the offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense. Nor is it adequate to require the provision of defense services for all offenses which carry a sentence to jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such sentences are rarely if ever imposed for certain types of offenses, so that for all intents and purposes the punishment they carry is ¿t most a fine. Thus, the standard seeks to distinguish those classes of cases in which there is real likelihood that incarceration may follow conviction from those types in which there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that . the standard does not recommend a determination of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each particular case; it draws a categorical line at those types of offenses for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility.” Providing Defense Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968).
  Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will havé a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.
  The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today’s ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of. a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of “the guiding hand of counsel” so necessary when one’s liberty is in jeopardy.
  Reversed.
  For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders concerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misdemeanors, see 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts 127-135 (1965).
  A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is contained in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970).
  Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of “serious crime” in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124.
  Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most misdemeanor cases. Id., at 124-133. One of these is Oregon, whose Supreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100-101, 458 P. 2d 414, 418, “If our objective is to insure a fair trial in every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not determined by the seriousness of the crime. The assistance of counsel will best avoid conviction of the innocent — an objective as important in the municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction.”
  California’s requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771.
  Overall, 31 States have now extended the right to defendants charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Right to Counsel, supra, at 134.
  See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 980-982 (1926); James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 331. Cf. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (1959).
  See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462-463:
  “[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is [re] presented by experienced and learned counsel. That'which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman' may appear intricate,- complex and mysterious.”
  In 1965, 314,000 defendants, were charged with, felonies in state courts, and 24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,- Task Force Report: The Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that there are annually between four and five million court cases involving misdemeanors. Ibid. And, while there are no authoritative figures, extrapolations indicate that there are probably between 40.8 and 50'million traffic offenses each year. Note, Dollars and Sense.of an Expanded Right, to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1261 (1970).
  Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of not more than $500, or both. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides for the appointment of counsel for indi^ents in all cases “other than a petty offense.” But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d, at 330-331, 18 U. S.. C. § 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, contains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full range of constitutional.rights.to counsel.
  Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 made clear the conferees’ belief that the right to counsel extends' to all offenses, petty and serious alike. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
  In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): “Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment.”
  The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: “Like the original rule.the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader in two respécts than that for which compensation is provided in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964:
  “(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the district courts, and
  “(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel for reasons ocher than financial.”
  See Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (ED Va. 1971):
  “Any incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment to the defendant and his family.”
  We do not share Mr. Justice Powell’s doubt that the Nation’s legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce today. It has been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 full-time counsel would be required to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic offenders. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to. Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated 355,200 attorneys in the United States (Statistical Abstract of the United States 153 (1971)), a number which is"projected to double by the year 1985. See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146, 147. Indeed, there are 18,000 new admissions to the bar each year — 3,500 moré lawyers than are required to fill the “estimated 14,500 average annual openings.” Id., at 148.
  Article I, § 9, of the proposed. Revised Constitution of Oregon provides:
  “Every person has the right to assistance of counsel in all official proceedings and dealings with public officers that may materially affect him. If he cannot afford counsel; he has the right to have counsel appointed for him in any case in which he may lose his liberty.”
  One partial solution to the problem of minor offenses may well be to remove them from’ the court- system. The American Bar Association Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control recently recommended, inter alia, that:
  “Regulation of various types of conduct which harm no one other than those involved (e. g., public drunkenness, narcotics addiction, vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior) should be taken out of the courts. , The handling of these matters should be transferred to nonjudicial entities, such as detoxification centers, narcotics treatment centers and social service agencies. The handling of other non-serious offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations, should be transferred to specialized administrative bodies.” ABA Report, New Perspectives on Urban Crime iv (1972). Such a solution, of course, is peculiarly within the province of state and local legislatures.
  “Forty thousand traffic charges (arising out of 150,000 non-parking traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle during 1964. The study showed, however, that in only about 4,500 cases was there any possibility of imprisonment as the result of a traffic conviction. In only three kinds of cases was the accused exposed to any danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense charged was hit-and-run, reckless or drunken driving; or (2) where any additional traffic violation was charged against an individual subject to a suspended sentence for a previous violation; or (3) where, whatever the offense charged, the convicted individual was unable to pay the fine imposed.” Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 711 (1968).
  Of the 1,288,975 people convicted by the City of New York in 1970 for traffic infractions such as jaywalking and speeding, only 24 were fined and imprisoned, given suspended sentences, or jailed. Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 11 (1970). Of the 19,187 convicted of more serious traffic offenses, such as driving under the influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident, 404 (2.1%) were subject to some form of imprisonment. Ibid.
  While it is true that Mr. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not require the Court to decide whether the indigent’s right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor eases.. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114 (1967); Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972).
choices: involuntary confession habeas corpus plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights) search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act) search and seizure, vehicles search and seizure, Crime Control Act contempt of court or congress self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution) Miranda warnings self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation) cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty) cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts) line-up discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations) double jeopardy ex post facto (state) extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases) extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case) extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment) extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses) subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy) subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case) subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statutory construction of criminal laws: assault statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy) statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury) statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue) statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951 statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization) statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation) statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements) statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952 statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences) speedy trial miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)