GRAY et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE et al.
NO. 120.
Argued January 9-10, 1952.
Decided March 3, 1952.
Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. -120 and. petitioners in No. 159, Misc. With him on the briefs were Carl A. Cowan, Thurgood Marshall and Z. Alexander Looby.
John J. Hooker argued the cause for appellees in No. 120. With him on the brief was K. Harlan Dodson, Jr. Mr. Hooker and Mr. Dodson also filed a brief for the Board of Trustees of the Uniyersity of Tennessee et al. in No. 159, Misc.
Shackelford Miller, Jr., U. S. Circuit Judge, and Leslie R. Darr and Robert L. Taylor, U. S. District Judges, filed a response to the rule to show cause in No. 159, Misc.
Per Curiam.
Appellants, on behalf of themselves and other Negroes “similarly situated,” sued in the District Court to enjoin appellees from alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment in refusing to admit Negroes to the University of Tennessee. A three-judge cohrt, convened at appellants’ request, held that this case was not within the jurisdiction of a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 2281 and ordered that the case proceed before a single district judge. 100 F. Supp. 113. The single judge held that appellants were entitled to relief but did not enter an order. 97 F. Supp. 463.
Appellants contend that only a court of three judges has jurisdiction over the cause. No. 120 is an appeal from the order dissolving the three-judge court brought directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1253. We set the appeal down for argument, postponing consideration of jurisdictional questions. In No. 159 Misc., appellants asked, in the alternative, that we issue a writ of mandamus to vacate the order dissolving the three-judge court. We issued a rule to show cause why the petition for mandamus should not be granted, 342 U. S. 846, and, upon the filing of a response to the rule, set the petition down for argument with the appeal.
At the argument, counsel for appellees stated that appellants would be admitted to the University of Tennessee as requested. Thereafter, appellants filed a motion stating that appellant Gray has been admitted to the University and that the other appellants were, because of changed circumstances, unable to avail themselves of the opportunity at present. Appellants moved this Court to vacate the order dissolving the three-judge court and to remand the case to that court for further proceedings. Since appellants’ requests for admission to the University of Tennessee have been granted and since there is no suggestion that any person “similarly situated” will not be afforded similar treatment, appellants’ motion is denied and the judgments below are vacated and the District Court is directed to dismiss the action upon the ground that the cause is moot.
It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.