PICCIRILLO v. NEW YORK
No. 97.
Argued November 9, 1970
Decided January 25, 1971
■ Malvine Nathanson argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was William, E. Hellerstein.
Stanley M. Meyer argued the cause for respondent. With, him on the brief was Eugene Gold.
Per Curiam
The occasion for granting the writ in this case was to . resolve the important question whether it is necessary to accord “transactional” immunity, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), to compel a witness to give testimony before a state grand jury over his claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, or whether-mere “use” immunity suffices to that end, see, e. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964); Uniformed Sanitation Mén Assn. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, 426 F. 2d 619 (CA2 1970).
After considering the briefs and oral argument's of the parties on this writ, we have reached the conclusion that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Gold v. Menna, 25 N. Y. 2d 475, 255 N. E. 2d 235 (1969), which makes clear that transactional immunity is required in New York and' also indicates that such' court's earlier decision in the case before us, People v. La Bello, 24 N. Y. 2d 598, 249 N. E. 2d 412 (1969), may have rested on that premise, makes this case an inappropriate vehicle for deciding a question of such far-reaching importance.
With the intervening decision in Gold, no controversy any longer exists between the parties as to the question which impelled us to grant the writ: whether, in the circumstances involved in this case, Piccirillo was entitled to “use” or “transactional” immunity. While it is true that, technically speaking, issues remain in the case 'concerning the kind of immunity required by federal law and, if" it be “transactional” rather than “use” immunity in such a case as this, the proper scope of such immunity, both issues arise only against the sterile background of agreement between the parties that Piccirillo is entitled to. “transactional’’ immunity under state law. Thus, our determination upon the fundamental constitutional question underlying this case would be in no sense necessary to. its resolution in this instance.
In this posture of affairs, we conclude that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so orderéd.
Mk. Justice Black dissents from the dismissal of this writ as improvidently granted. He would vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the New York Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its later opinion in Gold v. Menna, 25 N. Y. 2d 475, 255 N. E. 2d 235.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.