TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. CAMPAIGN CLEAN WATER, INC.
No. 73-1378.
Argued November 12, 1974
Decided February 18, 1975
Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Edmund W. Kitch, William L. Patton, Robert E. Kopp, Eloise E. Davies, and David M. Cohen.
W. Thomas Jacks argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Alan B. Morrison.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, pro se, Robert H. O’Brien, Senior Assist-ant Attorney General, and Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General, for the Attorney General of California; by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman and Charles Alpert, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Michigan; by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Byron E. Starns, Deputy Attorney General, Peter W. Sipkins, Solicitor General, and Eldon G. Kaul, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard P. Fahey, and David E. Northrop, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and Theodore L. Priebe, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, John C. Danforth, Attorney General, and Robert M. Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, Larry Derryberry, Attorney General, and Paul C. Duncan, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Tern Miller, Attorney General, and Curt T. Schneider, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, for the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, Gerald L. Baliles, Deputy Attorney General, and James E. Ryan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Martin J. Durkan and James B. McCabe, Special Assistant Attorneys General of Washington, and Israel Packel, Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, for the State of Washington and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the Center for Governmental Responsibility.
Pee Curiam.
On January 15, 1973, respondent filed a complaint in the District Court seeking to compel the petitioner, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to allot among the States the full sums authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 by § 207 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as added by the Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 839, 33 U. S. C. § 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. II), for federal grants to municipalities for construction of publicly owned waste treatment works. Although conceding in the trial court that the Administrator had a measure of discretion in making the allotments authorized by § 205 of the Act, 86 Stat. 837, 33 U. S. C. § 1285 (1970 ed., Supp. III), respondent asserted that the Administrator had abused his discretion by allotting only 45% of the sums authorized to be appropriated by § 207. In sustaining respondent’s position, the District Court rejected the holding by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (1973), that the Administrator has no discretion to allot less than the full amounts authorized by the Act. The Court of Appeals proceeded on the premise that there was discretion to control or delay allotments but concluded that further proceedings were essential to determine whether the Administrator’s discretion had been abused. The Administrator petitioned for certiorari, asserting that the exercise of his discretion to allot funds under § 205 is not subject to judicial review. We granted certiorari, 416 U. S. 969 (1974), and heard the case with Train v. City of New York, ante, p. 35.
We held in Train v. City of New York that the Administrator has no authority under § 205 to allot less than the full amounts sought to be appropriated under § 207. Because that holding is at odds with the premise underlying the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the opinion in Train v. City of New York.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
The petition also asserted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity foreclosed ordering the Administrator to allot funds that he had withheld in the course of exercising his discretion under the Act. In light of Train v. City of New York, ante, p. 35, and our disposition of the instant case, we need not address this question.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.