De MEERLEER v. MICHIGAN.
No. 140.
Argued January 6, 1947.
Decided February 3, 1947.
David W. Louisell argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Eugene F. Black, Attorney General, and Daniel J. O’Hara, Assistant Attorney General.
Per Curiam.
In conformity with Michigan procedure, petitioner moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which he had been convicted of first-degree murder. Serious impairment of his constitutional rights at the arraignment and trial were asserted as grounds for the motion. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Michigan on appeal affirmed that ruling. 313 Mich. 548, 21 N. W. 2d 849. We granted certi-orari because of the importance of the constitutional issues presented.
The facts are not in dispute. On May 16, 1932, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Lenawee County, Michigan, charging petitioner, then seventeen years of age, and one Virgil Scott with the crime of murder. On the same day, petitioner was arraigned, tried, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The record indicates that petitioner was without legal assistance throughout all these proceedings and was never advised of his right to counsel. The court did not explain the consequences of the plea of guilty, and the record indicates considerable confusion in petitioner’s mind at the time of the arraignment as to the effect of such a plea. No evidence in petitioner’s behalf was introduced at the trial and none of the State’s witnesses were subjected to cross-examination.
After reviewing the foregoing facts, the Supreme Court of Michigan determined that the record revealed no deprivation of petitioner’s constitutional rights. The court indicated that it had given consideration to the case of Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945), and the authorities cited therein, but concluded that the rule of the Michigan cases was determinative. See People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N. W. 818 (1923). In this there was error.
Here a seventeen-year-old defendant, confronted by a serious and complicated criminal charge, was hurried through unfamiliar legal proceedings without a word being said in his defense. At no time was assistance of counsel offered or mentioned to him, nor was he apprised of the consequences of his plea. Under the holdings of this Court, petitioner was deprived of rights essential to a fair hearing under the Federal Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, supra. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
Reversed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.