BOWERSOX, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORRECTIONAL CENTER v. WILLIAMS
No. A-828.
Decided April 9, 1996
Per Curiam.
Doyle J. Williams is scheduled to be executed by the State of Missouri on April 10, 1996. On January 11, 1996, a Federal District Court denied Williams’ third federal habeas corpus petition, finding all of Williams’ claims to be abusive, successive, or procedurally defaulted. On March 8,1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered a summary order staying Williams’ execution. The Court of Appeals scheduled oral argument for May 13, 1996, and resolved that the stay would remain in effect pending submission of the case and that court’s further order. The summary order gives no explanation for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that oral argument is necessary or that entry of a stay was appropriate. The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc, and we now have before us an application to vacate the stay.
“A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition should be granted only when there are ‘substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.”’ Delo v. Stokes, 495 U. S. 320, 321 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983)). Entry of a stay on a second or third habeas petition is a drastic measure, and we have held that it is “ ‘particularly egregious’ ” to enter a stay absent substantial grounds for relief. Delo v. Blair, 509 U. S. 823 (1993) (citation omitted). On the record before us, we can discern no such grounds. We are persuaded by the report prepared by Magistrate Judge Hays, which meticulously addresses each of Williams’ claims and finds each to be abusive, successive, procedurally defaulted, or meritless, and by the District Court’s order adopting that report, in which the District Court also denied Williams’ dilatory motion to amend the habeas petition. The Court of Appeals abused its discretion by entering a stay on this record.
To the extent the Court of Appeals discerned substantial grounds for relief, it failed to reveal them in its summary order granting the stay. Although we hesitate to say that a court of appeals must, in every case, explain the basis for its entry of a stay, we see fit to remind the lower courts that entry of a stay without explanation is disfavored. Cf. Netherland, v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995) (per curiam). When a court of appeals fails to articulate its reasons for granting a stay, we lose the benefit of that court’s views and must resort to other portions of the record in evaluating whether to vacate the stay. In this case, the District Court’s careful treatment of Williams’ claims and the surface implausibility of those claims persuade us that the stay should not have been granted, and the Court of Appeals’ summary order does not convince us otherwise.
Accordingly, the application to vacate the stay of execution is. granted.
It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.