McCARTHY v. PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
No. 75-783.
Decided March 22, 1976
Per Curiam.
After 16 years of service, appellant’s employment in the Philadelphia Fire Department was terminated because he moved his permanent residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey in contravention of a municipal regulation requiring employees of the city of Philadelphia to be residents of the city. He challenges the constitutionality of the regulation and the authorizing ordinances as violative of his federally protected right of interstate travel. The regulation was sustained by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and review was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. His timely appeal is here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
The Michigan Supreme Court held that Detroit’s similar requirement for police officers was not irrational and did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We dismissed the appeal from that judgment because no substantial federal question was presented. Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 405 U. S. 950 (1972). We have therefore held that this kind of ordinance is not irrational. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-345 (1975); see War dwell v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 529 F. 2d 625, 628 (CA6 1976).
We have not, however, specifically addressed the contention made by appellant in this case that his constitutionally recognized right to travel interstate as defined in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), is impaired. Each of those cases involved a statutory requirement of residence in the State for at least one year before becoming eligible either to vote, as in Dunn, or to receive welfare benefits, as in Sha.piro and Memorial Hospital. Neither in those cases, nor in any others, have we questioned the validity of a condition placed upon municipal employment that a person be a resident at the time of his application. In this case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadelphia while he is living elsewhere. There is no support in our cases for such a claim.
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Thus in Shapiro, supra, at 636, we stated: “The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.”. And in Memorial Hospital, supra, at 255, quoting Dunn, supra, at 342 n. 13, the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question “ ‘the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.' ”
This case involves that kind of bona fide continuing-residence requirement. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is therefore affirmed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.
§ 7-401 (u) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter of 1951 ; § 20-101 of the Philadelphia Code (as amended); and § 30.01 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations.
19 Pa. Commw. 383, 339 A. 2d 634 (1975).
In an unreported order entered on September 2, 1975, that court denied a petition for review.
Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N. W. 2d 97 (1971).
Although there is a durational residence requirement in the Philadelphia ordinances, appellant does not have standing to challenge that requirement.
Nor did any of those cases involve a public agency’s relationship with its own employees which, of course, may justify greater control than that over the citizenry at large. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973).
Appellant seeks review of other alleged errors as if presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari. We decline to review those issues.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.