ALABAMA v. TEXAS et al.
NO. —,
Argued February 3-4, 1954.
Decided March 15, 1954.
William E. Powers, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Si Garrett, Attorney General of Alabama, Benjamin V. Cohen and Marx Leva argued the cause for complainants. On the briefs were Mr. Powers, Mr. Cohen, Thomas G. Corcoran and Eugene Gressman for the State of Rhode Island; and Mr. Garrett, and M. Roland Nachman, Jr. and Gordon Madison, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Alabama, complainants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General of California, John L. Madden, Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana, Jesse P. Luton, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of Texas, and Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for defendants. On the briefs were Mr. Brown, William V. O’Connor, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Everett W. Mattoon, Assistant Attorney General, and George G. Grover, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of California, and Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General, Howard S. Bailey and Fred M. Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, and John D. Moriarty, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Florida; Fred S. LeBlanc, Attorney General, Mr. Madden and Bailey Walsh, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Louisiana; John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General, Robert S. Trotti, First Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Luton, and William H. Holloway and Phillip Robinson, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Texas; and Attorney General Brownell, Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Rankin, Oscar H. Davis, John F. Davis and George S. Swarth for Humphrey et al., defendants.
Per Curiam.
The motions for leave to file these complaints are denied. Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2, United States Constitution. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537: The power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States “is vested in Congress without limitation.” United States v. Midwest Oil Company, 236 U. S. 459, 474: “For it must be borne in mind that Congress not only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein. Congress 'may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from sale.’ Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 524; Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 536.” United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30: “Article 4, § 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that ‘The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United States.’ The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. ‘And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.’ ” United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27: “We have said that the constitutional power of Congress [under Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2] is without limitation. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30.”
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
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