BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. KIZER, DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, et al.
No. 86-863.
Argued November 10, 1987
Decided March 23, 1988
Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, and Richard Olderman.
Ralph Johnson, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, and Evelyn R. Frank.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Henry T. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, and Ken Eikenberry of Washington; and for the California Association of Public Hospitals et al. by Mark S. Windisch.
Per Curiam.
We granted the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ petition for certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), in order to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Secretary unlawfully rejected a California Medicaid plan amendment because an internal agency manual stating approval of the type of provision in question was a binding regulation, and because acceptance of the amendment was required by § 2373(c) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1112, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (1982 ed., Supp. III). Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F. 2d 1421 (1986). After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress enacted § 4106 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, which required the Secretary to approve the proposed California amendment, retroactively to the date of its proposal. The Secretary has complied with that requirement.
The parties agree that these developments have rendered the controversy moot. In accordance with our established practice, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions to dismiss the suit. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 200, 204 (1988); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.