CALDERON, WARDEN v. MOORE
No. 95-1612.
Decided June 17, 1996
Per Curiam.
Respondent Charles Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court, and sentenced to death. The District Court granted habeas relief, concluding that the state court had denied Moore his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). The District Court thus vacated the judgment of conviction and ordered the warden, petitioner here, to “release Moore from custody after the expiration of 60 days unless, within 60 days hereof, the State of California grants Moore the right to a new trial.” App. A to Brief in Opposition A65.
The State filed a notice of appeal and sought a stay of the District Court’s order pending appeal, but its various stay applications were respectively denied by the District Court, the Ninth Circuit, 56 F. 3d 39 (1995), and by Justice O’Con-nor, in her capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit. The State accordingly set Moore for retrial, and simultaneously pursued its appeal of the District Court’s order on the merits to the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals, observing that the “State of California has granted petitioner Charles Edward Moore, Jr., a new trial,” dismissed the State’s appeal as moot. App. A to Pet. for Cert.
It is true, of course, that mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974); that federal courts may not “give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,” Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895); and that an appeal should therefore be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant “any effectual relief whatever” in favor of the appellant, ibid. The available remedy, however, does not need to be “fully satisfactory” to avoid mootness. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13 (1992). To the contrary, even the availability of a “partial remedy” is “sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.” Ibid.
In this case, to say the least, a “partial remedy” necessary to avoid mootness will be available to the State of California (represented here by petitioner). While the administrative machinery necessary for a new trial has been set in motion, that trial has not yet even begun, let alone reached a point where the court could no longer award any relief in the State’s favor. Because a decision in the State’s favor would release it from the burden of the new trial itself, the Court of Appeals is not prevented from granting “any effectual relief whatever” in the State’s favor, Mills, supra, at 653, and the case is clearly not moot. We therefore grant respondent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, grant petition for a writ of certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.