PHILLIPS v. MARTIN MARIETTA CORP.
No. 73.
Argued December 9, 1970
Decided January 25, 1971
William L. Robinson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg,. James M. Nabrit III, Norman C. Amaker, and Earl M. Johnson.
Donald T. Senterfitt argued the cause for respondent. With him op the brief were William Y. Akerman, Paul A. Porter, Victor H. Kramer, Dennis G. Lyons, James A. Dobkin, Clark C. Vogel, James T. Ellison, J. Thomas Cardwell, and George T. Eidson, Jr.
Lawrence G. Wallace argued the cause for. the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Robert T. Moore, and Stanley P. Hebert.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by-Dorothy Kenyon, Norman Donen, Pauli Murray, and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Gilbert Feldman for the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local 550, Transport Workers Union of.America, AFL-CIO; by Jacob D. Hyman, Faith A. Seidenberg, Marguerite Rawalt, and Phineas-Indritz for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,Inc.;- and by Sylvia Ellison for Human Rights for Women, Inc.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Mrs. Ida Phillips commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that she had been denied employment because of her sex. The District Court granted summary ■judgment for Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) on the basis of the following showing: (1) in 1966 Martin informed Mrs. Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with pre-school-age children; (2) as of the time of the motion for summary judgment, Martin employed men with pre-school-áge children; (3) At the time Mrs. Phillips applied, 70-75 % of the applicants for the position she sought were women; 75-80% of those hired for the position, assembly trainee, were women,, hence no question of bias against women as such was presented.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 411 F. 2d 1, and denied a rehearing en banc, 416' F. 2d 1257 (1969). We granted certiorari. 397 U. S.. 960 (1970).
Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred, in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men— each having pre-school-age children. The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under § 703 (e) of the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that the' condition in question “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” The record before us, however, is not adequate for resolution of these important issues. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249, 256-257 (1948). Summary judgment was therefore improper and we remand for fuller development of the record and for further consideration.
Vacated and remanded.
Section 703 of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2, provides as follows:
“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-. ployer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of .such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
“(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) • it shall not be'an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the. normal operation of that particular business: or enterprise . . ,
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