NEWSOM v. SMYTH, SUPERINTENDENT, VIRGINIA STATE PENITENTIARY.
No. 116.
Argued January 16-17, 1961.
Decided March 27, 1961.
Armistead L. Boothe, acting under appointment by the Court, 363 U. S. 833, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Reno S. Harp III, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was A. S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General.
Per Curiam.
A writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Virginia was granted in this case, 363 U. S. 802, in the belief that it duly presented for the Court’s consideration the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution requires that the State must, in appropriate circumstances, appoint counsel to assist an indigent prisoner under sentence of conviction for a state crime in prosecuting his appeal. After hearing oral argument, and upon full consideration of the case, we find that the record does not adequately establish that the Virginia court found or was required to find that there was presented to it the federal claim on which the case was brought here. The case thus fails to present a federal question, and the writ must be dismissed as improvidently granted.
So ordered.
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