PEURIFOY et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 46.
Argued October 16, 20, 1958.
Decided November 10, 1958.
Daniel R. Dixon argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Martin F. O’Donoghue.
Earl E. Pollock argued the cause for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Lee A. Jackson and Melva M. Graney.
Per Curiam.
The petitioners were employed as construction workers at a site in Kinston, North Carolina, for continuous periods of 20% months, 12% months, and 8% months, respectively, ending in the year 1953. Each of the petitioners maintained a permanent residence elsewhere in North Carolina. In reporting his adjusted gross income for 1953 each petitioner deducted amounts expended for board and lodging at Kinston during the period of employment there, and for transportation from Kinston to his permanent residence upon leaving that employment. These deductions were disallowed by the respondent. Ensuing Tax Court proceedings resulted in a decision in favor of the petitioners. 27 T. C. 149. The Court of Appeals reversed. 254 F. 2d 483. We granted certiorari, 356 U. S. 956, to consider certain questions as to the application of §23 (a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 raised by the course of decisions in the lower courts since our decision in Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U. S. 465. However, as the case has been presented to us we have found it inappropriate to consider such questions.
The issue is whether the amounts in question constituted allowable deductions under § 23 (a)(1)(A). Generally, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct unreimbursed travel expenses under this subsection only when they are required by “the exigencies of business.” Commissioner v. Flowers, supra. Application of this general rule would require affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the present case.
To this rule, however, the Tax Court has engrafted an exception which allows a deduction for expenditures of the type made in this case when the taxpayer’s employment is “temporary” as contrasted with “indefinite” or “indeterminate.” Compare Schurer v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 544; Leach v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 20; Albert v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 129, with Warren v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 205; Whitaker v. Commissioner, 24 T. C. 750. The respondent does not in the present case challenge the validity of this exception to the general rule.
Resolution of this case as presented to us turns, therefore, upon a narrow question of fact — Was the petitioners’ employment “temporary” or “indefinite”? The Tax Court, stating that “each case must be decided upon the basis of its own facts and circumstances,” 27 T. C., at 157, found that their employment was temporary. The Court of Appeals, also recognizing that the question was “one of fact,” held that on the record the Tax Court’s finding of temporary employment was “clearly erroneous.” 254 F. 2d, at 487.
In reviewing the Tax Court’s factual determination, the Court of Appeals has made a fair assessment of the record. 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 7482; Rule 52 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.; cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. That being so, this Court will not intervene. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401; Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498, 502-503.
Affirmed.
“§ 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME.
“In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
“(a) Expenses.
“(1) Trade or business expenses.
“(A) In general.
“All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including .. . traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; . . . .” 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §23 (a)(1)(A).
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