WASHINGTON, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES, et al.
No. 17-269.
Supreme Court of the United States
June 11, 2018.
Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, Noah G. Purcell, Solicitor General, Fronda C. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Jay D. Geck, Anne E. Egeler, Deputy Solicitors General, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner.
Kevin P. Martin, Tucker DeVoe, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, William M. Jay, Brian T. Burgess, Jaime A. Santos, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, for Tribal Respondents.
Riyaz A. Kanji, Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI, John C. Sledd, Jane G. Steadman, Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondents the Hoh Tribe, the Jamestown, S'Klallam Tribe, the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe, the Nisqually Tribe, the Port Gamble S'Klallam, Tribe, the Sauk-Suiattle Tribe, the Squaxin Island Tribe, the Stillaguamish Tribe, and the Suquamish Tribe.
Mary Neil, Office of The Reservation Attorney, Lummi Nation, Bellingham, WA, James R. Sigel, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, Deanne E. Maynard, Brian R. Matsui, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent the Lummi Nation.
Thomas Zeilman, Law Offices of Thomas Zeilman, Yakima, WA, for Respondent the Confederated Tribes, and Bands of the Yakama Nation.
Craig Dorsay, Lea Ann Easton, Dorsay & Easton, LLP, Portland, OR, for Respondent the Hoh Tribe.
Brian Gruber, Ziontz Chestnut, Seattle, WA, for Respondent the Makah Tribe.
Alan C. Stay, Ann E. Tweedy, Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, Office of The Tribal Attorney, Auburn, WA, for Respondent the Muckleshoot Tribe.
Maryanne Mohan, Office of The Tribal Attorney, Nisqually Indian Tribe, Olympia, WA, for Respondent the Nisqually Tribe.
Lauren Rasmussen, Law Offices of Lauren P. Rasmussen, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondents the Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe and the Port Gamble, S'Klallam Tribe.
Steve Suagee, Sam Hough, Tribal Attorneys' Office, Lower Elwha, Klallam Tribe, Port Angeles, WA, for Respondent the Lower Elwha, Klallam Tribe.
Connie Sue Martin, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Seattle, WA, for Respondent the Nooksack Tribe.
Eric Nielsen, Nielsen, Broman & Koch, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondent the Quinault Indian Nation.
Earle David Lees, Tribal Attorney, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Skokomish Nation, WA, for Respondent the Skokomish Tribe.
Kevin R. Lyon, Squaxin Island, Legal Department, Shelton, WA, for Respondent the Squaxin Island Tribe.
Samuel J. Stiltner, John Howard Bell, Tribal Attorneys, Puyallup Indian Tribe, Tacoma, WA, Harry R. Sachse, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent the Puyallup Tribe.
Timothy J. Filer, Foster Pepper PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondent the Quileute Tribe.
Scott Owen Mannakee, Tribal Attorney, Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians, Arlington, WA, for Respondent the Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians.
David Hawkins, Office of The Tribal Attorney, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, Sedro Wooley, WA, for respondent the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe.
Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr., Tyler L. Farmer, Kristin Ballinger, Danielson Harrigan, Leyh & Tollefson, LLP, Seattle, WA, for respondent the Upper Skagit Tribe.
James Rittenhouse Bellis, Suquamish Tribe Legal Department, Suquamish Tribe, Suquamish, WA, for Respondent the Suquamish Tribe.
Emily Hutchinson Haley, Tribal Attorney, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, La Conner, WA, for Respondent the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community.
Mason D. Morisset, Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, Seattle, WA, for Respondent the Tulalip Tribes.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Allon Kedem, Assistant to the Solicitor General, William B. Lazarus, Vanessa Boyd Willard, Evelyn S. Ying, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Justice KENNEDY took no part in the decision of this case.
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