ANDERS, SOLICITOR OF RICHLAND COUNTY v. FLOYD
No. 77-1255.
Decided March 5, 1979
Per Curiam.
The motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is denied.
The motion of David Gaetano for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is granted.
Appellee was indicted by a grand jury of Richland County, S. C., for criminal abortion and murder in connection with the abortion of a 25-week-old fetus. The District Court enjoined the prosecution, concluding that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), there was no possibility of obtaining a constitutionally binding conviction of appellee. 440 F. Supp. 535 (1977). Because the District Court may have reached this conclusion on the basis of an erroneous concept of “viability,” which refers to potential, rather than actual, survival of the fetus outside the womb, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 388-389 (1979), the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for further consideration in light of Colautti.
In addition, it is suggested, in view of the alternative constructions of the South Carolina criminal statutes that are available, that the District Court give further consideration to the possibility of abstention, at least in part, in deference to the pendency of the state-court proceeding.
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stewart dissents.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.