NATIONAL LEAD CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 124.
Argued December 13, 1956.
Decided January 22, 1957.
Karl Riemer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Lawrence S. Lesser.
Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Philip Elman and Joseph F. Goetten.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to No. 78, United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., ante, p. 306, which was also decided today. During World War II petitioner manufactured engine bearings. In 1944 petitioner expanded its plant in an effort to increase the output of these essential war products. At the same time it applied to the War Production Board for certification that the various additions were necessary in the interest of national defense. However the Board, as in Allen-Bradley, granted certificates of necessity for only a part of the cost of petitioner’s new facilities. In its income tax return for 1944 petitioner exercised the privilege such certification conferred by taking as a deduction a sum based on the accelerated amortization of that part of the costs which had been certified by the Board.
In 1951 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted a deficiency against petitioner on grounds unrelated to the present controversy. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court claiming that it was entitled to a refund for overpayment of income taxes in 1944. The amount of this overpayment was calculated on the basis that petitioner was entitled to accelerate the amortization of the full cost of those facilities covered by the Board’s “partial certifications.” Petitioner contends that the Board was not authorized to certify only a part of the cost of a facility when the Board had determined that the facility as a whole was necessary to the national defense. The Tax Court granted petitioner’s claim, but on appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding that petitioner had forfeited its right to challenge the Board’s action by waiting too long after accepting the tax benefits of the “partial certificates” to attack their validity. 230 F. 2d 161. The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the Board was authorized to issue such “partial certificates.” For reasons stated in our opinion in No. 78, United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., supra, we hold that the Board was empowered to issue certificates covering only a part of the cost of petitioner’s improvements. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan joins in the Court’s decision for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., ante, p. 311.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.