UNITED STATES v. ACRI et al.
No. 33.
Argued November 16, 1954.
Decided January 10, 1955.
Charles K. Rice argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, A. F. Prescott and Fred E. Youngman.
Francis B. Kavanagh argued the cause and filed a brief for Oravitz, respondent. With him on the brief was Israel Freeman.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the relative priority between an attachment lien and the liens of the United States for unpaid taxes. The District Court found the attachment lien prior to the liens of the United States, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. We granted certiorari, 347 U. S. 973.
On August 11, 1948, the United--States filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to collect unpaid income taxes for the years 1942-1946 against one Acri and his wife. Acri was at the time in the penitentiary for the murder of one Oravec, whose personal representative, Oravitz, had, on August 6, 1947, in Mahoning County, Ohio, filed an action against Acri for wrongful death. On the same date, certain cash and bonds of Acri, which were in his safety deposit box in the Dollar Savings and Trust Company, were attached by Oravitz. The box was not opened until September 11, 1948, after the bank had been made guardian of Acri, at which time an inventory was filed. The personal representative, Oravitz, and the bank, as guardian of Acri, were made parties to the Government’s suit.
On January 19, 1949, the personal representative of the murdered man recovered judgment against Acri in the sum of $18,500. In the meantime, on November 18, 1947, after the issuance of the writ of attachment, but more than a year before the judgment in the main action for wrongful death, the assessment lists for unpaid income taxes of Acri and his wife for the years 1942-1946 were received in the office of the Collector of Internal Revenue. On November 19, 1947, demand for payment was mailed to Acri. On November 21, 1947, a notice of the tax liens was filed in the office of the Recorder in Mahoning County, Ohio, which is the residence of the defendants and the location of the Acris’ property, and the place where the action for wrongful death was begun. Notice and levy of the tax liens were served upon the Dollar Bank. It was stipulated that the only question involved was the relative priority of the attachment lien of the personal representative and the tax liens of the United States.
The issue here is identical with that in United States v. Security Trust Co., 340 U. S. 47. There the question was stated as follows:
“The question presented here is whether a tax lien of the United States is prior in right to an attachment lien where the federal tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the attaching creditor obtained judgment.” 340 U. S., at 48.
Our answer here is the same as in the Security Trust Company case and for the same reasons.
The relative priority of the lien of the United States for unpaid taxes is, as we said in United States v. Waddill Co., 323 U. S. 353, 356, 357; Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 371; United States v. Security Trust Co., 340 U. S. 47, 49, always a federal question to be determined finally by the federal courts. The state’s characterization of its liens, while good for all state purposes, does not necessarily bind this Court. United States v. Waddill Co., 323 U. S. 353, at 357; United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361. Therefore, the fact that the Ohio courts had designated an attachment lien “an execution in advance,” Rempe & Son v. Ravens, 68 Ohio St. 113, 67 N. E. 282, and treated it as a perfected lien at the time of attachment, does not bind this Court. We must look at the circumstances as we did in the Waddill case, where the Virginia court had held a landlord’s lien was fixed, specific, and not inchoate. This Court, after examining the facts, found otherwise. In Gilbert Associates, the New Hampshire court had held that the assessment of a tax was a judgment and the United States’ lien for taxes was not valid against the tax assessment made by the town within the meaning of § 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code. We held that although New Hampshire might treat its tax assessments as judgments for state purposes, the assessment of the tax was not a judgment within the meaning of § 3672. We hold here that the attachment lien in Ohio is for federal tax purposes an inchoate lien because, at the time the attachment issued, the fact and the amount of the lien were contingent upon the outcome of the suit for damages.
In argument it was pointed out that the statute of California involved in the Security Trust case was different because California courts had held an attachment lien to be inchoate and a mere notice of a more perfect lien to come, while Ohio courts had held it to be an execution in advance and a lien perfected as of the time of attachment. This distinction is immaterial for purposes of federal law. This case is not to be distinguished from United States v. Security Trust Co., 340 U. S. 47, and the judgment is
Reversed.
“Such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector . . etc.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.