PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al.
No. 459.
Decided December 14, 1959
Kent H. Brown and George H. Kenny for petitioner in No. 459.
J. David Mann, Jr. and J. Louis Monarch for United Gas Improvement Co., and Vincent P. McDevitt and Samuel Graff Miller for Philadelphia Electric Co., petitioners in No. 473.
Willard W. Gatchell and Howard E. Wahrenbrock for the Federal Power Commission; Richard J. Connor, John T. Miller, Jr., Thomas F. Broman, James B. Henderson and William N. Bonner, jr. for Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.; W. W. Heard and William J. Grove for Pan American Petroleum Corp.; Chas. B. EUard and Bernard A. Foster, Jr. for Atlantic Refining Co.; Gentry Lee and Bernard A. Foster, Jr. for Cities Service Production Co.; Carl Illig and William J. Merrill for Humble Oil & Refining-Co.; Clayton L. Orh and James D. Parriott for Ohio Oil Co.; Frank C. Bolton and William S. Richardson for Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc. (successor to Magnolia Petroleum Co.); John C. Snodgrass for Pure Oil Co.; George D. Horning for Union Oil Co. of California; Robert E. May for Húnt, Trustee; Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner, Kenneth Heady, Charles E. McGee and Lambert McAllister for Phillips Petroleum Co.; Martin A. Row, Robert E. May and Omar L. Crook for Sun Oil Co., respondents.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of petitioners were filed by William M. Bennett for the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of California; John W. Reynolds,. Attorney General of Wisconsin, N. S. Hefjeman, Deputy Attorney General, Roy G. Tulane, Assistant Attorney General, and William E. Torkelson for the State of Wisconsin and the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin; David Berger for the City of Philadelphia; David Stahl for the City of Pittsburgh; Joe W. Anderson, Roger Arnebergh, Alexander G. Brown, J. Elliott Drinard, N. H. Goldstick, Dion R. Holm, Claude V. Jonesj Walter J. Mattison; John C. Melaniphy, Barnett I. Shur, A. C. Van Soelen, Charles S. Rhyne and J. Parker Connor for the Member Municipalities of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; Charles S. Rhyne and J. Parker Connor for the Alabama League of Municipalities; Edward Munce and Thomas M. Kerrigan for,.the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; and Edward S. Kirby for Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Together with No. 473, United Gas Improvement Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al., also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same Count.
Per Curiam.
The motion to substitute Humble Oil & Refining Company, a Delaware corporation, in the place of Humble Oil & Refining Company, a Texas corporation, as a party respondent, is granted. The motions of Public Service Electric and Gas Company and the Alabama League of Municipalities for leave to file briefs, as amici curiae, are granted.
The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cases are remanded to that court with directions to remand the cases to the Federal Power Commission for reconsideration and redetermination in the light of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 360 U. S. 378.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.