CITY OF MERIDIAN v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
No. 546.
Decided February 24, 1959.
George M. Ethridge, Jr. and Lester E. Wills for appellant.
Charles B. Snow and John A. Boykin, Jr. for appellee.
Tally D. Riddell filed a brief on behalf of the City of Gulfport et al., as amici curiae, in support of appellant.
Per Curiam.
Appellee instituted this suit for a declaratory judgment that a 1956 Mississippi statute imposing a charge on public utilities for the use of public streets and places does not apply to it, and, if it does, violates the Federal and State Constitutions. It was tried before a single district judge. After trial the district judge wrote an opinion (154 F. Supp. 736) and then entered a judgment which declared the statute in conflict with the State and Federal Constitutions and thus beyond the power of the Mississippi Legislature to enact. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 256 F. 2d 83. An appeal was taken to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), providing for appeal of a decision of a Court of Appeals where appellant relies on a state statute held to be “invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.” Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that review by appeal does not lie because the Court of Appeals decision declaring the state statute unconstitutional was based on the Constitution of Mississippi as well as the Federal Constitution. Subsequently, appellant moved the Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to vacate its judgment and convene a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284 to consider appellee’s complaint. Appellee opposed the motion. Without passing judgment on the merits of that motion (cf. Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 352 U. S. 977), we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to hold the cause while the parties repair to a state tribunal for an authoritative declaration of applicable state law.
Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court’s consideration of the underlying federal constitutional questions. See Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496. That is especially desirable where the questions of state law are enmeshed with federal questions. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Here, the state law problems are delicate ones, the resolution of which is not without substantial difficulty— certainly for a federal court. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478, 483. In such a case, when the state court’s interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., supra; Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, supra, 104-105. See Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 228-229.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.