Per Curiam.
A three-judge District Court was convened in response to appellee’s complaint alleging that N. Y. Civil Service Law § 72 (1969), governing leave of absence for mentally unfit civil service employees, denied her the procedural due process guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Joined as defendants in her action, which sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, were the appellants Civil Service Commission of the State of New York and its members, and the city of New York.
The District Court sustained appéllee’s federal constitutional claims, and enjoined the defendants from taking any action under the challenged statutory provision, and also ordered that appellee be reinstated in her civil service position and given backpay by the city of New York. The city has not appealed from the judgments.
Appellee, in addition to the previously described allegations, also asserted in her complaint that the city of New York in suspending her had not followed the procedures set forth in § 72. She particularly alleged that the doctor who examined her had not been selected in the manner prescribed by that statute. Appellants have not denied this allegation and, indeed, now acknowledge that the state law was not followed. The record therefore now establishes that the statutory procedure which appellee challenged has not been applied to her. It follows that she may have had a claim under state law against the city of New York; she may indeed have had a claim against the city of New York based on the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of the procedure which the city in fact followed in suspending her. Since the city has not appealed, we have no occasion to consider any aspect of her claim against it, other than to say that neither of the claims just described would authorize the convening of the three-judge District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 2281. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 253 (1941).
“In so far as it is alleged that the assessments are void because unauthorized by the Arizona statute, the injunction sought is obviously not upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the state statute as tested by the Federal Constitution.” Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354, 358 (1940).
Stripped of these related contentions, appellee’s claim against appellant state Civil Service Commission amounts to a request for a determination of the constitutionality of a statute which, while administered by the Commission has never in fact been properly applied by the Commission or indeed by the city of New York to her. Since the record now makes it clear that she has no standing to assert such a challenge, her complaint as to the constitutionality of § 72 should be dismissed. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974).
Appellee asserted no claim against appellant Civil Service Commission and its members other than her constitutional claim. On their appeal, therefore, the judgment of the District Court as to them is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss ap-pellee’s complaint insofar as it sought relief against them.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would affirm without hearing oral argument.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations