HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
The proceeding under review here was brought under Section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act as a general investigation of the reasonableness of all the rates of petitioner, subject to the jurisdiction of the commission.
Petitioner, as to all of its rates sought to be investigated, denied that any of them were unreasonable, and as to sales of natural gas, made by it in the Monroe Gas Field to certain pipe line companies, it insisted that the rates and charges were not within the jurisdiction of the commission, that, indeed, as part of the production and gathering of the gas, they were by the statute expressly withdrawn from its jurisdiction.
The Commission found that all of the sales to these companies were “[sales] in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption” within the meaning of Section 1(b), the jurisdictional section of the act, and that the charges made were unreasonable. Its order required reductions in these rates from 7.390 to 4.660 per M.c.f.
Petitioner is here complaining: (l)-that the sales were not within, but were expressly excluded from, the jurisdiction of the commission; and (2) that the order as to them is confiscatory. In support of its first position, it relies not only on the language of’ the act, but on what it calls “authorized statements of commission representatives”, and “legislative history”. In support of its second position it points to the fact that the charges the order fixed as reasonable are considerably less than the average price, 5.50, which petitioner pays for gas purchased by it in the field, and that 1.10 must be added to this as gathering costs. Thus for gas which cost it 6.6 cents, the order allows it to charge only 4.66 cents.
In answer to petitioner’s first position, the Commission points to the precise language of the section, that the provisions of the act “shall apply to the sale in interstate commerce * * * for resale for ultimate public consumption * * * ”; to the undisputed fact admitted by petitioner that the sales the order deals with are in interstate commerce; to the legislative history of the act in question as distinguished from the history of prior acts introduced but not enacted into law, on which petitioner relies; and to Peoples Natural Gas v. The Commissioner, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 127 F.2d 153; and other cases which it claims support its view.
As to petitioner’s second point, that the order was confiscatory, the Commission invokes the settled principle that the rate order must be viewed not piecemeal but in its entirety, that, in short, if as a whole the order affords just compensation, the fact that some particular rate in the schedule of rates, viewed by itself alone, may appear to be low, is immaterial. Basing on that principle, it points to the admitted fact that the rate schedules as a whole established by the order are producing a 6.5% return on the rate base fixed. As to the precise rates, the Commission insists that since petitioner operates an integrated pipeline system in which both produced and purchased gas are commingled and disposes of a great pan of its gas to others than these pipelines in question, there is no way of knowing just what is the source of the gas delivered to petitioner’s pipeline customers. By figures it demonstrates that the cost of the gas produced is less than the 4.66^ allowed, and it insists that it is not, and cannot be, made to appear that that charge even by itself is confiscatory.
We agree with the Commission that the rates are within its jurisdiction and that petitioner has failed to show that they are confiscatory.
Disposing first of the question of compensation, we need not inquire whether, if it stood alone, the rate allowed would be confiscatory. It is sufficient to say that the Commission is correct in its position that the rate order must be viewed in its entirety, and that “it is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect o£ the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.” Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 288, 88 L.Ed. 333; Panhandle v. Federal Power, 324 U.S. 635, 65 S.Ct. 821, 89 L.Ed. 1241; Cities Service Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 10 Cir., 155 F.2d 694.
On the jurisdictional point, we think the language employed in the bill as it finally passed, “The provisions of this act shall apply * * * to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale” leaves in no doubt that the sales in question are within its purview. That they are sales in interstate commerce, we think is settled by the authorities. That the gas was sold for resale for ultimate public consumption, we think may not be doubted. This being so, the exception of the statute that it shall not apply to “any other * * * sale of natural gas” is unavailing to petitioner, for if the sale is the kind named in the first quoted clause, it certainly cannot be “any ■other sale”.
We think petitioner’s difficulties in construction and interpretation arise out of the fact that, treating unlike things as alike, it tries to read the exception with respect to production or gathering as an exception with respect to sales. There is no warrant in the act for so doing. It is very simply and plainly written. After stating what it shall apply to, it then states what it shall not apply to. Under familiar rules of construction, a negation in or exception to a statute will be construed so as to avoid nullifying or restricting its apparent principal purpose and the positive provisions made to carry them out. No conflict with them will, therefore, be found unless the conflict is clear and inescapable and then only in the precise point of the conflict. Cf. Hartford v. Federal Power, 2 Cir., 131 F.2d 953. Here the statute was drawn to regulate, it picked out for inclusion “sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption.” It excluded from the scope of the act sales other than of this kind. It included transportation in interstate commerce. It excluded local distribution of natural gas.
Unnecessarily perhaps but in the interest of making clear that the act gave jurisdiction only over sales and transportation of the kind described in it, it used language removing from any doubt that the Commission was not to have jurisdiction over properties used for production and local distribution or the activities of production and gathering. It did this by expressly providing that the act should not apply “to the facilities used for such [i. e. local] distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”
In Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 75 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 127 F.2d 153, the court found that a sale in Pennsylvania to an interstate pipeline company which immediately transported it to New York was a sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale, and, so finding, held that the provision, that the act did not apply to production or gathering did not limit the commission’s jurisdiction over such sales.
In the Canadian River Gas case, 324 U.S. 581 at pages 602-603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206, the Supreme Court rejected the argument which petitioner advances here that unless the meaning it contends for is given to the provision, with respect to gathering and distribution, that provision will be meaningless. It said:
“That does not mean that the part of § 1 (b) which provides that the Act shall not apply ‘to the production or gathering of natural gas’ is given no meaning. Certainly that provision precludes the Commission from any control over the activity of producing or gathering natural gas. For example, it makes plain that the Commission has no control over the drilling and spacing of wells and the like. It may put other limitations on the Commission. We only decide that it does not preclude the Commission from reflecting the production and gathering facilities of a natural gas company in the rate base ,and determining the expenses incident thereto for the purposes of determining the reasonableness of rates subject to its jurisdiction.”
A careful reading of petitioner’s brief, especially of that portion of it devoted to the legislative history, shows that its difficulties flow from the fact that it does not distinguish between the Lea Bill, House Bill No. 11,662, proposed in 1936, but never passed, and the bill which became the law now under review. Legislative history “cannot be resorted to for the purpose of construing a statute contrary to the natural import of its terms. * * * If the language be clear, it is conclusive.” Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., supra [127 F.2d 159], quoting from United States v. Shreveport Grain Co., 287 U.S. 77 at page 83, 53 S.Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed. 175. Certainly the legislative history of a bill that was not adopted cannot be resorted to to construe a bill that was.
It is quite plain that from the time the Lea Bill was introduced until the Natural Gas Act was passed, the ideas of the proponents of the legislation underwent considerable change. The purpose of the Natural Gas Act, as shown in the Senate and House Committee reports, which are identical, was to provide for the regulation of natural gas companies transporting and selling natural gas in interstate commerce. Its proponents were not interested in the production of gas or the individual sales of gas at the well. Nor were they interested in the gathering of the gas in the field. What they were interested in, as the report in terms states, what they were trying to reach, was wholesale sales of gas. Says the report:
“There is no intention in enacting the present legislation to disturb the states in their exercise of such jurisdiction. However, in the case of sales for resale, or so-called wholesale sales in interstate commerce, (for example sales by producing companies to distributing companies) the legal situation is different. Such transactions have been considered to be not local in character, and, even in the absence of congressional action, not subject to state regulation. (See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 1924, 265 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 544, 68 L.Ed. 1027, and Public Service Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 1927, 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549) The basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not act.”
It would be difficult to conceive language better adapted to achieve this purpose than the language of the act in question here. It would be difficult to, find a case more clearly illustrating the mischief which the act was supposed to remedy, more fittingly applying the remedy. The statute expressly provides that “it shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in intersate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale * * * It is conceded that Interstate is a natural gas company engaged in interstate transportation and sale, and it is further established that it, in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., D.C., 33 F.Supp. 50, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 980, successfully contended in the Federal Court that sales to the pipelines in question were sales in interstate commerce and beyond the reach of the State Commission. This is not to say that its success in so contending would estop it from claiming the contrary here or that the decision it obtained there is controlling here. It is to say though that the position it took and the decision it obtained give force and color to the avowed purpose of the Natural Gas Act as House and Senate Committees stated it, and that it seems clear to us that it would be difficult to find a case falling more clearly within both the purpose and the language of the act. Cf. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., Public Service Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., Supra. The record shows no ground for setting aside or modifying the order.
The petition for its review is denied.
“Sec. 5(a) Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State Commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract „ affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine' the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order:” 15 U.S.C.A. § 717d (a).
52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq.
Mississippi River Fuel Corp.; Southern Natural Gas Co.; United Gas Pipe Line Co. for account Memphis Natural Gas Co.
Sec. 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act provides :
“The provisions of this act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and tp natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local.distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”
Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 544, 68 L.Ed. 1027; Public Service Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549.
Cf. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co.; Public Service Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., supra.