opinion: Per Curiam.
  Respondents Hodges and Lewis were convicted of committing murder in the perpetration of a rape in Memphis, Tenn., and sentenced to death by electrocution. On July 31, 1972, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction but reversed and remanded the record to the trial court on the issue of punishment, declaring that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has decreed that the death sentence is contrary to the Eighth Amendment . . . Hodges v. State, 491 S. W. 2d 624, 628 (1972).
  On August 7, 1972, the Governor of Tennessee commuted respondents’ death sentences to 99 years’ imprisonment. On August 8, 1972, the State (represented by petitioner here) filed a timely petition for rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-451 (Supp. 1974), which provides that such a petition must be filed within 15 days of the entry of the judgment.
  The Court of Criminal Appeals then found the commutations by the Governor to be “valid and a proper exercise of executive authority,” citing Bowen v. State, 488 S. W. 2d 373 (Tenn. 1972), and held its remand “for naught,” thus affirming the convictions and the sentences, as modified, in full, 491 S. W. 2d, at 629. On March 5, 1973, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied certiorari.
  Respondents Hodges and Lewis then petitioned for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court asserting, inter alia, that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the illegal commutation of their sentences. The case was transferred to the Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, which dismissed as to this issue for failure to exhaust state remedies. Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
  In a brief order, that court held that since the death sentences had been vacated at the time of the Governor’s commutation order, “there were ... no viable death sentences to commute” and therefore declared the commutations invalid.
  Upon reconsideration, the court noted that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the death penalties had been timely modified by that court to comply with the commutation order. However, it did not alter its earlier decision, except to note that respondents had exhausted their state remedies as to this point.
  A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief to respondents is a determination by the federal court that their custody violates thé Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 U. S. C. § 2241 ; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312 (1963). The one sentence in the opinion of the Court of Appeals dealing with the invalidity of the Governor’s commutations contains no reference to any provision of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States or to any decision of this Court or any other court. Whether or not the sentences imposed upon respondents were subject to commutation by the Governor, and the extent of his authority under the circumstances of this case, are questions of Tennessee law which were resolved in favor of sustaining the action of the Governor by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in Hodges v. State, supra. It was not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine these questions.
  Respondents urge, in support of the° result reached by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial have been infringed by the Tennessee proceedings. We reject these contentions. A jury had already determined their guilt and sentenced them to death.. The Governor commuted these sentences to a term of 99 years after this Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). Neither Furman nor any other holding of this Court requires that following such a commutation the defendant shall be entitled to have his sentence determined anew by a jury. If Tennessee chooses to allow the Governor to reduce a death penalty to a term of years without resort to further judicial proceedings, the United States Constitution affords no impediment to that choice. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 (1902). Cf. Schick v. Reed, 419 U. S. 256 (1974).
  The motion of the respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
  Reversed.
  Mr. Justice Douglas would deny certiorari.
  This order would have returned respondents to the trial court for resentencing to between 20 years and life as a jury might determine. Tenn. Code Ann. §39-2405 (1956).
  The dissent would have us probe beneath the surface of the opinions below in search of a logical foundation. In cases where the holding of the court below is unclear, such a technique may be required. Here, however, that court clearly “hold[s] the purported commutation . . . invalid.” In its second opinion it reversed the District Court on the exhaustion question and otherwise specifically reaffirmed the earlier order. We are forced to take the Court of Appeals at its word.
  Two other panels of the same court have correctly recognized, in cases virtually identical to this one, that no federal constitutional question was presented by such a commutation. Smith v. Rose, No. 74-1753 (Nov. 15, 1974); Bowen v. Rose, No. 74-1087 (Mar. 19, 1974).
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