opinion: Justice Scalia
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), we held that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant’s confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant. Today we consider whether Bruton requires the same result when the co-defendant’s confession is redacted to omit any reference to the defendant, but the defendant is nonetheless linked to the confession by evidence properly admitted against him at trial.
  I
  Respondent Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her 4-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Respondent and Williams were tried jointly, over her objection. (Martin was a fugitive at the time of trial.) At the trial, Knighton testified as follows: On the evening of October 29, 1978, she and her son were at Scott’s home when respondent and her boyfriend Martin visited. After a brief conversation in the living room, respondent announced that she had come to “pick up something” from Scott and rose from the couch. Martin then pulled out a gun, pointed it at Scott and the Knightons, and said that “someone had gotten killed and [Scott] knew something about it.” Respondent immediately walked to the front door and peered out the peephole. The doorbell rang, respondent opened the door, and Williams walked in, carrying a gun. As Williams passed respondent, he asked, “Where’s the money?” Martin forced Scott upstairs, and Williams went into the kitchen, leaving respondent alone with the Knightons. Knighton and her son attempted to flee, but respondent grabbed Knighton and held her until Williams returned. Williams ordered the Knightons to lie on the floor and then went upstairs to assist Martin. Respondent, again left alone with the Knightons, stood by the front door and occasionally peered out the peephole. A few minutes later, Martin, Williams, and Scott came down the stairs, and Martin handed a paper grocery bag to respondent. Martin and Williams then forced Scott and the Knightons into the basement, where Martin shot them. Only Cynthia Knighton survived.
  In addition to Knighton’s testimony, the State introduced (over respondent’s objection) a confession given by Williams to the police shortly after his arrest. The confession was redacted to omit all reference to respondent — indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in the crime. The confession largely corroborated Knighton’s account of the activities of persons other than respondent in the house. In addition, the confession described a conversation Williams had with Martin as they drove to the Scott home, during which, according to Williams, Martin said that he would have to kill the victims after the robbery. At the time the confession was admitted, the jury was admonished not to use it in any way against respondent. Williams did not testify.
  After the State rested, respondent took the stand. She testified that on October 29, 1978, she had lost money that Martin intended to use to buy drugs. Martin was upset, and suggested to respondent that she borrow money from Scott, with whom she had worked in the past. Martin and respondent picked up Williams and drove to Scott’s house. During the drive, respondent, who was sitting in the backseat, “knew that [Martin and Williams] were talking” but could not hear the conversation because “the radio was on and the speaker was right in [her] ear.” Martin and respondent were admitted into the home, and respondent had a short conversation with Scott, during which she asked for a loan. Martin then pulled a gun, and respondent walked to the door to see where the car was. When she saw Williams, she opened the door for him. Respondent testified that during the robbery she did not feel free to leave and was too scared to flee. She said that she did not know why she prevented the Knightons from escaping. She admitted taking the bag from Martin, but said that after Martin and Williams took the victims into the basement, she left the house without the bag. Respondent insisted that she had possessed no prior knowledge that Martin and Williams were armed, had heard no conversation about anyone’s being harmed, and had not intended to rob or kill anyone.
  During his closing argument, the prosecutor admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against respondent. Later in his argument, however, he linked respondent to the portion of Williams’ confession describing his conversation with Martin in the car. (Respondent’s attorney did not object to this.) After closing arguments, the judge again instructed the jury that Williams’ confession was not to be considered against respondent. The jury convicted respondent of two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of an armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to commit murder. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, People v. Marsh, No. 46128 (Dec. 17, 1980), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 412 Mich. 927 (1982).
  Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. She alleged that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and that introduction of Williams’ confession at the joint trial had violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The District Court denied the petition. Civ. Action No. 88-CV-2665-DT (ED Mich., Oct. 11, 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 781 F. 2d 1201 (1986). The Court of Appeals held that in determining whether Bruton bars the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession, a court must assess the confession’s “inculpatory value” by examining not only the face of the confession, but also all of the evidence introduced at trial. 781 F. 2d, at 1212. Here, Williams’ account of the conversation in the car was the only direct evidence that respondent knew before entering Scott’s house that the victims would be robbed and killed. Respondent’s own testimony placed her in that car. In light of the “paucity” of other evidence of malice and the prosecutor’s linkage of respondent and the statement in the car during closing argument, admission of Williams’ confession “was powerfully incriminating to [respondent] with respect to the critical element of intent.” Id., at 1213. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, the Confrontation Clause was violated. We granted certiorari, 476 U. S. 1168 (1986), because the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those of other Courts of Appeals which have declined to adopt the “evidentiary linkage” or “contextual implication” approach to Bruton questions, see, e. g., United States v. Belle, 593 F. 2d 487 (CA3 1979) (en banc).
  II
  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 404, 406-407 (1965). Therefore, where two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other unless the confessing defendant takes the stand.
  Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness “against” a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant. This accords with the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 325, n. 9 (1985), which we have applied in many varying contexts. For example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), we held that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), can be introduced to impeach that defendant’s credibility, even though they are inadmissible as evidence of his guilt, so long as the jury is instructed accordingly. Similarly, in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967), we held that evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the jury was instructed it could not be used for purposes of determining guilt. Accord, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438-439, n. 6 (1983). See also Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. 409, 414-416 (1985) (instruction to consider accomplice’s incriminating confession only for purpose of assessing truthfulness of defendant’s claim that his own confession was coerced); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U. S. 341, 347 (1981) (instruction not to consider erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954) (instruction to consider unlawfully seized physical evidence only in assessing defendant’s credibility). In Bruton, however, we recognized a narrow exception to this principle: We held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. We said:
  “[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. . . .” 391 U. S., at 135-136 (citations omitted).
  There is an important distinction between this case and Bruton, which causes it to fall outside the narrow exception we have created. In Bruton, the codefendant’s confession “expressly implicat[ed]” the defendant as his accomplice. Id., at 124, n. 1. Thus, at the time that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt that it would prove “powerfully incriminating.” Id., at 135. By contrast, in this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant’s own testimony).
  Where the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Specific testimony that “the defendant helped me commit the crime” is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind. Moreover, with regard to such an-explicit statement the only issue is, plain and simply, whether the jury can possibly be expected to forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt; whereas with regard to inferential incrimination the judge’s instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of inference in the first place, so that there is no incrimination to forget. In short, while it may not always be simple for the members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to the general rule.
  Even more significantly, evidence requiring linkage differs from evidence incriminating on its face in the practical effects which application of the Bruton exception would produce. If limited to facially incriminating confessions, Bruton can be complied with by redaction — a possibility suggested in that opinion itself. Id., at 134, n. 10. If extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is that not possible, but it is not even possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance of trial. The “contextual implication” doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals would presumably require the trial judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of the evidence, a nontestifying codefendant’s confession has been so “powerfully incriminating” that a new, separate trial is required for the defendant. This obviously lends itself to manipulation by the defense— and even without manipulation will result in numerous mistrials and appeals. It might be suggested that those consequences could be reduced by conducting a pretrial hearing at which prosecution and defense would reveal the evidence they plan to introduce, enabling the court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than ex post. If this approach is even feasible under the Federal Rules (which is doubtful — see, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 14), it would be time consuming and obviously far from foolproof.
  One might say, of course, that a certain way of assuring compliance would be to try defendants separately whenever an incriminating statement of one of them is sought to be used. That is not as facile or as just a remedy as might seem. Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years. Memorandum from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 20, 1987) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Many joint trials — for example, those involving large conspiracies to import and distribute illegal drugs — involve a dozen or more codefendants. Confessions by one or more of the defendants are commonplace — and indeed the probability of confession increases with the number of participants, since each has reduced assurance that he will be protected by his own silence. It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require, in all these cases of joint crimes where incriminating statements exist, that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution’s case beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability— advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant’s benefit. Even apart from these tactical considerations, joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts. The other way of assuring compliance with an expansive Bruton rule would be to forgo use of codefendant confessions. That price also is too high, since confessions “are more than merely ‘desirable’; they are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 426 (1986) (citation omitted).
  The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process. On the precise facts of Bruton, involving a facially incriminating confession, we found that accommodation inadequate. As our discussion above shows, the calculus changes when confessions that do not name the defendant are at issue. While we continue to apply Bruton where we have found that its rationale validly applies, see Cruz v. New York, ante, p. 186, we decline to extend it further. We hold that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.
  In the present case, however, the prosecutor sought to undo the effect of the limiting instruction by urging the jury to use Williams’ confession in evaluating respondent’s case. See supra, at 205, and n. 2. On remand, the court should consider whether, in light of respondent’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments, the error can serve as the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977).
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  So ordered.
  The redacted confession in its entirety read:
  “On Sunday evening, October the 29th, 1978, at about 6:30 p.m., I was over to my girl friend’s house at 237 Moss, Highland Park, when I received a phone call from a friend of mine named Kareem Martin. He said he had been looking for me and James Coleman, who I call Tom. He asked me if I wanted to go on a robbery with him. I said okay. Then he said he’d be by and pick me up. About 16 or 20 minutes later Kareem came by in his black Monte Carlo car. I got in the ear and Kareem told me he was going to stick up this crib, told me the place was a numbers house. Kareem said there would be over $5,000 or $10,000 in the place. Kareem said he would have to take them out after the robbery. Kareem had a big silver gun. He gave me a long barrelled [sic] .22 revolver. We then drove over to this house and parked the car across the big street near the house. The plan was that I would wait in the car in front of the house and then I would move the car down across the big street because he didn’t want anybody to see the car. Okay, Kareem went up to the house and went inside. A couple of minutes later I moved the car and went up to the house. As I entered, Kareem and this older lady were in the dining room, a little boy and another younger woman were sitting on the couch in the front room. I pulled my pistol and told the younger woman and the little boy to lay on the floor. Kareem took the older lady upstairs. He had a pistol, also. I stayed downstairs with the two people on the floor. After Kareem took the lady upstairs I went upstairs and the lady was laying on the bed in the room to the left as you get up the stairs. The lady had already given us two bags full of money before we ever got upstairs. Kareem had thought she had more money and that’s why we had went upstairs. Me and Kareem started searching the rooms but I didn’t find any money. I came downstairs and then Kareem came down with the lady. I said, ‘Let’s go, let’s go.’ Kareem said no. Kareem then took the two ladies and little boy down the basement and that’s when I left to go to the car. I went to the car and got in the back seat. A couple of minutes later Kareem came to the car and said he thinks the girl was still living because she was still moving and he didn’t have any more bullets. He asked me how come I didn’t go down the basement and I said I wasn’t doing no shit like that. He then dropped me back off at my girl’s house in Highland Park and I was supposed to get together with him today, get my share of the robbery after he had counted the money. That’s all.” App. in No. 84-1777 (CA6), pp. 88-90.
  The prosecutor said:
  “It’s important in light of [respondent’s] testimony when she says Kareem drives over to Benjamin Williams’ home and picks him up to go over. What’s the thing that she says? Well, I’m sitting in the back seat of the car.’ ‘Did you hear any conversation that was going on in the front seat between Kareem and Mr. Williams?’ ‘No, couldn’t hear any conversation. The radio was too loud.’ I asked [sic] you whether that is reasonable. Why did she say that? Why did she say she couldn’t hear any conversation? She said, T know they were having conversation but I couldn’t hear it because of the radio.’ Because if she admits that she heard the conversation and she admits to the plan, she’s guilty of at least armed robbery. So she can’t tell you that.” Id., at 164.
  The dissent is mistaken in believing we “assum[e] that [Williams’] confession did not incriminate respondent.” Post, at 215, n. 3. To the contrary, the very premise of our discussion is that respondent would have been harmed by Williams’ confession if the jury had disobeyed its instructions. Our disagreement pertains not to whether the confession incriminated respondent, but to whether the trial court could properly assume that the jury did not use it against her.
  The dissent notes that “all of the cases in this Court that involved joint trials conducted after Bruton was decided, in which compliance with the rule of that case was at issue, appear to have originated in a state court.” Post, at 219. It concludes from this that “[fjederal prosecutors seem to have had little difficulty” in implementing Bruton as the dissent believes it must be implemented. Ibid. Since the cases in question number only a handful, the fact that they happened to be state cases may signify nothing more than that there are many times more state prosecutions than federal. There is assuredly no basis to believe that federal prosecutors have been applying the dissent’s interpretation of Bruton. Indeed the contrary proposition — as well as the harmfulness of that interpretation to federal law enforcement efforts — is suggested by the fact that the Solicitor General has appeared here as amicus to urge reversal for substantially the reasons we have given. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae.
  We express no opinion on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun.
choices: Alabama Alaska American Samoa Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Federated States of Micronesia Florida Georgia Guam Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Marshall Islands Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Northern Mariana Islands Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Palau Pennsylvania Puerto Rico Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virgin Islands Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming United States Interstate Compact Philippines Indian Dakota