opinion: Mr. Justice Frankfurter
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  These two cases, argued in succession, are controlled by the same considerations and will be disposed of in a single opinion. In one case the National Labor Relations Board ruled that it was not an unfair labor practice for an employer to enforce against his employees a no-solicitation rule, in itself concededly valid, while the employer was himself engaged in anti-union solicitation in a context of separate unfair labor practices. This ruling was reversed by a Court of Appeals. In the second case the Board on the basis of similar facts, except that the employer’s anti-union solicitation by itself constituted a separate unfair labor practice, found the enforcement of the rule to have been an unfair labor practice, but another Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board’s order. We brought both cases here because of the importance of the question they present in the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act, and because of the apparent conflict in the decisions in the Courts of Appeals. 353 U. S. 921; 355 U. S. 811.
  No. 81. — In April of 1953 the respondent Steelworkers instituted a campaign to organize the employees of respondent NuTone, Inc., a manufacturer of electrical devices. In the early stages of the campaign, supervisory personnel of the company interrogated employees and solicited reports concerning the organizational activities of other employees. Several employees were discharged; the Board later found that the discharges had been the result of their organizational activities. In June the company began to distribute, through its supervisory personnel, literature that, although not coercive, was clearly anti-union in tenor. In August, while continuing to distribute such material, the company announced its intention of enforcing its rule against employees’ posting signs or distributing literature on company property or soliciting or campaigning on company time. The rule, according to these posted announcements, applied to “all employees — whether they are for or against the union.” Later the same month a representation election was held, which the Steelworkers lost.
  In a proceeding before the Board commenced at the instance of the Steelworkers, the company was charged with a number of violations of the Act alleged to have taken place both before and after the election, including the discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule. The Board found that the pre-election interrogation and solicitation by supervisory personnel and the discharge of employees were unfair labor practices; it also found that the company had, in violation of the Act, assisted and supported an employee organization formed after the election. However, the Board dismissed the allegation that the company had discriminatorily enforced its no-solicitation rule. 112 N. L. R. B. 1153. The Steelworkers sought review of this dismissal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Board petitioned for enforcement of its order in the same court. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unfair labor practice for the company to prohibit the distribution of organizational literature on company property during non-working hours while the company was itself distributing anti-union literature ; and it directed that the Board’s order be modified accordingly and enforced as modified. 100 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 243 F. 2d 593.
  No. 289. — In the fall of 1954 the Textile Workers conducted an organizational campaign at several of the plants of respondent Avondale Mills. A number of individual employees were called before supervisory personnel of the company, on the ground that they had been soliciting union membership, and informed that such solicitation was in violation of plant rules and would not be tolerated in the future. The rule had not been promulgated in written form, but there was evidence that it had been previously invoked in a non-organizational context. During this same period, both in these interviews concerning the rule and at the employees’ places of work, supervisory personnel interrogated employees concerning their organizational views and activities and solicited employees to withdraw their membership cards from the union. This conduct was in many cases accompanied by threats that the mill would close down or that various employee benefits would be lost if the mill should become organized. Subsequently three employees, each of whom had been informed of the no-solicitation rule, were laid off and eventually discharged for violating the rule.
  As a result of charges filed with the Board by the Textile Workers, a complaint was brought against the company alleging that it had committed a number of unfair labor practices, including the discriminatory invocation of the no-solicitation rule and the discharge of employees for its violation. The Board found that the interrogation, solicitation and threatening of employees by the company’s supervisory personnel were unfair labor practices. Moreover, it found that resort to the no-solicitation rule and discharge of the three employees for its violation were discriminatory and therefore in violation of the Act; it further held that, even if the rule had not been invoked discriminatorily, the discharge of one of the employees had resulted solely from his organizational activities apart from any violation of the rule and was therefore an unfair labor practice. The Board ordered the cessation of these practices and the reinstatement of the discharged employees. 115 N. L. R. B. 840. Upon the Board’s petitioning for enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the company contested only the portions of the Board’s findings and order relating to the rule and the discharges. The court enforced the uncontested portions of the order but, finding insufficient evidence of discrimination in the application of the no-solicitation rule, denied enforcement to the portion of the order relating to the rule and to two of the discharges. As to the third discharge, the court agreed with the Board that it was the result of discrimination unrelated to a violation of the rule, and the court enforced the portion of the Board’s order directing the employee’s reinstatement. 242 F. 2d 669.
  Employer rules prohibiting organizational solicitation are not in and of themselves violative of the Act, for they may duly serve production, order and discipline. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793; Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105. In neither of the cases before us did the party attacking the enforcement of the no-solicitation rule contest its validity. Nor is the claim made that an employer may not, under proper circumstances, engage in non-coercive anti-union solicitation; indeed, his right to do so is protected by the so-called “employer free speech” provision of § 8 (c) of the Act. Contrariwise, as both cases before us show, coercive anti-union solicitation and other similar conduct run afoul of the Act and constitute unfair labor practices irrespective of the bearing of such practices on enforcement of a no-solicitation rule. The very narrow and almost abstract question here derives from the claim that, when the employer himself engages in anti-union solicitation that if engaged in by employees would constitute a violation of the rule — particularly when his solicitation is coercive or accompanied by other unfair labor practices— his enforcement of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against the employees is itself an unfair labor practice. We are asked to rule that the coincidence of these circumstances necessarily violates the Act, regardless of the way in which the particular controversy arose or whether the employer’s conduct to any considerable degree created an imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication. For us to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to the responsibilities imposed by the Act primarily on the Board to appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases and in light of the Board’s special understanding of these industrial situations.
  There is no indication in the record in either of these cases that the employees, or the union on their behalf, requested the employer, himself engaging in anti-union solicitation, to make an exception to the rule for pro-union solicitation. There is evidence in both cases that the employers had in the past made exceptions to their rules for charitable solicitation. Notwithstanding the clear anti-union bias of both employers, it is not for us to conclude as a matter of law — although it might well have been open to the Board to conclude as a matter of industrial experience — that a request for a similar qualification upon the rule for organizational solicitation would have been rejected. Certainly the employer is not obliged voluntarily and without any request to offer the use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-union solicitation. He may very well be wary of a charge that he is interfering with, or contributing support to, a labor organization in violation of § 8 (a) (2) of the Act.
  No attempt was made in either of these cases to make a showing that the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the ability of the labor organizations involved to carry their messages to the employees. Just as that is a vital consideration in determining the validity of a no-solicitation rule, see Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at 797-798; Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, at 112, it is highly relevant in determining whether a valid rule has been fairly applied. Of course the rules had the effect of closing off one channel of communication; but the Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because the employer is using it. Cf. Bonwit Teller, Inc., v. Labor Board, 197 F. 2d 640, 646; Labor Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78, 84 (concurring opinion). No such mechanical answers will avail for the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem in labor-management relations. If, by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources available to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer’s ability to promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union views, there is no basis for invalidating these “otherwise valid” rules. The Board, in determining whether or not the enforcement of such a rule in the circumstances of an individual case is an unfair labor practice, may find relevant alternative channels available for communications on the right to organize. When this important issue is not even raised before the Board and no evidence bearing on it adduced, the concrete basis for appraising the significance of the employer’s conduct is wanting.
  We do not at all imply that the enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the same time engaging in anti-union solicitation may not constitute an unfair labor practice. All we hold is that there must be some basis, in the actualities of industrial relations, for such a finding. The records in both cases — the issues raised in the proceedings — are barren of the ingredients for such a finding. Accordingly the judgment in No. 81 is reversed, insofar as it sets aside and requires the Board to modify its order, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion; in all other respects, it is affirmed. The judgment in No. 289 is affirmed. J °
  T, . , , It is so ordered.
  Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment in No. 81 for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 243 F. 2d 593.
  Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join in the dissent in No. 289, Labor Board v. Avondale Mills.
  The statutory basis for the decision that this conduct constituted an unfair labor practice was § 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a)(1), which provides:
  “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
  “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
  Section 7 provides that “ [employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a)(3).”
  49 Stat, 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (c):
  “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
  49 Stat. 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a) (2).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations