opinion: AMELL et al. v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 282.
  Argued January 24, 1966.
  Decided May 16, 1966.
  David Scribner argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Lee Pressman and Joan Stern Kiok.
  John C. Eldridge argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas and Alan S. Rosenthal.
  Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Howard Schulman for the Maritime Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, and by Abraham E. Freedman for the National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO.
  Mr. Chief Justice Warren
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The case before us presents interesting problems of a jurisdictional nature. The Suits in Admiralty Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts when the suit is of a maritime nature. Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over contractual claims against the United States. This jurisdictional interaction presents itself here.
  The petitioners are employees of various federal executive departments working aboard government vessels. They filed contractual actions in the Court of Claims, alleging they were entitled to back pay increases and overtime pay for their labors, invoking various federal pay statutes and regulations. In all these suits, the petitioners predicated jurisdiction on the Tucker Act, which has a generous six-year limitations period and provides a grace period as well, 28 U. S. C. § 2501 (1964 ed.). Their employer, the United States, filed motions to have the actions transferred to various federal district courts on the ground that the claims were of a maritime nature and justiciable exclusively under the Suits in Admiralty Act. This Act provides only two years for claimants to file suit, and also requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, 46 U. S. C. § 745 (1964 ed.). The Court of Claims granted the motions without opinion, simply citing to three unreported cases in which it had made similar dispositions. To uphold this transfer would bar those claims which accrued more than two years prior to the time the actions were filed. We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 810, and reverse.
  On its face, the Tucker Act permits all individuals with contractual claims against the Government to sue in the Court of Claims. The Suits in Admiralty Act similarly affords an open berth in the district courts, provided the claims are of a maritime nature. The question is which Act should be applicable to the claims brought here, and this in turn depends on whether these seafaring petitioners are more appropriately classified as federal workers or as mere seamen.
  The Government takes the position that these employees are to be deprived of the liberal benefits of the longer limitations period available to all other government employees under the Tucker Act. This is so, the Government reasons, because for purposes of wage claims the petitioners’ status as seamen overrides their acknowledged role as federal workers. In assuming this posture, the Government seeks the best of both worlds. Congress is depicted as ambivalent in treating these petitioners either as seamen or as federal employees depending on which status may redound more to the benefit of the Government’s proprietary interest.
  The Government acknowledges that the petitioners are governed by a patchwork pattern of federal statutes which encompass many facets of their economic welfare. With regard to so-called fringe benefits, pervasive government schemes provide for sick leave and vacation pay, and for death, health, medical and pension programs. The petitioners’ potential recovery for personal injuries is limited strictly by a workmen’s compensation statute governing them as federal workers to the exclusion of both the Public Vessels Act, Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, and the Suits in Admiralty Act, Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495. By virtue of their governmental employment, the petitioners’ right to join unions and to select bargaining representatives, unlike that of private seamen, exists only by express leave of the President, Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962), and they are forbidden, under pain of discharge, fine and imprisonment, from exercising or asserting the right to strike, 69 Stat. 624, 5 U. S. C. §§ 118p-118r (1964 ed.).
  When it comes to wage claims the Government treats the petitioners, to their detriment, as seamen. The workers, however, have their wages fixed by federal statutes and regulations, like other federal employees. It is true that their rates of pay are geared to the prevailing wage scale in private shipping operations, but this factor diminishes upon analysis. A host of federal workers, like these seamen, have their rates of pay so adjusted. The petitioners, then, are essentially no different from the civil servants who deliver the mail, fight forest fires, construct public buildings, or who engage in countless other tasks which affect virtually every phase of the country’s well-being. The wage scale of government-employed seamen is fixed by federal agencies; it is not automatically adjusted to the rate of pay prevalent in private industry, and in some cases the private pay rates are not easily ascertained. Further, these government employees — unlike normal seamen — benefit from wage pay increases won in the private industry only prospectively and to a limited degree. Often in the maritime industry, private contract negotiations continue beyond the terminal date set in a collective bargaining agreement. When the agreement is signed, however, it generally provides that the private seamen receive the increased pay retroactively. The government seamen receive pay increases only from the actual date agreement is reached in the private sector. Therefore, the back pay claims are more appropriately catalogued on the government side of the ledger, although they may have a salty tang.
  This inference as to congressional intent is reinforced in considering the claims for overtime pay. Here there is a specific provision — Section 205 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 — which fixes the ratio of overtime pay to the employees’ basic pay. Congress has thus explicitly prescribed that overtime pay should be fixed in a uniform manner for all government wage-board employees, whether seamen or not. Furthermore, in determining the applicability of this uniform statutory requirement, the court will be interpreting the pay regulation of an executive department. This task is typically within the province and expertise of the Court of Claims.
  We think the foregoing indicates that with respect to these wage claims, Congress thought of these petitioners more as government employees who happened to be seamen than as seamen who by chance worked for the Government. The remaining problems relate to specific legislative amendments. The Government approaches this by noting that the Suits in Admiralty Act specifically repealed the Tucker Act so far as the two conflicted. This may readily be conceded, see, e. g., Calmar S. S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 446, 455-456; Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 352. Compare Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495. From this proposition it adduces the principle that exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is now so deeply woven in the fabric of the law that congressional action is required to overturn it, cf. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U. S. 451, 458. This principle is sound where applicable, but such is not the case here.
  The evolution of the law, both statutory and judicial, indicates that at least until 1960, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over government seamen’s wage claims was unchallenged.. We do not understand the Government to dispute this fact. For example, wage claims by federal employees were found to be expressly within the ambit of the Tucker Act in Bruner v. United States, 343 U. S. 112, 115. In United States v. Towsley, 323 U. S. 557, this Court affirmed a judgment against the Government for overtime wages in favor of a government-employed operator of a dredge. The Court of Claims had assumed jurisdiction over the suit, 101 Ct. Cl. 237, and the Government never disputed the issue. Subsequent cases are to the same effect. It was on this line of precedent that the petitioners relied in bringing suit. This fact is worthy of mention to illustrate the impact upon claimants whose suits would otherwise be time-barred if we were now to hold that the Suits in Admiralty Act restricted all suits in cases like the present to the district courts, cf. Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 581.
  In 1960, Congress addressed itself to the jurisdictional overlap between the Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act. Its major aim was to empower the Court of Claims to transfer suits to the district courts when the latter had exclusive jurisdiction over them. This it accomplished by providing that when the transfer was made, the original filing in the Court of Claims would toll the applicable limitations period, Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. 86-770, 74 Stat. 912, 28 U. S. C. § 1506. Simultaneously, Congress abolished the distinction between public and merchant vessels, a matter which had sorely confused attorneys and had caused misfilings in the past, S. Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3, 6. In amending the Suits in Admiralty Act, Congress also wanted to affirm the existing law that suits which were justiciable exclusively under it would be brought only in the district courts. The new § 2 of the Act, 46 U. S. C. § 742, in the words of the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 1894, supra, at p. 2,
  “restates in brief and simple language the now existing exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the district courts, both on their admiralty and law sides, over cases against the United States which could be sued on in admiralty if private vessels, persons, or property were involved.”
  The Government would have us believe that this oblique reference to private “persons” was designed to make inroads on the right of government employees to sue in the Court of Claims. We reject this argument. The legislative history surrounding this enactment contains no discussion whatever concerning claims brought by government-employed seamen. This is highly significant because of the active interest in nautical legislation generally taken by the maritime labor unions. If Congress had meant to lower the limitations period from six to two years, surely these unions would have been privy to the decision; this is all the more true when one considers that seamen are often stationed far away from their home ports and need a lengthy period in which to register their claims. If they were governed by the maritime Act, they would be required not only to sue but to exhaust administrative remedies as well within the shorter period, 46 U. S. C. § 745 (1964 ed.).
  In effect, the Government asks us to repeal the former practice by implication. We have held in numerous cases that such a request bears a heavy burden of persuasion, e. g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758; Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228-229. Further, Congress had the opportunity in 1964 to deprive government-employed claimants of their rights when it amended the Tucker Act itself. Instead, Congress broadened the forums available to plaintiffs suing the Government for fees, salary or compensation for official services, giving the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims in matters of less than $10,000, 78 Stat. 699, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (d) (1964 ed.).
  As in other jurisdictional questions involving intersecting statutes, there is no positive answer. We can do no more than to exercise our best judgment in interpreting the will of Congress. In this instance, we believe the traditional treatment of federal employees by the Government tips the balance in favor of Court of Claims jurisdiction. The Court of Claims possesses the expertise necessary to adjudicate government wage claims. It also serves as a centralized forum for developing the law, particularly in large wage claim suits. These tasks have been its responsibility since 1887. In multi-party wage suits of large amounts, having one forum eliminates any problem of transferring venue from several district courts to one locale, see 28 U. S. C. § 1406 (1964 ed.). If we are here misconstruing the intent of Congress, it can easily set the matter to rest by explicit language. We therefore reverse and remand the suits to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.
  It is so ordered.
  41 Stat. 525, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §§741-752 (1964 ed.).
  24 Stat. 505, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§1346, 1491 (1964 ed.).
  Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 679, as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§2061-2066 (1964 ed.).
  Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 736, as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§2091-2103 (1964 ed.); Civil Service Retirement Act, 70 Stat. 743, as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§ 2251-2267 (1964 ed.); Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 708, 5 U. S. C. §§3001-3014 (1964 ed.).
  43 Stat. 1112, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §§781-790 (1964 ed.).
  Section 202 (8) of the Classification Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 954, as amended, 5 TJ. S. C. § 1082 (8) (1964 ed.), provides in substance that workers on vessels shall have their compensation fixed and adjusted by .federal agencies so far as consistent with the public interest in accordance with prevailing rates and practices in the maritime industry.
  In 1962, Congress enacted the Federal Salary Reform Act, making an explicit declaration of policy that federal salary fixing should be comparable to private enterprise salary rates for the same levels of work, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. 87-793, 76 Stat. 841, 5 U. S. C. §§1171-1174 (1964 ed.). Pursuant to congressional direction, the President issued an Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 11173, Aug. 20, 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 11999, taking full cognizance of the congressional policy enunciated in the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962. So far as determining the compensation for wage board employees, as are these petitioners, Congress has evinced a similar concern, Pub. L. 85-872, 72 Stat. 1696, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1181-1184 (1964 ed.). Thus, the whole trend in government compensation is to draw individuals into public service by providing salaries at least comparable to those they would earn on entering private industry.
  59 Stat. 295, 5 U. S. C. § 913 (1964 ed.), provides:
  “Employees whose basic rate of compensation is fixed on an annual or monthly basis and adjusted from time to time in accordance with prevailing rates by wage boards or similar administrative authority serving the same purpose shall be entitled to overtime-pay in accordance with the provisions of section 673c of this title. The rate of compensation for each hour of overtime employment of any such employee shall be computed as follows: . . . ."
  This provision, as does 5 U. S. C. § 673c (1964 ed.), gives government-employed seamen one and one-half times their basic pay for overtime pay.
  See, e. g., Hearne v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 335, 68 F. Supp. 786, cert. denied, 331 U. S. 858; Adams v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 133; Abbott v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 712, 169 F. Supp. 523. See also Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 140 Ct. Cl. 500, 156 F. Supp. 942.
  As amended, 46 U. S. C. § 742 now provides in pertinent part:
  “In cases where if such vessel [owned by the United States] were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate non-jury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States .... Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with liability is found. . . ."