opinion: GROVE CITY COLLEGE et al. v. BELL, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, et al.
  No. 82-792.
  Argued November 29, 1983
  Decided February 28, 1984
  White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 576. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result, post, p. 579. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 581.
  David M. Lascell argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robb M. Jones.
  Acting Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, De-puty Assistant Attorney General Cooper, John H. Garvey, and Brian K. Landsberg
  Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Edward E. Potter; for Hillsdale College by Robert W. Barker; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley.
  Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of University Women et al. by Nancy Duff Campbell and Margaret A. Kohn; for the Council of Collegiate Women Athletic Administrators by Lionel S. Sobel; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by Richard C. Dinkelspiel, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, and Roger L. Waldman; and for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. by Robert H. Kapp, Joseph M. Hassett, John C. Keeney, Jr., Joaquin Avila, and Morris J. Bailer.
  Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by Maxwell A. Miller; for Wabash College by David N. Shane; and for Representative Claudine C. Schneider et al. by Karen Syma Shinberg Czapanskiy.
  Justice White
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), prohibits sex discrimination in “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” and §902 directs agencies awarding most types of assistance to promulgate regulations to ensure that recipients adhere to that prohibition. Compliance with departmental regulations may be secured by termination of assistance “to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found” or by “any other means authorized by law.” §902, 20 U. S. C. § 1682.
  This case presents several questions concerning the scope and operation of these provisions and the regulations established by the Department of Education. We must decide, first, whether Title IX applies at all to Grove City College, which accepts no direct assistance but enrolls students who receive federal grants that must be used for educational purposes. If so, we must identify the “education program or activity” at Grove City that is “receiving Federal financial assistance” and determine whether federal assistance to that program may be terminated solely because the College violates the Department’s regulations by refusing to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. Finally, we must consider whether the application of Title IX to Grove City infringes the First Amendment rights of the College or its students.
  I — 1
  Petitioner Grove City College is a private, coeducational, liberal arts college that has sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. Grove City’s desire to avoid federal oversight has led it to decline to participate, not only in direct institutional aid programs, but also in federal student assistance programs under which the College would be required to assess students’ eligibility and to determine the amounts of loans, work-study funds, or grants they should receive. Grove City has, however, enrolled a large number of students who receive Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG’s), 20 U. S. C. § 1070a (1982 ed.), under the Department of Education’s Alternate Disbursement System (ADS).
  The Department concluded that Grove City was a “recipient” of “Federal financial assistance” as those terms are defined in the regulations implementing Title IX, 34 CFR §§ 106.2(g)(1), (h) (1982), and, in July 1977, it requested that the College execute the Assurance of Compliance required by 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983). If Grove City had signed the Assurance, it would have agreed to
  “[cjomply, to the extent applicable to it, with Title IX . . . and all applicable requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Department’s regulation ... to the end that ... no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity for which [it] receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance from the Department.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-126 — A-127.
  When Grove City persisted in refusing to execute an Assurance, the Department initiated proceedings to declare the College and its students ineligible to receive BEOG’s. The Administrative Law Judge held that the federal financial assistance received by Grove City obligated it to execute an Assurance of Compliance and entered an order terminating assistance until Grove City “corrects its noncompliance with Title IX and satisfies the Department that it is in compliance” with the applicable regulations. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-97.
  Grove City and four of its students then commenced this action in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which concluded that the students’ BEOG’s constituted “Federal financial assistance” to Grove City but held, on several grounds, that the Department could not terminate the students’ aid because of the College’s refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (1980). The Court of Appeals reversed. 687 F. 2d 684 (CA3 1982). It first examined the language and legislative history of Title IX and held that indirect, as well as direct, aid triggered coverage under § 901(a) and that institutions whose students financed their educations with BEOG’s were recipients of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX. Although it recognized that Title IX’s provisions are program-specific, the court likened the assistance flowing to Grove City through its students to nonearmarked aid, and, with one judge dissenting, declared that “[w]here the federal government furnishes indirect or non-earmarked aid to an institution, it is apparent to us that the institution itself must be the ‘program.’” 687 F. 2d, at 700. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Department could condition financial aid upon the execution of an Assurance of Compliance and that the Department had acted properly in terminating federal financial assistance to the students and Grove City despite the lack of evidence of actual discrimination.
  We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 1199 (1983), and we now affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the Department could terminate BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students to force the College to execute an Assurance of Compliance.
  t-H I — H
  In defending its refusal to execute the Assurance of Compliance required by the Department’s regulations, Grove City first contends that neither it nor any “education program or activity” of the College receives any federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX by virtue of the fact that some of its students receive BEOG’s and use them to pay for their education. We disagree.
  Grove City provides a well-rounded liberal arts education and a variety of educational programs and student services. The question is whether any of those programs or activities “receives] Federal financial assistance” within the meaning of Title IX when students finance their education with BEOG’s. The structure of the Education Amendments of 1972, in which Congress both created the BEOG program and imposed Title IX’s nondiscrimination requirement, strongly suggests an affirmative conclusion. BEOG’s were aptly characterized as a “centerpiece of the bill,” 118 Cong. Rec. 20297 (1972) (Rep. Pucinski), and Title IX “relate[d] directly to [its] central purpose.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30412 (1971) (Sen. Bayh). In view of this connection and Congress’ express recognition of discrimination in the administration of student financial aid programs, it would indeed be anomalous to discover that one of the primary components of Congress’ comprehensive “package of federal aid,” id., at 2007 (Sen. Pell), was not intended to trigger coverage under Title IX.
  It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the language of § 901(a) contains no hint that Congress perceived a substantive difference between direct institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students. The linchpin of Grove City’s argument that none of its programs receives any federal assistance is a perceived distinction between direct and indirect aid, a distinction that finds no support in the text of § 901(a). Nothing in § 901(a) suggests that Congress elevated form over substance by making the application of the nondiscrimination principle dependent on the manner in which a program or activity receives federal assistance. There is no basis in the statute for the view that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the Federal Government are subject to regulation. Cf. Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601-604 (SC 1974), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 514 (CA4 1975). As the Court of Appeals observed, “by its all inclusive terminology [§ 901(a)] appears to encompass all forms of federal aid to education, direct or indirect.” 687 F. 2d, at 691 (emphasis in original). We have recognized the need to “‘accord [Title IX] a sweep as broad as its language,”’ North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966)), and we are reluctant to read into § 901(a) a limitation not apparent on its face.
  Our reluctance grows when we pause to consider the available evidence of Congress’ intent. The economic effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable, see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 397, n. 6 (1983); id., at 412 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 783 (1973); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 463-465 (1973), and the BEOG program was structured to ensure that it effectively supplements the College’s own financial aid program. Congress undoubtedly comprehended this reality in enacting the Education Amendments of 1972. The legislative history of the Amendments is replete with statements evincing Congress’ awareness that the student assistance programs established by the Amendments would significantly aid colleges and universities. In fact, one of the stated purposes of the student aid provisions was to “provid[e] assistance to institutions of higher education.” Pub. L. 92-318, § 1001(c)(1), 86 Stat. 381, 20 U. S. C. § 1070(a)(5).
  Congress’ awareness of the purpose and effect of its student aid programs also is reflected in the sparse legislative history of Title IX itself. Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 684-685 (1979); 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). The drafters of Title VI envisioned that the receipt of student aid funds would trigger coverage, and, since they approved identical language, we discern no reason to believe that the Congressmen who voted for Title IX intended a different result.
  The few contemporaneous statements that attempted to give content to the phrase “receiving Federal financial assistance,” while admittedly somewhat ambiguous, are consistent with Senator Bayh’s declaration that Title IX authorizes the termination of “all aid that comes through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971). Such statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect, but, at least in instances where they are consistent with the plain language of Title IX, Senator Bayh’s remarks are “an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 527. The contemporaneous legislative history, in short, provides no basis for believing that Title IX’s broad language is somehow inconsistent with Congress’ underlying intent. See also 20 U. S. C. § 1094(a)(3) (1982 ed.).
  Persuasive evidence of Congress’ intent concerning student financial aid may also be gleaned from its subsequent treatment of Title IX. We have twice recognized the probative value of Title IX’s unique postenactment history, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 535; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 687, n. 7, 702-703, and we do so once again. The Department’s sex discrimination regulations made clear that “[scholarships, loans, [and] grants . . . extended directly to . . . students for payment to” an institution constitute federal financial assistance to that entity. 40 Fed. Reg. 24137 (1975); see n. 6, supra. Under the statutory “laying before” procedure of the General Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1232(d)(1) (1982 ed.), Congress was afforded an opportunity to invalidate aspects of the regulations it deemed inconsistent with Title IX. The regulations were clear, and Secretary Weinberger left no doubt concerning the Department’s position that “the furnishing of student assistance to a student who uses it at a particular institution . . . [is] Federal aid which is covered by the statute.” Yet, neither House passed a disapproval resolution. Congress’ failure to disapprove the regulations is not dispositive, but, as we recognized in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 533-534, it strongly implies that the regulations accurately reflect congressional intent. Congress has never disavowed this implication and in fact has acted consistently with it on a number of occasions.
  With the benefit of clear statutory language, powerful evidence of Congress’ intent, and a longstanding and coherent administrative construction of the phrase “receiving Federal financial assistance,” we have little trouble concluding that Title IX coverage is not foreclosed because federal funds are granted to Grove City’s students rather than directly to one of the College’s educational programs. There remains the question, however, of identifying the “education program or activity” of the College that can properly be characterized as “receiving” federal assistance through grants to some of the students attending the College.
  Ill
  An analysis of Title IX’s language and legislative history led us to conclude in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 538, that “an agency’s authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitations of §§ 901 and 902.” Although the legislative history contains isolated suggestions that entire institutions are subject to the nondiscrimination provision whenever one of their programs receives federal assistance, see 1975 Hearings 178 (Sen. Bayh), we cannot accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that in the circumstances present here Grove City itself is a “program or activity” that may be regulated in its entirety. Nevertheless, we find no merit in Grove City’s contention that a decision treating BEOG’s as “Federal financial assistance” cannot be reconciled with Title IX’s program-specific language since BEOG’s are not tied to any specific “education program or activity.”
  If Grove City participated in the BEOG program through the RDS, we would have no doubt that the “education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” would not be the entire College; rather, it would be its student financial aid program. RDS institutions receive federal funds directly, but can use them only to subsidize or expand their financial aid programs and to recruit students who might otherwise be unable to enroll. In short, the assistance is earmarked for the recipient’s financial aid program. Only by ignoring Title IX’s program-specific language could we conclude that funds received under the RDS, awarded to eligible students, and paid back to the school when tuition comes due represent federal aid to the entire institution.
  We see no reason to reach a different conclusion merely because Grove City has elected to participate in the ADS. Although Grove City does not itself disburse students’ awards, BEOG’s clearly augment the resources that the College itself devotes to financial aid. As is true of the RDS, however, the fact that federal funds eventually reach the College’s general operating budget cannot subject Grove City to institution-wide coverage. Grove City’s choice of administrative mechanisms, we hold, neither expands nor contracts the breadth of the “program or activity” — the financial aid program — that receives federal assistance and that may be regulated under Title IX.
  To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ holding that BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students constitute aid to the entire institution rests on the possibility that federal funds received by one program or activity free up the College’s own resources for use elsewhere, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning is doubly flawed. First, there is no evidence that the federal aid received by Grove City’s students results in the diversion of funds from the College’s own financial aid program to other areas within the institution. Second, and more important, the Court of Appeals’ assumption that Title IX applies to programs receiving a larger share of a school’s own limited resources as a result of federal assistance earmarked for use elsewhere within the institution is inconsistent with the program-specific nature of the statute. Most federal educational assistance has economic ripple effects throughout the aided institution, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which programs or activities derive such indirect benefits. Under the Court of Appeals’ theory, an entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one of its students received a small BEOG or because one of its departments received an earmarked federal grant. This result cannot be squared with Congress’ intent.
  The Court of Appeals’ analogy between student financial aid received by an educational institution and nonearmarked direct grants provides a more plausible justification for its holding, but it too is faulty. Student financial aid programs, we believe, are sui generis. In neither purpose nor effect can BEOG’s be fairly characterized as unrestricted grants that institutions may use for whatever purpose they desire. The BEOG program was designed, not merely to increase the total resources available to educational institutions, but to enable them to offer their services to students who had previously been unable to afford higher education. It is true, of course, that substantial portions of the BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students ultimately find their way into the College’s general operating budget and are used to provide a variety of services to the students through whom the funds pass. However, we have found no persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the Department’s regulatory authority follow federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity to activity. In addition, as Congress recognized in considering the Education Amendments of 1972, the economic effect of student aid is far different from the effect of nonearmarked grants to institutions themselves since the former, unlike the latter, increases both an institution’s resources and its obligations. See Pub. L. 92-318, § 1001(a), 86 Stat. 375, 20 U. S. C. § 1070e; S. Rep. No. 92-346, p. 43 (1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 20331 (1972) (Rep. Badillo). In that sense, student financial aid more closely resembles many earmarked grants.
  We conclude that the receipt of BEOG’s by some of Grove City’s students does not trigger institutionwide coverage under Title IX. In purpose and effect, BEOG’s represent federal financial assistance to the College’s own financial aid program, and it is that program that may properly be regulated under Title IX.
  IV
  Since Grove City operates an “education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” the Department may properly demand that the College execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983). Grove City contends, however, that the Assurance it was requested to sign was invalid, both on its face and as interpreted by the Department, in that it failed to comport with Title IX’s program-specific character. Whatever merit that objection might have had at the time, it is not now a valid basis for refusing to execute an Assurance of Compliance.
  The Assurance of Compliance regulation itself does not, on its face, impose institutionwide obligations. Recipients must provide assurance only that “each education program or activity operated by . . . [them] and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.” 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983) (emphasis added). The regulations apply, by their terms, “to every recipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.” 34 CFR §106.11 (1983) (emphasis added). These regulations, like those at issue in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512 (1982), “conform with the limitations Congress enacted in §§901 and 902.” Id., at 539. Nor does the Department now claim that its regulations reach beyond the College’s student aid program. Furthermore, the Assurance of Compliance currently in use, like the one Grove City refused to execute, does not on its face purport to reach the entire College; it certifies compliance with respect to those “education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” See n. 2, supra. Under this opinion, consistent with the program-specific requirements of Title IX, the covered education program is the College’s financial aid program.
  A refusal to execute a proper program-specific Assurance of Compliance warrants termination of federal assistance to the student financial aid program. The College’s contention that termination must be preceded by a finding of actual discrimination finds no support in the language of § 902, which plainly authorizes that sanction to effect “[c]ompliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section.” Regulations authorizing termination of assistance for refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title VI had been promulgated, 45 CFR §80.4 (Supp., Jan. 1, 1965), and upheld, Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F. 2d 804 (CA5 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1046 (1968), long before Title IX was enacted, and Congress no doubt anticipated that similar regulations would be developed to implement Title IX. 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). We conclude, therefore, that the Department may properly condition federal financial assistance on the recipient’s assurance that it will conduct the aided program or activity in accordance with Title IX and the applicable regulations.
  V
  Grove City’s final challenge to the Court of Appeals’ decision — that conditioning federal assistance on compliance with Title IX infringes First Amendment rights of the College and its students — warrants only brief consideration. Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept. E. g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Grove City may terminate its participation in the BEOG program and thus avoid the requirements of § 901(a). Students affected by the Department’s action may either take their BEOG’s elsewhere or attend Grove City without federal financial assistance. Requiring Grove City to comply with Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination as a condition for its continued eligibility to participate in the BEOG program infringes no First Amendment rights of the College or its students.
  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
  Affirmed.
  Section 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), provides, in pertinent part:
  “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”
  Nine statutory exemptions, none of which is relevant to the disposition of this case, follow. See §§ 901(a)(l)-(9), 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681(a)(l)-(9).
  Section 902, 20 U. S. C. § 1682, provides:
  “Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [901] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncomplianee has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report” (emphasis in original).
  See, e. g., 20 U. S. C. § 1071 et seq. (1982 ed.); 34 CFR pt. 674 (1983) (National Direct Student Loans); 42 U. S. C. § 2751 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V); 34 CFR pt. 675 (1983) (College Work Study Program); 20 U. S. C. § 1070b (1982 ed.); 34 CFR pt. 676 (1983) (Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants).
  The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s functions with respect to BEOG’s were transferred to the Department of Education by § 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1982 ed.). We will refer to both HEW and DOE as “the Department.”
  The Secretary, in his discretion, has established two procedures for computing and disbursing BEOG’s. Under the Regular Disbursement System (RDS), the Secretary estimates the amount that an institution will need for grants and advances that sum to the institution, which itself selects eligible students, calculates awards, and distributes the grants by either crediting students’ accounts or issuing checks. 34 CFR §§ 690.71-690.85 (1983). Most institutions whose students receive BEOG’s participate in the RDS, but the ADS is an option made available by the Secretary to schools that wish to minimize their involvement in the administration of the BEOG program. Institutions participating in the program through the ADS must make appropriate certifications to the Secretary, but the Secretary calculates awards and makes disbursements directly to eligible students. 34 CFR §§ 690.91-690.96 (1983).
  The Title IX regulations were recodified in 1980, without substantive change, at 34 CFR pt. 106 in connection with the establishment of the Department of Education. 45 Fed. Reg. 30802, 30962-30963 (1980). All references herein are to the currently effective regulations.
  “Federal financial assistance” is defined in 34 CFR § 106.2(g)(1) (1983) to include:
  “A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available for:
  “(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity.”
  A “recipient” is defined in 34 CFR § 106.2(h) (1983) to include:
  “[A]ny public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance . . . .” See also 34 CFR §§ 106.11, 106.31(a) (1983).
  The Assurance of Compliance form currently in use differs somewhat from the version quoted in the text. See App. to Brief for Federal Respondents in Hillsdale College v. Department of Education, O. T. 1982, No. 82-1538, pp. 1a-2a. The substance, however, is the same in that it refers to “education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance.”
  The Department also sought to terminate Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL’s), 20 U. S. C. § 1071 (1982 ed.), received by Grove City’s students.
  The District Court held, first, that GSL’s were “contracts] of insurance or guaranty” that could not be terminated under § 902 of Title IX. The Department did not challenge this conclusion on appeal, and we express no view on this aspect of the District Court’s reasoning. The court also concluded that Grove City could not be required to execute an Assurance of Compliance because Subpart E of the Title IX regulations, which prohibits discrimination in employment, was invalid. As the Court of Appeals recognized, we have since upheld the validity of Subpart E. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512 (1982). The District Court held, in the alternative, that § 902 permitted termination only upon an actual finding of sex discrimination and that Grove City’s refusal to execute an Assurance could not justify a termination of assistance. Finally, the court reasoned that affected students were entitled to hearings before their aid could be discontinued.
  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals accepted the position argued by respondents. As respondents acknowledged in the oral argument before this Court, the Department’s position has not been a model of clarity. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-35. The Department initially took the position that the receipt of student financial aid would trigger institutionwide coverage under Title IX and construed its regulations to that effect. It pressed that position in the lower courts. In their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondents did not defend this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, but argued instead that the question need not be resolved to decide this case. In their brief on the merits and in the oral argument, however, respondents conceded that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Grove City itself constituted the “program or activity” subject to regulation under Title IX. The Department’s regulations, it was represented, may be construed in a program-specific manner and hence are not inconsistent with the statute. This concession, of course, is not binding on us and does not foreclose our review of the judgment below.
  See, e. g., Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 235 (1970) (Rep. May); id., at 483 (Rep. Mink); id., at 739 (Rep. Griffiths); 118 Cong. Rec. 3935-3940, 5803-5809 (1972) (Sen. Bayh).
  Grove City itself recognizes the problematic nature of the distinction it advances. Although its interpretation of § 901(a) logically would exclude from coverage under Title IX local school districts that receive federal funds through state educational agencies, see, e. g., 20 U. S. C. §3801 et seq. (1982 ed.), Grove City wisely does not attempt to defend this result. In fact, the College concedes that “[b]ecause federal assistance is often passed through state agencies, this type of indirect assistance leads to Title IX jurisdiction over the education program, or activity which ultimately receives the assistance.” Brief for Petitioners 17, n. 17 (emphasis in original). Grove City has proposed no principled basis for treating differently federal assistance received through students and federal aid that is disbursed by a state agency.
  Grove City’s students receive BEOG’s to pay for the education they receive at the College. Their eligibility for assistance is conditioned upon continued enrollment at Grove City and on satisfactory progress in their studies. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1091(a)(1), (3) (1982 ed.). Their grants are based on the “cost of attendance” at Grove City, 20 U. S. C. § 1070a(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982 ed.), which includes the College’s tuition and fees, room and board, and a limited amount for books, supplies, and miscellaneous expenses. 34 CFR § 690.51 (1983). The amount that students and their families can reasonably be expected to contribute is subtracted from the maximum BEOG to ensure that the assistance is used solely for educational expenses, 20 U. S. C. § 1070a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1982 ed.), and students are required to file affidavits stating that their awards will be “used solely for expenses related to attendance” at Grove City. 20 U. S. C. § 1091(a)(5) (1982 ed.); see 34 CFR §§690.79, 690.94(a)(2) (1983).
  Grove City’s attempt to analogize BEOG’s to food stamps, Social Security benefits, welfare payments, and other forms of general-purpose governmental assistance to low-income families is unavailing. First, there is no evidence that Congress intended the receipt of federal money in this manner to trigger coverage under Title IX. Second, these general assistance programs, unlike student aid programs, were not designed to assist colleges and universities. Third, educational institutions have no control over, and indeed perhaps no knowledge of, whether they ultimately receive federal funds made available to individuals under general assistance programs, but they remain free to opt out of federal student assistance programs. Fourth, individuals’ eligibility for general assistance is not tied to attendance at an educational institution.
  See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-554, p. 244 (1972) (Supplemental Views); 117 Cong. Rec. 2007 (1971) (Sen. Pell); id., at 37778, 37782 (Rep. Quie); ■id., at 39256 (Rep. Steiger); 118 Cong. Rec. 20295 (1972) (Rep. Reid); id., at 20297 (Rep. Pucinski); id., at 20312 (statement of Isaac K. Beckes); id., at 20310 (letter from Kingman Brewster, Jr.); id., at 20324 (Rep. Mitchell).
  See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 104-105 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 13388 (1964) (Sen. McClellan). Appendix A to the initial Title VI regulations identified several programs making assistance available through payments to students among those to which the regulations applied, 29 Fed. Reg. 16298, 16304 (1964), as did the version in force when Title IX was enacted. 45 CFR pt. 80, Appendix A (1972). See Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (SC 1974), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 514 (CA4 1975). The current list of programs covered by Title VI includes BEOG’s and GSL’s, 34 CFR pt. 100, Appendix A (1983), and Grove City’s assumption that Congress would have excluded BEOG’s from coverage under Title VI if the program had been operational in 1964 is baseless.
  See 117 Cong. Rec. 30158-30159 (1971) (Sen. McGovern); id., at 39260 (Rep. Erlenbom); 118 Cong. Rec. 5814 (1972) (Sen. Bentsen). Grove City relies heavily on a colloquy between Senators Bayh and Dominick:
  “Mr. DOMINICK. The Senator is talking about every program under HEW?
  “Mr. BAYH. Let me suggest that I would imagine that any person who was sitting at the head of [HEW], administering this program, would be reasonable and would use only such leverage as was necessary against the institution.
  “It is unquestionable, in my judgment, that this would not be directed at specific assistance that was being received by individual students, but would be directed at the institution, and the Secretary would be expected to use good judgment as to how much leverage to apply, and where it could best be applied.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971).
  Grove City contends that Senator Bayh’s statement demonstrates an intent to exclude student aid from coverage under Title IX. We believe that his answer is more plausibly interpreted as suggesting that, although the Secretary is empowered to terminate student aid, he probably would not need to do so where leverage could be exerted by terminating other assistance. The students, of course, always remain free to take their assistance elsewhere.
  The statutory “laying before” procedure and the actions taken by Congress pursuant to it were more completely summarized in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 531-534.
  Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1975) (1975 Hearings). The Secretary added:
  “Our view was that student assistance, assistance that the Government furnishes, that goes directly or indirectly to an institution is Government aid within the meaning of Title IX. If it is not, there is an easy remedy. Simply tell us that it is not. We believe it is and base our assumption on that.” Id., at 484.
  Although “Congress has proceeded to amend §901 when it has disagreed with HEW’s interpretation of the statute,” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 534, it has acquiesced in the Department’s longstanding assessment of the types of federal aid that trigger coverage under Title IX. In considering the 1976 Education Amendments, for example, Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senator McClure that would have defined federal financial assistance as “assistance received by the institution directly from the federal government.” 122 Cong. Rec. 28144 (1976). Senator Pell objected that the amendment would remove from the scope of Title IX funds provided under the BEOG program and pointed out that, “[w]hile these dollars are paid to students they flow through and ultimately go to institutions of higher education . . . .” Id., at 28145. Senator Bayh raised a similar objection, id., at 28145-28146, and the amendment was rejected. Id., at 28147. See also id., at 28013-28016 (treatment of Hatfield amendment).
  It is also significant that in 1976 Congress enacted legislation clarifying the intent of the Privacy Act to ensure that institutions serving as payment agents for the BEOG program are not considered contractors maintaining a system of records to accomplish a function of the Secretary. Pub. L. 94-328, § 2(f), 90 Stat. 727, 20 U. S. C. §1070a(c). This legislation responded to concerns expressed by educational institutions over “the additional and unnecessary administrative burdens which would be imposed upon them if [they] were deemed ‘contractors.’ ” S. Rep. No. 94-954, p. 3 (1976). In sharp contrast, Congress has failed to respond to repeated requests by colleges in Grove City’s position for legislation exempting them from coverage under Title IX.
  The statutory authorization for BEOG’s, moreover, has been renewed three times. Pub. L. 94-482, § 121(a), 90 Stat. 2091; Pub. L. 95-566, § 2, 92 Stat. 2402; Pub. L. 96-374, § 402(a), 94 Stat. 1401. Each time, Congress was well aware of the administrative interpretation under which such grants were believed to trigger coverage under Title IX. The history of these reenactments makes clear that Congress regards BEOG’s and other forms of student aid as a critical source of support for educational institutions. See, e. g., Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and Related Measures: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 400 (1979) (Rep. Ford). In view of Congress’ consistent failure to amend either Title IX or the BEOG statute in a way that would support Grove City’s argument, we feel fully justified in concluding that “the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 535.
  Justice Stevens’ assertion that we need not decide and have no jurisdiction to decide this question is puzzling. Title IX coverage is triggered only when an “education program or activity” is receiving federal aid. Unless such a program can be and is identified, there is no basis for ordering the College to execute an Assurance of Compliance. The Court of Appeals understood as much and ruled that the entire College is the covered educational program. Until and unless that view of the statute is overturned, there will be outstanding an authoritative Court of Appeals’ judgment that the certificate Grove City must execute relates to the entire College and that without such a certificate the Department would be entitled to terminate grants to Grove City students.
  Grove City asks to be relieved of that judgment on the grounds that none of its educational programs is receiving any federal aid and that if any of its programs is receiving aid, it is only its administration of the BEOG program. Grove City is entitled to have these issues addressed, for otherwise it must deal with the undisturbed judgment of the Court of Appeals that the entire College is subject to federal oversight under Title IX. Even though the Secretary has changed his position and no longer agrees with the expansive construction accorded the statute by the Court of Appeals, it is still at odds with Grove City as to the extent of the covered program; and, in any event, its modified stance can hardly overturn or modify the judgment below or eliminate Grove City’s legitimate and substantial interest in having its submissions adjudicated.
  There is no merit to Grove City’s argument that the Department may regulate only the administration of the BEOG program. Just as employees who “work in an education program that receive[s] federal assistance,” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 540, are protected under Title IX even if their salaries are “not funded by federal money,” ibid., so also are students who participate in the College’s federally assisted financial aid program but who do not themselves receive federal funds protected against discrimination on the basis of sex.
  Until 1980, institutions whose students received BEOG’s and other forms of assistance were required to provide assurance that they would “continue to spend on [their] own scholarship and student-aid program[s], from sources other than funds received under [the federal programs], not less than the average expenditure per year made for that purpose during the most recent period of three fiscal years.” 20 U. S. C. § 1088c.
  This requirement was altered in the Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. 96-374, § 487(a), 94 Stat. 1451, 20 U. S. C. § 1094(a)(2) (1982 ed.), and no longer applies to schools whose students receive only BEOG’s.
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