Also, if contrary to our wishes, the FERC allows market monitoring committees to further investigate, make findings, and impose penalties, FERC must require the tariffs to contain detailed due process requirements that: (1) specifically name the behavior that is illegal and relate any penalties to specific violations, (2) require the MMC to notify the party being invested of the tariff or law that may have been violated, (3) allow the party being investigated to perform discovery on any other party (including the ISO or the PX) that may instead be at fault or may be a contributing party, (4) to facilitate this discovery, allow a party to know the identity of the party (if any) that alerted the MMC to the alleged violation, and (5) detail the process for any discovery, hearing, or ADR process to ensure the party being investigated has adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and to impute others who may instead be at fault.
If the FERC permits market monitoring committees to conduct investigations, issue findings, and enforce penalties despite objections, it must ensure that tariffs include clear due process provisions. These provisions should: (1) explicitly define prohibited behaviors and link penalties to specific violations, (2) mandate that the MMC informs the investigated party of the specific tariff or law potentially violated, (3) grant the investigated party the right to conduct discovery on other parties, including the ISO or PX, who may be at fault or involved, (4) allow the investigated party to learn the identity of any party that reported the alleged violation to the MMC, and (5) outline the procedures for discovery, hearings, or alternative dispute resolution to ensure the investigated party receives proper notice, an opportunity to respond, and the ability to identify others who may be responsible.
If the FERC permits market monitoring committees to conduct further investigations, make findings, and impose penalties, it must ensure that the tariffs include clear due process requirements. These requirements should: (1) explicitly identify illegal behaviors and link penalties to specific violations, (2) mandate that the MMC informs the investigated party of the relevant tariff or law potentially violated, (3) allow the investigated party to gather information from any relevant parties, including the ISO or the PX, who may share responsibility, (4) permit the investigated party to know the identity of anyone who reported the alleged violation to the MMC, and (5) outline the procedures for discovery, hearings, or alternative dispute resolution to guarantee that the investigated party receives adequate notice and the chance to present their case and identify others who may be responsible.
If the FERC allows market monitoring committees to investigate further, issue findings, and impose penalties, the tariffs should contain explicit due process provisions. These provisions should: (1) clearly define prohibited conduct and assign penalties to particular violations, (2) require the MMC to notify the investigated party of the tariff or law allegedly violated, (3) permit the investigated party to obtain information from any parties, including the ISO or the PX, who may be liable, (4) allow the investigated party to identify the identity of any person who reported the alleged violation to the MMC, and (5) specify the discovery, hearing, or other dispute resolution procedures to ensure that the investigated party is given sufficient notice and opportunity to present its case and identify others who may be liable.
If the FERC allows market monitoring committees to continue to investigate, to make findings, and to impose penalties, it must require that the tariffs contain explicit due process provisions. These requirements should: (1) clearly define illegal conduct and tie penalties to specific violations, (2) require the MMC to notify the party under investigation of the applicable tariff or law that may have been violated, (3) allow the investigated party to obtain information from any relevant parties, including the ISO or the PX, who may be responsible, (4) allow the investigated party to know the identity of any person who reported the alleged violation to the MMC, and (5) describe the discovery, hearing, or alternative dispute resolution procedures to ensure that the investigated party is given sufficient notice and the opportunity to present its case and identify other responsible parties.