                               COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Felton and Haley
Argued by teleconference

LEE ANDREW GRAHAM, II
                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v.     Record No. 0281-04-3                                   JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
                                                                     JULY 19, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
                                Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge

                 Mark T. Williams (Williams, Morrison, Light and Moreau, on brief),
                 for appellant.

                 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams
                 Jagdmann, Attorney General; Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney
                 General, on brief), for appellee.

       On February 5, 2004, Lee Andrew Graham, II (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal,

appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized

during a search of his person. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

                                                  I.

       On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing

below, here the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 704, 712, 589 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2003).

Applying that principle, the evidence showed that around 12:30 a.m. on July 9, 2003, Officers

Turpin and Harper were patrolling, on foot, an area adjacent to an apartment complex in a known

       *
           Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
high crime area, looking for gang activity and curfew violations, when they heard loud music

some 150 yards away, coming from the apartment complex. As they arrived on the apartment

grounds, they observed appellant sitting in a parked car with excessively loud music coming

from it. Believing the loud music violated a local noise ordinance, the officers approached

appellant who was seated in the front passenger seat of the car with the door open, talking to

another individual. When appellant saw the officers, he leaned over, turned the music down and

got out of the car, closing the door behind him. Turpin observed an open bottle of beer, still cold

to the touch, on the ground within appellant’s reach. Appellant denied the beer bottle was his

and denied that he had been drinking. Noticing that appellant had “glassy eyes,” Turpin asked

him if he had “smoked any dope.” Appellant denied doing so.

       Turpin then asked appellant if he had “any guns, weapons or drugs or anything like that

on him.” Appellant “sort of shrugged his shoulders, threw his hands up and turned around,” and

put his hands on “the roof of the car.” Appellant spread his legs and, leaning on the car, adopted

“the typical frisk stance, . . . assuming the position.” The officer immediately conducted a

pat-down frisk of appellant’s outer clothing with his open hands, given appellant’s response to

his questions. During the pat down, Turpin felt what he believed to be a pager in appellant’s

front pants pockets but continued his frisk. He then felt a “flat oblong, odd shaped rock” in

appellant’s right rear pants pocket, which he immediately recognized as a large rock of crack

cocaine. He reached into appellant’s pocket and removed the cocaine rock contained in a small

clear plastic baggie. When the officer seized the cocaine, appellant stated, “You put that there,”

even though he was unable to see at the time what the officer pulled out of his pants. After he

arrested appellant for possession of cocaine, Turpin searched his clothing, recovering $1,337 in

                                               -2-
cash 1 and a pager. Subsequent forensic testing identified the suspected drug seized from

appellant to be a 10.9 grams “rock” of cocaine. Testimony at trial placed a street value of the

cocaine at around $1,100.

       The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from him, and

subsequently convicted him of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, imposing a

sentence of eight years imprisonment, with seven years suspended. Appellant appealed.

                                                  II.

       On appeal, the burden of proving that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress

was reversible error lies with appellant, McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487

S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc), and the decision of the trial court will be disturbed only if plainly

wrong, Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). When we

review such a denial, “we consider the evidence adduced at both the suppression hearing and the

trial,” Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 420, 579 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2003), aff’d on other

grounds, 267 Va. 291, 590 S.E.2d 365 (2004), and “[w]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of

historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to

the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers,”

McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996)). Whether the seizure of the evidence from appellant was constitutionally valid involves a

question of law which we review de novo on appeal. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.

       Appellant contends that Turpin lacked authority to conduct a pat-down frisk while

investigating misdemeanor noise and alcohol offenses; that the pat-down frisk was unreasonable

because there was no basis for the officers to believe that he was armed and dangerous; and that

       1
         The denominations of the recovered money were five one-hundred dollar bills,
thirty-one twenty-dollar bills, eight ten-dollar bills, twenty-six five-dollar bills, and seven
one-dollar bills.
                                                 -3-
by voluntarily assuming the frisk stance, he did not consent for Turpin to frisk him, but rather

submitted to the officer’s show of authority.

        It is well established that a police search made pursuant to valid consent does not

implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973);

Iglesias v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 99, 372 S.E.2d 170, 173 (1988) (en banc). “The

Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and

‘[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’” Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49). The United States

Supreme Court has articulated the standard for measuring the scope of an individual’s consent

under the Fourth Amendment to be “‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical

reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). “Both the presence of consent to search and any

related limitations are factual issues for the trial court to resolve after consideration of the

attendant circumstances.” Bynum v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 412, 418, 477 S.E.2d 750,

753 (1996).

        “Where consent is based on implication, the Commonwealth bears a heavy burden of

proof.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 674, 687-88, 496 S.E.2d 143, 150 (1998)

(citations omitted). “Although the consent need not be oral, mere acquiescence is not enough.”

Jean-Laurent v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 74, 78, 538 S.E.2d 316, 318 (2000). Courts have

found consent to search a person when evidenced by conduct alone, such as turning and “placing

[one’s] hands against the wall without prompting,” Bynum, 23 Va. App. at 417, 477 S.E.2d at 753,

or shrugging one’s shoulders and then extending one’s arms, United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168,

170 (4th Cir. 1990).

                                                  -4-
        When Turpin asked appellant if he had “any guns, weapons or drugs or anything like that

on him,” his question made clear his concern over the potential presence of weapons. Appellant

did not respond orally but immediately assumed the frisk position. His assumption of the

“typical frisk stance,” in response to the officer’s inquiry, equally suggested that he had a

weapon or drugs or both, or that he denied such and invited the officer to dispel any suspicion by

frisking him. The record reflects that appellant’s behavior was voluntary and not the product of

coercion or intimidation. The officers approached appellant on foot. Neither officer had his gun

drawn. When appellant saw the officers approach, he voluntarily turned down the music and waited

outside the car for them. Turpin did not mention to appellant that he might be charged with an

offense. The encounter had been brief, and appellant was not “boxed in.”

        We conclude from the record that appellant’s non-verbal response, shrugging his shoulders

and assuming the frisk position, to the question of whether he had guns, weapons, or drugs on his

person, invited the officer to frisk him. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 615, 620, 1 S.E.2d

300, 302 (1939) (“In the absence of vocal expressions evidencing intention, we must look to actions

and surrounding incidents.”). See also United States v. Steward, 93 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)

(using “magic words” such as “yes” are not necessary to evince consent because “the key inquiry

focuses on what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between

the officer and the suspect”).

        Although Turpin did not ask or direct appellant to assume the frisk position, and did not ask

if he could pat him down, the officer was objectively reasonable in inferring that appellant assented

to his patting him down to satisfy his concern that he may have weapons or drugs on his person.

Appellant cannot complain when the frisk he invited led to the officer’s discovery of the cocaine in

his rear pocket.

                                                -5-
        While the trial court did not specifically rule on the issue of consent raised by the

Commonwealth, it denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the pat-down frisk was lawful for

purposes of the officer’s safety. Because we find that appellant invited Turpin to frisk him, we

conclude that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress, although it did so for a

different reason, i.e., the need to assure the officer’s safety in continuing his investigation, given the

early morning hour, the high crime location, and the responses to his questions. See Driscoll v.

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 452, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313-14 (1992) (holding that an appellate

court may affirm the trial court when it reached the right result for the wrong reason when the

reason was raised at trial).

                                                   III.

        Appellant also contends that, even assuming the brief encounter and frisk were permissible

under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Turpin’s removal of the cocaine from his rear pants pocket

exceeded the scope of the pat-down frisk. Appellant argues that Turpin had, at most, authority to

frisk to determine if any weapons were on his person. It is well established that “[a] search for

weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest . . . must, like any other search, be strictly

circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Id. at 25-26. “The purpose of this

limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his

investigation without fear of violence . . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); see

Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 574, 570 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2002). The pat-down frisk

“must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to

harm the officer or others nearby . . . .” Terry, 392 U.S. at 26; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.

85, 94 (1979).

        It is equally well established that contraband discovered during a lawful frisk is admissible

so long as the search does not exceed the limited intrusion permitted by Terry. See Murphy, 264

                                                   -6-
Va. at 574-75, 570 S.E.2d at 839; Hall v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 226, 228, 468 S.E.2d 693,

694 (1996). In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), the Court considered “whether police

officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the

sort permitted by Terry.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373. In answering that question in the affirmative,

the Court stated:

               [i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing
               and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
               immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s
               privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for
               weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would
               be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the
               plain-view context.

Id. at 375-76. However, once an officer has determined that the object is not likely a weapon, and

its shape or size does not immediately indicate it is contraband, he may not continue the search to

determine if the item is contraband. See id. at 378; see also Murphy, 264 Va. at 574, 570 S.E.2d at

839.

       Appellant’s reliance on Murphy is misplaced. In Murphy, a police officer conducting a

pat-down frisk for weapons felt a plastic bag in Murphy’s pocket. Suspecting that the bag contained

marijuana, the officer removed it, and found that it did. 264 Va. at 571-72, 570 S.E.2d at 837-38.

The Court found the officer’s seizure of the plastic bag exceeded the scope of the frisk as only the

character of the plastic bag was immediately apparent, and the object he felt was not immediately

identifiable as a weapon or contraband. Id. at 574-75, 570 S.E.2d at 839.

       Here, the record reflects that it was immediately apparent to Turpin from “one pat” that the

“flat oblong, odd shaped rock” was crack cocaine. Turpin had eleven years experience as a police

officer, and had conducted more than thirty drug arrests. He testified that on previous occasions he

had been able to identify crack cocaine by feel during pat-down frisks. The trial court found the

officer’s testimony credible that, based on his experience, he immediately concluded from touching

                                                 -7-
the object that it was “one big rock” of cocaine. The officer did not manipulate the object in any

way once he first felt it. Significantly, during his frisk of appellant, Turpin first felt appellant’s

pager, but because he concluded it was not immediately identifiable as a weapon or contraband, he

continued his frisk of appellant for weapons, seizing the pager and a wad of money only following

his arrest of appellant on the drug offense.

        Based on our review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s

motion to suppress the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                Affirmed.

                                                   -8-


Anti-inflammatory drugs do not improve cognitive function in older adults

May 12, 2008 in Medicine & Health / Diseases, Conditions, Syndromes

The anti-inflammatory drugs naproxen and celecoxib do not appear to improve cognitive function in older adults with a family history of Alzheimer’s disease, and naproxen may have a slightly detrimental effect, according to an article posted online today that will appear in the July 2008 print issue of Archives of Neurology.

Inflammatory processes may play a role in Alzheimer’s disease and other neurodegenerative disorders, as well as in the decline of cognitive (thinking, learning and memory) function in older adults, according to background information in the article. “Consistent with this hypothesis, observational studies have shown an association between the use of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) and a lower risk of Alzheimer’s disease,” the authors write.

The ADAPT (Alzheimer’s Disease Anti-Inflammatory Prevention Trial) Research Group conducted a randomized clinical trial involving 2,117 individuals age 70 and older with a family history of Alzheimer’s disease. From March 2001 to December 2004, 617 took 200 milligrams of the NSAID celecoxib twice daily, 596 took 220 milligrams of naproxen sodium twice daily and 904 took placebo. Each year, the study participants took seven tests assessing cognitive function that were added into one global summary score. Treatments were halted in December 2004 because another study found increased cardiovascular risks associated with celecoxib.

“The ADAPT cognitive function results through six months after study treatment cessation do not show a protective effect with the use of NSAIDs and may suggest that cognitive scores are lower,” the authors write. “The global summary scores, which combine the results from seven individual tests in the cognitive assessment battery, were significantly lower over time for naproxen, but not for celecoxib, compared with placebo.”

There are several explanations for the difference between these findings and those of previous observational trials, the authors note. Because observational trials do not assign participants to treatment groups but analyze existing behavior, additional factors that were not measured may have confounded or affected the results. In addition, the findings of this trial may apply only to celecoxib and naproxen and not to other anti-inflammatories, such as ibuprofen. Finally, NSAIDs may be protective only when given several years before the time when cognitive function would have begun to decline.

“Continued follow-up of trial participants, even after cessation of treatment, appears warranted to investigate treatment effects with respect to the timing of exposure,” the authors write. “However, for now we suggest that naproxen and celecoxib should not be used for the prevention of Alzheimer’s disease.”


                        NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
                To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

                United States Court of Appeals
                                For the Seventh Circuit
                                Chicago, Illinois 60604

                                Submitted July 30, 2019*
                                 Decided July 31, 2019

                                        Before

                      ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

                      DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

                      MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3646

BECKY L. BISHOP,                               Appeal from the United States District
     Plaintiff-Appellant,                      Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

      v.                                       No. 16-CV-1447

PETER BOSQUEZ, et al.,                         William C. Griesbach,
     Defendants-Appellees.                     Chief Judge.

                                      ORDER

        Officers executing a warrant searched Becky Bishop’s property for maltreated
horses. Bishop sued them, alleging that the warrant was invalid and that the officers
used excessive force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeded in two phases. First, the district
court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the claim challenging the
warrant’s validity. Then, following some pretrial rulings, the excessive-force claims
went to a bench trial, where the court found that the force was reasonable. Bishop now

      *  We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 18-3646                                                                         Page 2

contests (1) summary judgment on the invalid-warrant claim; (2) the adverse pretrial
rulings; and (3) the excessive-force finding. We affirm because, with deference to the
warrant-issuing judge, the warrant was justified; the pretrial rulings fall comfortably
within the trial judge’s discretion; and the finding of no unreasonable force was not
clearly erroneous.
       I.     Background
       We recite the facts in the record, noting where the parties disagree.
              a. The Search
       Peter Bosquez, a Waupaca County police officer, visited Bishop’s farm in 2013 to
respond to a report that Bishop’s horses were malnourished. (Mistreating animals is a crime
in Wisconsin.) He saw malnourished horses and fences and stables in disrepair. (Bishop
counters that Bosquez never entered her barn.) Bosquez served Bishop with an
administrative order requiring her to call a veterinarian for the horses and to repair her
fencing. Bishop administratively appealed the order, but the county voted to uphold it.
        A month later, Bosquez saw that Bishop’s fence had not been repaired, so he
obtained a search warrant. In the affidavit supporting the warrant, Bosquez attested to the
mistreatment he had observed and that he had completed animal-welfare training. A state
judge issued the warrant. It authorized a search of Bishop’s property for the seizure of
malnourished horses and any paperwork or electronic files about their care. Bosquez, other
officers, and Dr. Matt Koltz, a veterinarian, then went to Bishop’s home and served her with
the warrant. She cracked the door open briefly, but quickly closed and locked it. Bosquez
forced the door open and took Bishop to the living room. After assigning two officers to
watch her, Bosquez and Dr. Koltz searched the property. They seized Bishop’s 22 horses
and various documents.
        The officers assigned to watch Bishop during the search, Tim Wilz and Kevin
Studzinski, ordered her to stay seated on the couch, but Bishop refused. A few times she
tried to get up, use the phone and bathroom, and walk about living room, which was
cluttered and might have concealed dangerous objects or weapons. The first time that
Bishop refused to stay seated, Studzinski pushed her back onto the couch. Another
time, Bishop thought that officers outside were aiming a gun at one of her sons (it was
actually a taser). When she stood up again, she fought Studzinski’s attempt to seat her,
so he and Wilz pushed Bishop facedown onto the couch and handcuffed her.
      A struggle to handcuff Bishop ensued. According to Studzinski, Bishop was
swearing at him and punched him. As Bishop clashed with the officers, her pants
became unbuttoned and partially fell down. Bishop says that the officers pulled them
and her underwear down and touched her inappropriately. The officers responded that
No. 18-3646                                                                            Page 3

her pants came down inadvertently and that her underwear never came down. The
police then led her from the house to a car outside, using force to lift her because she
was “passively resisting.” As she resisted, Bishop’s pants began to fall down again.
Studzinski states that he “hoist[ed]” them up while taking her to the police car.
              b. Litigation
       After the search, the State of Wisconsin prosecuted Bishop in state court for failing to
lawfully care for her horses. During those proceedings, Bishop challenged the validity of
the warrant. The state judge ruled that warrant was valid and sufficiently supported by
Bosquez’s affidavit. After pleading no contest to the charges, the judge sentenced her to two
years of probation. Bishop did not appeal.
       This suit followed. As relevant on appeal, Bishop sued Bosquez, and Dr. Koltz and
his employer, alleging that the search and seizure were unreasonable and had violated state
law. These defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their
motions. Regarding Bishop’s challenge to the warrant’s validity, it ruled that Bishop had
not substantiated her assertion that Bosquez had lied to obtain the warrant. On the claims
against Dr. Koltz and his employer, the district court determined that Bishop did not offer
evidence suggesting that they contributed to an unlawful search. The court dismissed
Bishop’s state-law claims against these defendants without prejudice.
        Bishop also sued Wilz and Studzinski for using unreasonable force during the
search. Those claims survived summary judgment, leading to several pretrial rulings.
The district judge granted the defendants’ motion to extend discovery to depose
Bishop’s son because Bishop had not timely provided his contact information. Bishop
filed two motions in limine on which the judge deferred ruling. The first sought to bar
the defendants from questioning Bishop at trial about her horses. The judge advised
Bishop that if he granted the motion, a jury might speculate—adversely to Bishop—
about the reason for the search warrant. The second motion sought to bar from trial a
summary of the county’s investigation into Bishop’s administrative complaint against
Studzinski and Wilz. The judge wanted more time to assess the summary’s relevance.
Finally, citing factual disputes, the judge denied a third motion from Bishop in which
she sought to tell the jury that she was not “under arrest” when the officers handcuffed
her during the search. After these decisions, Bishop waived her right to a jury trial.
       At trial, the judge credited the officers’ testimony and ruled that they did not use
unreasonable force. He bypassed the question whether Bishop was arrested and treated
the case as if Bishop was not under arrest and was handcuffed only to facilitate the
search. But the judge concluded that the officers used reasonable force because Bishop
locked the door when she was served with the warrant, refused to stay on the couch
No. 18-3646                                                                                Page 4

when she was ordered to do so, and fought the officers when they tried to keep her
there. It also rejected the claim that the officers intentionally pulled and left her pants
down, finding that Studzinski pulled them up for her when they fell accidentally. The
court entered judgment for all defendants and awarded costs. Bishop then filed a
motion that the district court construed as a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59, and the court denied it.
       II.     Analysis
        First, a word about the scope of Bishop’s appeal: Bishop’s new-trial motion was
still pending when she filed her notice of appeal. Under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i), the judgment became final and came within the scope of her
earlier-filed notice once the district court ruled on Bishop’s new-trial motion. But we
lack jurisdiction to consider Bishop’s challenge to that new-trial ruling because she did
not file an amended notice to appeal that ruling. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
       We similarly do not consider Bishop’s challenge (in her appellate brief) to the
award of costs. Under the local rules, which even pro se litigants must follow, see, e.g.,
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006), “[a] party may move for review of the
Clerk of Court's decision taxing costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) within 7 days from
taxation.” E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 54(c); see also Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Edward E. Gillen Co.,
926 F.3d 318, 328 (7th Cir. 2019). A failure to do so prevents appellate review. Id. Bishop
objected to the bill of costs, but she did not, as these rules require, ask the district court to
review her objections once the Clerk taxed costs; nor did she appeal from the taxation of
costs.
               a. Summary Judgment Regarding the Warrant’s Validity
       Bishop first argues that in two ways Bosquez lied to obtain the search warrant,
rendering it invalid. First, in his affidavit supporting the warrant, he attested that he had
completed training about animal treatment, but Bishop insists that he did not complete that
training until after he first visited her property. Second, in that affidavit Bosquez also
attested that Bishop had not called a veterinarian to examine her horses, but Bishop
maintains that she scheduled a herd evaluation for the day before the search. We review
de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, construing the undisputed facts
in Bishop’s favor. White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary
judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the
moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); White,
829 F.3d at 841.
      Bishop’s challenge to the warrant’s validity fails. First, the challenge is precluded
because a state court already has upheld the warrant against Bishop’s previous
No. 18-3646                                                                                Page 5

challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–05 (1980). In any event,
her challenge is meritless. We afford “great deference” to the decision of the judge who
issued the warrant. United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir 2008). And Bishop
has offered no evidence showing that Bosquez lied to that judge, so the deference is intact.
See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2017). Even though Bosquez may not
have completed his animal-welfare training until after he first visited Bishop’s property, in
the warrant application he stated truthfully that he completed the training before seeking
the warrant. And nothing in the record suggests that Bosquez knew that Bishop had
scheduled a herd evaluation for the day before the search.
        Next, Bishop argues that Bosquez exceeded the warrant’s scope by (1) searching
vehicles in which horses were never kept; and (2) searching a vehicle and seizing horses
that belonged to her son. Though she arguably raised these contentions in her complaint,
she did not present them at summary judgment, so we need not consider them. See Fednav
Intern., Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). But for two reasons, they
are unavailing anyway. First, the warrant authorized a search of the property for animals
and records of their treatment, and “officers are entitled to search anywhere the items to be
seized might likely be discovered, so long as that is within the place authorized to be
searched.” Archer, 870 F.3d at 617. Because the warrant empowered Bosquez to search the
property for paperwork (including electronic files) about the horses’ care, he could look any
place on the property where documents could have been, including vehicles. See United
States v. Borotowski, 775 F.3d 851, 864–65 (7th Cir. 2014). Second, because Bishop “admitted
that [s]he did not own the horses” or the son’s vehicle, she “lacked standing to sue” about
those searches and seizures. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001).
       Finally, Bishop challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss her state-law
claims. But the court reasonably declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims when it decided Bishop’s federal claims against Bosquez at summary judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3); Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2019).
               b. Trial – Officers Tim Wilz and Kevin Studzinski
                       i. Pretrial Motions
       Bishop contests three pretrial decisions. She first argues that by delaying ruling
on two of her motions in limine until trial, the court “forced” her to waive her right to a
jury because she feared that adverse rulings on these motions could prejudice the jury.
District courts have broad discretion to make and alter pretrial evidentiary rulings
before and during trial. Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013). A court
that delays ruling on a motion in limine until trial might abuse its discretion if it did not
prepare the parties for the ruling. See, e.g., Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1034–35
(7th Cir. 1999). But that is not the case here. The court reasonably deferred ruling on
No. 18-3646                                                                           Page 6

Bishop’s request to block questions about her horses because it advised her to consider
if she wanted a jury to speculate about the basis for the search warrant. And the court
properly delayed ruling on whether to admit the report of Bishop’s administrative
complaint against Studzinski and Wilz because its relevance was uncertain. See Perry,
733 F.3d at 252. Finally, the court reasonably left for trial the question whether Bishop
was under arrest during the search: her “arrest” status was contested, and different
standards govern the use of force for detentions incident to a search warrant and for
those incident to an arrest. Compare Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–100 (2005) (search
warrant) with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (arrest).
       Bishop also challenges the court’s decision to extend the discovery deadline so
that the defendants could take her son’s deposition. But an extension was well within
the court’s broad discretion over “matters of trial management,” Griffin v. Foley,
542 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2008), given that Bishop had refused to provide her son’s
contact information earlier.
                     ii. Sufficiency of the Evidence
       Finally, Bishop argues that the evidence at trial compels the conclusion that
Studizinski and Wilz used excessive force. She emphasizes that the officers admitted
that her pants were partially down during the search and they would not let her pull
them up, make any phone calls, go to the bathroom, or leave the couch after she
thought that officers had drawn a gun on her son. We review for clear error the trial
judge’s findings that the officers’ use of force was reasonable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6);
Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004, 1006–07 (7th Cir. 2018).
        To determine whether police used excessive force when executing a search
warrant on a civilian, a trier of fact examines “whether the officers’ actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Flournoy v. City
of Chicago, 829 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2016). The factfinder assesses reasonableness from
the perspective of an officer on the scene, recognizing that officers often must make
split-second decisions. Id. at 874. When a person forcefully and persistently refuses to
comply with lawful orders to submit to a search, the police may use force reasonably
calculated to achieve compliance. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98–100; Smith v. Ball State
Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
       For several reasons, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the force
applied to Bishop was reasonable. First, Bishop disobeyed lawful orders. She ignored
orders to let the police in her home to execute the warrant and to remain seated during
the search. Second, she used force: she locked the police out and punched them when
they tried to seat her. Third, her resistance led them to worry understandably about
No. 18-3646                                                                          Page 7

their safety and the search. The clutter in Bishop’s living room might conceal a weapon
that Bishop could use to harm them or interfere with the search, and this reasonable
fear justified their use of force to handcuff her, even if that her kept her from using the
phone or bathroom. See Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614–16 (2007); Muehler,
544 U.S. at 98–100. Fourth, the police did not use force beyond that needed to handcuff
her for their safety: the district court permissibly accepted as more credible the officers’
testimony that they did not deliberately pull her pants down and that they pulled the
pants up as they moved her to the car. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). Finally, Bishop’s concern that the police
held her son at gunpoint did not disable the police from keeping her immobilized for
their safety and to complete the search. “When officers execute a valid warrant and act
in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm … the Fourth Amendment is
not violated.” Rettele, 550 U.S. at 616.
      We have considered Bishop’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment.


The present invention relates to a fully fabricated three-dimensional knitted cover. Such seat covers are known e.g. from EP 0 361 855 B1. The disadvantage of these three-dimensional covers is the fact that the visual finish in the region of the contour lines, such as e.g. spiked lines, lacks true homogeneity and thus visual appeal.
It is thus the object of the invention to provide a knitted cover and a method for producing a knitted cover which masks the contour lines for visual appeal.
In accordance with the invention a tubular knit is integrated in the region of at least one contour line in a seat cover. Contour line in this context is understood to be one of the following:
a line at which the knit changes,
a widening, narrowing or spike line
a corner, edge or rim of a two-dimensional or three-dimensional seat cover or
strongly contoured portions of a three-dimensional cover.
This tubular knit is knitted to the seat cover in knitting the latter so that it is integrally joined to the cover. This is achievable either by transferring prefabricated parts over a comb into the knitting portion of the flat bed machine or by knitting the tubular knit on separate needle beds with subsequent transfer to the needle beds on which the knitted cover is being knitted. However, it is just as possible to simply knit the bead or tubular knit into the cover whilst the remaining needles for knitting the cover remain inactive. The tubular knit conceals the contour line similar to piping to thus create a neat finish. In addition, the contour line is protected from being physically damaged.
The tubular knit must not necessarily take the form of a closed tubing, it instead being configured as a single-ply knitted tag or taking the form of a two-ply knitted tag in which e.g. one ply is knitted closer and/or with elastic thread material and/or thermalized so that this ply is closer than the other ply, resulting in the tag rolling up into an open tubing. However, the tubular knit may also be knitted as a closed tubing. The way in which the tubular knit is configured is irrelevant for its function in masking and protecting the contour lines from damage.
To produce a variety of visual effects the tubing can, of course, be knitted with patterns, markings, defined perforations, reinforcements, optical fibers, differing binding variants, in thermoplastic or elastic materials, e.g. with a rubber thread having an elasticity exceeding 50%, as a result of which this piping may also be employed as a bumper rim.
Lengthwise the tubing may be knitted ditferingly in thickness, or it may be spiked to produce a jagged edge in thus creating a wealth of differing patterns, all of which, however, serve in the same way to mask the contour lines or to protect them from damage in forming a bumper edge.


package japgolly.scalajs.react.extra.router

/** The means by which the location should be set to a given URL. */
sealed trait SetRouteVia

object SetRouteVia {

  /** The current URL will not be recorded in history. User can't hit ''Back'' button to reach it.
    *
    * Implemented via `replaceState` in the History API.
    *
    * @see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/History/replaceState
    */
  case object HistoryReplace extends SetRouteVia

  /** The current URL will be recorded in history. User can hit ''Back'' button to reach it.
    *
    * Implemented via `pushState` in the History API.
    *
    * @see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/History/pushState
    */
  case object HistoryPush extends SetRouteVia

  /** `window.location.href` will be directly set to the new URL.
    *
    * If the new URL is part of the current SPA, the entire SPA will be reloaded.
    *
    * The current URL will be recorded in history. User can hit ''Back'' button to reach it.
    */
  case object WindowLocation extends SetRouteVia
}


FrameFrame XL

Burkhard Vogtherr designed the Frame Chair for Arco back in 2000. This chair has since become a classic piece within the collection. Arco has now developed a wide range of Frame Chairs that offers an extensive choice of models (seats and frames) and materials. The existing Frame Chair has a distinctive metal frame with fine rectangular lines that create a sleek and delicate look. Frame comes in a standard and XL version with a chrome or epoxy frame. These chairs look fabulous in residential interiors and are also absolutely ideal for high-end business environments and meeting rooms.


Q:

Is there a link format for physical street address?

Mobile devices have started to do link detection fairly well. They now detect links, email address, phone numbers and physical street addresses.
The problem is that link detection is not 100% correct. So to be more explicit, for most of these, we can use a link.
1-408-555-5555

Is there an equivalent link format for a physical street address?

A:

There doesn't seem to be one defined, according to the IANA. Here is a discussion about creating one, but it doesn't seem it ever went anywhere. The closest I can find is geo, which is just latitude and longitude, not a postal address. I see from the update that you want to display a map, so what you want is to geocode the address to get a geo URI. You could use Google's API but I don't know if there is any need for the geo URI at that point.


Beer Taps & Cask Beer Keg Equipment

This collection of beer taps and cask beer keg equipment forms part of the extensive range of cellar equipment available from Pattersons Bar Supplies. Pub cellar equipment such as beer taps and cask beer keg equipment are vital for keeping a pub running smoothly behind the scenes. Ensure you have all the cask beer stillage tools you need for your pub and bar with Pattersons Bar Supplies.

Buy Beer Taps & Cask Beer Keg Equipment from Pattersons Bar Supplies

Buy your beer taps and cask beer keg equipment from Pattersons Bar Supplies and our extensive range of cellar equipment. Ensure you have all the tools for running behind the scenes in your pub or bar. If you have any questions about the range of beer taps and cask beer keg equipment, or any of our cellar equipment, please contact our customer services on 0117 934 1270 or email us on web@pattersons.co.uk.


This past Monday, October 5, California became the fifth state to allow doctors to prescribe life-ending drugs to patients with terminal illnesses, joining Washington State, Oregon, Vermont, and Montana. In an unusually confessional signing message, Governor Jerry Brown explained his decision to sign the legislation, writing: “I do not know what I would do if I were dying in prolonged and excruciating pain. I am certain, however, that it would be a comfort to be able to consider the options afforded by this bill.”

 The passage of the End of Life Option Act capped a tumultuous process that began more than 20 years ago, when Californians roundly rejected an aid-in-dying ballot initiative (the first of several efforts), and accelerated only recently alongside shifting currents in the broader culture. New books such as Atul Gawande’s Being Mortal have been raising vital questions about personal agency, the culture of modern healthcare, and the end of life. Award-winning documentaries like How To Die in Oregon have drawn attention to the real-life responses to death-with-dignity legislation. And recent cases like that of Brittany Maynard, the 29-year-old with a brain tumor who chose to move to a state where aid in dying is legal, have fascinated the media. Maynard famously relocated from California to Oregon so that she could die a more peaceful, dignified death than the one fated by her cancer.

 Ann Neumann, author of the forthcoming The Good Death: An Exploration of Dying in America, attributes the new openness to discussions about death and dying to a mix of demographic, cultural and even medical shifts. Americans are living longer, she told The Nation, but many of those extra years are proving to be a series of long, slow and disabling medical problems. “Independent, control-focused baby boomers are taking care of their elderly parents and beginning to worry about what will happen in their own end years,” she said.

But the new openness to end-of-life care is running up against one of the complexities of America’s healthcare system. Catholic hospitals supply an indispensable and growing share of the country’s healthcare services. These hospitals now make up 10 of the 25 largest healthcare networks in the United States and, in some places and for some people, they are the only realistic option. But Catholic hospitals don’t do “death with dignity.”

Catholic hospitals have long taken the position that they will not provide medical services that contradict Catholic religious principles. More than that, they will frequently not permit their doctors and other providers—many of whom are not Catholic—to perform such services. For decades, they have exercised this right in the area of reproductive health, where they refuse to provide many services, mostly to women, which are perfectly legal. Last week, the ACLU filed a suit against a Catholic hospital system, Trinity Health Corporation, charging it with failing to provide women with pregnancy complications with emergency abortions as required by federal law.

As with the beginning of life, so it will be with the end of life. In the aftermath of Oregon’s Death with Dignity law, which went into effect in 1997, it has become clear that Catholic hospitals will deny aid in dying to patients even in those states where such services have been legalized.

In 2014, a patient in a hospice in Washington State made repeated requests for assistance in ending his life. His condition, brain cancer, was terminal and had the potential to become excruciatingly painful. But his physician and the other medical professionals charged with his care declined to provide him with information about aid in dying or referrals to other places that might be able to help him. Eventually, he decided to solve the situation on his own. He climbed into a bathtub and shot himself with a gun.

As a resident of Washington, which had passed a Death With Dignity Act six years earlier, the patient was legally entitled to receive the information and assistance he desperately wanted. He had a right to seek medical help to end his life. His mistake, however, was to have found himself in a hospice that is affiliated with Providence Health & Services, a large Catholic healthcare network. The medical professionals in this patient’s case appear to have believed that they would be fired if they offered him referrals.

We know of this case only because a hospice nurse found the incident so upsetting that the nurse filed a complaint with Washington’s Department of Health. The health department found no evidence of medical wrongdoing. The tragedy, however, does provide evidence of the kind of suffering that results from the complexity of an American healthcare system in which the religious orientation of large healthcare corporations may have more influence over the care of individuals than the laws passed by their duly elected representatives.

In the case of Catholic hospitals, the religious principles guiding hospital administrators are codified in a document called the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERD). The ERD has been around in some form since at least 1921, with the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops publishing the first uniform ERD in 1948; it has since been updated every few years, most recently in 2009. The ERD provides “authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that face Catholic healthcare today.”

Although local bishops have a certain amount of leeway in how the ERD is interpreted, most of them believe that the ERD rules out aid in dying. Indeed, directive number 60 is blunt on the matter: “Catholic healthcare institutions may never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way.” Dying patients who request aid in hastening the event “should receive loving care, psychological and spiritual support, and appropriate remedies for pain and other symptoms so that they can live with dignity until the time of natural death.” Directive number 61 adds: “Patients experiencing suffering that cannot be alleviated should be helped to appreciate the Christian understanding of redemptive suffering.”

Some medical professionals at Catholic institutions do point to “workarounds,” in which they are able to refer patients to other organizations or individuals that provide such services. Others, who are part of institutions whose boards enforce a stricter interpretation of the directives, say they are not even allowed to do that much.

Those patients who are aware of their medical options are of course “free” to seek other healthcare providers, just as doctors are presumably able to find jobs at non-Catholic institutions. But the growing—and in some places dominant—position of Catholic hospitals in the US healthcare system leaves many patients and doctors with few realistic options. According to a 2013 report by MergerWatch, between 2001 and 2011, at a time when other types of nonprofit hospitals have been disappearing, the number of Catholic-sponsored hospitals grew by 16 percent; only for-profit hospitals have fared better. Catholic hospitals now account for 1 in 9 hospital beds around the country, with much higher concentrations in some states, including Washington State, where they account for nearly one of every two hospital beds.

Dr. Stephen Kerner, who practices family medicine in Florence, Oregon, and has served for eight years as medical director at a Catholic-affiliated hospice care facility, expresses frustration with the restrictions. “I am not able to give my own perspective,” he said. “There is no question that it affects the kind of care I am able to deliver. When my patients inquire about it, I have to say that we don’t participate in it.”

Kerner pointed out that the only hospital in his town is Catholic, so most patients have little choice in the matter. “If patients ask about aid in dying, we can refer them to the Lane County Medical Society or the Washington State Department of Health, and then those organizations may refer those patients to Compassion & Choices,” he said, referring to the nation’s largest aid-in-dying organization. “But we can’t do it directly.”

Death-with-dignity acts allow physicians to prescribe lethal doses of medication, so that patients may self-administer drugs that hasten their end of life. Each patient must meet multiple criteria: He or she must be an adult resident of that state and have been diagnosed with an incurable, irreversible, terminal disease that will lead to death within six months. A second, consulting physician is required to confirm eligibility.

A patient must undergo a psychological evaluation if either the attending or consulting physician suspects the patient’s judgment might be impaired by mental illness. Patients must ask for the medication a total of three times—twice verbally, and once in writing. To ensure terminally ill people aren’t making these decisions in haste, there is a mandatory 15-day waiting period between the first and second verbal requests.

“If your primary-care physician is part of a Catholic organization or network, you might find another physician who can fulfill the requirements,” Kerner said, “but in our region, as with many small towns or rural areas, the only facilities within reach are Catholic.”

For patients in such circumstances, the process of obtaining referrals can be arduous. Struggling with exhaustion, restricted mobility, nausea, overwhelming pain, and other symptoms of terminal illness, many simply give up—or die while trying.

“Remember,” said Dr. Kerner, “these institutions are directly supported by the federal government. How is it that their religious imperatives can take precedence over two physicians in a situation in which a prescription is legally allowed and medically indicated?”

Dr. Frances DeRook, a Washington State cardiologist who recently completed a fellowship in Palliative Medicine at the University of Washington in Seattle, spent a portion of her fellowship year studying aid-in-dying legislation. She and Dr. Kerner presented an abstract on the topic to the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine in February, raising awareness of the issue in the broader medical community.

“Doctors who work for Catholic healthcare organizations are not allowed to give patients the name of Compassion & Choices as a resource,” she said. “They can refer patients to state or county medical societies, and the idea is that there they have Compassion & Choices listed. It’s a step removed.”

The restrictions, said DeRook, have produced a broad sense of frustration in the medical community. “People who work at PeaceHealth have told me that they are ‘gagged,’” DeRook said, referring to a prominent Catholic health services chain throughout Northwest. “They actually used that term to describe their inability, not only to participate in aid in dying, but to share important information with their patients about their rights.”

Tim Strickland, a spokesperson for PeaceHealth, denied that the organization silences its medical staff or stands in the way of patients looking for information about aid in dying. “Resources are available outside of PeaceHealth for patients who are seeking information about Death With Dignity laws,” he told The Nation. “We treat all patients with compassion and respect, and when asked about ‘death with dignity,’ our physicians provide information about resources through which patients can become more informed.”

Nonetheless, there are reports of doctors facing grave consequences for defying their hospital’s restrictions. Dr. David Grube, medical director of Compassion & Choices, spoke with an Oregon physician who was fired for writing a prescription. “The pharmacist recognized that this doctor worked in a Catholic health system and called the physician’s office,” he says. “A staff member reported this to the office medical director and to a priest who was in the Catholic health-system administration. The priest had the authority to fire the doctor, and he did. And that was it.”

In areas that are dominated by Catholic healthcare systems, medical professionals recognize that it could be difficult or impossible to obtain new jobs in non-Catholic healthcare systems, so the threat of being fired is especially acute.

For DeRook, a commitment to comprehensive palliative care means she is compelled to move to an area with a broader array of medical care facilities. “I’m presently packing up to leave the town where I’ve been living because my professional options here are limited,” she says. “I want to be able to speak freely and openly about death with dignity if my patients ask about it, because it is a valid and legal end-of-life option in this state. So I narrowed my job search to secular hospitals. I’m voting with my feet.”

Many death-with-dignity activists have been motivated by the experience of watching their own loved ones suffer. One of those is Steph Campbell, a 65-year-old retired manager of software quality assurance in Costa Mesa, California, whose mother died in 2007 after a protracted illness.

“When she became sick, she lost her independence and was put on a feeding tube,” Campbell recalls. “Initially she didn’t want to die because she had this theory that she would get off of it and could turn her life around. But once she realized that was not going to happen, she had no interest in surviving. She told me, ‘I want this to be over as soon as possible.’ I absolutely know that if she had had that option, she would have taken it.”

Campbell campaigned actively for California’s End of Life Option Act and says her activism is a way of trying to give elders a right that her mother was not able to access. “When my time comes, I know I certainly don’t want to go through what my mother had to go through,” she says. “For me it’s a lot like abortion. You should have the choice. You don’t have to do it if you don’t want to. But to have some religious person tell you [that] you can’t have that right is not okay.”

Catholic healthcare institutions have been important and indispensable components of America’s medical landscape for centuries. But what’s clear is that the ragged interchange between America’s excessively complex healthcare delivery system and the demands for religious exemptions have produced problematic results that answer not to the will of the people or their elected representatives but to religious authorities.

Dr. David Grube sums it up with a quip that is darkly funny precisely because it captures something of the truth: “There’s a man in Rome who tells his Jewish doctor in Eugene what prescriptions his Buddhist patient can and cannot have.”


---
abstract: 'In the framework of topcolor-assisted technicolor(TC2) model, we study a neutral toppion production process $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$ in this paper. Our results show that the production cross section of $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$ can reach the level of several tens fb, and over $10^{3}$ neutral toppion events can be produced in the planned $e^+e^-$ linear colliders each year. Therefore, such a toppion production process provides us a unique chance to detect toppion events and test the TC2 model. On the other hand, the cross section of $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$ is about one order of magnitude larger than those of some similar processes in SM and MSSM(i.e., $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}H$ in SM and $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}H^{0}(A^0,h^0)$ in MSSM). So, we can easily distinguish the neutral toppion from other neutral Higgs bosons in SM and MSSM.'
author:
- |
    Xuelei Wang $^{(a,b)}$, Yueling Yang$^{b}$,Bingzhong Li$^{b}$, Lingde Wan$^{b}$\
    [a: CCAST(World Laboratory) P.O. BOX 8730. B.J. 100080P.R.China]{}\
    [b: College of Physics and Information Engineering,]{}\
    [^1] [^2] [^3]
title: 'Production of the neutral toppion at the $e\gamma$ colliders '
---

[**PACS number(s)**]{}: 12.60Nz, 14.80.Mz, 12.15.LK, 14.65.Ha

[**I. Introduction**]{}  \
Although the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam(GWS)theory which bases on the gauge group $SU_{L}(2)\otimes U_{Y}(1)$ have made a great success to describe the weak and electromagnetic interactions, the mechanism of the electroweak symmetry breaking(EWSB) is still unknown. So probing the mechanism of the EWSB will not only be one of the main subjects of theoretical research but also be the most important task at future high energy colliders.

Dynamical EWSB, such as technicolor(TC) theory [@TC], is an attractive idea that avoids the shortcoming of triviality and unnaturalness arising from the elementary Higgs field in the standard model(SM). The simplest QCD-like TC models[@QCD-like] leads to a large oblique correction to the electroweak parameter S[@s-parameter] and is already ruled out by the CERN $e^{+}e^{-}$ collider LEP precision electroweak measurement data[@LEP1; @LEP2]. Various improvements have been made to make the predictions consistent with the LEP precision measurement data. Among all these improved TC models, topcolor-assisted technicolor(TC2) model [@TC2] is a more realistic one, which provides an additional source of EWSB and also solves heavy top quark problem. In TC2 theory, the new strong dynamics topcolor is assumed to be chiral critically strong at the scale 1 TeV, and it is coupled preferentially to the third generation. In this model, the EWSB is driven mainly by TC interactions and extended technicolor gives the contributions to all ordinary quark and lepton masses including a very small portion of the top quark masses :$m_{t}^{'}=\varepsilon m_{t}
   (0.03\leq\varepsilon\leq0.1)$ [@Buchalla]. The topcolor interactions also make small contributions to the EWSB and give rise to the main part of the top mass $(1-\varepsilon)m_{t}$. Three Pseudo-Goldstone bosons (PGB’s) called toppions $\Pi^{0}_{t},\Pi^{\pm}_{t}$ are predicted by TC2 model in the few hundred GeV region. The physical particle toppions can be regarded as the typical feature of TC2 model. Thus, the studies of some toppion production processes at present and future high energy colliders can help the experiment to search for toppion and test TC2 theory, furthermore, to probe EWSB mechanism. A comprehensive review on the phenomenological studies in TC2 model has been given in Ref.[@review].

Over the last decade, several laboratories in the world have been working on linear $e^+e^-$ collider projects with an energy from several hundreds GeV up to several TeV and the luminosity over 100 $fb^{-1}$/year, these are NLC(USA) [@NLC],JLC(Japan)[@JLC], TESLA(Europe)[@TESLA]. The search for Higgs particle in SM or some new particles predicted in the models beyond the SM(such as Higgs bosons $A^{0},H^{0},h^{0},H^{\pm}$ in MSSM and PGB’s in TC model) is one of the most important goals of future high energy $e^{+}e^{-}$ colliders. Some Higgs bosons production processes in SM and MSSM in $e^{+}e^{-}$ collision have been studied in many literatures[@eeH]. To search for the toppions in TC2 model, the literatures have studied the neutral toppion production processes in high energy $e^{+}e^{-}$ collision[@yue; @wang]. Ref.[@yue] has calculated the production cross sections of the processes $e^{+}e^{-}\to\Pi^{0}_{t}\gamma,\Pi^{0}_{t}Z$ and the results show that the cross sections are about several fb. Recently, we have studied a flavor-changing neutral toppion production process $e^{+}e^{-}\to
   t\bar{c}\Pi^{0}_{t}$[@wang]. We find that the resonance effect can enhance the cross section significantly when toppion mass is small. The above studies provide the feasible ways to detect toppion events and test TC2 model. The future $e^+e^-$ colliders can also operate in the $e\gamma$ or $\gamma\gamma$ modes. High energy photons for $\gamma \gamma, e\gamma$ collisions can be obtained using compton backscattering of laser light off the high energy electrons. In this case, the energy and luminosity of the photon beam would be the same order of magnitude of the parent electron beam and the set of final states at a photon collider is much richer than that at in an $e^{+}e^{-}$ mode. At the same time, the high energy photons polarizations can relatively easily vary, which is advantageous for experiments. All the virtues of the photon colliders will provide us a good chance to pursuit new physics particles. The production of Higgs bosons in SM and MSSM at $e\gamma$ colliders have been studied in Ref.[@gamma-e].

In this paper, in the framework of TC2, we will study a neutral toppion production process $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$. The results show that the cross section can be up to the level of several tens fb due to strong coupling of $\Pi^0_t$ to $t\bar{t}$ and t-channel effect. The signals of toppion can be easily detected at $e\gamma$ colliders. On the other hand, we find that we can distinguish toppion from other toppion-like particles(such as Higgs bosons in SM and MSSM).

[**II. The cross section of the process**]{}  \
As it is known, the couplings of toppions to the three family fermions are non-universal and the toppions have large Yukawa couplings to the third generation. The coupling of the neutral toppion $\Pi_{t}^{0}$ to a pair of top quarks is proportion to the mass of top quark and the explicit form can be written as[@He]: $$\begin{aligned}
  i\frac{m_{t}}{\upsilon _{w}}\tan\beta K_{UR}^{tt}K_{UL}^{tt*}
  \overline{t}\gamma_5 t\Pi_{t}^{0}\end{aligned}$$ where $\tan\beta=\sqrt{(\frac{\upsilon_{\omega}}{\upsilon_{t}})^{2}-1}$ $\upsilon_{\omega}=246$ GeV is electroweak symmetry-breaking scale, and $\upsilon_{t}\approx 60-100$ GeV is the toppion decay constant. $K^{tt}_{UL}$ is the matrix element of the unitary matrix $K_{UL}$ which the CKM matrix can be derived as $V=K^{-1}_{UL}K_{DL}$ and $K^{ij}_{UR}$ are the matrix elements of right-handed rotation matrix $K_{UR}$. Their values can be taken as: $$\begin{aligned}
  \hspace*{1cm}K^{tt*}_{UL}\approx 1 \hspace{1.5cm}K^{tt}_{UR}=1-\varepsilon\end{aligned}$$ Here we take the parameter $\varepsilon$ as a free parameter changing from 0.03 to 0.1.

With $\Pi^0_tt\bar{t}$ coupling, the neutral toppion $\Pi^{0}_{t}$, as an isospin-triplet, can couple to a pair of gauge bosons through the top quark triangle loop in an isospin violating way. Calculating the top quark triangle loop, we can explicitly obtain the couplings of $\Pi^{0}_{t}-\gamma-\gamma$ and $\Pi^{0}_{t}-\gamma-Z$ $$\begin{aligned}
   \Pi^{0}_{t}-\gamma-\gamma \hspace{1.5cm} iN_{c}\frac{8}{9\pi}
   \frac{tan\beta}{\upsilon_{w}}m_{t}^{2}(1-\varepsilon)\alpha_{e}
   \varepsilon_{\mu\nu\rho\delta}p_{2}^{\rho}p_{4}^{\delta}C_{0}
   \end{aligned}$$ $$\begin{aligned}
  \Pi^{0}_{t}-\gamma-Z \hspace{1.5cm} iN_{c}
  \frac{\alpha_e}{3\pi c_ws_w}
   \frac{tan\beta}{\upsilon_{w}}m_{t}^{2}(1-\varepsilon)
   \varepsilon_{\mu\nu\rho\delta}(1-\frac{8}{3}s_{w}^{2})
   p_{2}^{\rho}p_{4}^{\delta}C_{0}\end{aligned}$$ where $N_{c}$ is the color index with $N_{c}=3$, $s_{w}=\sin
   \theta_{w}$, $c_{w}=\cos\theta_{w}$($\theta_{w}$ is the Weinberg angle), $C_{0}=C_{0}(-p_{2},p_{4},m_{t},m_{t},m_{t})$ is standard three-point scalar integral with $p_{2}$ and $p_{4}$ denoting the momenta of the incoming photon and the outcoming toppion, respectively.

With the couplings of $\Pi^0_t\gamma\gamma$ and $\Pi^0_tZ\gamma$, the neutral toppion can be produced via the process $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}
   \Pi^{0}_{t}$, the Feynman diagram of the process is shown in Fig.1. The amplitude of the process can be written directly $$\begin{aligned}
M=M^{\gamma}+M^{Z}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 M^{\gamma} &=& -iN_{c}\frac{16\sqrt{\pi}}{9\pi}\frac{\tan\beta}{\upsilon_{w}}
 m^{2}_{t}(1-\varepsilon)\alpha_{e}^{3/2}C_{0}
\varepsilon^{\mu\nu\rho\delta}p_{2\rho}p_{4\delta}\\ \nonumber
&&\epsilon_{\mu}(p_{2})
\overline{u}_{e}(p_{3})\gamma_{\nu}u_{e}(p_{1})G(p_{2}-p_{4},0)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 M^{Z} &=& iN_{c}\frac{2\alpha^{3/2}_e}{3\sqrt{\pi}c^2_ws^2_w}
 \frac{\tan\beta}{\upsilon_{w}}(1-\varepsilon)m^{2}_{t}
 (1-\frac{8}{3}s_{w}^{2})C_{0}\\ \nonumber& &
 \varepsilon^{\mu\nu\rho\delta}p_{2\rho}p_{4\delta}\epsilon_{\mu}(p_{2})
\overline{u}_{e}(p_{3})[-\frac{1}{2}L+s^{2}_{w}]\gamma_{\nu}u_{e}(p_{1})
\\ \nonumber &&
 G(p_{2}-p_{4},M_{Z})\end{aligned}$$

Where, $L=\frac{1}{2}(1-\gamma_{5})$. $G(p,m)=\frac{1}{p^{2}-m^{2}}$ denotes the propagator of the particle. We can see that there exists a t-channel resonance effect for photon, this t-channel resonance effect will enhance the cross section significantly.

The hard photon beam of the $e\gamma$ collider can be obtained from laser backscattering at the $e^+e^-$ linear collider. Let $\hat{s}$ and $s$ be the center-of-mass energies of the $e\gamma$ and $e^+e^-$ systems, respectively. After calculating the cross section $\sigma(\hat{s})$ for the subprocess $e^-\gamma\to
e^-\Pi^0_t$, the total cross section at the $e^+e^-$ linear collider can be obtained by folding $\sigma(\hat{s})$ with the photon distribution function which is given in Ref[@Gjikia] $$\begin{aligned}
                                                   %(21)
\sigma_{tot}=\int\limits_{M_{\Pi}^2/s}^{x_{max}}dx\hat{\sigma}
(\hat{s})f_{\gamma}(x)\,,\end{aligned}$$ where $$\begin{aligned}
                                                    %(22)
\displaystyle f_\gamma(x)=\frac{1}{D(\xi)}\left[1-x+\frac{1}{1-x}
-\frac{4x}{\xi(1-x)}+\frac{4x^2}{\xi^2(1-x)^2}\right],\end{aligned}$$ with $$\begin{aligned}
                                                    %(23)
\displaystyle D(\xi)=\left(1-\frac{4}{\xi}-\frac{8}{\xi^2}\right)
\ln(1+\xi)+\frac{1}{2}+\frac{8}{\xi}-\frac{1}{2(1+\xi)^2}\,.\end{aligned}$$ In above equation, $\xi=4E_e\omega_0/m_e^2$ in which $m_e$ and $E_e$ stand, respectively, for the incident electron mass and energy, $\omega_0$ stands for the laser photon energy, and $x=\omega/E_e$ stands for the fraction of energy of the incident electron carried by the back-scattered photon. $f_\gamma$ vanishes for $x>x_{max} =\omega_{max}/E_e=\xi/(1+\xi)$. In order to avoid the creation of $e^+e^-$ pairs by the interaction of the incident and back-scattered photons, we require $\omega_0x_{max}\leq
m_e^2/E_e$ which implies that $\xi\leq 2+ 2\sqrt{2}\approx 4.8$. For the choice of $\xi=4.8$, we obtain $$\begin{aligned}
                                                     %(24)
x_{max}\approx 0.83,\hspace{1cm} D(\xi)\approx 1.8 \,.\end{aligned}$$ For simplicity, we have ignored the possible polarization for the electron and photon beams. [**III. The numberal results and conclusions** ]{}  \
To obtain numerical results , we take $m_{t}=174$ GeV, $M_Z=91.187$ GeV, $\upsilon_{t}=60$ GeV, $s^2_w=0.23$. The electromagnetic fine structure constant $\alpha_e$ at certain energy scale is calculated from the simple QED one-loop evolution formula with the boundary value $\alpha_e=1/137.04$ [@Donoghue]. There are three free parameters in the cross section, i.e., $\varepsilon,M_{\Pi},s$. To see the influence of these parameters on the cross section, we take the mass of toppion $M_{\Pi}$ to vary in certain range 150 GeV$\leq M_{\Pi}\leq 450$ GeV, $\varepsilon=0.03,0.06,0.1$, respectively. Considering the center-of-mass energies $\sqrt{s}$ in planned $e^+e^-$ linear colliders(for example: TESLA), we take $\sqrt{s}$=500 GeV, 800 GeV, 1600 GeV, respectively. The final numerical results of the cross section are summarized in Fig.2-4. The Fig.2-4 are the plots of the cross section as the function of $M_{\Pi}$ for $\sqrt{s}$=500 GeV, 800 GeV, 1600 GeV, respectively. We can see that there is a peak in the plot when $M_{\Pi}$ is about 350 GeV which arises from top quark triangle loop. We can see that the cross section is in the range of a few tens fb. With the luminosity of 100 $fb^{-1}$/year, there are over $10^3$ events of neutral toppion to be produced via the process $e^-\gamma
\rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t$ per year. Such sufficient events can be easily detected experimentally. As have been studied in Ref[@yue; @wang], the cross sections of neutral toppion in $e^+e^-$ collision are only at the level of a few fb. The t-channel resonance effect can enhance the cross section of the process $e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t$ significantly, this makes process $e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t$ potentially important for the detecting of toppion. Some Higgs bosons production processes in $e\gamma$ collision have been studied in SM and MSSM($e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-H^0$ in SM and $e^-\gamma
\rightarrow e^-H^0(h^0,A^0)$ in MSSM)[@gamma-e], the results show that the cross sections are at the level of a few fb, i.e., the cross section of $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$ is about one order of magnitude larger than those of some similar processes in SM and MSSM. The reason is that there is a large extra coefficient $tan\beta$ in the coupling $\Pi^0_tt\bar{t}$ compared with the coupling $Ht\bar{t}$ in SM(MSSM) and $tan\beta$ can enhance the cross section about one order of magnitude. With such a large cross section of $e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t$, we can easily distinguish neutral toppion in TC2 from Higgs bosons in SM and MSSM. This is another important feature of the process $e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t$.

To determine which channel is the best one to search for neutral toppion, we need to know its decay branching ratio of each decay modes. The possible decay modes are: $t\bar{t}$(if $\Pi^0_t>2m_t$),$t\bar{c}, b\bar{b},gg,\gamma\gamma,Z\gamma$. For $\Pi^0_t>2m_t$, the main decay mode is $\Pi^0_t \rightarrow
t\bar{t}$. The decay branching ratio $Br(\Pi^0_t\rightarrow
t\bar{c})$ is the largest one when $t\bar{t}$ channel is forbidden. Using the FormCalc[@FormCalc], we can directly obtain the cross section of the processes: $e^-\gamma \rightarrow
e^-t\bar{t},e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-t\bar{c},e^-\gamma
\rightarrow e^-b\bar{b}$ in SM, the results are shown in Table 1.

  [**Tbale 1:**]{} The cross section of $e^-\gamma
\rightarrow e^-t\bar{t},e^-\gamma \rightarrow
e^-t\bar{c},e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-b\bar{b}$ in SM.

0.8pt 0.1in

   $\sqrt{s}(GeV)$   $\sigma(e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-t\bar{t})$(pb)   $\sigma(e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-t\bar{c})(pb)$   $\sigma(e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-b\bar{b})$(pb)
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------
         500                       $1.0\times10^{-2}$                               $5.5\times 10^{-12}$                                     10.5
         800                       $2.7\times10^{-2}$                               $7.2\times 10^{-12}$                                     10.9
        1600                       $4.2\times 10^{-2}$                              $8.6\times 10^{-12}$                                     11.5

We can see that, in SM, the cross section of $e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-t\bar{c}$ is very small because there is no tree level flavor-changing neutral current(FCNC) in SM. Therefore, $e^-\gamma\rightarrow e^-\Pi^0_t \rightarrow
e^-t\bar{c}$ is the most ideal channel to detect neutral toppion. The decay branching ratio of $\Pi^0_t \rightarrow t\bar{c}$ and the signal per year in the $t\bar{c}$ channel are shown in table 2

  [**Table 2:**]{}The decay branching ratio of $\Pi^0_t \rightarrow t\bar{c}$ and the signal per year in the $t\bar{c}$ channel. We take $\varepsilon=0.06$ and the luminosity $L=100 fb^{-1}/$year.

0.8pt 0.1in

  -----------------------------------------------------------------
        $M_{\Pi}(GeV)$
  --------------------------- ----- ----- ------ ----- ----- ------
    $Br(\Pi^0_t \rightarrow
          t\bar{c})$

        $\sqrt{s}(GeV)$        500   800   1600   500   800   1600

   Signal/Year in tc channel   600   704   741    73    184   269
  -----------------------------------------------------------------

We can conclude that there is about a few hundred signals of neutral toppion produced in $t\bar{c}$ channel. With such large numbers of signals and very clean background in SM for this $t\bar{c}$ channel(As it is shown in table 2 that the cross section of $e^-\gamma \rightarrow e^-t\bar{c}$ in SM is only about $10^{-12}$ pb), the neutral toppion can be easily detected via $t\bar{c}$ channel at $e\gamma$ collision.

In conclusion, we have studied a neutral toppion production process $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^{0}_{t}$ in TC2 model. The numerical results show that the cross section is very large (at the level of several tens fb), and over $10^3$ neutral toppion events can be produced in $e\gamma$ collision. With the large $Br(\Pi^0_t
 \rightarrow t\bar{c})$ and small cross section of $e^{-}\gamma
 \rightarrow e^{-}t\bar{c}$ in SM, $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^0_t
 \rightarrow e^{-}t\bar{c}$ provide us the best channel to search for neutral toppion. On the other hand, the cross section of $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow
e^{-}\Pi^0_t$ is about one order of magnitude larger than those of the production processes of toppion-like particles in SM and MSSM. Therefore, the process $e^{-}\gamma\rightarrow e^{-}\Pi^0_t$ provides us a unique way to distinguish TC2 model from other models.

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[^1]: This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Excellent Youth Foundation of Henan Scientific Committee, the Henan Innovation Project for University Prominent Research Talents.

[^2]: E-mail:wangxuelei@263.net

[^3]: Mailing address


Finite element modeling of the human sclera: influence on optic nerve head biomechanics and connections with glaucoma.
Scleral thickness, especially near the optic nerve head (ONH), is a potential factor of interest in the development of glaucomatous optic neuropathy. Large differences in the dimensions of the sclera, the principal load-bearing tissue of the eye, have been observed between individuals. This study aimed to characterize the effects of these differences on ONH biomechanics. Eleven enucleated human globes (7 normal and 4 ostensibly glaucomatous) were imaged using high-field microMRI and segmented to produce 3-D individual-specific corneoscleral shells. An identical, idealized ONH geometry was inserted into each shell. Finite element modeling predicted the effects of pressurizing the eyes to an IOP of 30 mmHg, with the results used to characterize the effect of inter-individual differences in scleral dimensions on the biomechanics of the ONH. Measurements of the individual-specific corneoscleral shells were used to construct a 2-D axisymmetric idealized model of the corneoscleral shell and ONH. A sensitivity analysis based on this model quantified the relative importance of different geometrical characteristics of the scleral shell on the biomechanics of the ONH. Significant variations were observed in various measures of strain in the idealized lamina cribrosa (LC) across the seven normal corneoscleral shells, implying large differences in individual biomechanics due to scleral anatomy variations alone. The sensitivity analysis revealed that scleral thickness adjacent to the ONH was responsible for the vast majority of variation. Remarkably, varying peripapilary scleral thickness over the physiologically measured range changed the peak (95th percentile) first principal strain in the LC and radial displacement of the ONH canal by an amount that was equivalent to a change in IOP of 15 mmHg. Inter-individual variations in scleral thickness, particularly peripapillary scleral thickness, can result in vastly different biomechanical responses to IOP. These differences may be significant for understanding the interactions between IOP and scleral biomechanics in the pathogenesis of glaucomatous optic neuropathy. The relationship between scleral thickness and material properties needs to be studied in human eyes.


Sunday, September 16, 2012

INTRODUCING:

Dr. Michelle Solomon

Dr. Michelle Solomon, a Richmond native, grew up in
Midlothian, VA. She received an undergraduate degree from James Madison
University with a B.S. in Health Sciences and a Biology minor. She completed
her doctoral studies at the Illinois College of Optometry (ICO) in Chicago. In her
time at ICO she was involved in several organizations which included the American
Optometric Student Association, National Optometric Student Association,
Contact Lens Society, Tomb and Key Honor Society (a society based on high academic achievement), Beta Sigma Kappa Honor
Society, and the Virginia Optometric Association.

Dr. Solomon is dedicated to providing the best care possible
to her patients. She is up to date with the latest developments in technology
and advancements within the realm of Optometry. She is a current member of the
following organizations:

-American Optometric Association

-Virginia Optometric Association

-Beta Sigma Kappa International Honor Society

-Tomb and Key Honor Society

In her spare time Dr. Solomon enjoys traveling and spending
time with family and friends. Just ask her about her trip to Hawaii this summer!

*** A Note from Dr. Paull ***

We are very excited to have Dr. Solomon as the new owner of the practice. There will be a transition during the month of September, and the 'official' name change will take place on October 1st, 2012. Dr. Amanda Paull will still be working at the office 1 day per week, as it has grown to be a 6-day per week practice. Thank you to all the wonderful patients who have helped it grow over its years in practice, and we look forward to growing in the future with Dr. Solomon! Dr. Paull will still be providing eye care in nursing homes from Virginia Beach to Richmond, but she and her family have moved to Williamsburg, which means that the practice will now be in the capable hands of Dr. Solomon. Please welcome her at your next eye exam!


Police get calls like it every hour of every day in Melbourne and the call to Hambleton Street in Middle Park a year ago was no different.

First Constable Emma Quick, normally based at St Kilda Police Station, was filling in on the divisional van for South Melbourne police when the call came through to assist a man threatening self-harm.

The Victoria Police First Constable Emma Quick, left, and Constable Varli Blake at the Southern Metro Region Division 1 Honours and Awards Ceremony. Credit:Penny Stephens

"We went in there not expecting for him to have gas and there was no warning flags for me to stop," she told Fairfax Media.

Leon Firth, 40, had locked himself in his bedroom of his flat with a gas bottle and that gas had spilled out into the lounge room where it reacted with an ignition point as Constable Quick, Constable Varli Blake, Sergeant Tony Scully and firefighters came in.