This is an excerpt of “Our Commons: Political Ideas for a New Europe” edited by Sophie Bloemen and Thomas de Groot.

In 2019, only oil lobbyists and shabby orange politicians persist in denying the influence of human activities on the Earth’s climate. Scientific evidence is piling up and we know that we must change our ways. The concept of energy transition has become mainstream.

However, governments have remained remarkably motionless. They are so inactive that kids have started school strikes and demand climate justice in front of the United Nations’ Conference of Parties. They are so immobile that citizen groups actually sue their governments for their lack of climate action. And when governments attempt to do something, it is so unjust that people take to the streets even during the coldest months of the year, screaming, filled with rage and frustration.

Our leaders have forgotten that the poorer half of our societies should not have to clean up the mess produced by the richest half. That it should not be our kids cleaning up our mess.

Doing It Ourselves

Facing a lack of political will, an interesting and vivid grassroots movement has taken shape to reclaim our energy systems. From households to city politics, and even at the European level, there has been an unprecedented involvement from the public into energy and electricity matters. For example, in the shape of energy cooperatives.

According to the European Federation of renewable energy cooperatives, RESCOOP, there are at present some 1,250 energy communities in which a million people throughout Europe are involved. Through the RESCOOP federation, these groups actively lobby at a European level to bend the legislation towards promoting and supporting energy cooperatives.

This model of energy cooperativism originated in Germany in the late 1990s and was enabled by a set of disruptive laws supporting the production of renewable energy. This bill kick-started the German energy transition (dubbed “Energiewende”), which has become a landmark and is being widely copied.

The two main pillars were defined in the Feed-In Act of 2000: the priority of renewable sources to the grid and feed-in tariffs (fixed prices paid for renewable energy).

The particularity of this framework is that it has enabled small players to enter the game. Citizen cooperatives and households have especially benefited, because a fixed price for each kilowatt hour (KWH) could be sold back to the grid, which gave them more space to invest in new technologies.

From the late 1990s onwards, the number of cooperatives in Germany has grown exponentially, reaching 900 in 2019, representing the majority of energy cooperatives in Europe. It is a model that comes with many advantages. Let’s virtually visit one of these cooperatives together.

The Revived Village

It is raining softly and the landscape is dissolved in the mist when we enter Feldheim after a one-hour drive from Berlin. Apart from a large blue sign at the entrance of the village, nothing distinguishes the Energieautarker Ortsteil Feldheim (“Self-Sustainable Village Feldheim”) from the other villages in Brandenburg: all have similar houses with their neat little front-gardens along a similar straight road.

There is a bit of wind, it is cold and nobody ventures outside, except for our guide, Herr Kappert, his hat pulled all the way down, who comes to greet us. He leads us to the brand-new visitor’s center. It is big and clean, and somehow reminds me of the over-dimensioned churches in small villages along the Camino de Santiago in France, designed to host the pilgrims on their journey.

Indeed, I feel like a pilgrim reaching a Mecca for community-based off-grid energy projects. Once pointed in the right direction, we see the big giants peering through the fog, all turned in the same direction and rotating out of phase.

Contrary to its bland appearance, Feldheim is very special. Its uniqueness does not lie in the fact that there is about one wind turbine for every three people here (47 wind turbines for 148 inhabitants) — that is actually quite common in Germany nowadays, especially in the former DDR. The special thing here is that the inhabitants are largely involved in the project.

At the turn of the century, Feldheim was just another post-communist village in Brandenburg: people were leaving, the school had closed down and unemployment was affecting more than 25 percent of the population. But in 1995, a joint venture between the villagers and a small local energy developer, EnergieQuelle GmbH, installed a first batch of four wind turbines.

The success of that operation soon led to the installation of another 40 wind turbines, a biogas factory, a solar park, a giant battery and a parallel electricity and heating grid. This meant that the village has since become self-sufficient in its energy needs. There are several other spill-over effects from these energy developments in Feldheim.

As we strolled through the village to go to the wind farm, I approached Mr. Kappert and asked him whether the price of the real-estate in the village has suffered from the installation of so many wind turbines. He looked at me a little puzzled, laughed and said: “No, not at all, why?” So I explained that people in the media often talk about the opposition from local populations to wind farms and the recurring argument of plummeted prices of real-estate next to large projects. Mr. Kappert said that the project is an asset to the village and that it has probably increased the value of houses. And there is a major difference: external, imposed projects versus internal, self-managed and self-designed projects.

In Feldheim, the project was developed in collaboration with the population over a period of more than 20 years and has been designed to fit the needs and specificities of the village. For instance, the fact that the local industry is mostly relying on agriculture rendered the installation of a biogas production unit (which enables the conversion of animals’ manure and land-crop waste into natural gas) desirable and efficient. This shows how important it is to determine the appropriate technology for a community.

As we chatted, Mr. Kappert told me that the success of the project had a snowball effect on the life in the village. The income generated by the wind farm could be reinvested in other local ventures, such as a company designing arrays for solar parks. This, together with the maintenance of the wind farm and the biogas unit, created jobs so that the employment rate is now virtually 100 percent in Feldheim.

How can such a model spill over to neighboring villages? What happens with families who do not have the financial means to get involved in the project, in which a sum of 1500 euros was required to enter the cooperative? These important questions regarding inclusiveness and reproducibility are not fully answered by the cooperative model and we must turn our sight to re-municipalization of electricity utilities.

Municipal Utilities and the Energy Commons

According to a recent report from the Right to Energy Coalition, poorer households in many European countries face moderate to extreme levels of fuel poverty. This means that these families can hardly access energy to cook and heat their houses. The report also shows that households spend an increasing proportion of their income on energy expenditure (which can reach up to 33 percent). Although affecting most strongly southern and eastern European countries, this problem is also seen in cities like London, where the government has issued a plan to tackle fuel poverty.

All over Europe, a movement to reclaim public services from the private sector is gaining traction. Municipal utilities are seen as a tool to control tariffs, steward the energy transition and fight energy poverty. And indeed, cities have a crucial role to play as they are accountable to all citizens and are thus by definition more inclusive than cooperatives. The re-municipalization movement is complex and involves a large range of interactions between local initiatives and governments, intrinsic motivations and level of achievement (i.e., from full purchase to public-private-partnerships).

An aspect of the energy transition which is often overlooked is the need to drastically reduce our consumption of energy (a decrease by 50 percent is planned in the German “Energiewende” plan). The cheapest and cleanest energy is the one which is not produced and not used: all power plants, even those harvesting renewable sources of energy, have large impacts on the environment (e.g., by using rare minerals for wind turbines).

Energy efficiency and conservation measures cannot be undertaken by for-profit energy providers, because they have an incentive to sell as much energy as possible. Municipal utilities, by effectively shifting energy from the commodities market to the commons, can help to manage the resource more efficiently and have a decisive role to play.

An example for this is provided by the Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU) in the American state of Delaware, which is a community-based institution aiming at designing and financing local energy projects. The idea is to consider the energy consumption of a community globally, with the primary aim being to save it: when energy is needed, the SEU should implement an appropriate renewable technology, and incorporate heat and transport systems in the design.

Although municipal energy utilities have a great potential in achieving a just transition towards cleaner energy, the question of governance is not always adequately tackled. In Hamburg for instance, a successful citizen campaign and referendum in 2013 compelled the city government to buy the energy (electricity, gas and heating) networks back from private operators.

Two publicly-owned companies are now operating the grids, but citizens are still seen as clients and have no decisionmaking power. The next step is therefore to combine the governance model of cooperatives with the inclusiveness of municipal utilities in order to implement a fully democratic and just energy transition.

In many places, privatization of the energy market led to the appropriation of productive land by large multinationals (think of solar farms in the Sahara to feed the European grid), with very little or no spillover for the local economy. This could be described as cases of enclosure of the commons and energy colonialism. Furthermore, the present “over-grazing” of our finite energy resources, which results from our “energy obesity”, questions the inter-generational liability: our right to access energy should be limited by the legacy that we will leave to our kids.

Relocating energy in the commons (by de-privatizing or re-municipalizing) would be a powerful way to address these questions, by linking production to consumption and re-engaging our liability as energy users. Finally, considering energy as a commons would allow to benefit from the creative power and experience of commoners to manage and share the resource.

The new book Our Commons: Political Ideas for a New Europe edited by Sophie Bloemen and Thomas de Groot of the Commons Network can be downloaded for free.


Assisted living nursing practice: the language of dementia: theories and interventions.
The person with dementia uses behavior to communicate, but their behavior is altered by the combination of neurological damage and impairment, altered interpersonal relationships and reactions of others, and the individual's loss or weakening of their lifelong defenses or coping mechanisms. This article discusses the routes by which behavior can be understood and describes a constellation of needs of a person with dementia that has a unique fit with person-centered care. Three evidence-based models (theories) and interventions specific to dementia behaviors are discussed: the Need-Driven Dementia-Compromised Behavior Model, the Progressively Lowered Stress Threshold Model, and the utilization of self-identity roles. Montessori-based activities are another approach to person-centered dementia care that respect, as do the models, the dignity, worthiness and interests of the person afflicted with dementia. The models discussed in this article all seek to improve the quality of life of the person with dementia. Other than those at the profound end stage of dementia, most sufferers can communicate feelings. Subjective quality of life must be determined based on the self-report of the person suffering with dementia so that treatment interventions and effectiveness are grounded in that person's reality.


5-Fluorouracil cardiotoxicity induced by alpha-fluoro-beta-alanine.
Cardiotoxicity is a rare complication occurring during 5-fluorouracil (5-FU) treatment for malignancies. We herein report the case of a 70-year-old man with 5-FU-induced cardiotoxicity, in whom a high serum level of alpha-fluoro-beta-alanine (FBAL) was observed. The patient, who had unresectable colon cancer metastases to the liver and lung, was referred to us for chemotherapy from an affiliated hospital; he had no cardiac history. After admission, the patient received a continuous intravenous infusion of 5-FU (1000 mg/day), during which precordial pain with right bundle branch block occurred concomitantly with a high serum FBAL concentration of 1955 ng/ml. Both the precordial pain and the electrocardiographic changes disappeared spontaneously after the discontinuation of 5-FU. As the precordial pain in this patient was considered to have been due to 5-FU-induced cardiotoxicity, the administration of 5-FU was abandoned. Instead, oral administration of S-1 (a derivative of 5-FU), at 200 mg/day twice a week, was instituted, because S-1 has a strong inhibitory effect on dihydropyrimidine dehydrogenase, which catalyzes the degradative of 5-FU into FBAL. The serum FBAL concentration subsequently decreased to 352 ng/ml, the same as the value measured on the first day of S-1 administration. Thereafter, no cardiac symptoms were observed. The patient achieved a partial response 6 months after the initiation of the S-1 treatment. The experience of this case, together with a review of the literature, suggests that FBAL is related to 5-FU-induced cardiotoxicity. S-1 may be administered safely to patients with 5-FU-induced cardiotoxicity.


984 A.2d 86 (2009)
118 Conn.App. 418
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Tiffany BROWN.
No. 28924.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued September 3, 2009.
Decided December 15, 2009.
*89 Heather M. Wood, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Susann E. Gill, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, former state's attorney, John C. Smriga, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Toni M. Rosario-Smith, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
GRUENDEL, BEACH and ALVORD, Js.
GRUENDEL, J.
The defendant, Tiffany Brown, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(3). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, (2) the court's allegedly improper jury instructions *90 violated her due process rights and (3) the court improperly denied her motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim, Daayon Devane, were involved in a romantic relationship for six or seven months. Throughout their relationship, the defendant and the victim engaged in several arguments that escalated into physical altercations. Not once did the defendant call the police for assistance when such altercations arose. Instead, according to the defendant, on some occasions, she brandished a knife to quell such altercations, and, in each instance, the victim left her apartment.
On the morning of February 22, 2005, the defendant, sensing the possibility of another altercation with the victim, walked to the police station across from her apartment to obtain assistance. At the defendant's request, the police removed the victim from her apartment. Later that evening, the defendant and a friend drove to a pool hall where they saw the victim. There, the victim informed the defendant that he had been kicked out of his mother's house and, promising to be on his best behavior, asked to return to her apartment. The defendant acquiesced and together they left the pool hall in the early morning of February 23, 2005.
Upon returning to the defendant's apartment, the victim became enraged with the defendant for speaking with "mad dudes" at the pool hall. The victim grabbed the defendant's arm, hit her and pushed her. The defendant then entered the kitchen and brandished a steak knife, instructing the victim to "chill." As the altercation escalated, the victim followed the defendant into the kitchen, and she stabbed him in the neck with the steak knife. After being stabbed, the victim exclaimed, "yo, babe, look what you've done," exited the defendant's apartment, ascended the stairs to the second floor of the apartment complex, collapsed and eventually died from blood loss.
When police officers arrived at the second floor landing of the defendant's apartment complex, they found the defendant cradling the victim. The defendant made several statements in the presence of the police officers. Officer David Payne and Detective Michael Fiumidinisi heard the defendant address the victim: "Wake up, wake up; I didn't mean to do it." Payne then asked the defendant about the identity of the victim, to which she responded: "He's my boyfriend; he came at me." The defendant told Fiumidinisi: "Mike, I can't wake [the victim] up."[1] Fiumidinisi told the defendant to stop cradling the victim to allow medical personnel to assist him. As medical personnel began to assist the victim, Fiumidinisi also asked the defendant about the identity of the victim, to which she responded: "[He] was my boyfriend, and I stabbed him." Next, Fiumidinisi told the defendant that she was under arrest and placed her inside of a police car. While the defendant was alone in the police car, an officer standing nearby heard the defendant proclaim repeatedly: "He was beating me. I told him to get away from me. Then he fell on the knife. I didn't mean to stab him." From there, the defendant was transported to the police station, where she was advised of her Miranda[2] rights before providing a written *91 statement in which she claimed that the victim had run into the knife. Thereafter, a jury trial followed, at the conclusion of which the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and the court rendered judgment accordingly. From that judgment, the defendant appeals.

I
The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of manslaughter in the first degree pursuant to § 53a-55 (a)(3). Specifically, the defendant maintains that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she created a grave risk of death and that she evinced an extreme indifference to human life. We disagree.
We review the defendant's claim, which she preserved through her motions for a judgment of acquittal; see State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 146 n. 12, 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (motion for judgment of acquittal on specific charge preserves charge for appeal); initially by setting forth our standard of review. "When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we [apply] a two part analysis. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.... Second, we determine whether, from that evidence and all the reasonable inferences which it yields, a [trier of fact] could reasonably have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wideman, 36 Conn.App. 190, 202, 650 A.2d 571 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 903, 653 A.2d 192 (1995).
Moreover, "[w]e note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 542, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S.Ct. 1798, 164 L.Ed.2d 537 (2006).
"[T]he statute on manslaughter in the first degree ... provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person. For the defendant to have been found guilty of this offense, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (1) that the defendant engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death; (2) that in doing so the defendant acted recklessly; (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life; and (4) the defendant caused the death of the victim.... Additionally, the state had to prove that the defendant had the general intent to engage in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing extreme indifference to human life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Best, 56 Conn.App. 742, 753-54, 745 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 902, 753 A.2d 937 (2000).
The defendant concedes that, acting recklessly, she caused the victim's *92 death. She challenges the jury's finding that she acted under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life and that she created a grave risk of death to the victim as a result of her conduct.
"Our Penal Code does not define, in title 53a of the General Statutes, what constitutes extreme indifference to human life [or grave risk of death].... Therefore, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term[s] as expressed in a dictionary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCoy, 91 Conn.App. 1, 4, 879 A.2d 534, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 904, 884 A.2d 1026 (2005). In examining what constitutes an extreme indifference to human life, "we have stated that the legislature modified the level of indifference required with the adjective extreme, which has been defined to mean existing in the highest or greatest possible degree.... It is synonymous with excessive.... Extreme indifference to human life has been defined accurately, in part, as more than [m]ere carelessness or ordinary recklessness.... Extreme indifference to human life also has been defined accurately, in part, as a high degree of disinterest to human life." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "What evinces an extreme indifference to human life is really a question of fact." State v. Best, supra, 56 Conn.App. at 755, 745 A.2d 223. Further, in examining what constitutes a grave risk of death, this court has noted that Webster's Third New International Dictionary "defines the adjective `grave' as meaning `very serious; dangerous to life.'" Id., at 756, 745 A.2d 223.
Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the defendant's conviction, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant evinced an extreme indifference to human life. The jury could have found that the defendant stabbed the victim in the neck. During her physical altercation with the victim, the defendant, by her own admission, entered the kitchen and brandished a steak knife. Upon discovering the defendant next to the unconscious victim, Fiumidinisi testified, the defendant told him that she had stabbed the victim. Peter DeForest, a professor of criminalistics at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, testified that it was possible that the wound occurred as a result of a downward thrust of the knife and that he could not exclude any possibility as to what caused the knife to penetrate the victim's neck. Susan Williams, a forensic pathologist, testified that her examination of the wound indicated that the knife entered the victim's neck "at a steep angle ... basically downward and a little bit backward." An autopsy revealed that the wound itself extended three to four inches within the right side of the victim's neck and into his chest cavity, piercing his carotid artery and the top of his lung. Williams further testified that the victim's injuries were so severe that emergency medical technicians would likely have been unable to prevent the victim's death had they been there to instantaneously administer medical treatment the very moment the victim was stabbed. Further, contrary to the defendant's assertion that she dropped the knife immediately after the victim was stabbed, the jury heard testimony that the knife was discovered next to mattresses and old furniture underneath the stairwell of a maintenance building near the defendant's apartment complex. Accordingly, on the basis of the cumulative effect of all of the evidence, the jury could have concluded reasonably that the defendant engaged in conduct evincing an extreme indifference to human life.
The jury also could have found that the defendant's conduct created a grave risk of death. In reviewing convictions of manslaughter in the first degree, this court has observed that "[t]he facts of those cases *93 demonstrate that the grave risk of death associated with the subject conduct are within the common knowledge of a layperson and that no expert testimony would be necessary to educate the jury." State v. Wade, 106 Conn.App. 467, 486, 942 A.2d 1085, cert. granted on other grounds, 287 Conn. 908, 950 A.2d 1286 (2008) (appeal withdrawn June 12, 2008). In the present case, we are unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that the grave risk of death inherent in stabbing a person in the neck with a steak knife is without the common knowledge of a layperson. Accordingly, the defendant's claim fails.

II
The defendant raises two claims regarding the court's charge to the jury, arguing that the court's allegedly improper instructions violated her due process rights.

A
The defendant first claims that the court diluted the state's burden of proof by improperly instructing the jury on self-defense. We disagree.
Before reviewing the merits of the defendant's claim, we first address the state's contention that we should decline to review the defendant's claim because, with respect to the instruction at issue, the defendant waived any right to challenge that charge on appeal. The facts that follow are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The defendant filed a written request to charge, pursuant to which she asked the court to instruct the jury on only deadly physical force when considering self-defense. Specifically, the written request provided: "In this case, we are talking about the use of deadly physical force by the defendant. It is therefore the last portion of that section of the statute on self-defense that is implicated in this case...." Rejecting the defendant's request to charge, the court instructed as to both deadly and nondeadly physical force. The court's instructions provided: "The first issue that you must resolve is whether the defendant used deadly or nondeadly force. This is a question of fact for you to decide after a full consideration of the evidence." After the court concluded reading its instructions to the jury, the defendant took exception to the charge and asked the court to instruct pursuant to her written request to charge. The court declined.
For the first time on appeal, the defendant claims that the court diluted the state's burden of proof by failing to inform the jury that it must apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in considering whether she applied deadly or nondeadly force. Having failed to preserve her claim, the defendant seeks to prevail under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).[3]Golding provides that "a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail." (Emphasis in original.) *94 Id. "The first two Golding requirements involve whether the claim is reviewable, and the second two involve whether there was constitutional error requiring a new trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 477, 915 A.2d 872 (2007).
That the first two prongs of Golding are satisfied in the present case is uncontested. The record is adequate for review, and the defendant's claim is of constitutional magnitude because it involves her fundamental due process right to a proper jury instruction. See State v. Fuller, 199 Conn. 273, 278, 506 A.2d 556 (1986). Accordingly, we consider whether the alleged constitutional violation clearly existed and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
"In State v. Fabricatore, [supra], 281 Conn. at [478], 915 A.2d 872, we stated that `[i]n the usual Golding situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.' ... We generally do not review unpreserved, waived claims.... `To reach a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush of the trial court by permitting the defendant to raise a claim on appeal that his or her counsel expressly had abandoned in the trial court.'" (Citations omitted.) State v. Foster, 293 Conn. 327, 337, 977 A.2d 199 (2009). Recently, in State v. Ebron, 292 Conn. 656, 975 A.2d 17 (2009), our Supreme Court elucidated the principles governing the reviewability of claims of instructional error in which a party has acquiesced to the court's charge. The court in Ebron concluded that a defendant will be deemed to have waived an objection to an instruction only if he "actively induced the trial court to act on the challenged portion of the instruction." Id., at 680, 975 A.2d 17. In the present case, the court rejected the defendant's request to charge. The defendant could not have actively induced the court by virtue of the fact that the court specifically rejected her requested charge. Accordingly, the defendant did not waive her claim, and, therefore, we consider the merits.
We first set forth our standard of review. "A challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law over which this court has plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mann v. Regan, 108 Conn.App. 566, 576, 948 A.2d 1075 (2008). "It is well settled that jury instructions are to be reviewed in their entirety.... When the challenge to a jury instruction is of constitutional magnitude, the standard of review is whether it is reasonably possible that the jury [was] misled.... In determining whether it was ... reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions, the charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement.... Individual instructions also are not to be judged in artificial isolation.... Instead, [t]he test to be applied... is whether the charge ... as a whole, presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Makee R., 117 Conn.App. 191, 198, 978 A.2d 549 (2009).
The defendant directs our attention to one particular part of the court's instruction, claiming that she was denied her due process right to a fair trial. Specifically, she argues that the court diluted the state's burden of proof by improperly instructing the jury that "[t]he first issue that you must resolve is whether the defendant used deadly or nondeadly force. This is a question of fact for you to decide after a full consideration of the evidence." According to the defendant, because the court's instructions as a whole are rife with the reasonable doubt standard of proof, *95 the court's failure to include it in this one instance misled the jury into applying some other standard.
On the basis of the charge as a whole, we conclude that the court's instruction on self-defense presented the case to the jury in such a manner that no injustice resulted. The court provided a general charge to the jury in which it specifically instructed that the only standard of review that the jury was to apply was that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At no time did the court instruct the jury to apply any other standard, and, throughout its charge, the court instructed the jury repeatedly to apply the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The court further emphasized that the state bore the burden in proving both the elements of the charged crime and in disproving the defendant's claim of self-defense. Nothing in the court's instructions evinced a determination under any other standard of review. Accordingly, we conclude that the court's instructions did not mislead the jury and, thus, this claim fails under Golding's third prong.

B
The defendant also claims that the court's instructions violated her due process right to a fair trial by referring to Devane as "the victim." We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. The court used the term "victim" ten times in its charge to the jury. Nine such references were made in the context of its charge on self-defense. The court referred to Devane as "the alleged victim" in the context of its charge on the irrelevance of sympathy, prejudice and punishment. That sole reference preceded those that appeared in the self-defense charge.
Conceding that her claim is unpreserved as a result of her failure to take exception to the court's instructional reference or covering such in her request to charge, the defendant seeks to prevail under Golding. We review the defendant's claim because the record is adequate for review, and her claim that she was denied a fair trial due to the court's alleged instructional error is of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Eric M., 79 Conn.App. 91, 99, 829 A.2d 439 (2003) (right to fair trial is fundamental liberty secured by fourteenth amendment), aff'd, 271 Conn. 641, 858 A.2d 767 (2004). Accordingly, we turn to the third prong of Golding.
Preliminarily, we note that our analysis of the defendant's claim requires application of the same standard of review as applied in part II A of this opinion. In particular, "[t]he test to be applied ... is whether the charge ... as a whole, presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Makee R., supra, 117 Conn.App. at 198, 978 A.2d 549.
"The appellate courts of this state have had occasion to consider the ambiguous nature of the term victim. In State v. Cortes, 84 Conn.App. 70, 86, 851 A.2d 1230 (2004), aff'd, 276 Conn. 241, 885 A.2d 153 (2005), this court held that the trial court's pervasive use of the term in its jury charge deprived the defendant of a fair trial.... This court reasoned: In cases in which the fact that a crime has been committed against the complaining witness is not contested, but only the identity of the perpetrator is in dispute, a court's use of the term victim is not inappropriate. In cases in which the fact that a crime has been committed is contested, and where the court's use of the term victim has been the subject of an objection and has not been the subject of a subsequent curative instruction, a court's use of the term may constitute reversible error. The danger in *96 the latter type of case is that the court, having used the term without specifically instructing the jury as to its intention in using the term, might convey to the jury, to whatever slight degree, its belief that a crime has been committed against the complainant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 100 Conn. App. 236, 252-53, 917 A.2d 1051, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 933, 935 A.2d 153 (2007). In our analysis, "[w]e also ask whether any prejudicial effect of the court's use of the term `victim' was negated by the court's other instructions to the jury." State v. Cortes, supra, at 87, 851 A.2d 1230.
Relying on Cortes, the defendant claims that the court's use of the term "victim" undermined her claim of self-defense, deprived her of the presumption of innocence and infringed on the jury's function as the finder of fact. The defendant argues that the most critical determination that the jury had to make was whether she acted in self-defense. As the defendant correctly points out, if she was justified in her conduct, Devane could not have been a victim because his death would not have constituted a crime. By using the term "victim," the defendant contends, the court communicated to the jury its belief that the defendant did not act in self-defense, thereby infringing on the jury's duty to determine if Devane was a victim of a crime and if, in fact, a crime had been committed.
Upon our review of the court's instructions as a whole, we conclude that it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the court's use of the term "victim." The court began and ended its instructions by referring to Devane by name and did not refer specifically to him as "the victim," except on one occasion. On that occasion, the court referred to Devane as "the alleged victim," making clear that it passed no judgment as to whether Devane was or was not the victim of a crime. Moreover, the court stated that it had no preference as to the outcome of the case, that its sole task was to apply the rules of evidence and charge the jury on the law and that it was the jury's task to decide the outcome. Any potential harm by the court's use of the term "victim" was further negated through its final instructions accurately describing the defendant's presumption of innocence. See State v. Lemay, 105 Conn.App. 486, 493, 938 A.2d 611 ("[i]n the absence of a showing that the jury failed or declined to follow the court's instructions, we presume that it heeded them" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 915, 945 A.2d 978 (2008). Accordingly, the defendant's claim fails and, thus, fails under Golding's third prong.

III
Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied her motion to suppress statements that she made prior to being advised of her constitutional rights. We disagree.
"Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 279, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001).
"It is well established that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the *97 defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). The burden of proving custodial interrogation lies initially with the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 647, 513 A.2d 58 (1986).
"To determine whether a suspect is in custody so as to require Miranda warnings, we inquire whether a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.... The term interrogation under Miranda is not limited to questioning explicitly designed to elicit an incriminating response but extends to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. The police, however, cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.... Voluntary statements of any kind are not barred by the fifth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 289-90, 636 A.2d 351 (1994); see also State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 208, 530 A.2d 603 (1987) (officer's request that defendant hand over clothes not reasonably likely to elicit defendant's subsequent incriminating response).
Notwithstanding these procedurals safeguards, "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning... of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by [Miranda's] holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Szabo, 166 Conn. 289, 293, 348 A.2d 588 (1974); see also United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 838 n. 1 (2d Cir.1969) (questioning defendant about identity of white powder when executing search warrant was general on the scene questioning, expressly excepted by Miranda), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002, 90 S.Ct. 1149, 25 L.Ed.2d 412 (1970); State v. Bennett, 171 Conn. 47, 53, 368 A.2d 184 (1976) (routine investigatory information gathering not focused on defendant as accused does not constitute custodial interrogation).
The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant's claim. On December 11, 2006, the court held a hearing in which it denied the defendant's motion to suppress several statements she made from the time that officers first arrived at her apartment complex through her being advised of her constitutional rights at police headquarters. At that hearing, Fiumidinisi testified that when he arrives at the scene of a crime, he often finds family members of the injured there trying to assist that person. Fiumidinisi indicated that any witness or suspect would have been questioned as part of the investigation before being permitted to leave. When Fiumidinisi, upon arrival, saw the defendant cradling the victim, he thought it possible that the defendant and the injured victim were related and testified that "it would have been [his] intention to interview [the defendant] because she was there with a person who was injured." *98 Only after the defendant exclaimed that she had stabbed the victim was she arrested. In denying her motion, the court concluded that although the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda, she was not interrogated. Specifically, the court reasoned that questions concerning the victim's identity amounted to general on the scene questioning, which does not invoke the warnings required by Miranda.[4] The defendant now argues that the court improperly denied her motion to suppress these statements.[5] The defendant contends that Payne and Fiumidinisi knew or should have known that their questions concerning the identity of the victim were likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant.
On the basis of the facts of the present case, we conclude that the defendant was not "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. The court's conclusion that Payne and Fiumidinisi's questions as to the victim's identity amounted to no more than general on the scene questioning not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response finds ample support in the record. Even though Payne and Fiumidinisi heard the defendant exclaim, "[w]ake up, wake up; I did not mean to do it," their subsequent questions were not focused on the defendant as an accused. Their questions were essentially protocol upon arriving at the scene of a crime. Having seen the defendant cradle the victim, Payne and Fiumidinisi reasonably believed that the two may have been related or that, at the very least, she knew his identity. The defendant was not asked about her involvement, if any, in the crime. Nevertheless, after identifying the victim, the defendant volunteered that he "came at [her]" and that she had "stabbed him." The defendant's responsive statements were unforeseeable and, thus, not barred by the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the defendant's claim fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
NOTES
[1]  The defendant recognized Fiumidinisi from a previous investigation in which the defendant was the victim of or a witness to a crime.
[2]  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
[3]  The defendant concedes that her claims are not preserved. We agree because she neither filed a request to charge covering these matters nor took exception to such. See Practice Book § 42-16.
[4]  The court stated: "The question [as to the victim's identity] ... is not the sort of thing when officers arrive on the scene [that] would reasonably be expected to elicit an incriminating response. The officers to this point are just trying to sort things out. And, obviously, with a dead or dying person on the scene, there's not a lot of time for the officers to thoroughly analyze this before commencing questioning of the sort they did here."
[5]  The defendant limits her claim to statements she made in direct response to questions about the victim's identity.


Drink Philly On CBS Philly and KYW News

CBS Philly and KYW News was kind enough to interview us about the recent expansion of drinknjshore.com. Help us out by going to the article page and clicking "Like" or tweeting it if you have twitter. You can read the article and hear the entire interview here.

Thanks to CBS Philly and KYW for such a great writeup.

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Seller’s Description

Check out this amazing house located in South County, features include 3 bedrooms, 2 full baths, newer kitchen - including custom cabinetry, granite counters, stainless steel appliances and an exquisite back splash. Formal living room has recessed lighting and large bay window to provide a ton of natural light. The dining room is located right off the kitchen and would be a perfect spot for a huge table. You will find three bedrooms and one full bath located on main floor as well as a large bedroom/game room in the finished attic/loft area. Laundry room, full bath, and spacious family room are located in lower level as well as 2 walk in closets. Nestled on a large (.97 Acre) level lot that is perfect for large gatherings, bonfires, gardening, and much more. Bonus features include one car garage, circle drive way, patio, front porch, and beautiful landscaping. You will love this turnkey house.

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Check out this property I found on The NewCastle Group (Worth Clark Realty):
http://www.thenewcastlegroup.com/homes/4776-ringer-road-st-louis-mo-63129/28245626

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Nene and Clarion have a new housemate: Clarion's mysterious twin, Phobos! While Clarion is still wary of her strange sister, Nene is just happy to have a new friend! Besides, Nene is going to need all the help she can get after accepting a dangerous new job...


Mike,

His comment on the vintage of our transport agreement causes me to think that we'd better look pretty hard at any penalties that do come back to us that might be administered under a broader policy.  I recall seeing margin notes on a term sheet that was received by Tenaska when they asked TXU for quotes on a second unit which indicated to me that they were surprised by the proposed hourly imbalance provisions (which would be the case if the existing unit weren't subject to similar penalties).  I don't think this changes our communication with Brazos, as they need to know that if penalties are incurred, they eat 'em.  However, let's make a mental note to reveiw the Feb-Mar LS invoices to make sure they're being issued in accordance with our contract.

-----Original Message-----
From: Mazowita, Mike
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 12:03 PM
To: Parks, Joe; Hill, Garrick; Ken Riesz (E-mail)
Subject: FW: PPEP Spreadsheet

-----Original Message-----
From: jeffsmirin@txu.com [mailto:jeffsmirin@txu.com]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 12:02 PM
To: Mazowita, Mike
Subject: RE: PPEP Spreadsheet

I understand your pain.  We are just stating what has been told to us by
the Gas Control group.

The answers to your questions are as follows:

1) The OFO will probably be in effect until sometime on Monday.

2) The Tenaska IV Texas Partners contract is very old and was written
before TXU LSP put hourly swing imbalance penalty provisions in the
Electric Generation contracts.   The main remedy for TXU LSP in the
contract is to physically resrict flow to the power plant to stay even with
gas receipt volumes or to demand that the power plant bring in receipt gas
to meet its burn.

I hope this helps.

"Mazowita, Mike" <Mike.Mazowita@ENRON.com> on 03/01/2002 11:29:34 AM

To:   <jeffsmirin@txu.com>
cc:
Subject:  RE: PPEP Spreadsheet

Jeff:

The problem with all of the power plants is that somebody has to swing on
load to follow the electric profile. This may be us.

Also, how long is this OFO going to be in place??

Secondly, namely because I haven't thoroughly read the contract, what are
the imbalance penalties??

-----Original Message-----
From: jeffsmirin@txu.com [mailto:jeffsmirin@txu.com]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 10:52 AM
To: Mazowita, Mike
Subject: Re: PPEP Spreadsheet

Thanks for the load profile.  The official word is still that TXU LSP is
requesting that all power plants stay as even as possible on their hourly
pulls with respect to their nominations.

"Mazowita, Mike" <Mike.Mazowita@ENRON.com> on 03/01/2002 09:48:26 AM

To:   <jeffsmirin@txu.com>
cc:
Subject:  PPEP Spreadsheet

Jeff,

See attached, ready to print.

 <<HourlyRate_3_02.xls>>

Michael Mazowita
Director of Asset Management
White Pine Energy, LLC
6073 Riverton
Troy, MI 48098-1899
Phone: (248) 813-1063
Fax: (248) 813-1064
Cell: (248) 345-4002
Email: Mike.Mazowita@enron.com

**********************************************************************
This e-mail is the property of Enron Corp. and/or its relevant affiliate
and may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of
the intended recipient (s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by
others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or
authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender or
reply to Enron Corp. at enron.messaging.administration@enron.com and delete
all copies of the message. This e-mail (and any attachments hereto) are not
intended to be an offer (or an acceptance) and do not create or evidence a
binding and enforceable contract between Enron Corp. (or any of its
affiliates) and the intended recipient or any other party, and may not be
relied on by anyone as the basis of a contract by estoppel or otherwise.
Thank you.
**********************************************************************

(See attached file: HourlyRate_3_02.xls)


Robert du Preez (rugby player, born 1963)

Robert James du Preez (born 19 July 1963 in Potchefstroom) is a former South African international rugby union player and the current head coach of the  Super Rugby team. His regular position was scrum-half.

Playing career
Du Preez started his provincial career with Western Transvaal in 1982. He then moved to Northern Transvaal, where his regular halfback partner was Naas Botha. He ended his playing career with Natal.

Du Preez played seven test matches for the Springboks in 1992 and 1993. He also played in eight tour matches, scoring nine tries for the Springboks.

Test history

Coaching career

He coached KwaZulu-Natal sides Crusaders (in 2010) and College Rovers (between 2011 and 2013) before returning to his home town of Potchefstroom to coach both provincial side the  and university side .

Personal

Du Preez's son – also called Robert – is also a professional rugby player that played provincial rugby for  and for the South Africa Under-20 side at the 2013 IRB Junior World Championship.

He also has two younger twin sons – Dan and Jean-Luc – that were both included in the South Africa Under-20 squad for the 2014 IRB Junior World Championship.
All three sons are in the Sharks squad for the 2019 Super Rugby competition.

Accolades

Du Preez was also a South African Rugby Young Player of the Year nominee in 1987 and a South African Rugby Player of the Year nominee in 1989 and 1990.

References

Category:South African rugby union players
Category:Living people
Category:1963 births
Category:People from Potchefstroom
Category:Sharks (Currie Cup) players
Category:Sharks (rugby union) players
Category:Rugby union scrum-halves
Category:South Africa international rugby union players
Category:South African rugby union coaches


ERCC1 as a risk stratifier in platinum-based chemotherapy for nonsmall-cell lung cancer.
Cisplatin-based chemotherapy remains the treatment of choice in advanced nonsmall-cell lung cancer. The development of predictive biomarkers able to identify lung-cancer patients who are most likely to benefit from cisplatin-based chemotherapy would be a powerful tool. Many reports have explored the role of ERCC1 expression in the repair mechanism of cisplatin-induced DNA adducts in cancer cells. Using immunohistochemistry in resected tumors, the International Adjuvant Lung Cancer Trial showed that high ERCC1 protein expression was associated with improved survival in patients who did not receive chemotherapy. In contrast, the benefit of adjuvant cisplatin-based chemotherapy was more profound in patients with low ERCC1 expression. Other investigators studying mRNA expression in tumor biopsies from patients treated with cisplatin and gemcitabine showed that patients with low ERCC1 mRNA expression have a longer median survival compared to those with high expression. High ERCC1 expression is predictive of resistance to platinum-based therapy. Thus, there is solid evidence to support ERCC1 as a useful marker of clinical resistance to platinum-based chemotherapy in the adjuvant setting of nonsmall-cell lung cancer. Meanwhile, optimization of methodology and standardization of technical procedures seem necessary before larger prospective studies can address the same question.


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SURRENDER OF JAPANESE TROOPS ON THE BANKS OF THE SITTANG [Allocated Title]

Title:SURRENDER OF JAPANESE TROOPS ON THE BANKS OF THE SITTANG [Allocated Title]

Film Number:JFU 351

Other titles:BRITISH ARMY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR [Allocated Series Title]

Summary: Japanese troops, probably of 53rd Division, 33rd Army, surrender their arms and equipment to men of 1st Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles (63rd Brigade, 17th Indian Division) on the banks of the River Sittang near Pegu, Burma.

Description: Japanese personnel seen wading across a flooded stream or river. A file of Japanese troops cross a railway bridge carrying a variety of arms and stores. Reverse angle shows the Japanese troops walking along the railway bridge with armed Gurkha troops lining their route. Japanese personnel wading across the stream. Troops enter a hut to deposit their equipment. Surrendered Japanese soldiers on an embankment by paddy fields. Japanese soldiers picking up ammunition crates and carrying them away on their shoulders; local Burmese civilians pass by. Japanese soldiers carrying shells. A Japanese soldier, wearing little more than a loincloth and carrying a bundle of clothing, crosses a paddy field with a number of swords on his shoulder. Section of footage, badly out of focus, showing Japanese (officers?) making a list. Japanese troops carrying shells. A long line of Japanese troops, still wearing their personal equipment and led by an officer who still has his sword, are led to a Ramp Cargo Lighter on the River Sittang. They board the lighter for transit across the river. On the (west?) bank of the Sittang the troops leave the lighter and board a train. The train is composed of a number of flatcars with a small shunter.

Notes: Dopesheet does not give a precise location or date. The official history however would suggest that the location is the HQ of 1st Battalion 10th Gurkhas at Abya, and the date likely late August 1945. The surrender of Japanese forces in Burma was a protracted process that was made very difficult by the scattering of Japanese formations, tenuous or non-existent communications in inaccessible terrain, and the Japanese insistence on receiving orders from above before surrendering.
In the background when the Japanese troops cross the river the blown Sittang bridge is visible. It was demolished on 23 February 1942 in the face of the advancing Japanese but this resulted in two brigades of 17th Division being trapped on the far side. The blowing of the Sittang bridge remains a controversial and contested episode.
The dopesheet mentions that Japanese battalion commanders were permitted to retain their swords but junior officers were forced to surrender them. The issue of the surrender of swords was somewhat contentious, some feeling it was symbolically necessary to emphasise that the Japanese Army had been decisively defeated, while others believed that disgracing Japanese officers in front of their men would undermine discipline and make it impossible for them to control their soldiers in captivity. This was a particularly pressing issue as large bodies of Japanese troops were still stationed elsewhere in south east Asia with no Allied troops yet available to intern them.


Internal park figures show that visitor numbers from Spain and the United Kingdom are seriously down. According to EuroDisney SCA reports, an equally serious profit loss is the result of the downturn.

"The net loss in the six months ended March 31 was 71.9 million euros ($94 million), up from 37.5 million euros a year earlier, the company, based east of Paris, said in a statement today. Sales fell 7.3 percent to 558.8 million euros."

Apparently, the poor economy is hurting DLP right at a time when it is making major strides to get back on it's feet. Let's hope the economy improves soon. Hope some of the rumored major attraction additions occure at the two Paris parks over the course of the next few years as well.


- -26. Suppose 0 = -q*p + p. Suppose 21*t - 24*t - 9 = p. Sort 2, -4, t.
-4, t, 2
Let y(u) = 2*u**2 + u - 1. Let g be 1 + (0/(-1) - 3). Let p be y(g). Let w = 4 + -7. Sort p, -5, w.
-5, w, p
Let k = 279 - 284. Sort 103, 5, k in ascending order.
k, 5, 103
Let l(q) = q + 14. Let j be l(-10). Put 55, j, 5 in descending order.
55, 5, j
Let d = -4 + 3.5. Let y(f) = f**2 - 7*f + 10. Let m be y(6). Let k = 0.1 + 0.9. Sort k, d, m in decreasing order.
m, k, d
Suppose 4*q + 4*r - 4 = 0, -4*q + 1 = 8*r - 3*r. Let s be ((-2)/(-2))/(2/q). Suppose 3*f + f + 20 = -2*c, s*f + 3*c = -10. Put f, -4, 0 in ascending order.
f, -4, 0
Suppose -41*m + 39*m + 702 = 0. Let b be m/(-45) + (1 + 1)/(-10). Suppose 3*u + 3*q = 0, -4*u + 8 = -0*u + 2*q. Sort u, b, -3 in decreasing order.
u, -3, b
Let a(g) = -g**2 + 19*g - 137. Let i be a(22). Put -1, -5, i in ascending order.
i, -5, -1
Let r = -0.13 - -0.161. Let v = 0.531 - r. Sort v, -0.5, 0.4, -3.
-3, -0.5, 0.4, v
Suppose 4*z + 2*h = 46, -7*z + 2*h - 34 = -10*z. Sort 1, -5, 3, z in decreasing order.
z, 3, 1, -5
Suppose 5*r + 2 = -2*y, 5*y = 4*y + 5*r - 1. Let s = 58 - 63. Sort 0, -2/3, s, y.
s, y, -2/3, 0
Let s be (-68)/(-18) - (-4)/18. Let u(k) = 9*k - 4. Let n be u(-1). Let q(c) = -3*c - 39. Let f be q(n). Sort f, -4, s.
-4, f, s
Suppose -113*h - 1980 = -47*h. Sort 2, h, -4, 4.
h, -4, 2, 4
Let u = 24.051 - 0.051. Let l = 3 - u. Let v = -25 - l. Sort -0.02, -0.3, v in ascending order.
v, -0.3, -0.02
Let k be -1*(-21)/14*-2. Sort -7, k, 6, -2.
-7, k, -2, 6
Suppose 0 = -4*d + 43 - 155. Let y be 4*((-9)/d)/9. Put 5, -3/5, y in ascending order.
-3/5, y, 5
Let g be (2/(-4))/((-76)/(-114)). Sort 0.3, g, 19 in descending order.
19, 0.3, g
Let h = 6 - 7. Let r = -1 - -0.7. Let i = 27.95 - 30.95. Put r, i, h in descending order.
r, h, i
Suppose 2*s + 4 = 4*y - 2*s, -4*s + 24 = 3*y. Let d be (3 + -3)/(4 + -2). Suppose -3*w - 2*w + 25 = d. Sort -1, w, y.
-1, y, w
Suppose 5*b - 188 + 196 = u, b + 2*u = 5. Sort -5, b, 46 in ascending order.
-5, b, 46
Let y be (2 - 0) + (-9)/5. Let l = -9.48 - -9.18. Sort y, l, -2/7.
l, -2/7, y
Suppose -6*q + 3*q = -39. Suppose -2*m + 6 = 2*n, 1 - q = -n - 4*m. Sort 4, n, -3, -5 in ascending order.
-5, -3, n, 4
Let r = -168 - -168.1. Let i = 8 + -7.7. Let t = -0.4 + i. Put 3, r, t in ascending order.
t, r, 3
Let t = 0.392 + 0.108. Let i be 0 + 2*2/(-3). Sort i, t, -0.4 in increasing order.
i, -0.4, t
Let p be (-1 + 4)*(4 + -5 - -4). Let v = 6 - p. Put 4, v, -5, -4 in increasing order.
-5, -4, v, 4
Suppose 0 = -3*f - 3*m - 12, -21*f + 23*f - 7 = m. Put f, -1, -5, -38 in descending order.
f, -1, -5, -38
Suppose -3*g + 8 - 34 = -d, g = -3. Let c = d - 11. Let z = 18 - 20. Sort c, 1, z in descending order.
c, 1, z
Let y(u) = -12 - 12*u**2 + 11 - 35*u + 36*u. Let k be y(1). Sort k, -2, -4, 5 in decreasing order.
5, -2, -4, k
Let q be 2/8*4/6. Let g = q + -13/42. Let o = 190.3 + -193.3. Put g, 0.5, o in ascending order.
o, g, 0.5
Let h = -574 - -551. Put 4, 1, h in increasing order.
h, 1, 4
Let u(o) = o**3 + 11*o**2 - 12*o + 4. Let r be u(-12). Let k be -3*(12/24 + 7/(-12)). Put -2, r, -1/3, k in ascending order.
-2, -1/3, k, r
Suppose 10 - 30 = 5*z. Suppose -6*c + 4*c - 4 = 0. Let x be 8 + (-9)/(-6)*c. Put z, 3, x in descending order.
x, 3, z
Let w be ((-3)/(-6) + -1)*-2. Let g(o) = o**3 - 2*o**2 - 12*o + 11. Let m be g(4). Sort 0, w, 5, m in descending order.
5, w, 0, m
Let d = 3 + -1. Let j = -7471 - -7467. Put j, -0.3, d in increasing order.
j, -0.3, d
Let c = 525.8 - 529. Let r = 20.5 - 17. Let l = c + r. Put l, -5, -2/5 in ascending order.
-5, -2/5, l
Let r(d) = d**2 + 7*d + 2. Let x be r(-7). Let u be (2 - 4 - -2)*2/x. Sort u, -9, 4.
-9, u, 4
Let f(n) = n**2 - 3*n - 8. Let r(q) = q. Let y(c) = -f(c) - 2*r(c). Let i be (-3 - 0)/(6/(-8)). Let k be y(i). Sort k, 2, -2.
k, -2, 2
Let g(r) = -284*r - 282. Let l be g(-1). Suppose b = -4*b + 15. Sort 4, -5, l, b in decreasing order.
4, b, l, -5
Let r = 9 + 0. Suppose 0 = b + 2*b - r. Let s be (4 + -6)/((-1 - 0)/(-1)). Put s, b, -3 in increasing order.
-3, s, b
Let v = 139 - 142. Let l(b) be the first derivative of -b**3/3 - 11*b**2/2 + 5*b - 2. Let n be l(-11). Put v, 2, n in decreasing order.
n, 2, v
Let p be 15/(-5) + 9 - 6. Sort 0.4, p, -0.1, -6 in increasing order.
-6, -0.1, p, 0.4
Let i(m) = m**3 + 8*m**2 + 7*m - 3. Let t be i(-7). Let u = -169 + 166. Let j be 2/t - 5/u. Sort j, 2/5, -4 in decreasing order.
j, 2/5, -4
Suppose -170*c + 167*c - 7 = p, 0 = -3*p + 4*c - 8. Sort p, 4, -68 in descending order.
4, p, -68
Let m = -2.18 + -0.22. Let i = -2 - m. Let g = 18 - 17.9. Sort -8, i, g in descending order.
i, g, -8
Let y(k) = 2*k + 3. Suppose 4*t + 0*t - 576 = 0. Let r be t/(-40) - 4/10. Let i be y(r). Put -2, i, 2 in increasing order.
i, -2, 2
Let q(l) = -8*l**2 - 48*l - 6. Let r be q(-6). Put 0, r, 2 in increasing order.
r, 0, 2
Suppose -17*n + 48 = 7*n. Suppose 2*j - 1 = -3. Put 3/5, j, n, -3 in descending order.
n, 3/5, j, -3
Let v = -0.282 + 3.282. Let a = -18 - -54. Suppose 4*c = -4*n + a, -6*c = -2*c - 4*n - 36. Put 1, c, v in increasing order.
1, v, c
Let c = 4699 - 4698.95. Let l = 2 - -1. Let v = -11/4 + l. Put -5, c, v in decreasing order.
v, c, -5
Let w be ((-2)/(-3))/(4/(-6)). Suppose -3*s = -2*a + 28 - 10, 2*a - 10 = s. Put 4, w, a in descending order.
4, a, w
Let d be (96/42)/((-10)/(-35)). Sort 2, -1, d, 4 in descending order.
d, 4, 2, -1
Suppose 0 = i + 11 - 10. Let n = -8 + 4. Sort 4, n, i in descending order.
4, i, n
Let c = -16 + 20. Suppose c*m = 5*m - 8. Sort 4, m, -5.
-5, 4, m
Let d(r) = r**3 - 12*r**2 + 28*r - 10. Let m be d(9). Sort m, 3, -37, -2 in ascending order.
-37, -2, m, 3
Let r = -31.939 + -0.061. Let a = r - -31.7. Let t be 1 - -4*(-1)/5. Put t, a, -4 in descending order.
t, a, -4
Let a(j) = -j**3 - 8*j**2 - 7*j + 4. Let z be a(-7). Let y be (-5)/(-12) + (-1)/(-3). Let l = -730/91 + 108/13. Put l, z, y in increasing order.
l, y, z
Let d(t) = -t**3 + 24*t**2 + 57*t - 133. Let a be d(26). Sort a, -0.3, -0.063, 2/11.
a, -0.3, -0.063, 2/11
Let x(c) = -2*c**2 - c. Let t be x(1). Let j = -2828 + 2823. Sort t, j, -4 in ascending order.
j, -4, t
Let s = 2 + 2. Suppose -h - 5*l + 4 = 0, h = 4*h + 5*l - 2. Let d = h - 2. Sort -1, s, d.
d, -1, s
Let o be (0 + -2)*(1 + -2). Let h be 18/5 + -3 - (-54)/(-15). Put 10, o, h in descending order.
10, o, h
Let r be (-24)/9*(-90)/40. Sort 0, r, -1.
-1, 0, r
Suppose -3*p + 0*p = -15. Let u be -14 + 18 - 1/(-138)*-551. Let w = 71/276 - u. Put p, w, 1/7 in increasing order.
1/7, w, p
Suppose -4*l + 2*i = -l - 2, 5*l = 5*i + 5. Sort 9, -3, l, 13 in descending order.
13, 9, l, -3
Let g = -4 + 0. Let k = g + 9. Suppose 2*l - 4*u + 4 + 8 = 0, -4*u - 28 = 2*l. Put k, -2, l in ascending order.
l, -2, k
Let v = 317 + -310. Put v, 1/2, 2, 0.3 in ascending order.
0.3, 1/2, 2, v
Let h = 21 + -21. Suppose h = -3*i - 12. Sort i, 2, -42.
-42, i, 2
Let t = -6.7 - 0.3. Let w = t + -6. Let r = 10 + w. Put 0.1, r, 0 in decreasing order.
0.1, 0, r
Let h = -5.9 - 2.1. Let t = h - -8.09. Let d = -322 - -321. Sort t, -0.5, d in descending order.
t, -0.5, d
Let i = 8 + -10. Let q = -1.9 - i. Put 3/8, -1/5, q in ascending order.
-1/5, q, 3/8
Suppose 8*a - a = 2*a. Suppose 0 = -3*r - a*r + 3. Suppose 3*d + m = 2*d - 4, 8 = -4*m. Put 0, r, d in decreasing order.
r, 0, d
Let j = 0.585 - 0.985. Put j, 0.2, -50 in ascending order.
-50, j, 0.2
Let d = -7519/47 + 160. Sort -0.03, 1/2, d.
-0.03, d, 1/2
Let a(o) = o**2 - 8*o + 11. Let r be a(7). Let k be 1*r - 1026/243. Put 1/6, -1/6, 4, k in descending order.
4, 1/6, -1/6, k
Let o = 166 - 26. Let c = 141 - o. Let k = -2.6 - -3. Sort k, -1, c in descending order.
c, k, -1
Let o(t) = -t**2 - 2*t + 3. Let d be o(-3). Suppose u = -4, 4*s = -3*u - d*u - 20. Let a be (1 - -1*6) + (-20 - -19). Put 3, a, s in descending order.
a, 3, s
Suppose 5*q - 25 = m, 4*m = 3*q + 4 - 2. Suppose 0 = -2*a - 9 + 13. Put a, 5, 3, q in ascending order.
a, 3, 5, q
Suppose -2*q - 4*v - 7 = -1, 3*q + 10 = -5*v. Let u = 13 + q. Suppose 8 + 0 = 2*s - 2*r, 0 = -3*s - r - u. Put -2, s, -5 in ascending order.
-5, -2, s
Suppose -46 = -5*j + 4. Let v be (20/8)/(j/8). Let k be ((-3)/4)/((-18)/4). Put k, v, -2 in descending order.
v, k, -2
Let z = -9 - -5. Let m = 27 + -46. Let h = m + 14. Sort z, -6, h.


[Visceral complications of the aortic dissections - indications and technique of the thoracoabdominal refenestration].
Aortic dissection is a life threatening cardiovascular catastrophy. Its incidence estimated to 5-6 cases per 100,000 patients/year. The intimal tear happens at the ascending aorta in Type A, meanwhile at the aortic isthmus in Type B, but entry point may develop anywhere alongside the entire aorta. All types may affect a short aortic segment resulting in a localized false aneurysm, others separate the intimal layer at longer extension down to the visceral segment and far beyond to the femoral arteries. Dissection of orifices of side branches may lead to cerebral, upper extremity, spinal, visceral, renal and lower extremity malperfusion. These complications beyond the aortic rupture contribute significantly to high mortality of dissection. Today, first line treatment option in Type A dissection is surgery, but it can be endovascular or medical in Type B dissection. However, awareness of surgical procedures in this field remains inevitable. In this paper we summarize the surgical options for distal malperfusion affecting spinal, visceral, renal and lower extremity circulation.


Geoffrey S Ginsburg

Professor of Medicine

Dr. Geoffrey S. Ginsburg's research interests are in the development of novel paradigms for developing and translating genomic information into medical practice and the integration of personalized medicine into health care.

Contact Information

Education

Children's Hospital Boston, 1994

Children's Hospital Boston, 1987

Ph.D. Boston University, 1984

M.D. Boston University, 1984

Research Interests

Dr. Geoffrey S. Ginsburg's research interests are in the development of novel paradigms for developing and translating genomic information into medical practice and the integration of personalized medicine into health care.


I have added the screencaps for The Set-Up to the episodes' section. Again, a little more focus on the main guest character in this episode, and again, it's done very well. A hit-man returns from Europe, recalled for one last hit. Appearances can be deceptive however, and we find out that this man's life has totally changed, and the mobster who called him back may not have the motivations he claims. Steve and Mike work the case, but we as viewers get a lot more insight than they into the hitman's character and situation.

In this episode, we are taken to various locations throughout the city. The opening sequence was filmed at San Quentin prison, and subsequently the inmate who was almost assassinated is taken in protective custody at a site named Clover Leaf Rest Home (I am still trying to find out whether this was a fake sign or not). The former hit-man arrives at San Francisco International Airport and takes a shabby transient hotel room in Chinatown. Several sequences were filmed in the Tenderloin, at Leavenworth and Turk, where Mike and Steve are shading a bar owner and former member of the mob. Filming locations also include one of the mansions on Marina Boulevard (just for indoor filming), the Palace of Fine Arts, San Francisco General Hospital, Aquatic Park, and the Embarcadero, just south of the Ferry Terminal and right beneath the elevated Embarcadero Freeway.


Q:

Crawlspider not scraping anything

from scrapy.spider import BaseSpider
from scrapy.selector import HtmlXPathSelector
from scrapy.contrib.spiders import CrawlSpider, Rule
from scrapy.contrib.linkextractors.sgml import SgmlLinkExtractor
#scrapy crawl dmoz -o items.json -t json
from scrapy.http import Request
from urlparse import urlparse

from manga.items import MangaItem

class MangaHere(CrawlSpider):
    name = "mangahs"
    allowed_domains = ["mangahere.com"]
    start_urls = ["http://www.mangahere.com/seinen/"]
    rules = [Rule(SgmlLinkExtractor(allow = ('//a[@class="next"]')), follow=True,

        callback='parse_item'),]

#def parse(self, response):
    # get indext depth for every page
   # hxs = HtmlXPathSelector(response)
   # next_link = hxs.select('//a[@class="next"]')
   # index_depth = int(next_link.select('preceding-sibling::a[1]/text()').extract()[0])
    #create a request for the first page

  #  url = urlparse("http://www.mangahere.com/seinen/")
  #  yield Request(url.geturl(), callback=self.parse_item)

    #create a request for each subsequent page in the form "./seinen/x.html"
 #   for x in xrange(2, index_depth):
 #       pageURL = "http://www.mangahere.com/seinen/%s.htm" % x
 #       url = urlparse(pageURL)
  #      yield Request(url.geturl(), callback=self.parse_item)
    def parse_start_url(self, response):
        list(self.parse_item(response))

    def parse_item(self,response):
        hxs = HtmlXPathSelector(response)
        sites = hxs.select('//ul/li/div')
        items = []
        for site in sites:
            rating = site.select("p/span/text()").extract()
            desc = site.select("p[2]/text()").extract()
            for i in rating:
                for p in desc:
                    if float(i) > 4.8 and "ecchi" not in str(p):
                        item = MangaItem()
                        item['title'] = site.select("div/a/text()").extract()
                        item['link'] = site.select("div/a/@href").extract()
                        item['desc'] = site.select("p[2]/text()").extract()
                        item['rate'] = site.select("p/span/text()").extract()

                        items.append(item)
        return items

The commented stuff is a method of crawling the pages without a crawlspider that someone here helped me with. But I still want to learn how to make the crawlspider work for the sake of knowing.
I get no errors but it scrapes 0 pages, I checked a lot of threads and it sounded like I had to add a parse_start_url for some reason but that didn't help, changing the names of the parse function didn't help either.
What is not working? Is my rule incorrect or am I missing something?

A:

You need to change your rule to something like this:
rules = [Rule(SgmlLinkExtractor(allow = ('/\d+.htm')), follow=True,
    callback='parse_item'),]


Silene uniflora

Silene uniflora is a species of flowering plant in the family Caryophyllaceae known by the common name sea campion.

Description
Silene uniflora is a herbaceous perennial plant, similar in appearance to the bladder campion (Silene vulgaris) but with flowers generally solitary. It is generally prostrate, mat-forming. The leaves are linear, grey-green glabrous and glaucous in opposite and decussate pairs, the flowers white with five deeply notched petals, the 5 sepals fused and inflated to form a bladder.

Distribution
Silene uniflora is a maritime species, almost confined to Iceland, the Atlantic and Baltic Sea coasts of western Europe, Madeira and the Azores. In Britain it also occurs rarely in the mountains.

References

uniflora


class Solution {
    func solveNQueens(_ n: Int) -> [[String]] {
        var res = [[String]]()
        let row = [Character](repeating:".", count: n)
        var board = [[Character]](repeating: row, count: n)
        dfs(&board, &res, 0)
        return res
    }

    func dfs(_ board:inout [[Character]], _ res: inout [[String]], _ col: Int){
        if col == board.count{
            res.append(build(board));
            return
        }

        for i in 0..<board.count{
            if valid(board, i, col){
                board[i][col] = "Q"
                dfs(&board, &res, col+1)
                board[i][col] = "."
            }
        }
    }

    func build(_ board:[[Character]]) -> [String]{
        var res = [String]()
        for row in board{
            res.append(String(row))
        }
        return res
    }

    func valid(_ board:[[Character]], _ x:Int, _ y: Int) -> Bool{
        for i in 0..<board.count{
            for j in 0...y{
                if board[i][j] == "Q" && (i == x || j == y || x + y == i + j || x - y == i - j){
                    return false
                }
            }
        }
        return true
    }

}