Google has quietly released a static analysis framework for Python - rictic
http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_name=9c768dc61001121642t5bd1a7ddmd1fe9e088e1d9ab0@mail.gmail.com
======
mahmud
_it was an intern project from last summer, written from scratch by our intern
Yin Wang_

:-)

------
cracki
It's Steve Yegge again. Nice to see him not totally gone in the google black
hole.

------
pgbovine
awesome! i really hope projects like this gain traction and are actually used
by hackers. staunch supporters of statically-typed languages often criticize
the lack of IDE/static analysis tool support for dynamic languages like
python/js/ruby, citing that it's simply harder to create a good static
analysis for dynamically-typed languages. while this is true in theory, in
practice type, type inference and local dataflow analyses work pretty darn
well, since people aren't just using types willy nilly in these languages ---
there's actually a lot of implicit structure

~~~
jermy
Quite. This'll be an awesome addition to the python toolbox when a diagnostic
tool is built around it.

Just in case anybody else is new to jython and wants to give Steve's HTML
indexing demo a go:

      $ mkdir google-indexer && cd google-indexer
      $ wget http://bugs.jython.org/file756/google-indexer.zip
      $ unzip google-indexer.zip
      $ svn co https://jython.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/jython/trunk/jython
      $ cd jython
      $ patch -p0 < ../google-indexer-patch.diff
      $ tar zxvf ../google-indexer-newfiles.tar.gz
      $ ant jar

And then (following the suggestion in the top of the HtmlDemo class - see
src/org/python/indexer/demos/HtmlDemo.java for how to do this on the whole
stdlib)

      $ java -classpath ./dist/jython-dev.jar:./extlibs/antlr-runtime-3.1.3.jar:./extlibs/constantine.jar org.python.indexer.demos.HtmlDemo /usr/lib/python2.4/email

This will produce a set of files in html/. Use a suitable browser to view

      $ google-chrome html/Message.py.html

------
amix
Some time ago I looked for something similar and found Pyflakes, which uses
Python's compiler module to do some simple checks. This looks more promising.
I have patched Pyflakes and I usually use it when refactoring code (check out
<http://amix.dk/blog/viewEntry/19361> for more info).

------
ableal
There's probably an interesting "summer job" cross-breeding this with Mark
Dufour's ShedSkin Python-to-C++ compiler ( <http://shed-skin.blogspot.com/> ,
<http://code.google.com/p/shedskin/> )

By the way, I see ShedSkin 0.3 is just out this week. Mark has been persistent
and seems to have interesting results.

------
samstokes
"My team at Google also plans to continue work on [the analyzer] on a part-
time basis, as it's an important part of a larger project we're doing in this
space."

Interesting... I wonder what Unladen Swallow or App Engine could do with type
inference and static analysis?

~~~
rictic
I think the larger project has to do with the language-neutral framework that
he's advocated for (and is now apparently building). Google's now definitely
got static analysis for Python, Javascript through Closure Compiler, and Java
through a ton of open software (and probably a bunch of google-specific stuff
too). Interesting to see where this goes.

------
jbellis
don't projects like pydev (which has been completely OSS for a while now, and
is even written in java, like the code Steve attached) already provide this?


Features: This aromatherapy essential oil diffuse will fill your space with a soothing fragrance. It helps lift your mood and relieve stress. The fragrance shields you from stubborn, unwanted odors. Perfect for use in any area of your room, office or even in hotels.


Children of a Lesser God (TV series)

Children of a Lesser God () is a 2018 South Korean television series starring Kang Ji-hwan and Kim Ok-bin. It aired on OCN's Saturdays and Sundays at 22:20 (KST) time slot from March 3 to April 22, 2018.

Synopsis
The story of two detectives who work together to unravel the corruption behind a tragedy that happens within a powerful organization.

Cast

Main
 Kang Ji-hwan as Cheon Jae-in
 An elite and genius detective who is guided by only facts, logic and numbers.
 Kim Ok-bin as Kim Dan
 Han Seo-jin as young Kim Dan
 A warm-hearted rookie detective who has a supernatural ability to see death.

Supporting
  as Joo Ha-min
 Lee Elijah as Baek A-hyeon
 Lee Jae-yong as Kook Han-joo
 Jang Gwang as Pastor Wang
 Lee Hyo-jung as Baek Do-gyu
  as Gye Do-hoon
 Ahn Gil-kang as Kim Ho-ki
  as Choi Sung-ki

Production
 The first script reading of the cast was held on December 17, 2017 at CJ E&M in Sangam-dong.
 Jo Min-ki originally played Kook Han-joo but he was removed from the series after accusations of sexual harassment and assault. He was replaced by Lee Jae-yong.

Ratings
In this table,  represent the lowest ratings and  represent the highest ratings.

References

External links

Category:Orion Cinema Network television dramas
Category:Television series by Studio Dragon
Category:Korean-language television programs
Category:2010s South Korean television series
Category:2018 South Korean television series debuts
Category:2018 South Korean television series endings
Category:South Korean thriller television series
Category:South Korean mystery television series


Helia, commander of the Tria, knew what she had to do after the three Potentia were installed. The humans would have to go back where they had come from.
She would sink the city again after her ship had been repaired. These...children should not be roaming the galaxy through the gates that her people had
built.

She willed the override to rise from the floor in front of the gate. It would turn off the interfaces the humans had built and give her complete control of
the city as the leader of her ship. She could then make them leave. Another thought should have led to confused shouting as the very things that had always
worked now failed.

That isn't what happened, however, instead the man who had introduced himself as Lieutenant Colonel John Sheppard caulked his head as if listening to
something. His lips pressed thin as he suddenly glared at her. The scientist, Dr. Rodney McKay, then jumped slightly before frantically tapping something
on the console next to him. His expression was more irritated but not fearful or worried.

"No casualties so far from the surges, a few burns en route to the infirmary; still waiting on reporting from around 25% of the departments." A look of
delight crossed his features, "Hey look at that, it seems like she's started translating on her own."

The Colonel nodded and turned to Dr. Elizabeth Weir who stood to the side looking as confused as Helia felt. What was happening?

"Helia apparently attempted to lock us out of the computers and send us back to earth. Lucky for us we made a much better impression on 'Lantis than she
did."

Here Dr. McKay broke in scowling again, "Three of my scientist and one of the trained monkeys that the SGC just sent me are head to the infirmary with
second degree burns the surge from her attempt caused."

"That's not possible" Helia spoke, trying to inject a calm influence to set these children's minds at ease; "the override is designed to not cause harm to
any system it shuts down. It could not possibly cause a back surge."

Helia had not felt like she was incompetent since her first year of flight school until that moment. Blue eyes stared at her; she was judged and apparently
found wanting.

"That might have been the case if you hadn't taken two very important facts into consideration. First, you just flooded starving programs with more power
than they've had in 10,000 years. Most of their buffers are completely off line; Atlantis said that if anyone had been in the scanner in the infirmary for
any reason we would have had to bury them. The second fact is that several of our interfaces are of both ancient and earth design. Your override only shuts
down the Ancient equipment. Four conduits just blew. Again thankfully I had some of our first wavers in those areas that have contained the damage and are
repairing what they can."

Colonel Sheppard continues as if Dr. McKay hadn't spoken even though his face tightened with each report of damages. "Elizabeth, I recommend that none of
the Alterans from the Tria be allowed to wander without an armed guard; at least until we can be sure they won't try to commandeer our city again."

Despite her guilt over the injuries Helia couldn't help but puff in indignation at his tone, "Atlantis was our home long before it was yours, Colonel
Sheppard. You can't keep us from our home; Our city."

Like the Doctor Colonel Sheppard left the distinct impression that she was unworthy as he stared at her with pitiless eyes. "You abandoned her to the sea;
we woke her. You ran from your enemies while we fight and die to protect her from them. How would this city hold any loyalty toward you and yours over us?"

Staring at the pair who were now ignoring her for earnest discussions into their own earpieces she tried again to activate the override. This time there
was no response save a budding pain in her head; a warning.

"That's not possible" she utter quietly as she listened to the humans making plans around her. "It's just a city, just machines and programming."

&nbsp

Stargate SG-1 and Stargate: Atlantis, the characters and universe are the property of Stargate (II) Productions, Showtime/Viacom, MGM/UA, Double Secret Productions, Gekko Productions and the Sci-Fi Channel. The content of this site is solely for entertainment purposes and no copyright infringement is intended.


Yea, I have spent so much over the years on cheap $100 shoes and having them look like crap in no time. I want a good long lasting pair of shoes that I can wear to work in an office and even with some jeans.

Definitely. What is cool about these boots is that you can really dial in their "dressiness" with the way you polish them. They look great all roughed up, but it's easy to take them to another level with some polish on the toes.

i have a pair of these from leathersoul. plaza instead of the grant last, which i think the dc store carries. have closeups somewhere in this thread. this shows the silhouette of the boot pretty well though i think.

what cut are those jeans aerium? i wear apc NS with my indys, and i feel like im wearing clown shoes.

I always wore my rescues with my indy's, but am looking to get some NS and hopefully they look decent with my 4060's. Do you have any fit pics of the NS and Indy? I'm worried about the same thing (clown shoes) with that combo. Thanks!

I always wore my rescues with my indy's, but am looking to get some NS and hopefully they look decent with my 4060's. Do you have any fit pics of the NS and Indy? I'm worried about the same thing (clown shoes) with that combo. Thanks!

i have both the nst and the jumper boots both are great but i have to say the nst is the best of the bunch.

So, for an interesting twist... I had ordered the Cap-toes from The Shoe Mart a couple days ago, but I really wanted the NST, I just didn't want the wait. Well, I just went onto the Shoe Mart website and noticed they put a bunch of boots up there including the NST in #8--ORDERED!!! Not sure what last it's on, but looks like it could actually be Aberdeen--see the attachments.

Also, wow, the NST in Ravello--SO HOT, but I really need something in #8.


For years I have been accustomed to programming big, compound lifts first in my workouts. Unless on a given day we happened to be working on power development, I typically prescribed the big strength movements first, like most people do.

However, lately I have been doing more research on creating a safer approach. I kept coming across the concept of “getting a pump” prior to the big lifts. At first, I was extremely reluctant to try this out. I thought that if my athletes were pre-fatigued prior to the big lifts their strength would suffer, as well as their technique. I was comparing this to the old bodybuilding method of pre-exhaustion popularized by Joe Weider. The concept made a lot of sense to me when it came to bodybuilding. But athletes looking to make serious strength gains? I couldn’t help but scratch my head.

So before trying this out on my athletes, I decided to use myself as a guinea pig. Here is what I found…

RELATED: Strong and Energized vs Weak and Depleted: How High School Wrestlers Need to Eat

Having been training hard for 16 years, I do have some lower back tightness and minor pain from time to time. Nothing out of the ordinary. Before a big squat or deadlift session, I started using exercises like split squats and glute ham raises, and before an upper body day I used exercises like chest supported rows, band pull-aparts, push-ups, and side raises. Keep in mind that I don’t try to go super heavy here or anywhere near failure. I do sets of somewhere between 12-15 with a controlled tempo and quality technique.

Once I got to my working sets on my big lift for the day I felt better and stronger than just jumping into my big lifts after a dynamic warm-up! When you do this, not only are you activating the muscles being trained, but you are also producing more synovial fluid in the joints, which acts as a lubricant and can help reduce joint stress and pain.

Now, there is a possibility that you may lose a small percentage on your big lifts due to the small amount of fatigue you may feel. However, when you look at the grand scheme of things, the importance is that your athletes are working towards their goal more safely than before. As long as they are still making progressions, who cares if they lose a very small percentage on that particular training day?

When I started to apply this to my high school and college athletes, they loved it too. They looked and felt strong, and their technique actually improved! However, regarding enhanced athletic performance, I wanted to make sure that they were getting the most out of each session. Not only do we want them to get stronger in a safer manner, but we also still need to focus on mobility, power, and flexibility.

I have been reading a lot of work by Dr. John Rusin, who has certainly influenced me on this philosophy. As I started to apply these tactics, everything started to make a lot more sense. So here is what our training sessions currently look like for our more advanced athletes at Tutela Training Systems here in Clark, New Jersey.

Phase 1: Static Stretching and/or Self-Myofascial Release

Our athletes are advised to arrive 15 minutes before the start of their training sessions to work on flexibility and soft tissue. This gives them an extra 15 minutes a day to work on stuff that most athletes neglect. I know there has been some debate in the past about how bad it is for athletes to use static stretching prior to training. However, in my opinion, I feel that as long as they are not getting fatigued from intense stretching, a static stretch can help athletes that are tight get into certain positions that they may not be able to get into without a light stretch. As long as this comes before a dynamic warm-up, I have never seen any issues with any of the athletes I have ever trained, my adult clients, training partners, or myself in the last 11 years.

Phase 2: Dynamic Warm-Up

The dynamic warm-up is used for multiple reasons: to increase core temperature, heart rate, activate the CNS, lubricate the joints, activate the muscles being trained, improve mobility, and put you in a more ready, safer state to train in. The important thing here is that you do not just go through the motions, which I see time and time again in high school weight rooms.

As a coach, you have to be sure that your athletes are getting the most out of their warm-ups, otherwise it is a waste of time. You have to coach them on their technique even during their warm-up! That is, if you want it to do what it is designed to do.

Phase 3: Power Development/CNS Activation

Once we wrap up the warm-up, I like to hop right into some type of jump, throw, sprint, or upper body plyometric to work on power development. Along with developing power, these movements will excite the central nervous system that much more, which will prepare your athletes for their strength work.

MORE: Should I Lift or Should I Sprint — The Case for Power

To give you an idea, during this phase we use things like box jumps, squat jumps, vertical and broad jumps, medicine ball slams, overhead medicine ball soccer throws, medicine ball side throws, medicine ball sit-up throws, Prowler sprints, band-resisted sprints, flat ground sprints, and plyo push-ups. Typically we prescribe anywhere from three to five sets of three to five reps on jumps and throws, and 10-20 yards on sprint work.

Phase 4: Activation/Getting A Slight Pump

Once we get through our power stuff we then move on to our activation work. Our exercise selection here is based on our big strength movement of the day. For example, if we are squatting that day, we will use an exercise like split squats to fire the glutes, quads, and hip flexors. Alternatively, if we are starting with a bench press variation for our big lift, we will typically prescribe push-ups, band pull-aparts, and/or band-resisted rows to draw more blood and fluid to the shoulders and upper back. Sometimes we even do a quick superset with pushups and band-resisted rows.

It’s important that you emphasize staying clear of failure and not going too heavy here. The intention here is to bring more blood and fluid to the joints, warming up the muscles a bit more, improving mobility, and making the big lifts safer for your athletes. These sets are not intended to be ball-breaking work sets.

Phase 5: Strength

Now we get into our big strength stuff for the day. Here we are usually working on the big three and their variations with specialty bars, overhead pressing, and chin-up variations. Here we follow the same progressive overload principle as we normally would.

Through my experience using this approach, I have found that our athletes can actually get into certain positions better since they are even more warmed up. As I mentioned earlier, I have not noticed any major reduction in strength, only better technique and maybe a slight decrease on the training day. Overall, each athlete has improved their lifts and have gotten stronger.

Phase 6: Hypertrophy

After our major strength work for the day, we then move to our hypertrophy work. We utilize rep ranges anywhere from eight to 15, and occasionally high rep sets of 20 or so if it’s a lower body day. The hypertrophy phase is typically where I like to work on bodyweight movements like dips and inverted rows (you can obviously add external resistance here when needed), dumbbell and unilateral work, eccentrics, isometrics and tempo work.

Phase 7: Core/Crawl/Carry/Condition

Depending on the day, we will select some type of core exercise, crawl variation, loaded carry, or conditioning. These are all essential in any program, so you need to make it a priority. We do anything during this phase, from jumping rope to strongman training for conditioning, bear crawls to ab circuits, or gator walks to sandbag complexes. We will also place an emphasis on grip and neck work during this phase, so make sure you do not neglect those in your programming as well.

Phase 8: Stretch and Relax

Once we wrap up our sessions, we spend some more time on static stretching. It is important to note that it is extremely important to relax and begin the recovery process once you finish up your training. If you are like me, you’re still pretty jacked up after training, so spend some time listening to music that’s a little more chill, deload the spine by simply hanging from a chin-up bar, and just focus on your breathing. Trust me, your spine needs this from time to time and you’ll be surprised how much hanging will help.

When it comes to training athletes, keep in mind that their health is priority number one. That shouldn’t be confused with taking it easy on them. They need to work their asses off! Don’t mistake that for a second.

What I’m saying is that getting them strong as shit while keeping them healthy is our priority as strength coaches. It isn’t about how hard you can work them or if you can make them puke. It’s about taking a smarter approach and keeping their best interest in mind.

Help them become well-rounded in every area of their fitness and they will become better athletes that last longer on the field of play. Sometimes it’s easy to let that get away from us. Let’s focus on helping our athletes have better seasons and careers by making them better all around.

Remember that anyone can make you tired, but not anyone can make you better.

For educational use only - Disclaimer


                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                 Fifth Circuit
                                                              F I L E D
               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   June 20, 2006

                                                           Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                   Clerk
                             No. 05-41519
                         Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                     Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HILARIO ANALCO-ANALCO,

                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                      --------------------
          Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Southern District of Texas
                    USDC No. 2:05-CR-259-ALL
                      --------------------

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Hilario Analco-Analco (Analco) appeals his sentence under

8 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry into the United States after

deportation.   Analco argues that the district court erred by

characterizing his prior state felony conviction for simple

possession of a controlled substance as an “aggravated felony”

for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).     Analco’s argument is

unavailing in light of circuit precedent.      See United States v.

Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1997).       Analco

     *
       Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
                           No. 05-41519
                                -2-

argues that this circuit’s precedent is inconsistent with Jerome

v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943).     Having preceded

Hinojosa-Lopez, Jerome is not “an intervening Supreme Court case

explicitly or implicitly overruling that prior precedent.”     See

United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999).

     Analco argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony”

provisions of § 1326(b) are unconstitutional.    This challenge is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

235 (1998).   Although Analco contends that Almendarez-Torres was

incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court

would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such

arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding.

See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005).     Analco properly concedes

that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and

circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for

further review.

     AFFIRMED.


27 B.R. 311 (1983)
In re MATLOCK TRAILER CORPORATION, Debtor,
WALTER E. HELLER AND COMPANY, SOUTHEAST, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
MATLOCK TRAILER CORPORATION, Defendant.
In re CUMBERLAND ENTERPRISES, INC., Northeast Enterprises, Inc., Northeast Enterprises of Columbus, Inc., Debtors.
T. Larry EDMONDSON, Trustee, in Bankruptcy for Cumberland Enterprises, Inc., Northeast Enterprises, Inc., Northeast Enterprises of Columbus, Inc., and on behalf of himself as sole stockholder of The 1727 Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
2-STAR FOODS, INC., the Chipper Foods, Co., Inc., Gulf Coast Foods, Inc., Leon Moore, Moore & Associates, Inc., Venture Enterprises, Inc., Shoney's, Inc., David Wachtel, William Tell, Inc., Wilson C. Tate, Sr., Harold F. Morris, Mark R. Moore, Charles Cox, Jr., Tate, Cox & Moore, A Partnership, Sequel II Corporation, James C. Smith, Seafood Distributors, Defendants.
Bankruptcy No. 382-02778, Adv. No. 382-0755, Bankruptcy Nos. 381-01797, 381-00758 and 381-00757, Adv. No. 382-0289.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee.
January 26, 1983.
Wm. Caldwell Hancock, Daniel C. Kaufman, Waddey & Newport, Nashville, Tenn., for Matlock Trailer Corp.
John Bailey, Julie Jones, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for Walter E. Heller and Co. Southeast, Inc.
Larry Stewart, Donelson, Stokes & Bartholomew, Nashville, Tenn., for The Chipper Foods Co., Inc. and 2-Star Foods, Inc.
Harry D. Lewis, Nashville, Tenn., for the Trustee in Cumberland Enterprises.
Before GEORGE C. PAINE, II and KEITH M. LUNDIN, Bankruptcy Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
These matters are before the court on motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 915 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 712(b). Because the issues presented by the motions in these cases are identical, the matters were consolidated for hearing and opinion. The movants argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ("Northern Pipeline") removed this court's authority to adjudicate bankruptcy matters after December 24, 1982. Upon consideration of the briefs submitted, *312 argument of counsel, and the entire record, the court is of the opinion that it retains § 241(a) jurisdiction to adjudicate all bankruptcy cases[1] filed prior to December 24, 1982, including all adversary proceedings and related matters relevant to those cases, whenever filed. The motions to dismiss are therefore DENIED.
The defendant/debtor Matlock Trailer Corporation ("Matlock") manufactures, sells, leases and services commercial truck bodies and semi-trailers at a facility located in Nashville, Tennessee. Matlock employs more than 60 individuals earning an aggregate payroll in excess of $78,000 per month. On August 27, 1982, Matlock filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Matlock sought to reorganize its debts because its immediate expense obligations exceeded its current revenues, although its total assets exceeded liabilities by approximately two million dollars.
The plaintiff/creditor Walter E. Heller and Company Southeast, Inc. ("Heller") is a major commercial lender from whom Matlock obtained approximately $750,000 in operating funds in December, 1981. To secure this loan, Heller took a security interest in Matlock's raw materials, work-in-progress, inventories and the real estate upon which Matlock's facility is located. The total value of the collateral is approximately $1.7 million.
As a result of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, all actions by creditors such as Heller to collect debts from Matlock or levy against its property were stayed as a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979). On November 8, 1982, Heller filed a complaint seeking to terminate the automatic stay and to obtain other appropriate relief, alleging in essence that its secured position was not adequately protected and that Matlock could not be successfully reorganized. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d) (West 1979). Heller also filed a motion to convert the Chapter 11 case to one under Chapter 7, to appoint a trustee, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the petition because of the alleged inability of Matlock to reorganize. Matlock timely responded to Heller's complaint and motion, denying the factual assertions and legal positions contained therein.
Heller's complaint for relief from the automatic stay was heard at a preliminary hearing and pretrial conference on December 8, 1982. At that time counsel announced that the parties had tentatively agreed on a settlement and that an agreement would be entered, subject to court approval, following an opportunity for interested parties to be heard. The parties agreed that a hearing on the settlement would be set at a date future, that the preliminary hearing on relief from the automatic stay would be consolidated with the final hearing, and that the automatic stay would continue in the interim. The settlement, however, was never consummated and an agreed order was entered on December 23, 1982, formally setting the final hearing for January 6, 1983, and continuing the automatic stay "pending further order of this court." This order was not appealed by either party.
At the scheduled hearing, counsel for Heller advised the court that he had filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this court as well as in the district court. He also filed a motion to dissolve the automatic stay for want of jurisdiction. In order to hear the jurisdiction motions before a possibly unnecessary final hearing on the merits and to allow the parties leave to file briefs on the issues, the stay proceeding was continued until after argument on the jurisdiction motions on January 19, 1983.
On May 12, 1980, Cumberland Enterprises, Inc. filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana. On May 24, 1980, Northeast Enterprises, Inc. and Northeast Enterprises of Columbus, Inc. filed Chapter 7 petitions with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio. On May 5, 1981, the United *313 States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana transferred the Cumberland Enterprises, Inc. case to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On February 1, 1982, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio transferred the Northeast Enterprises, Inc. and Northeast Enterprises of Columbus, Inc. cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On April 12, 1982, this court ordered the consolidation of the cases of Cumberland Enterprises, Inc., Northeast Enterprises, Inc., and Northeast Enterprises of Columbus, Inc. A trustee was subsequently appointed to administer the estate.
On May 11, 1982, the trustee filed a complaint against a number of defendants alleging conversion of assets, preferential transfers, fraudulent conveyances, and seeking the subordination of all claims held by the defendants. The trustee asserted jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1471 and 1481 (West Supp.1982), as well as 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 1979). Several of the defendants, including Chipper Foods Co., Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 915 of the Bankruptcy Rules and Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 18, 1982, this court issued a memorandum and order denying defendants' motions and noting jurisdiction to act during the pendency of the Northern Pipeline stay pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Supp.1982). Schneider v. 2-Star Foods, Inc. (In re Cumberland Enterprises), 22 B.R. 626 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn.1982). The order was issued without prejudice to the defendants' right to raise the jurisdictional issue after the stay expired. Defendant Chipper Foods Co., Inc. has subsequently renewed its objection to jurisdiction. For the purpose of resolving the jurisdictional question, this motion was consolidated with the Matlock matter.
Although this court's jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Reform Act as conferred through 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Supp. 1982) was declared unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court applied its holding prospectively and did not intend the decision to impact cases filed in reliance on the presumed validity of the Bankruptcy Code. The plurality stated that:
Having concluded that the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in § 241(a) is unconstitutional, we must now determine whether our holding should be applied retroactively to the effective date of the Act. Our decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), sets forth the three considerations recognized by our precedents as properly bearing upon the issue of retroactivity. They are first, whether the holding in question `decid[ed] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed' by earlier cases, id., at 106, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296; second, `whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the] operation' of the holding in question, id., at 197, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296; and third, whether retroactive application `could produce substantial inequitable results' in individual cases, ibid. In the present case, all of these considerations militate against the retroactive application of our holding today. It is plain that Congress' broad grant of judicial power to non-Art III bankruptcy judges presents an unprecedented question of interpretation of Art III. It is equally plain that retroactive application would not further the operation of our holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. We hold, therefore, that our decision today shall apply only prospectively. (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
102 S.Ct. at 2880. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the application of prospectivity. 102 S.Ct. at 2882. (Rehnquist, J. and O'Connor, J., concurring).
The prospectivity of the Court's opinion was based on the Court's insightful conclusion that application to pending cases would cause irreparable hardship to creditors *314 and debtors alike. It is a well-settled principle that where a decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied to all cases, there is an ample basis for making the decision prospective only in nature. Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). The prospective application of judicial decisions has been most conspicuously observed in the area of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (constitutional standards for search incident to arrest); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (constitutionally required counsel at lineups); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) (constitutional restrictions on search and seizure). However, the Court has recognized the doctrine of prospectivity outside the criminal area many times. See, e.g., Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969) (elections); Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (elections); Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940) (issuance of bonds). One clear indication from these decisions is that "prospective" has no single meaning. The circumstances of each particular case must be analyzed to determine what is meant by a "prospective application." As the Court has noted: "We must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operation." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) (emphasis added).
The prospective nature of the Court's decision in Northern Pipeline must be interpreted and applied to five categories of cases: (1) bankruptcy cases filed under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, completed and closed before June 28, 1982; (2) bankruptcy cases filed after June 28, 1982, but completed and closed before December 24, 1982; (3) bankruptcy cases which are uncompleted because of unresolved matters or proceedings filed prior to June 28, 1982; (4) bankruptcy cases which are uncompleted because of unresolved matters or proceedings filed between June 28, 1982 and December 24, 1982; and (5) uncompleted bankruptcy cases that require adjudication of matters or proceedings filed after December 24, 1982. The court finds that in Northern Pipeline the Court intended bankruptcy courts to continue to exercise complete jurisdiction over all five categories of cases.

CATEGORIES 1 AND 2
The Court clearly intended all bankruptcy court orders and decisions entered prior to December 24, 1982, the effective date of Northern Pipeline, to be immune from collateral attack. The Court has repeatedly sanctioned actions taken even under unconstitutional authorization when making prospective application of their decisions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 446, 17 L.Ed.2d 330 (1966); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 84 S.Ct. 1429, 12 L.Ed.2d 595 (1964). The Court has sought to protect the reliance interest of those parties who have taken actions pursuant to the presumed validity of an act of Congress. Thousands of litigants relied on the constitutional validity of the Bankruptcy Reform Act prior to the Court's unprecedented interpretation of Article III in Northern Pipeline. Reliance on the continued viability of the bankruptcy system was no less significant after the Court's announcement of Northern Pipeline. Debtors filing bankruptcy petitions and parties filing adversary proceedings relied on the prospective language of Northern Pipeline itself, the Court's stay of their judgment[2] and the subsequent extension of *315 the stay, the Court's reaffirmation of the prospective nature of their decision in United States v. Security Industrial Bank, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 407, 410 n. 5, 74 L.Ed.2d 235, 240 n. 5 (1982)[3] and the numerous judicial interpretations by bankruptcy courts, including a decision by this court, that § 241(a) jurisdiction was retained during the interim period. See Schneider v. 2-Star Foods, Inc. (In re Cumberland Enterprises), 22 B.R. 626 (Bkrtcy.M. D.Tenn.1982).[4]See also Armco, Inc. v. Cherry Pond Coal Co., 21 B.R. 592 (S.D.W. Va.1982), rev'g 21 Bankr. 588 (Bkrtcy.S.D. W.Va.1982); Zinker v. Levy (In re M.J.S. Apparel, Inc.), 22 B.R. 736, 737 (Bkrtcy.E.D. N.Y.1982); National Sugar Refining Co. v. U.S. Brands Corp., 22 B.R. 279 (Bkrtcy.S.D. N.Y.1982); Hassett v. Ganz (In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.), 21 B.R. 986 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y.1982); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust, 21 B.R. 645 (Bkrtcy.D.N.M. 1982). The Court intended to protect this reliance interest and the rights of all those parties who went through the bankruptcy process prior to December 24. Northern Pipeline cannot be interpreted to undo the actions which have been taken in the years since the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The rights of these parties have vested thus requiring that the status quo be maintained and these orders not be overturned.

CATEGORIES 3, 4 AND 5
While this court does not presently address the issue of whether jurisdiction exists to entertain bankruptcy cases filed after December 24, the only reasonable interpretation to be given to the prospective language of the Court's decision is that bankruptcy courts should continue to complete those cases, matters and proceedings which were filed on or before the effective date of Northern Pipeline. As a necessary corollary, this court must also continue to have jurisdiction over matters and proceedings which are filed after December 24, 1982 within cases commenced before that date.
In applying rulings "prospectively" in the criminal area, the Court has often allowed cases to continue despite constitutional questions and infirmities concerning underlying issues. For example, in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971), the court emphasized that their decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), which altered a series of opinions relevant to searches incident to arrest, would not be applied to searches conducted prior to June 23, 1969. The Court noted *316 that "the Chimel rule will receive sufficient implementation by applying it to those cases involving the admissibility of evidence seized in searches occurring after Chimel was announced." 401 U.S. 646 at 656, 91 S.Ct. at 1154. Rather than distinguishing between cases which were awaiting trial and those which were on review or appeal, the Court elected to restrict their opinion to those acts occurring after the opinion was announced. See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) would not invalidate lineups conducted prior to the effective date of the opinion). In these cases, law enforcement officials had reasonably relied on the constitutionality of their actions and the Court determined that this reliance should not be prejudiced by having a case dismissed or interrupted in midtrial by an unanticipated construction of the Constitution by the Supreme Court. Cases involving constitutionally tainted searches and lineups were, thus, allowed to proceed on the theory that justice is better served when cases begun in reliance on a particular constitutional interpretation are allowed to continue to completion.[5]
A similar (if not more compelling) interest is certainly served by allowing bankruptcy cases filed prior to December 24 to be completed. Litigants' reliance on the continued viability of the bankruptcy system is no less reasonable and no less deserving of protection than the actions of police officers sanctioned by the Court in Williams, Foster and other cases making prospective applications of newly-announced law. Only continued jurisdiction over filed bankruptcy cases gives meaning and effect to the Court's concern for fairness, equity and the prevention of hardship which motivated their decision to apply Northern Pipeline prospectively. Any other holding would create an inequitable travesty. Litigants would be treated differently based solely on the date a particular proceeding was completed.
For example, if two Chapter 7 debtors filed their cases on the same day and the clerk's office set the first for a discharge hearing on December 23, 1982 and the other for December 27, 1982, the cases might have entirely different outcomes although both debtors filed in full reliance on the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The debtor who received the discharge on December 23, 1982 would realize the protection intended by the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, all creditors would have their rights adjudicated under the same provisions. Absent the prospective application of Northern Pipeline, the second debtor whose case was not completed until December 27, 1982, would not receive a valid order of discharge solely by the passage of a single day and by events completely beyond his control.
Another example involves litigants who filed and tried a Northern Pipeline style adversary proceeding prior to December 24, 1982 (or prior to June 28, 1982), but part of the case was taken under advisement until December 27, 1982. The portion of the case decided at trial would be a valid judgment, despite being acted upon by a bankruptcy court. The remaining issues, although resolved by the same court, would be without the validity of a court order because they were decided after the effective date of Northern Pipeline. The litigants involved would be severely impacted solely by the bankruptcy court's delay in the release of its opinion. Part of the issues would be res judicata while the remaining questions would be unresolved if not unresolvable.
Perhaps the best example of inequity is before this court in one of the instant cases. If the court had required the parties in Matlock to proceed to trial at the preliminary *317 hearing rather than continuing the hearing because of an alleged agreement, and Matlock had prevailed, (and the facts certainly indicate a reasonable likelihood of that result), then that judgment would be accorded the full protection of the bankruptcy laws and Matlock's reorganization would continue with the 60 jobs of its employees along with their monthly payroll remaining intact. An altogether different outcome would occur if Heller had agreed at the preliminary hearing that Matlock had "a reasonable likelihood" of prevailing at the final hearing and the matter continued until a date after the Northern Pipeline stay was lifted. Then under Heller's reasoning, no court would have jurisdiction to lift the stay and it would automatically terminate 30 days from December 8 pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(e) (West 1979). Matlock would, thus, be out of business (and 60 jobs lost) merely because of the scheduling of the final hearing.
Certainly the Court did not envision that the numerous litigants who filed cases on or before December 24, 1982, who all relied on the presumed constitutionality of an act of Congress, should have their rights treated differently as a result of Northern Pipeline. There is absolutely nothing in the Northern Pipeline opinion to indicate that the Court intended to promote a "race to judgment" so that parties who received judgments prior to December 24 would be protected and those whose cases could not be accommodated by the court's schedule or were taken under advisement would be prejudiced.
Finally, if the movants' interpretation of "prospective" is accepted, the administration of all bankruptcy cases would come to a grinding halt. Movants contend that the Supreme Court's "prospectivity" holding protects only orders of the bankruptcy court which become final before December 24 and does not permit the bankruptcy court to complete cases still pending on that date. By this analysis, the bankruptcy courts in the United States would have pending on their dockets some 700,000 cases filed before the effective date of Northern Pipeline, but would be without jurisdiction to enter orders to bring the cases to completion. The practical effect is to reduce bankruptcy to a meaningless concept. Parties, such as those in the instant cases, would be unable to obtain relief because the automatic stay was activated in a period of undisputed jurisdiction, yet now the court is without jurisdiction to enter an order to modify or dissolve the stay. Similarly, the court would be without authority to enter discharges, order the turnover of property, appoint a trustee, determine the dischargeability of debts, approve plans of reorganization, or perform any other number of necessary functions. Bankruptcy cases pending before this court would disappear with consequent unimaginable waste and prejudice to the parties involved if this court accepted movants' argument that prospectivity is limited to orders entered before December 24, 1982. Only a continuous adjudication of these cases by the bankruptcy courts can protect the rights of all the parties involved.
The parade of inequities occasioned by the movants' attempt to circumscribe the prospective nature of Northern Pipeline could be traced ad nauseum through an endless series of combinations and permutations. However, it is clear that movants' interpretation of the term "prospective" is blatantly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's express concern for injustice and hardship and would eviscerate the purpose behind the Court's prospective application. In order to accord deference to the Court's concerns for justice to litigants, this court is required to reject the movants' interpretation of "prospective application."
In anticipation of the failure of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate to act in accordance with Northern Pipeline and the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to extend its stay, the Judicial Conference of the United States requested the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to provide each circuit with a proposed rule to permit the bankruptcy system to continue without disruption. Judicial Conference Resolution (September 23, 1982). The director, William E. Foley, then *318 provided proposed rules drafted within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Docter v. Gleicher (In re Stillman), 26 B.R. 834 (Bkrtcy. D.Md.1982); De Concini Hearing, National Conference on the Resolution of the Bankruptcy Crisis, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1983; Letters from William E. Foley (September 27 and December 3, 1982) (discussing proposed rule). Subsequently, the Judicial Council for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit promulgated an "emergency rule" which was adopted by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee as Administrative Order No. 28 on December 24, 1982. The Administrative Order provides that:
(h) Effective Date and Pending Cases
This rule shall become effective December 25, 1982, and shall apply to all bankruptcy cases and proceedings not governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended, and filed on or after October 1, 1979. Any bankruptcy matters pending before a bankruptcy judge on December 25, 1982, shall be deemed referred to that judge.
In re Administration of the Bankruptcy System, Adm. Order No. 28 at 9 (M.D.Tenn. Dec. 24, 1982).
The emergency rule and the section quoted were drafted on the inaccurate assumption that this court's jurisdiction over pending bankruptcy cases was diminished effective December 24. The prospective nature of Northern Pipeline preserves § 1471 jurisdiction and, therefore, bankruptcy courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases filed prior to December 24. This court continues to act in pre-December 24 cases based on its independent statutory grant of jurisdiction without reliance on any attempt to transfer authority from the district court to the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the "emergency rule" is not applicable in bankruptcy cases filed prior to the effective date of Northern Pipeline. The emergency procedures for case adjudication requiring referral and review by the district court are unnecessary and are contrary to the exclusive jurisdiction provided to bankruptcy courts by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Supp.1982). The court does not presently address the constitutionality and applicability of the emergency rule to cases filed after December 24.
Accordingly, movants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are DENIED and the consolidated final hearing in Matlock is hereby reset for the 8th day of March, 1983 at 1:00 p.m. in Room 216, Customs House, 701 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  In referring to "bankruptcy cases," the court means all bankruptcy petitions, voluntary and involuntary, filed under Title 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 1979).
[2]  In staying their judgment, the Court noted that "[t]his limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy law." 102 S.Ct. at 2880. The stay of judgment is clearly distinguishable in effect and intention from the prospective application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of § 241(a). The stay was designed to allow Congress an opportunity to remedy the constitutional infirmities identified in Northern Pipeline. By applying the holding prospectively, the Court was acknowledging the peculiar nature and length of bankruptcy cases. The Court was obviously aware that an immediate application of its decision would leave a debtor no forum in which to complete a pending bankruptcy. The prospect of such an alternative would create an unacceptable void in a time of intense economic dislocation. There is certainly no evidence that the Court intended the stay to merely provide a grace period within which parties would have to complete their bankruptcy cases. It would be unrealistic to place such time parameters on a bankruptcy case. The ongoing nature of a bankruptcy case, particularly in the areas of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, requires a significant gap period between the filing of a petition and a final order closing the case.
[3]  The Court noted in United States v. Security Industrial Bank that "[b]ecause our decision in Northern Pipeline is prospective only . . . and because we have stayed the issuance of our mandate in that case to December 24, 1982 . . . that decision does not affect the judgment in this case." ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 407, 410 n. 5, 74 L.Ed.2d 235, 240 n. 5 (1982).
[4]  This court did not address the questions raised by the instant motions in Cumberland Enterprises. The court merely decided the issue of whether it possessed jurisdiction to act during the Court imposed stay, and did not determine whether the court retained jurisdiction to complete cases filed prior to Northern Pipeline or filed during the pendency of the stay. This court's determination of jurisdiction during the stay was subsequently supported by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Security Industrial Bank. (See note 3, supra).
[5]  In applying principles of prospectivity to their decision holding portions of the Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies Act unconstitutional, the Tennessee Supreme Court has similarly considered the issues of fairness and public policy and applied federal precedents to sanction the legitimacy of notes and obligations incurred under the Act, as well as suits to enforce those obligations, and to "apply the new rule to the case at bar, but prospectively to all present or future litigants." Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 542 (Tenn.1977).


837 F.2d 128
Robert J. BAINVILLEv.HESS OIL V.I. CORP.v.STANDBY POWER SUPPLIES, INC., Third Party Defendant, Appellant.
Nos. 87-3062, 87-3161.
United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 7, 1987.Decided Jan. 15, 1988.

Diane Trace Warlick, R. Eric Moore (argued), Law Offices of R. Eric Moore, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for third party defendant, appellant, Standby Power Supplies, Inc.
Law Offices of Britain H. Bryant and Associates, P.C., Nancy V. Young (argued), St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for appellee, Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
Before GIBBONS, Chief Judge, and STAPLETON and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Chief Judge:

1
Standby Power Supplies, Inc.  (Standby) appeals from summary judgment in a third party indemnity action, enforcing its contractual duty to indemnify Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (Hess), and from a supplemental judgment awarding attorney's fees to Hess.  Since we review a summary judgment our review is plenary, 649 F.Supp. 804.

2
At issue is an indemnity clause contained in a contract for manpower between a company "contracting-out" for labor and services (here, Hess) and a general contractor/labor supplier (here, Standby).  We read the contract to express the intent that the duty to indemnify extends to stipulated judgments.  We further conclude that the duty to pay attorney's fees follows the duty to indemnify.  Therefore, we will affirm the summary judgment, enforcing Standby's duty to indemnify, and the supplemental judgment awarding Hess attorney's fees.

I.
The Facts

3
In 1981, Hess and Standby entered into a contract whereby Standby agreed to provide millwright manpower to Hess at its oil refinery on St. Croix.  The parties expressed their agreement in a standard form contract drafted by Hess which contained the following clause requiring Standby to:

4
indemnify, exonerate, and hold harmless [Hess] against loss, damage, liability or expense by reason of any suits, claims, demands, judgments or causes of action for personal injury (including death) or property damage (including property of the parties) arising out of or in any way in consequence of the performance hereunder by [Standby] except that in no instance shall [Standby] be held responsible for any liability, claim, demand or cause of action attributable solely to the negligence of [Hess].

5
The contract further required Standby to procure worker's compensation insurance and insurance for certain risks.

6
In 1982 Robert Bainville, one of the millwrights hired by Standby and provided by Standby to work at Hess's plant pursuant to the agreement, was injured on the job.  Bainville subsequently filed a personal injury suit against Hess for failure to provide proper supervision and failure to warn.  Bainville brought the suit against Hess on the assumption that Hess did not assume the status of Bainville's employer but rather stood in relation to Bainville as the owner of the premises and, therefore, was not protected from liability to suit in negligence by the Worker's Compensation Act.

7
Upon notice of the personal injury action against it, Hess tendered the defense to Standby, relying on their hold harmless-indemnity agreement.  Standby refused to accept the tender of defense, although it did proceed to assist in Hess's preparation of its own defense.  Following Standby's refusal to take over the defense, Hess filed a third-party indemnity action against Standby on the theory of an express contractual duty to indemnify.  The third-party indemnity action was severed prior to the trial of the primary lawsuit.  Before and during the course of the trial, counsel for Bainville and Hess maintained settlement negotiations, during which Bainville made settlement demands, first for $300,000, then for $200,000.  Hess offered Standby the opportunity to approve the lower demand for $200,000, but Standby stated that it refused to contribute more than $25,000 to a settlement.  Subsequent to Standby's refusal, during jury deliberations, Hess reached a conditional settlement with Bainville for $175,000--payment of that amount being conditioned on allowing the jury to reach a verdict on the allocation of negligence for the sole purpose, approved by the district court, of determining whether or not the sole negligence exception to the duty to indemnify would apply in the context of the third-party indemnity action.  The jury returned its verdict finding that Bainville was 50 percent negligent and that Hess was 50 percent negligent, and that Bainville was the borrowed employee of Hess.

II.

8
The Intent of the Contract Was to Indemnify Against

Judgments Stipulated by Settlement

9
Hess's claim is based on an express contractual duty to indemnify.  Such contractual indemnity clauses are typically drafted to cover the circumstances created by agreements between the companies which contract out jobs and general contractors which perform them, under which workers can bring personal injury actions against the contracting-out company that they could not bring against their employer, the labor contractor, under the Worker's Compensation Act.  Through contractual indemnity provisions, the labor contractor undertakes to indemnify the company for such personal injury liability that escapes the limitations of worker's compensation (insurance for which it also typically provides) by virtue of its agreement.  As such, the duty's scope, in particular its applicability to stipulated judgments, is determined by the parties' mutual intent, expressed in the contract, rather than by general principles of equity.    See Parfait v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 484 F.2d 296, 304 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1485, 39 L.Ed.2d 572 (1974);  Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394, 401-02 (5th Cir.1971);  Tankrederiet Gefion A/S v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 406 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir.1969) (all stating that equitable considerations governing the applicability of a duty to indemnify where actual liability has not been proven do not apply to a duty to indemnify founded on a written contract).  It is well-settled that parties can allocate the financial responsibility for the consequences of negligence as they see fit.    See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211, 90 S.Ct. 880, 885, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970);  Eastern Airlines v. Insurance Company of North America, 758 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.1985);  Beloit Power Systems, Inc. v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 757 F.2d 1427 (3d Cir.1985).  This capacity to shift financial responsibility by contract naturally includes the capacity to contractually allocate financial responsibility for stipulated judgments where cases are settled without the benefit of an adjudication of actual liability.  Thus, in contract indemnity cases, as distinguished from cases where liability arises as a matter of law, the question of whether actual liability is a prerequisite to the duty to indemnify is answered by reference to what the parties, by virtue of their contractual capacity, intended, as reflected in the language of the indemnity clause.    United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 90 S.Ct. 880, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970).

10
This method of determining if the duty encompasses payments based on potential, as opposed to only actual, liability, contractual interpretation, is entirely different from the approach propounded by Chief Judge Seitz in Frederick v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 642 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir.1981) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).  In Chief Judge Seitz's approach an actual liability requirement is assumed to be the general rule, from which a "potential liability exception" is made on the basis of weighing the policy interests in encouraging settlements (where ordinarily an actual liability requirement cannot be met) against considerations of fairness to the putative indemnitor.  Id.  Other courts have further elaborated the circumstances in which such a potential liability exception should apply, specifically, when the indemnitor has had the opportunity either to take over the defense of the original action or approve the terms of the settlement, see, e.g., Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hughes Bros., Inc., 671 F.2d 279 (8th Cir.1982);  Missouri Pac.  R.R. Co. v. International Paper Co., 618 F.2d 492, 497 (8th Cir.1980);  Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Co., 565 F.2d 490, 495-96 (8th Cir.1977);  Parfait v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 484 F.2d 296 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1485, 39 L.Ed.2d 572 (1974);  Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1971);  Missouri Pac.  R.R. Co. v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 434 F.2d 575, 580 (8th Cir.1970);  Tankrederiet Gefion A/S v. Hyman-Michaels Company, 406 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.1969);  Hess Oil V.I. Corp. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 626 F.Supp. 882 (D.V.I.1986);  Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 624 F.Supp. 117 (D.V.I.1985);  Terra Resources, Inc. v. Lake Charles Dredging and Towing, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 406 (W.La.1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.1983), or, more broadly, when the indemnitor has been substantially protected against the awkward possibility of having to prove the original plaintiff's case against himself, Burke v. Ripp, 619 F.2d 354 (1980).  This court, while not having committed itself, has signaled some inclination toward adopting this balancing-of-the-equities formula as a guide to when to recognize exceptions to the general rule of an actual liability requirement.    See Frederick at 56 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), and M & O Marine, Inc. v. Marquette Co., 730 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.1984).

11
It must be emphasized, however, that the balancing-the-equities approach applies only to cases where the duty to indemnify arises as a matter of law.  Balancing the interest in promoting settlements against considerations of fairness to the indemnitor is simply irrelevant to the determination of whether a contractual duty to indemnify requires a demonstration of actual liability as a precondition or whether, alternatively, an assertion of potential liability is sufficient to trigger the duty.  That determination, according to elementary principles of contract law, is clearly a matter of the intent of the parties.

12
We have no trouble concluding that here the intent of the parties was not to require a determination of actual liability as a precondition of the duty to indemnify.  The indemnity agreement applies to "any suits, claims, demands, judgments or causes of action for personal injury."    There is no question that Hess was faced with a demand from the original plaintiff.  This reading of contractual intent is supported by our holding in Frederick that substantially similar contract language, indemnifying against "all demands, loss or liability for or on account of any injury," was intended to apply to stipulated judgments.    Frederick, 642 F.2d at 55.

13
Standby attempts to deny that the demand on Hess made by the plaintiff was of the sort contemplated by the agreement to require indemnification on the basis of three arguments.  First, Standby argues that the judgment stipulated in response to the demand was not binding on the parties;  in other words, that there was no authentic stipulated judgment and that, therefore, the jury verdict of no liability is controlling.  We follow the district court in rejecting Standby's argument that the payment was a mere gratuity, finding that the settlement was effective and binding prior to the jury verdict on the basis of specific evidence, to wit, a letter from Hess's counsel to the plaintiff's counsel, dated two days prior to the jury verdict, stating that, "we will pay you $175,000.00 as a gross trial settlement."    We are unpersuaded by Standby's efforts to dispute this characterization of the letter as expressing a binding settlement on the basis of further language in the same letter to the effect that "[t]he matter will not be deemed settled or concluded until after a jury returns a verdict on liability, which is a condition precedent to any settlement at this figure."    A settlement is a promise, and to state that the transaction is not yet deemed to be concluded in no way diminishes the binding force of the promise to do so.  Furthermore, the inclusion of a condition precedent in the terms of an agreement in no way invalidates it qua binding agreement.  The parties made a jury verdict a condition precedent as part of their agreement, and this they did for the sole purpose of facilitating the resolution of this third-party action, with the approval of the trial judge.  That this was their sole purpose clearly implies the intent that the verdict should have no bearing on the original action.  Hence, by the intent of the parties, the substance of the verdict on liability is entirely irrelevant to the effectiveness and authenticity of the stipulated judgment settlement.  We conclude, therefore, that Hess's payment to Bainville was pursuant to a binding settlement and not a mere gratuity.

14
Given that the settlement between Hess and Bainville is bona fide, Standby further argues that settlements are not covered by the contractual duty to indemnify.  While purporting to hew to the meaning of the contract, Standby relies for support almost exclusively on the equitable considerations which, as we explained above, are not pertinent to determining the scope of a contractual indemnification duty.    See Parfait, 484 F.2d at 304;  Tankrederiet, 406 F.2d at 1043.  Thus, Standby's protestations that it had no opportunity to approve the final settlement, that it had no duty to defend the original action and, therefore, that its failure to approve or defend should not warrant recognizing the potential liability exception, are quite simply out of place.  The refusal of a tender of defense is a circumstance factored into the equitable approach to determining the scope of a duty to indemnify as a matter of law.  Hence, treating potential liability as an "exception" to the "general rule" of actual liability is inapposite to discerning contractual intent;  as parties are free to shift liability as they will, there are no a priori general rules and exceptions.  Relying on such a priori equitable principles, Standby thus ignores the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and fails to convince us that the contract requires actual liability.  The language of the contract is not limited to cases in which the indemnitee is found liable to the injured person, and we see no reason to imply such a limit.    See Frederick, 642 F.2d at 55.

15
Standby's final argument against enforcing the duty to indemnify invokes the sole negligence exception of the indemnity clause.  By the terms of the contract, "in no instance shall [Standby] be held responsible for any liability, claim, demand or cause of action attributable solely to the negligence of [Hess]."  The jury found that Hess was 50 percent negligent, that Bainville was 50 percent negligent, and that Bainville was the borrowed employee of Hess.  Standby argues that, by the operation of the borrowed servant doctrine, Bainville's negligence is imputed to Hess and that therefore Hess is 100 percent, i.e., solely, negligent.  Consequently, Standby further argues, the sole negligence exception to the duty to indemnify should apply.

16
This line of argument raises two questions, both of which require reference to the intent of the contract.  The first question is whether the jury verdict is determinative of the sole negligence issue.  The threshold inquiry is whether the contract contemplates that the sole negligence issue, like the liability issue, is subject to either judicial or non-judicial determination or, alternatively, whether it requires a judicial determination of the sole negligence issue.  Judges Mansmann and Stapleton favor reading the sole negligence clause of the contract to require a judicial determination and, hence, excluding a determination of the sole negligence issue by settlement.  They support this view on the ground that to permit a settlement agreement between Hess and the tort plaintiff to control the sole negligence issue would enable Hess to extract an agreement that it was not solely negligent in virtually every case because the tort plaintiff has no interest in opposing such an agreement.  To thus render the sole negligence clause virtually meaningless in a settlement context, Judges Mansmann and Stapleton suggest, could not reasonably have been the intent of the contracting parties.

17
By contrast, Judge Gibbons favors reading the sole negligence clause and the remaining clauses of the indemnity agreement together to permit any of the issues upon which the duty to indemnify depends--including sole negligence as well as liability to the tort plaintiff--to be subject to either judicial or non-judicial determination.  This reading of the contract is supported on the ground that to require judicial determination of the sole negligence issue is to create a huge incentive on the part of the potential indemnitor to pursue a court adjudication--a result that is in tension with our reading of the rest of the contract to embrace stipulated judgments.  To so discourage settlements by requiring judicial determination of the sole negligence issue cannot, in Judge Gibbons' view, reasonably have been the intent of the contracting parties.

18
This is a close question of contractual interpretation, but one which we need not finally resolve here because it is clear from the facts of this case that even if the contract did give the parties the option of subjecting the sole negligence issue to non-judicial determination, that is an option that they did not exercise.  The record is clear that Hess and Bainville pursued a jury verdict for the purpose of determining the sole negligence issue.  The indemnitor, Standby, could have participated in the litigation of that issue, but declined to do so.  Like any indemnitor to whom defense of the action is tendered, but who declines to participate, Standby is bound by the outcome.  Therefore, the jury verdict is controlling of the sole negligence issue in this case, and the dispositive question is what the meaning of the jury verdict, with respect to the applicability of the sole negligence exception, is.

19
The jury found that Bainville and Hess were each 50 percent negligent, and that Bainville was the borrowed employee of Hess.  The question is whether or not the jury finding that Bainville was Hess's borrowed employee operates to attribute Bainville's negligence to Hess, thereby attributing 100 percent of the negligence to Hess and triggering the sole negligence exception.  This question of the effect of Bainville's borrowed servant status on the sole negligence issue, unlike the question of whether or not Bainville is a borrowed servant, is a matter of the contractual intent of the indemnity agreement because the parties are entitled to allocate between themselves the risk of loss resulting from the employee's contributory negligence, regardless of the employee's status under the borrowed servant doctrine.    See Krzywicki v. Tidewater Equipment Co., 600 F.Supp. 629, 639 (D.Md.1985);  Sea Land Industries, Inc. v. General Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D.Md.1982);  Elston v. Shell Oil Co., 376 F.Supp. 968, 972 (E.D.La.1973);  accord Warren Petroleum Corp. v. J.W. Green Contractors, 417 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir.1969) (stating that indemnitor's liability under an indemnification contract does not necessarily turn on the characterization of the tort plaintiff's employment status under the borrowed servant doctrine).  Therefore, the question is whether or not the contract expresses the intent to shift the responsibility for a borrowed employee's negligence to the borrowing employer for purposes of the sole negligence exception.  We conclude that the indemnification contract is properly read as not contemplating that the borrowed servant doctrine have such an effect on the sole negligence exception.  The basic rationale for our conclusion that the contract does not contemplate attributing the negligence of a borrowed employee to a borrowing employer for the purpose of triggering the sole negligence exception is that the contrary reading "would preclude use of the indemnity provision in one of the primary circumstances for which indemnity was intended."    Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 758 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.1985).  Although Eastern Airlines did not involve the specific question of the effect of the borrowed servant doctrine on the sole negligence exception to the duty to indemnify, this court had occasion there to observe that it would be inconsistent with the contractual intent to "disregard" or fail to attribute to the employee his or her contributory negligence in applying the sole negligence exception where the indemnity contract was intended to cover situations in which the employees' own negligence contributed to their injuries.

20
Eastern Airlines held that the contract was intended to indemnify against injuries partially caused by the employee's contributory negligence on the basis of the language of the contract.  Similarly, the language of the contract between Hess and Standby warrants a finding that it was intended to cover situations where the employees' own negligent acts contributed to their injuries.  The language of the contract which we concluded in Eastern Airlines "explicitly contemplates" and "specifically covers" indemnification against "liability arising out of or resulting from any acts of [the contractor's] employees" consisted of the following statement:

21
Contractor [ABC] agrees to assume full responsibility for any and all liability to its employees on account of injury, disability or death resulting from or sustained by said employees in the performance of the services contemplated herein.

22
Id. at 133 (emphasis added).  Likewise, the language in the Hess-Standby contract, indemnifying against liability "arising out of or in any way in consequence of the performance hereunder by [Standby] ...," (emphasis added), while not referring specifically to the employees, encompasses liability resulting from the employees' acts because Standby's performance under the contract, which is explicitly covered, consists precisely in the supply of their labor.  Hence, we conclude that it would be unreasonable to read the sole negligence exception to apply, by virtue of the operation of the borrowed servant doctrine, in the large percentage of cases in which the only negligent parties are the tort plaintiff and Hess, when the contract clearly provides for indemnification in cases in which the tort plaintiff was contributorily negligent.1

23
Standby's arguments against awarding Hess attorney's fees are based on the same theories--that the stipulated judgment fell outside the indemnity agreement, or within the sole negligence exception--that we rejected above.  Therefore, we will also affirm the supplemental judgment.

1
 An alternate approach to discerning contractual intent with regard to the effect of the borrowed servant doctrine on sole negligence is represented by several cases e.g., Warren Petroleum Corp. v. J.W. Green Contractors, 417 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.1969);  Sea Land Industries, Inc. v. General Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550 (D.M.1982);  and Elston v. Shell Oil Co., 376 F.Supp. 968 (E.D.La.1973), which base their conclusions that the indemnity contracts at issue evince the intent not to attribute the borrowed employee's contributory negligence to the borrowing employer on the following various grounds:  (1) the supplier assumed the responsibility for carrying liability insurance, see Warren Petroleum, 417 F.2d at 244;  Krzywicki v. Tidewater Equipment Co., Inc., 600 F.Supp. 629, 639 (D.M.1985);  accord Sea Land, 530 F.Supp. at 563 (inferring from the compensation arrangements that the parties must have contemplated that the supplier would assume the responsibility for liability insurance, and considering this as an indication that the parties intended the supplier to bear the risk of loss);  (2) the supplier warranted the workmanship and diligence of the employees supplied, see Elston, 376 F.Supp. at 972;  (3) the supplier maintained the position of an independent contractor and the work was performed in its name, see, e.g., Elston, 376 F.Supp. at 972;  Warren Petroleum, 417 F.2d at 345 (the fact that the employee's services were provided "on a contract basis, 'working through' a compensated independent supplier or broker of labor" considered as tending to suggest that liability for indemnification is not intended to depend on borrowed servant status);  Sea Land, 530 F.Supp. at 563 (stating that it is "significant" in determining the intent of the parties as to who should bear the risk of loss due to contributory negligence that the employee was "not 'borrowed' but was in fact 'rented' ");  (4) the supplier undertook to furnish the necessary labor and supervision, see Elston, 376 F.Supp. at 972.  In this case, these factors are either disputed or not asserted.  However, we need not address them since we base our reading of contractual intent on different grounds


316. Where can one get a list of all hidden Oracle parameters? (for DBA

Oracle initialization or INIT.ORA parameters with an underscore in front are hidden or unsupported parameters. One can get a list of all hidden parameters by executing this query:
select *
from SYS.X$KSPPI
where substr(KSPPINM,1,1) = '_';
The following query displays parameter names with their current value:
select a.ksppinm "Parameter", b.ksppstvl "Session Value", c.ksppstvl "Instance Value"
from x$ksppi a, x$ksppcv b, x$ksppsv c
where a.indx = b.indx and a.indx = c.indx
and substr(ksppinm,1,1)='_'
order by a.ksppinm;
Remember: Thou shall not play with undocumented parameters!


Q:

GroupControl - BackColor não muda

Estou utilizando um GroupControl da DevExpress 16.1, porém ao tentar mudar a cor de fundo (backcolor) o mesmo continua com a cor default, alguem sabe o motivo? ou se estou fazendo errado?
        //
        // groupControl2
        //
        this.groupControl2.Appearance.BackColor = System.Drawing.Color.DarkRed;
        this.groupControl2.Appearance.Options.UseBackColor = true;
        this.groupControl2.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(346, 314);
        this.groupControl2.Name = "groupControl2";
        this.groupControl2.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(308, 156);
        this.groupControl2.TabIndex = 60;
        this.groupControl2.Text = "Fiscal";

A:

Seguinte, para usar o backcolor, é necessário definir a propriedade LookAndFeel.UseDefaultLookAndFeel como false e a propriedade LookAndFeel.Style para Flat.