**2 + 35*p - 15. Let y(m) = -4*m**2 - 18*m + 8. Determine -6*s(a) - 11*y(a).
-4*a**2 - 12*a + 2
Let o(r) = 1. Let d(y) be the third derivative of y**5/30 + y**4/24 - y**3/3 - 6*y**2 - 2*y. Give -d(m) - 4*o(m).
-2*m**2 - m - 2
Let o(d) = d + 6. Let v(y) = -2*y - 16. Let m(n) = 8*o(n) + 3*v(n). Let c(h) = 3*h - 1. Calculate 3*c(s) - 5*m(s).
-s - 3
Let o(d) = d + 8. Let f(v) = -v - 5. Let b(u) = 13*u + 21. Let a be b(-2). Determine a*o(i) - 7*f(i).
2*i - 5
Let b(j) = -2 + 4 - 4*j - 7 + 12*j. Let s be 4/26 + 1953/(-273). Let d(l) = -4*l + 3. Calculate s*d(z) - 4*b(z).
-4*z - 1
Let j = 25 + -19. Let l(f) = 5*f**3 - 6*f**2. Let c(z) = 8*z**3 - 5*z**2. Let x(r) = 41*r**3 - 24*r**2. Let w(q) = 11*c(q) - 2*x(q). Calculate j*w(k) - 7*l(k).
k**3
Suppose 4 + 0 = d. Suppose 5*i - 2*k = -5, 2*k = d - 14. Let v(z) = 2*z**2 + 1. Let f(g) = 2*g**2 + 1. What is i*v(t) + 4*f(t)?
2*t**2 + 1
Let q(t) = -15*t**3 + 5*t + 5. Let k(v) be the first derivative of v**4/4 - v**2/2 - v - 533. Give -5*k(i) - q(i).
10*i**3
Let w(b) = -b**3 + b**2 + b - 1. Let o(x) = 39*x**3 - 3*x**2 - 6*x + 4. Determine o(d) + 4*w(d).
35*d**3 + d**2 - 2*d
Let n(x) = 7*x**3 - 3*x**2 + x. Let c be (-220)/(-264) - 31/(-6). Let k(g) = -4*g**3 + 2*g**2 - g. Give c*n(l) + 10*k(l).
2*l**3 + 2*l**2 - 4*l
Let z(f) = 3*f**3 - 23*f**2 + 4*f - 3. Let r(l) = -3*l**3 + 24*l**2 - 5*l + 4. Determine 3*r(q) + 4*z(q).
3*q**3 - 20*q**2 + q
Let p(b) = -b**3 - b**2 - 1. Let l(m) = 2*m**3 + 4*m**2 + 2*m + 5. Suppose 0*t - 4*c + 36 = -4*t, -2*t + 5*c = 33. Calculate t*p(g) - l(g).
2*g**3 - 2*g - 1
Let w(d) = 2 + 1 + 2 - 18*d + 25*d. Let g be 1/(-4) - 162/24. Let f(r) = -10*r - 7. What is g*w(h) - 5*f(h)?
h
Let s(h) = 6*h**3 + 4*h**2 - 273*h. Let a(b) = 11*b**3 + 7*b**2 - 545*b. What is 4*a(c) - 7*s(c)?
2*c**3 - 269*c
Let t(y) = -561*y**2 - 15*y. Let f(u) = -5048*u**2 - 140*u. Give -3*f(o) + 28*t(o).
-564*o**2
Suppose 0*o + 2*o - 2 = 0. Let d(y) = y + 1. Let w = -233 + 230. Let h(z) = z. Let a(m) = 4*m - 2. Let i(r) = -a(r) + 6*h(r). Determine o*i(t) + w*d(t).
-t - 1
Let s(f) = -f**3 + f**2 - f - 1. Let j(a) be the second derivative of -9*a**5/20 + 5*a**4/4 - 5*a**3/2 - 15*a**2/2 - 877*a. Determine -j(m) + 15*s(m).
-6*m**3
Let f(g) = 2*g + 44. Let l(u) = 6*u + 87. Calculate -5*f(q) + 2*l(q).
2*q - 46
Let t(n) = -819*n - 104. Let s(x) = -78*x - 10. What is -52*s(c) + 5*t(c)?
-39*c
Let h(u) = 9*u**2 - 5*u - 33. Let y(s) = 9*s**2 - 6*s - 37. Calculate -6*h(i) + 5*y(i).
-9*i**2 + 13
Let z(o) = -1. Suppose -5*i = 4*g - 40, 0*i = -2*i - g + 13. Suppose -i*u + 14 - 2 = 0. Let n(t) = -1 + u*t + 3*t - 3*t + 7. Determine n(x) + 6*z(x).
3*x
Suppose -2*h - 5*k = 12 + 8, -2*k + 21 = -5*h. Let y(m) = -2*m**2 - 5*m - 1. Let x(a) = -a. Determine h*x(q) + y(q).
-2*q**2 - 1
Suppose -5*x + 75 = 105. Let o(c) = 6*c**2 - 5. Let v(j) = 7*j**2 - 6. What is x*o(a) + 5*v(a)?
-a**2
Let p(c) = 12*c**2 + 17*c - 17. Suppose -6*f + 8 = -4*f. Suppose f*a - 69 = -u, 4*u - 8 - 47 = -3*a. Let v(q) = -4*q**2 - 6*q + 6. Calculate a*v(w) + 6*p(w).
4*w**2
Let p(m) = -3*m**3 + 9*m**2 - 5*m + 17. Let j(y) = -2*y**3 + 4*y**2 - 2*y + 8. Calculate -5*j(u) + 2*p(u).
4*u**3 - 2*u**2 - 6
Let h(f) = 20*f**3 - 4*f**2. Let j(s) = -141*s**3 + 27*s**2. Let m(y) = -27*h(y) - 4*j(y). Let g(u) = -u**3. Calculate -153*g(i) - 6*m(i).
9*i**3
Let k(y) = 6*y + 23. Let s(b) = -7*b - 28. Let v(p) = -6*k(p) - 5*s(p). Let z(n) be the second derivative of n**3/6 - n**2 + n. Give -7*v(h) - 6*z(h).
h - 2
Let m(s) = s - 1. Let b(r) = 18*r - 18. Let x(v) = -b(v) + 12*m(v). Let u(a) be the first derivative of -5/2*a**2 + 1 + 5*a. What is -5*u(t) + 4*x(t)?
t - 1
Let l(q) = 4*q**2 - 4*q - 2. Let b(s) = 17*s**2 - 17*s - 9. Give 6*b(t) - 26*l(t).
-2*t**2 + 2*t - 2
Let w(l) = 3*l**2 - 5*l + 3. Let p(i) = 8*i**2 - 9*i + 7. What is 2*p(u) - 5*w(u)?
u**2 + 7*u - 1
Let s(r) = r - 1. Suppose 5*g + 5*q - 72 = -57, 5*g + 3*q - 13 = 0. Let t(p) = 5*p - 3. Give g*s(c) - t(c).
-3*c + 1
Let l(c) = c**3 + 91*c**2 + c - 3. Let x(w) = 6*w**3 + 545*w**2 + 8*w - 20. Calculate -13*l(p) + 2*x(p).
-p**3 - 93*p**2 + 3*p - 1
Let l(c) = c**3 + c**2 - c - 1. Let u(j) = -2*j**3 - 5*j**2 + 5*j + 6. Calculate -10*l(x) - 2*u(x).
-6*x**3 - 2
Let z(b) = -185*b**2 + 8*b - 2. Let n(c) = -370*c**2 + 14*c - 4. Give 4*n(g) - 7*z(g).
-185*g**2 - 2
Let w(p) = 0*p + 3*p - 2*p. Suppose j - 5 = a - 3, 3*a + 11 = -2*j. Let k(s) = -104 - 103 - 2*s - 99 + 305. Determine j*w(i) - k(i).
i + 1
Let d(u) = 7*u**2 - 4. Let g(c) = -6*c**2 - c + 3. Calculate 5*d(k) + 6*g(k).
-k**2 - 6*k - 2
Let l(z) = z**3 + z**2. Let j be 6/12 + (-33)/6. Let t(w) = -2*w**3 - 2*w**2. Suppose 5*a = 5*i - 10, -3*i = -3*a + 2*a - 2. Calculate a*t(f) + j*l(f).
-f**3 - f**2
Let k(u) = 21*u - 60. Let c(z) = -5*z - 1. What is 4*c(v) + k(v)?
v - 64
Let p(j) = j**2 - 3*j + 7. Let q(i) = -i**2 + i. What is -2*p(a) - 6*q(a)?
4*a**2 - 14
Let j(g) = 8*g**3 - 6*g**2 - 6*g + 5. Let z(n) = 15*n**3 - 11*n**2 - 11*n + 11. Calculate 11*j(d) - 6*z(d).
-2*d**3 - 11
Let y(r) = -9*r - 39. Let v(i) = -14*i - 59. Calculate 5*v(k) - 8*y(k).
2*k + 17
Let r(n) = n**2 - 1. Let k(z) = 14*z**2 - 14*z + 12. Let j(u) = -5*u**2 + 5*u - 4. Let g(f) = -17*j(f) - 6*k(f). Determine -g(m) + 3*r(m).
2*m**2 + m + 1
Let c(q) = -12*q**3 + 27*q - 27. Let j = 18 - 20. Let s be 12*-3*(-3)/18. Let n(x) = x**3 - x - 4 - x + 0 + s. Determine j*c(l) - 27*n(l).
-3*l**3
Let q(z) = -3*z**3 - 3*z**2 - 2*z + 1. Let v(w) = -5*w**3 - 4*w**2 - 3*w + 1. Let t(a) = 3*q(a) - 2*v(a). Let r(d) = -d**3 + 11*d**2 + 1. Calculate r(y) - t(y).
-2*y**3 + 12*y**2
Let u(v) = -3*v - 2. Let c = 2679 + -2694. Suppose -5*z - 27 = -0*d + d, 3*d + z = -11. Let n(x) = 20*x + 15. Determine c*u(k) + d*n(k).
5*k
Let h(t) = t + 1. Suppose 2*f = 13 + 15. Let a be 7/4 - (-1)/4. Let k(y) be the second derivative of -y**3 - 4*y**2 - 62*y. Calculate a*k(u) + f*h(u).
2*u - 2
Suppose 0 = 7*h - 3*h. Suppose 2*s + 4*d = -h*d, 0 = -3*s + 3*d - 18. Let q(z) = 0 - 9 - 14*z**2 - 2. Let p(b) = 5*b**2 + 4. Calculate s*q(l) - 11*p(l).
l**2
Let f be ((-2)/5)/(8/(-10))*2. Suppose -561 + 564 = 3*v. Let u(r) = -r**3 + r**2 + r - 1. Let n(y) = 2*y**3 - 3*y**2 - 2*y + 1. What is f*u(s) + v*n(s)?
s**3 - 2*s**2 - s
Let c(j) = 13*j**3 + 25*j**2 + 6. Let v(s) = 11*s**3 + 25*s**2 + 5. What is -5*c(r) + 6*v(r)?
r**3 + 25*r**2
Let v(q) = -1159*q + 29. Let r(c) = 386*c - 11. Give 8*r(p) + 3*v(p).
-389*p - 1
Let l(r) = 2*r - 396. Let i(o) = -10*o + 1978. What is -3*i(x) - 14*l(x)?
2*x - 390
Suppose -2*g + 7 = 2*b - 5, 4*g - 4*b + 16 = 0. Let s(h) be the second derivative of h**3/6 + 25*h. Let v(p) = 6*p. Determine g*v(j) - 4*s(j).
2*j
Let o(z) = 115*z**3 - 5*z**2 - 5. Let l(c) = 576*c**3 - 24*c**2 - 24. What is 5*l(h) - 24*o(h)?
120*h**3
Let b = -45 + 24. Let z = 22 + b. Let i(k) = -3*k**2 + 1. Let y(x) = -x**2 + 1. Calculate z*i(o) - 2*y(o).
-o**2 - 1
Let a(f) = -4*f - 1. Suppose -5*v + 5 - 20 = 0. Let j be 15/10 + -1 + (-9)/(-2). Let n(t) = -74 + j*t + 35 + 41. Give v*a(c) - 2*n(c).
2*c - 1
Let p(j) = -13*j - 11. Let g(u) = -6*u - 5. Let k be -1*1*(3 - 0). Let y(v) = -9*v - 5. Let z be y(k). Let q be (-84)/z + 4/(-22). Calculate q*p(s) + 9*g(s).
-2*s - 1
Let l(g) = 11*g**2 - 27*g - 22. Let f(q) = q**2 - 2*q - 2. Let j(n) = 3*f(n) - l(n). Let h(b) = 2*b**2 - 5*b - 4. Determine 9*h(p) + 2*j(p).
2*p**2 - 3*p - 4
Let s(j) = 3*j - 2 + j**2 + 1 + 2 - 2*j. Let d be 2/(2/(3 - 1)). Let k(n) be the first derivative of -4*n**3/3 - n**2 - 2*n + 97. What is d*k(x) + 6*s(x)?
-2*x**2 + 2*x + 2
Suppose -2*g = 4*g - 3*g - 15. Let j(f) = -1 - 7*f**3 + 8*f**2 + 5*f + 9 - 2*f**3. Let z(o) = 6*o**3 - 5*o**2 - 3*o - 5. Give g*j(y) + 8*z(y).
3*y**3 + y
Let g(i) = -i**2. Let q(m) = 0*m**2 + 2*m**3 - m**3 - 3*m**3 - 4*m**2. Let r(k) = -2*k + 17. Let o be r(9). Calculate o*q(s) + 3*g(s).
2*s**3 + s**2
Let x(h) = 9*h**3 - 116*h + 5. Let v(k) = 4*k**3 - 58*k + 2. Determine 5*v(n) - 2*x(n).
2*n**3 - 58*n
Let d(a) be the second derivative of -a**3/2 - a**2 - 53*a. Let v(w) = 11*w + 8. Determine 9*d(q) + 2*v(q).
-5*q - 2
Let p(j) = -j**3 + 4*j + 1. Let z(t) = 2*t**3 - 5*t - 1. Suppose -y = 3*g - 12, 4*y + 0*g + 2 = -2*g. Let r be 2 - (8 - (4 - 2)). What is r*p(n) + y*z(n)?
-2*n**3 - n - 1
Suppose 3*y + l - 3*l = -11, -l = -5*y - 16. Let c(q) = 7. Let z(u) = -u - 20. Calculate y*z(w) - 8*


Synopsis: At the Bacaro Barley Interstellar Travelling Carnival & Sideshow, the Legionnaires are using a brain scanner to prove that Imik the Juggler is the murderer they are looking for. Suddenly, the device electrocutes him! Brainiac 5 now knows that whoever the murderer is, he or she must have some advanced technological knowledge.

Meanwhile, the assistant manager of the circus is heading towards their trailer when she sees someone lurking around suspiciously, dressed all in black. He sees that she sees him, so he kills her with his disruptor. Inside their trailer, Timber Wolf hears her dying cry and rushes outside to give chase to the murderer. Timber Wolf catches up to the killer, but they accidentally fall into a cage with a Venusian Night Shark. Phantom Girl stops it by phasing through it, but in the confusion the murderer has gotten away.

Ring Master Gissark decides that he has no choice but to quit and return to their native planet, Cygnus IV. He understands that this might mean war between Earth and Cygnus, but he refuses to jeopardize any more of his staff or animals.

Of Brainiac 5's original three suspects, only Tyrus the Clown remains. Mon-El and Star Boy decide to watch over him, but they are not quick enough to stop him from being killed in an explosion.

As the circus train of space ships begin to depart into Hyperspace, the Legionnaires suddenly find themselves without a vehicle. Timber Wolf grabs the energy charge from the last ship, and the others hold onto him. All of the Legionnaires are then pulled into hyperspace without a space ship.

In order to prevent the Legionnaires from suffering from vertigo or even worse visual disorientation, Projectra lets them all see an illusion of a pleasant trail as they fly through hyperspace. Suddenly, the Ring Master flies back towards them, admitting that as an Earthman who immigrated to Cygnus, he wanted to cause a war between his two "native" planets because he is a racist. Phantom Girl easily disarms him, as she is not injured by his blaster in her phantom form. After he confesses, he jumps off the illusional "path" into hyperspace, killing himself.

Commentary:
Well, *that* was a disappointment! On the one hand I'm glad to see that the murderer was not one of the three suspects, but, really, Brainiac 5 and company only reached that conclusion after two of the three were murdered! This is 16th level intelligence?

Speaking of intelligence, why was Tyrus murdered? Seems to me that the Ring Master would have left him alive, if only to leave him as the prime suspect. Or did the Ring Master know or suspect that the Legion was on to him? Maybe, as it would have been his decision to blast off into hyperspace while the Legionnaires were outside of their space-ship. Speaking of that, though....huh? Timber Wolf somehow grabs hold of the energy charge emitting from the last ship in the chain, and that allows all of them to fly into hyperspace? This is a stretch. What if, instead, Mon-El, who has the speed of Superboy, grabbed his friends and flew them into the last space-ship trailer? Wouldn't that make a little bit more sense? Of course, then we wouldn't get the scene of the Ring Master flying up to the Legionnaires, trying to kill them, then flying off again....to his death? Not sure what happened there, why he was okay to approach them but not okay to fly away from them?

The art this issue is by Ric Estrada and John Calnan. Due to the heavy inks of Calnan, though, you might not be able to recognize any Estrada pencilling work. It looks very much like last issue's Joe Staton art. Oddly enough, the circus characters appear more "cartoony" this issue. Check out the page reprinted above of the ill-fated Tyrus; he looks like a Looney Tunes frog or something. I do think Estrada's layouting is good, though....check out that page where the Legion decides to chase after the hyperspace-jumping ships; the angles and close-ups are quite effective.

Science Police Notes:

Princess Projectra's hair is mis-colored as blonde throughout this story.

Clovis the assistant manager is totally annihilated by the disruptor, but no one witnessed her death, so why does everyone assume that she is dead, and not just missing?

2 comments:

This storyline was what I hoped would be the bottom for the Legion but unbelievably it got worse until Keith Giffen took over !

The plot was just pathetic and made me question the "writer, Jerry Conway was on either a bender or drying out as it looks like he'd just read " The Avengers #22 with the Ringmaster and his Circus of Crime and plagerized the work!

The "artwork" was exactly what the story deserved.... Crap !

Siskel and Ebert would have given this masterpiece " two thumbs DOWN !

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About The Super Bloggers

Three naive and innocent travelers of the world-wide-web were minding their own business when super-star industrialist the Irredeemable Shag called out to them in his super-hypnotic voice with a mission! And thus Bilingual Boy, Metropolis Kid, and Kord Kid answered the call and thus The Legion of Super-Bloggers was born! (And it was good!)

As soon as we incorporated, we reached out for more super-aliens to fill our ranks. We asked Siskoid Five,The Duo Davids,and Dr. Anjto join so we would have a true Legion-on-Legion... because, ya know, it takes a Legion to write about the Future!

Banded together from the farthest reaches of the galaxy (or atleast the internet), we have vowed since Autumn 2014 to celebrate one of the greatest super-hero franchises in the history of comics!

And just like the "real" Legion, we have had some membership changes along the way. We have added new members. Others have taken on reserve status. Some have traveled to Marzal. And yes, some members have even passed on (but not in the line of duty!) Newer members have included Legionnaire Lad,Myk-El, Continuity Kid,Shotgun, Sarcasm Kid, Nostalgic Kid,Articulated Lad, Ultra Fan, and Anachronistic Kid! Heroes All!!

So if you are new to this time-period and these outer worlds, sit back and enjoy meeting these great characters and concepts for the first time.

If you are already a Legion fan, join in the conversations about which version is best, and why!

We hope to have something for everybody, as we reminisce about the various futures we can all look forward to!

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The Legion of Super-Heroes and all related characters, names, and elements and the distinctive likenesses thereof are trademarks of DC Comics, Inc.

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Q:

Suggestions for finishing a pine/mahogany sword

I just finished shaping a sword out of some pine and mahogany scraps I had lying around.
I like how it turned out, so I want to finish the bare wood in a way that will enhance its appearance and protect it.  However, I have zero (0) experience finishing wood.  So I would like some advice before I proceed!  Please keep in mind a few things:

I'd like to maintain the color contrast between the blade and hilt.
I'd like to keep material quantities down since I don't know when I will next be finishing anything, and I have minimal storage space
I don't have any experience, so complex techniques may be beyond me!
I haven't glued any of the pieces together yet, so I can finish the blade, crossguard, handle, and pommel individually.

Edit: Per suggestions below, here is some more focus:
For the pine blade, I don't want to darken the color very much at all, but just add some warmth, like the boards in this photo:

For the mahogany, I have my own reference.  Several years ago I turned a chess piece from the same wood, and my friend had me apply a liquid finishing product while turning the piece at high speed (perhaps because the heat from friction helped it set?).  The result is below, next to the sword grip.  I prefer this color to some of the darker red finishes that seem common, but for the sword I would like to use a filler or something to smooth out the fibres on the surface.

The overall finish for both parts should be satin as opposed to high gloss and match in sheen as much as possible.

A:

First I really like your craftsmanship.
A satin wipe-on oil-based poly would be the easiest, using a good shop towel or lint-free rag the oil-based poly will give the wood added warmth and a very durable finish.
A satin water-born poly will leave the colours very much as they are.
If you use a finish like Danish oil applied while sanding (use a wet/dry paper) the slurry will fill some of the voids, this works very well wile turning and giving you a nice satin finish while bringing out the colours.


Q:

FOPL and equational logic

Hi,
I am trying to convert First Order Predicate Logic (FOPL) sentences to sentences in Equational Logic (EL). I am using Skolem constants and function to represent FOPL existential quantification in the EL sentences. Here is an example of defining overlap in terms of the part-of relation:
-- FOPL definition of overlap \A denotes for all, \E denotes there exists
ax [A9] : \A[x:Entity, y:Entity] \E[z:Entity] overlap(x, y) = (part-of(z, x) & part-of(z, y))
-- Equational logic (EL) definition of overlap
-- In EL variables are univerally quantified, exestential quantification is simulated by Skolem function f.
vars  x y z : Entity
eq [A9] :  overlap(x, y) = (part-of(f(y), x) and part-of(f(x), y))
I have two questions:
1) Is the above translation valid?
2) Using this technique is it in general possible to represent FOPL sentences in EL.
Thanks,
Pat

A:

This question seems confused in several respects.  First, a minor point, "equational logic" ordinarily means that no predicates except equality are available; your equational translation, however, uses the "overlap" and "part-of" relations.
Second, if your definition of "overlap" is to give the usual meaning, then \Ez should apply to the right side of your equation (which is really an "if and only if" since the two sides are formulas), not to the whole equation.
Perhaps more important is that, when one Skolemizes a formula, an existentially quantified variable (z in your example) should be replaced by a Skolem function with, as its arguments, all the universally quantified variables in whose scope the relevant existential quantifier lies.  So in your example, z would be replaced by f(x,y) (at both occurrences), not by f(y) at one occurrence and f(x) at the other.
Finally, the Skolem form of a sentence implies the original sentence but is not in general a logical consequence of it.  What would be equivalent to the original sentence would be a second-order form of the Skolemization where, after replacing existential variables by Skolem functions (with the appropriate arguments), you existentially quantify over all the Skolem functions.
(Technical caution: I've written "existentially" quantified variables to mean "quantifiers that would become existential in prenex form"; dually for "universal".)


Q:

Bluetooth not work on elementary os 0.4 Loki

I've installed elementary OS on my laptop but bluetooth doesn't recognize any device, can someone help me? I'm not expert with the ubuntu system...and sorry for my english
03:00.0 Ethernet controller [0200]: Realtek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. RTL8101/2/6E PCI Express Fast/Gigabit Ethernet controller [10ec:8136] (rev 0a)
    Subsystem: Lenovo RTL8101/2/6E PCI Express Fast/Gigabit Ethernet controller [17aa:3830]
    Kernel driver in use: r8169
    Kernel modules: r8169
04:00.0 Network controller [0280]: Realtek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. RTL8723BE PCIe Wireless Network Adapter [10ec:b723]
    Subsystem: XAVi Technologies Corp. RTL8723BE PCIe Wireless Network Adapter [1b9a:2485]
    Kernel driver in use: rtl8723be
    Kernel modules: rtl8723be, wl

Bus 002 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0003 Linux Foundation 3.0 root hub
Bus 001 Device 004: ID 04f2:b49f Chicony Electronics Co., Ltd
Bus 001 Device 003: ID 174f:1169 Syntek
Bus 001 Device 002: ID 062a:4102 Creative Labs
Bus 001 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0002 Linux Foundation 2.0 root hub

0: ideapad_wlan: Wireless LAN
    Soft blocked: no
    Hard blocked: no
1: ideapad_bluetooth: Bluetooth
    Soft blocked: no
    Hard blocked: no
2: phy0: Wireless LAN
    Soft blocked: no
    Hard blocked: no
4: hci0: Bluetooth
    Soft blocked: no
    Hard blocked: no

    [    0.160519] [Firmware Bug]: ACPI: BIOS _OSI(Linux) query ignored
[    0.364113] acpi PNP0A08:00: [Firmware Info]: MMCONFIG for domain 0000 [bus 00-3f] only partially covers this bridge
[    1.466117] [Firmware Bug]: No valid trip found
[    2.610072] usb 1-4: Product: Bluetooth Radio
[   10.398181] rtl8723be: Using firmware rtlwifi/rtl8723befw.bin
[   11.842460] Bluetooth: Core ver 2.21
[   11.842487] Bluetooth: HCI device and connection manager initialized
[   11.842493] Bluetooth: HCI socket layer initialized
[   11.842498] Bluetooth: L2CAP socket layer initialized
[   11.842508] Bluetooth: SCO socket layer initialized
[   12.626712] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: examining hci_ver=06 hci_rev=000b lmp_ver=06 lmp_subver=8723
[   12.626719] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: loading rtl_bt/rtl8723b_fw.bin
[   12.698802] Bluetooth: hci0: rom_version status=0 version=1
[   17.016934] Bluetooth: BNEP (Ethernet Emulation) ver 1.3
[   17.016940] Bluetooth: BNEP filters: protocol multicast
[   17.016947] Bluetooth: BNEP socket layer initialized
[   19.079058] Bluetooth: hci0 command 0x0c56 tx timeout
[   38.328458] Bluetooth: RFCOMM TTY layer initialized
[   38.328470] Bluetooth: RFCOMM socket layer initialized
[   38.328483] Bluetooth: RFCOMM ver 1.11
[ 1171.588454] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: examining hci_ver=06 hci_rev=000b lmp_ver=06 lmp_subver=8723
[ 1171.588462] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: loading rtl_bt/rtl8723b_fw.bin
[ 1171.589660] Bluetooth: hci0: rom_version status=0 version=1
[ 3599.475358] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: examining hci_ver=06 hci_rev=000b lmp_ver=06 lmp_subver=8723
[ 3599.475364] Bluetooth: hci0: rtl: loading rtl_bt/rtl8723b_fw.bin
[ 3599.476353] Bluetooth: hci0: rom_version status=0 version=1

Results from dmesg | grep 'usb 1-4'
[ 2.432072] usb 1-4: new full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[ 2.561475] usb 1-4: New USB device found, idVendor=04f2, idProduct=b49f
[ 2.561481] usb 1-4: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[ 2.561484] usb 1-4: Product: Bluetooth Radio
[ 2.561487] usb 1-4: Manufacturer: Realtek
[ 2.561489] usb 1-4: SerialNumber: 00e04c000001
[16443.840076] usb 1-4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[41178.579274] usb 1-4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd

A:

maybe your bluetooth is soft blocked? try :
sudo rfkill list

if it is blocked, try this command
sudo rfkill unblock bluetooth

hope it helps!


$20 for $30 Toward Hibachi Dinner for Two or More at Oyama Sushi

Cedar Rapids

In a Nutshell

Chefs toss and sizzle entrees on a tabletop griddle with a theatrical flair at one of The Culture Trip’s top 10 Cedar Rapids restaurants

The Fine Print

Promotional value expires 120 days after purchase. Amount paid never expires.Limit 1 per person. Limit 1 per visit. Limit 1 per table. Valid only for option purchased. Not valid on holidays. Not valid Friday or Saturday.Merchant is solely responsible to purchasers for the care and quality of the advertised goods and services.

Oyama Sushi

The Deal

Oyama Sushi

There's much more to Oyama Sushi than its name suggests. Yes, there are eye-catching platters of thin-sliced sashimi, carefully arranged nigiri, and more than 40 sushi rolls, featuring everything from lobster and avocado to tempura-fried shrimp and honey-wasabi sauce. But another side of the restaurant appears as soon as you walk in: several tables feature gleaming hibachi grills, where chefs sear orders of vegetables, filet mignon, or scallops while dazzling their hungry audience with culinary showmanship. No matter which neighborhood of the menu you're ordering from, dishes are designed to be visually appealing as well as tasty; The Culture Trip's Cedar Rapids guide placed Oyama on its list of Top 10 Restaurants in the city, praising its knack for "turning food into art."

The decor is as traditional as the menu. A torii-style gateway divides two seating sections, and red lanterns decorated with kanji hang from the ceiling alongside kaleidoscopic chains of origami cranes. The blonde woodwork, pale yellow walls, and soft lighting all contribute to an open and inviting ambiance. In addition to its collection of wines and familiar spirits, the bar also displays its collection of Japanese beers and sakes, imported straight from Tokyo via underground tunnel.


Influence of Ginkgo biloba extract on the proliferation, apoptosis of ACC-2 cell and Survivin gene expression in adenoid cystic carcinoma of lacrimal gland.
To explore the influence of extract of Ginkgo biloba (EGB) on the proliferation, apoptosis of ACC-2 cell and Survivin gene expression in adenoid cystic carcinoma (ACC) of lacrimal gland. ACC-2 cell in human with ACC of lacrimal gland was in vitro cultured. MTT method was used for cell proliferation detection. Annexin V/PI double-staining flow cytometer was used to detect cell apoptosis and cell cycle. Survivin gene expression was analyzed by RT-PCR and Western blotting. EGB had inhibitory effect on the proliferation of ACC-2 cell with significant dose-effect relationship, and there was statistical difference when compared with the control group (P<0.01). The inhibitory concentration 50 % (IC(50)) is 88 mg/L. The flow cytometer test indicated that EGB can gradually increase ACC-2 cell in G(0)-G(1) stage and decrease it in G(2)-M and S stage. With the increase of dose, the apoptosis rate of ACC-2 cell was obviously increased (P<0.05 or P<0.01). EGB had certain inhibitory effect on Survivin gene expression of ACC-2 cell, and Survivin gene expression was decreased with the increasing of the EGB concentration (P<0.01). EGB can effectively inhibit Survivin gene expression of ACC-2 cell in human with ACC of lacrimal gland, induce the apoptosis of ACC-2 cell and inhibit tumor cell proliferation.


#if 0
#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/init.h>

#ifdef CONFIG_USB_DEBUG
	#define DEBUG
#else
	#undef DEBUG
#endif
#include <linux/usb.h>
#include "hcd.h"
#else
#include "../usb_wrapper.h"
#include "hcd.h"
#endif

/**
 * usb_init_urb - initializes a urb so that it can be used by a USB driver
 * @urb: pointer to the urb to initialize
 *
 * Initializes a urb so that the USB subsystem can use it properly.
 *
 * If a urb is created with a call to usb_alloc_urb() it is not
 * necessary to call this function.  Only use this if you allocate the
 * space for a struct urb on your own.  If you call this function, be
 * careful when freeing the memory for your urb that it is no longer in
 * use by the USB core.
 *
 * Only use this function if you _really_ understand what you are doing.
 */
void usb_init_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
	if (urb) {
		memset(urb, 0, sizeof(*urb));
		urb->count = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(1);
		spin_lock_init(&urb->lock);
	}
}

/**
 * usb_alloc_urb - creates a new urb for a USB driver to use
 * @iso_packets: number of iso packets for this urb
 * @mem_flags: the type of memory to allocate, see kmalloc() for a list of
 *	valid options for this.
 *
 * Creates an urb for the USB driver to use, initializes a few internal
 * structures, incrementes the usage counter, and returns a pointer to it.
 *
 * If no memory is available, NULL is returned.
 *
 * If the driver want to use this urb for interrupt, control, or bulk
 * endpoints, pass '0' as the number of iso packets.
 *
 * The driver must call usb_free_urb() when it is finished with the urb.
 */
struct urb *usb_alloc_urb(int iso_packets, int mem_flags)
{
	struct urb *urb;

	urb = (struct urb *)kmalloc(sizeof(struct urb) +
		iso_packets * sizeof(struct usb_iso_packet_descriptor),
		mem_flags);
	if (!urb) {
		err("alloc_urb: kmalloc failed");
		return NULL;
	}
	usb_init_urb(urb);
	return urb;
}

/**
 * usb_free_urb - frees the memory used by a urb when all users of it are finished
 * @urb: pointer to the urb to free
 *
 * Must be called when a user of a urb is finished with it.  When the last user
 * of the urb calls this function, the memory of the urb is freed.
 *
 * Note: The transfer buffer associated with the urb is not freed, that must be
 * done elsewhere.
 */
void usb_free_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
	if (urb)
		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&urb->count))
		{
			kfree(urb);
		}
}

/**
 * usb_get_urb - increments the reference count of the urb
 * @urb: pointer to the urb to modify
 *
 * This must be  called whenever a urb is transferred from a device driver to a
 * host controller driver.  This allows proper reference counting to happen
 * for urbs.
 *
 * A pointer to the urb with the incremented reference counter is returned.
 */
struct urb * usb_get_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
	if (urb) {
		atomic_inc(&urb->count);
		return urb;
	} else
		return NULL;
}

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/

/**
 * usb_submit_urb - issue an asynchronous transfer request for an endpoint
 * @urb: pointer to the urb describing the request
 * @mem_flags: the type of memory to allocate, see kmalloc() for a list
 *	of valid options for this.
 *
 * This submits a transfer request, and transfers control of the URB
 * describing that request to the USB subsystem.  Request completion will
 * be indicated later, asynchronously, by calling the completion handler.
 * The three types of completion are success, error, and unlink
 * (also called "request cancellation").
 * URBs may be submitted in interrupt context.
 *
 * The caller must have correctly initialized the URB before submitting
 * it.  Functions such as usb_fill_bulk_urb() and usb_fill_control_urb() are
 * available to ensure that most fields are correctly initialized, for
 * the particular kind of transfer, although they will not initialize
 * any transfer flags.
 *
 * Successful submissions return 0; otherwise this routine returns a
 * negative error number.  If the submission is successful, the complete()
 * callback from the urb will be called exactly once, when the USB core and
 * host controller driver are finished with the urb.  When the completion
 * function is called, control of the URB is returned to the device
 * driver which issued the request.  The completion handler may then
 * immediately free or reuse that URB.
 *
 * For control endpoints, the synchronous usb_control_msg() call is
 * often used (in non-interrupt context) instead of this call.
 * That is often used through convenience wrappers, for the requests
 * that are standardized in the USB 2.0 specification.  For bulk
 * endpoints, a synchronous usb_bulk_msg() call is available.
 *
 * Request Queuing:
 *
 * URBs may be submitted to endpoints before previous ones complete, to
 * minimize the impact of interrupt latencies and system overhead on data
 * throughput.  This is required for continuous isochronous data streams,
 * and may also be required for some kinds of interrupt transfers. Such
 * queueing also maximizes bandwidth utilization by letting USB controllers
 * start work on later requests before driver software has finished the
 * completion processing for earlier requests.
 *
 * Bulk and Isochronous URBs may always be queued.  At this writing, all
 * mainstream host controller drivers support queueing for control and
 * interrupt transfer requests.
 *
 * Reserved Bandwidth Transfers:
 *
 * Periodic transfers (interrupt or isochronous) are performed repeatedly,
 * using the interval specified in the urb.  Submitting the first urb to
 * the endpoint reserves the bandwidth necessary to make those transfers.
 * If the USB subsystem can't allocate sufficient bandwidth to perform
 * the periodic request, submitting such a periodic request should fail.
 *
 * Device drivers must explicitly request that repetition, by ensuring that
 * some URB is always on the endpoint's queue (except possibly for short
 * periods during completion callacks).  When there is no longer an urb
 * queued, the endpoint's bandwidth reservation is canceled.  This means
 * drivers can use their completion handlers to ensure they keep bandwidth
 * they need, by reinitializing and resubmitting the just-completed urb
 * until the driver longer needs that periodic bandwidth.
 *
 * Memory Flags:
 *
 * The general rules for how to decide which mem_flags to use
 * are the same as for kmalloc.  There are four
 * different possible values; GFP_KERNEL, GFP_NOFS, GFP_NOIO and
 * GFP_ATOMIC.
 *
 * GFP_NOFS is not ever used, as it has not been implemented yet.
 *
 * GFP_ATOMIC is used when
 *   (a) you are inside a completion handler, an interrupt, bottom half,
 *       tasklet or timer, or
 *   (b) you are holding a spinlock or rwlock (does not apply to
 *       semaphores), or
 *   (c) current->state != TASK_RUNNING, this is the case only after
 *       you've changed it.
 *
 * GFP_NOIO is used in the block io path and error handling of storage
 * devices.
 *
 * All other situations use GFP_KERNEL.
 *
 * Some more specific rules for mem_flags can be inferred, such as
 *  (1) start_xmit, timeout, and receive methods of network drivers must
 *      use GFP_ATOMIC (they are called with a spinlock held);
 *  (2) queuecommand methods of scsi drivers must use GFP_ATOMIC (also
 *      called with a spinlock held);
 *  (3) If you use a kernel thread with a network driver you must use
 *      GFP_NOIO, unless (b) or (c) apply;
 *  (4) after you have done a down() you can use GFP_KERNEL, unless (b) or (c)
 *      apply or your are in a storage driver's block io path;
 *  (5) USB probe and disconnect can use GFP_KERNEL unless (b) or (c) apply; and
 *  (6) changing firmware on a running storage or net device uses
 *      GFP_NOIO, unless b) or c) apply
 *
 */
int usb_submit_urb(struct urb *urb, int mem_flags)
{
	int			pipe, temp, max;
	struct usb_device	*dev;
	struct usb_operations	*op;
	int			is_out;
//	printk("sub dev %p bus %p num %i op %p sub %p\n",
//	       urb->dev, urb->dev->bus,urb->dev->devnum,urb->dev->bus->op, urb->dev->bus->op->submit_urb);
	if (!urb || urb->hcpriv || !urb->complete)
		return -EINVAL;
	if (!(dev = urb->dev) ||
	    (dev->state < USB_STATE_DEFAULT) ||
	    (!dev->bus) || (dev->devnum <= 0))
		return -ENODEV;
	if (!(op = dev->bus->op) || !op->submit_urb)
		return -ENODEV;

	urb->status = -EINPROGRESS;
	urb->actual_length = 0;
	urb->bandwidth = 0;

	/* Lots of sanity checks, so HCDs can rely on clean data
	 * and don't need to duplicate tests
	 */
	pipe = urb->pipe;
	temp = usb_pipetype (pipe);
	is_out = usb_pipeout (pipe);

	if (!usb_pipecontrol (pipe) && dev->state < USB_STATE_CONFIGURED)
		return -ENODEV;

	/* (actually HCDs may need to duplicate this, endpoint might yet
	 * stall due to queued bulk/intr transactions that complete after
	 * we check)
	 */
	if (usb_endpoint_halted (dev, usb_pipeendpoint (pipe), is_out))
		return -EPIPE;

	/* FIXME there should be a sharable lock protecting us against
	 * config/altsetting changes and disconnects, kicking in here.
	 * (here == before maxpacket, and eventually endpoint type,
	 * checks get made.)
	 */

	max = usb_maxpacket (dev, pipe, is_out);
	if (max <= 0) {
		dbg ("%s: bogus endpoint %d-%s on usb-%s-%s (bad maxpacket %d)",
			__FUNCTION__,
			usb_pipeendpoint (pipe), is_out ? "OUT" : "IN",
			dev->bus->bus_name, dev->devpath,
			max);
		return -EMSGSIZE;
	}

	/* periodic transfers limit size per frame/uframe,
	 * but drivers only control those sizes for ISO.
	 * while we're checking, initialize return status.
	 */
	if (temp == PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS) {
		int	n, len;

		/* "high bandwidth" mode, 1-3 packets/uframe? */
		if (dev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH) {
			int	mult = 1 + ((max >> 11) & 0x03);
			max &= 0x03ff;
			max *= mult;
		}

		if (urb->number_of_packets <= 0)
			return -EINVAL;
		for (n = 0; n < urb->number_of_packets; n++) {
			len = urb->iso_frame_desc [n].length;
			if (len < 0 || len > max)
				return -EMSGSIZE;
			urb->iso_frame_desc [n].status = -EXDEV;
			urb->iso_frame_desc [n].actual_length = 0;
		}
	}

	/* the I/O buffer must be mapped/unmapped, except when length=0 */
	if (urb->transfer_buffer_length < 0)
		return -EMSGSIZE;

#ifdef DEBUG
	/* stuff that drivers shouldn't do, but which shouldn't
	 * cause problems in HCDs if they get it wrong.
	 */
	{
	unsigned int	orig_flags = urb->transfer_flags;
	unsigned int	allowed;

	/* enforce simple/standard policy */
	allowed = URB_ASYNC_UNLINK;	// affects later unlinks
	allowed |= URB_NO_DMA_MAP;
	allowed |= URB_NO_INTERRUPT;
	switch (temp) {
	case PIPE_BULK:
		if (is_out)
			allowed |= URB_ZERO_PACKET;
		/* FALLTHROUGH */
	case PIPE_CONTROL:
		allowed |= URB_NO_FSBR;	/* only affects UHCI */
		/* FALLTHROUGH */
	default:			/* all non-iso endpoints */
		if (!is_out)
			allowed |= URB_SHORT_NOT_OK;
		break;
	case PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS:
		allowed |= URB_ISO_ASAP;
		break;
	}
	urb->transfer_flags &= allowed;

	/* fail if submitter gave bogus flags */
	if (urb->transfer_flags != orig_flags) {
		err ("BOGUS urb flags, %x --> %x",
			orig_flags, urb->transfer_flags);
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	}
#endif
	/*
	 * Force periodic transfer intervals to be legal values that are
	 * a power of two (so HCDs don't need to).
	 *
	 * FIXME want bus->{intr,iso}_sched_horizon values here.  Each HC
	 * supports different values... this uses EHCI/UHCI defaults (and
	 * EHCI can use smaller non-default values).
	 */
	switch (temp) {
	case PIPE_ISOCHRONOUS:
	case PIPE_INTERRUPT:
		/* too small? */
		if (urb->interval <= 0)
			return -EINVAL;
		/* too big? */
		switch (dev->speed) {
		case USB_SPEED_HIGH:	/* units are microframes */
			// NOTE usb handles 2^15
			if (urb->interval > (1024 * 8))
				urb->interval = 1024 * 8;
			temp = 1024 * 8;
			break;
		case USB_SPEED_FULL:	/* units are frames/msec */
		case USB_SPEED_LOW:
			if (temp == PIPE_INTERRUPT) {
				if (urb->interval > 255)
					return -EINVAL;
				// NOTE ohci only handles up to 32
				temp = 128;
			} else {
				if (urb->interval > 1024)
					urb->interval = 1024;
				// NOTE usb and ohci handle up to 2^15
				temp = 1024;
			}
			break;
		default:
			return -EINVAL;
		}
		/* power of two? */
		while (temp > urb->interval)
			temp >>= 1;
		urb->interval = temp;
	}

	return op->submit_urb (urb, mem_flags);
}

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------*/

/**
 * usb_unlink_urb - abort/cancel a transfer request for an endpoint
 * @urb: pointer to urb describing a previously submitted request
 *
 * This routine cancels an in-progress request.  The requests's
 * completion handler will be called with a status code indicating
 * that the request has been canceled, and that control of the URB
 * has been returned to that device driver.
 *
 * When the URB_ASYNC_UNLINK transfer flag for the URB is clear, this
 * request is synchronous.  Success is indicated by returning zero,
 * at which time the urb will have been unlinked,
 * and the completion function will see status -ENOENT.  Failure is
 * indicated by any other return value.  This mode may not be used
 * when unlinking an urb from an interrupt context, such as a bottom
 * half or a completion handler,
 *
 * When the URB_ASYNC_UNLINK transfer flag for the URB is set, this
 * request is asynchronous.  Success is indicated by returning -EINPROGRESS,
 * at which time the urb will normally not have been unlinked,
 * and the completion function will see status -ECONNRESET.  Failure is
 * indicated by any other return value.
 */
int usb_unlink_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
	if (urb && urb->dev && urb->dev->bus && urb->dev->bus->op)
		return urb->dev->bus->op->unlink_urb(urb);
	else
		return -ENODEV;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_init_urb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_alloc_urb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_free_urb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_get_urb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_submit_urb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(usb_unlink_urb);


Single-molecule studies of DNA mechanics.
During the past decade, physical techniques such as optical tweezers and atomic force microscopy were used to study the mechanical properties of DNA at the single-molecule level. Knowledge of DNA's stretching and twisting properties now permits these single-molecule techniques to be used in the study of biological processes such as DNA replication and transcription.


637 A.2d 1131 (1994)
In re Petition of Kara B. RUBENSTEIN (Applicant No. 33).
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: January 25, 1994.
Decided: February 28, 1994.
J.R. Julian of J.R. Julian, P.A., Wilmington, for petitioner Kara B. Rubenstein.
Josy W. Ingersoll (argued), and William J. Wade, Wilmington, for Board of Bar Examiners.
Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.
*1132 HOLLAND, Justice:
Kara B. Rubenstein ("Rubenstein") has petitioned this Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 52(f). Rubenstein contends that, under the facts and circumstances presented, this Court should direct the Board of Bar Examiners ("Board") to issue a certificate that she is qualified for admission to the Delaware Bar. Supr.Ct.R. 52(e); B.R. 52.1. This Court has concluded that Rubenstein's petition for relief should be granted.

Facts
Rubenstein received a bachelor's degree from the University of Pennsylvania and a juris doctorate from the Temple University Law School. Rubenstein first applied for admission to the Delaware Bar in 1990. She made subsequent applications in 1991, 1992, and 1993. In 1990, Rubenstein did not achieve a passing score on the Professional Conduct Examination or either portion of the Delaware Bar Examination, i.e., the essay section or the Multistate Bar Examination ("MBE") section. See B.R. 52.4 and 52.5. In 1991, Rubenstein passed the separate Professional Conduct Examination, but once again did not pass the Bar Examination. In 1992, Rubenstein achieved a passing score of 137 on the MBE section, but failed the Bar Examination by not achieving a passing score on the essay section.
From 1989 to 1990, Rubenstein served as a law clerk to the President Judge of the Delaware Superior Court. In the fall of 1990, Rubenstein was certified under Supreme Court Rule 55. That rule provides for limited permission to practice law in Delaware's courts as a part of certain public programs.
In 1990, in accordance with the limited practice provisions of Rule 55, Rubenstein became employed by the Department of Justice of the State of Delaware as an Assistant Deputy Attorney General. Rubenstein worked as an attorney in that capacity for a period of two years until December 1992.[1] As an Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Rubenstein prosecuted driving under the influence and other criminal cases in the Court of Common Pleas in New Castle County. She also appeared in the Superior Court on habitual offender motions in motor vehicle cases and on motions to reinstate motor vehicle licenses.
The record before the Board included evidence of Rubenstein's competence and ability to practice law in the Delaware Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas during her tenure as an Assistant Deputy Attorney General. That evidence included letters from the Judge she clerked for in the Superior Court, as well as letters from several other judges she had appeared before in the Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas. An experienced member of the Delaware *1133 Bar, who was frequently Rubenstein's courtroom adversary, wrote to the Board on her behalf, as follows:
In permitting the admission of an applicant to the Delaware Bar, the Board must always be concerned with whether or not the applicant can competently practice law in this state. That answer cannot always be gleaned from someone's test score. As a result of my unique opportunity to observe Kara Rubenstein practice for over a year in two of the busiest courts of this state under Supreme Court Rule 55, I can unequivocally state she is well qualified to do so.
In support of her petition, the Attorney General of Delaware also wrote to the Board that, as an Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Rubenstein was a "competent and diligent" practitioner and that he found it "inexplicable" that Rubenstein had been unable to pass the Delaware Bar Examination.
After three unsuccessful attempts to pass the Bar Examination, Rubenstein sought an expert's explanation for the anomalous dichotomy between her inability to pass the Bar Examination and her undisputed ability to function effectively as a prosecuting attorney in Delaware courts, pursuant to this Court's limited practice rule. Supr.Ct.R. 55. After careful testing, Rubenstein was advised that she suffered from a learning disability, which had been previously undiagnosed. The exact nature of the disability had no bearing on her intelligence or acumen but related exclusively to the means by which Rubenstein processed information.

Rubenstein's 1993 Board Petition
In April 1993, Rubenstein filed a petition with the Board requesting an exercise of its discretion to permit her a fourth opportunity to take the Bar Examination. B.R. 52.8(e). Rubenstein's petition alleged that she suffered from a learning disability, which had been previously undiagnosed. In support of her petition, Rubenstein presented to the Board a report prepared by William F. Shaw, M.Ed. ("Shaw"), concerning his evaluation of Rubenstein's learning disability. Shaw's report stated, in part:
The 21 point discrepancy between the verbal and performance abilities suggest that her learning style is that of a linguistic, sequential processor of information rather than a simultaneous processor. In the latter information is presented all at one time rather than in a sequence. If client's tests are more similar to the latter, for example if the fact patterns are presented all at once and client has to come up with a solution, she will do less well than if she is able to develop a problem sequentially as she would do in her criminal prosecutor role.
Due to the large discrepancy between the verbal and performance abilities, the verbal measure is used as an expectancy of achievement as the Full Scale I.Q. represents a meaningless average. In this regard client's current measures of achievement are not significantly below her measure of expectancy, but the overlays of a learning disability and the learning processing difficulties still exist. The reader is reminded to once again look at the qualitative behavior observations during the reading tests. Moving one's head rather than to read with her eyes, especially for an individual with some superior abilities, speaks out boldly in terms of the diagnosis of a learning disability. In addition the observable mouthing of words as she reads, supposedly silently, is a further indication of an inefficient and maldeveloped reading process.
Shaw's report made the following recommendation to the Board:

In order to compensate for her disability, unlimited or at least extended time should be granted for the bar examination. This is assuming that the Testing Committee, based upon the new information reported in this examination, would reconsider and allow her to take the test again. The increased time allowed will grant more opportunity for client to read and reread items in order to give additional input [emphasis added].
The Shaw report concluded with the observation that Rubenstein's learning disability would not impair her law practice. In fact, the report stated that Rubenstein "has a *1134 facility for the practice of law and is encouraged to pursue that interest." In addition, Rubenstein supported her petition to the Board with a letter from the Deputy Attorney General who had supervised her Rule 55 practice. Her supervisor represented to the Board that Rubenstein's "learning disability had no discernible impact on her ability to practice law in the criminal courts, something the tests cannot show."

Board's 1993 Response
On June 11, 1993, the Board informed Rubenstein that it had granted her petition to take the Delaware Bar Examination for a fourth time. The Board's letter to Rubenstein also stated that based upon the medical evidence of her learning disability, accommodations would be made for her to take the essay portions of the examination. Those accommodations consisted of the Board's permission for Rubenstein to take the essay section in a separate room and to have one additional hour for each three-hour essay session. The Board decided that Rubenstein would not be permitted additional time for the MBE section.[2]

Rubenstein's 1993 Results
With the accommodation of additional time on the essay section, Rubenstein passed that portion of the 1993 Delaware Bar Examination. However, she received a score of 128 on the MBE, the examination she had passed in 1992 with a score of 137. That score was two points less than the minimum MBE score of 130 required by the rules of the Board. B.R. 52.4(c). Consequently, Rubenstein was informed that she had failed the 1993 Bar Examination.
Rubenstein petitioned the Board. She requested to be certified by the Board as being qualified for admission to the Delaware Bar, notwithstanding the two-point insufficiency of her MBE score in 1993. Rubenstein's petition was considered by the Board. Her petition was denied by the Board in a letter dated November 17, 1993.

Standard of Review Rubenstein's Contention
Rubenstein has appealed to this Court for relief from the Board's action. Supr.Ct.R. 52. The Board's ruling would prevent Rubenstein from ever gaining admission to the Delaware Bar. Consequently, the Board's denial of Rubenstein's petition has affected her "substantial rights," as required by Supreme Court Rule 52(f). Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to consider the merits of Rubenstein's petition for relief.
This Court will not set aside the determination of the Board as to an applicant's professional competence unless the applicant demonstrates fraud, coercion, arbitrariness, or manifest unfairness. In re Reardon, Del. Supr., 378 A.2d 614, 618 (1977). Rubenstein does not allege that the Board conducted itself in either a fraudulent or a coercive manner. Rather, she contends that the Board's decision to grant her additional time on the essays but not on the MBE section of the Bar Examination was both arbitrary and manifestly unfair.
Rubenstein argues that the Board's accommodations to her during the 1993 Bar Examination were an unreasonable response to her undisputed learning disability. Rubenstein asserts that she has demonstrated her professional competence by passing the essay section of the Bar Examination in 1993 and the MBE section of the Bar Examination in 1992. Accordingly, Rubenstein asks this Court to direct the Board to suspend the application of Board Rule 52.4(c), which requires an applicant to achieve specified minimum scores on both sections of the Delaware Bar Examination in the same administration of that test, and to certify her as qualified for admission to the Delaware Bar. Compare In *1135 re Hudson, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 369, 371 (1979).

Delaware Bar Admission Certification Requirements
No applicant can be certified by the Board as qualified for admission to the Bar of this Court unless he or she has: first, complied with each of the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 52; second, achieved a passing score on the Professional Conduct Examination; and third, achieved a passing score on the Bar Examination. B.R. 52.1. The Board acknowledges that Rubenstein has satisfied each of the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 52 and achieved a passing score on the Professional Conduct Examination.[3] Therefore, the only issue before this Court relates to Rubenstein's performance on the Bar Examination.
The Bar Examination consists of two sections: the Multistate Bar Examination ("MBE") administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and twelve essays on certain enumerated subjects, as determined by the Board. B.R. 52.4(b). "An applicant shall be deemed to have passed the Bar Examination if he [or she] achieves a scaled score of not less than 130 on the MBE and an average of not less than 65.0 on all of the twelve essay questions on the Bar Examination." B.R. 52.4(c). The latter provision is subject to the additional requirement that the applicant "shall not have received a grade of less than 65.0 on more than five of the said essay questions." Id.

Rubenstein's Disability Board's Discretion Exercised Fourth Application Granted
Rubenstein failed the Bar Examination in three successive years. An applicant, who has failed to pass the Bar Examination three times, seeking to be afforded a fourth opportunity to take that test, has the burden of providing the Board with evidence:
(i) That there existed physical, emotional, or other good reason constituting mitigating circumstances for the applicant's failure to pass 1 or more of the prior examinations; and
(ii) That such reason, or reasons, have been resolved and the applicant knows of no impediment to his preparation for the fourth examination.
B.R. 52.8(e).
The Board was satisfied that the evidence presented by Rubenstein of her previously undiagnosed learning disability constituted a mitigating circumstance for her failure to pass the Bar Examination in the past. Id. This satisfied the Board rule's first requirement "[t]hat there existed physical, emotional, or other good reason constituting mitigating circumstances" for her failure to pass one or more of the prior examinations. B.R. 52(e)(i). Since Rubenstein's learning disability was of a continuing nature, the Board realized that it was impossible for her to attest to its resolution, which is the second requirement of the Board's rule regarding an application to take the Bar Examination for a fourth time. B.R. 52.8(e)(ii).
The Board properly recognized, however, that the continuing nature of Rubenstein's learning disability was not only (1) an improper basis to deny her petition to take the Bar Examination a fourth time but also (2) required it to make reasonable accommodations for her learning disability if she was permitted to take the Bar Examination for the fourth time. The Board decided to give Rubenstein time and one-third to take the essay section of the Bar Examination but no additional time to take the MBE section. Our review of the Board's action must necessarily involve a consideration of both the factual evidence presented to the Board and the applicable law.

Bar Examinations Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 *1136 (West Supp.1993), became effective on January 26, 1992. The United States Department of Justice promulgated regulations to implement the ADA's statutory mandate. 28 C.F.R. pts. 35-36 (1991). The Department of Justice also prepared a section-by-section analysis of its regulations. Id. In 1991, prior to the ADA becoming effective, the United States Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission published the Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook.
The ADA has been described as a "national mandate to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled persons." Morrissey, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Disabling of the Bar Examination Process?, The Bar Examiner, May 1993, at 9, 9. It "imposes new standards of conduct upon bar examiners and similar entities ... with respect to disabled individuals [who are] pursuing professional careers." Id. The extent to which the ADA applies to bar examinations has been the subject of recent scholarly analysis. See Rogers, The ADA, Title VII and the Bar Examination: The Nature and Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations, 36 How.L.J. 1 (1993). The issues that confront boards of bar examiners in complying with the ADA have also been carefully considered by two special counsel to the National Conference of Bar Examiners. Fedo & Brown, Accommodating the Disabled Under the ADA: The Issues for Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiner, Aug. 1992, at 6.
The ADA provides that an individual is disabled if, inter alia, he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). Once such a disability has been established, the ADA generally requires the persons or entities designated by the Act to make reasonable accommodations or modifications for the disability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112, 12131(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A). Title II of the ADA provides:
Subject to the provisions of this [title], no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12132.
Admission to the Delaware bar is governed exclusively by this Court. In re Hudson, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 369 (1979). The application and testing procedures are administered by the Board, which is appointed by this Court. Supr.Ct.R. 51 and 52. The Board, as an instrumentality of this Court, constitutes a public entity within the meaning of Title II. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1); Supr.Ct.R. 51. See also Fedo & Brown, Accommodating the Disabled Under the ADA: The Issues for Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiner, Aug. 1992, at 6, 6. Consequently, as a public entity, the Board must make reasonable accommodations to prevent the de facto exclusion "which may occur when disabled but otherwise qualified individuals are limited by standard administrative or other operating procedures from participating fully in the examination process." Fedo & Brown, Accommodating the Disabled Under the ADA: The Issues for Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiner, Aug. 1992, at 6, 6.
The regulations implementing the ADA state that Title II is applicable to licensing and certification "programs." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6). Title II and its regulations, however, contain no specific standards for the administration of bar examinations, or of other professional licensing tests. Nevertheless, specific guidance is available regarding the administration of examinations in the regulations promulgated to implement Title III of the ADA. Title III, in part, provides:

Any person that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12189 (emphasis added).
Title III of the ADA generally applies only to private entities. However, in the interpretive analysis of its Title III regulations, the United States Department of Justice has taken *1137 the position that "[e]xaminations covered by this section would include a bar exam." ADA Handbook, III-100, Oct. 1991.[4]See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(a). See also Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law for the United States, at 4 n. 2, Rosenthal v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1992) (No. 92 Civ. 1100). At least one federal court has agreed with the Department of Justice's construction of the ADA by applying both Title II and III with regard to the administration of a bar examination. D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F.Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y.1993).[5]

Additional Time A Reasonable Accommodation
The purpose of the ADA "is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing and not to give them an unfair advantage." D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F.Supp. at 221. Compare Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).[6] The integrity of the examination process has been an important consideration for the federal courts in reviewing the reasonableness of accommodations made by testing authorities pursuant to other disabilities legislation. See, e.g., Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 752 F.Supp. 696, 697 (E.D.Va.1990), rev'd and remanded, 946 F.2d 345 (4th Cir.1991). The ADA also provides authority, for example, that a testing authority may refuse to provide an auxiliary aid or service to a disabled person if it meets the burden of establishing "that offering [the] particular auxiliary aid would fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or knowledge the examination is intended to test or would result in an undue burden." 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(3) (1991).
A learning disability, such as Rubenstein's, is a condition which the ADA recognizes should be accommodated. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(1)(i), 36.104(1)(i). The regulations promulgated under Title III describe several kinds of accommodations that may be required in the examination process, as well as the limitations on such accommodations that may be applicable. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (1991). Those regulations specifically state that "[r]equired modifications to an examination may include changes in the length of time permitted for completion of the examination." 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The record reflects that the Board found that Rubenstein had established that she was a person with a learning disability. The ADA Handbook provides that "[e]xaminers may require evidence that an applicant is entitled to modifications." ADA Handbook, III-102, Oct. 1991. The ADA Handbook suggests that appropriate documentation for a requested accommodation "might include a letter from a physician or other professional." Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, Rubenstein requested the Board to accommodate her learning disability by allowing her additional time to take the *1138 Bar Examination. She documented her request with Shaw's expert report. Shaw's report made the following recommendation to the Board:

In order to compensate for her disability, unlimited or at least extended time should be granted for the bar examination. This is assuming that the Testing Committee, based upon the new information reported in this examination, would reconsider and allow her to take the test again. The increased time allowed will grant more opportunity for client to read and reread items in order to give additional input [emphasis added].
Shaw's report recommended that Rubenstein be afforded additional time to take the Bar Examination. Shaw's professional recommendation was unqualified. It did not differentiate between the essay section and the MBE section of the Bar Examination with respect to Rubenstein's need for additional time to accommodate her learning disability.

Time Afforded Rubenstein An Inconsistent Accommodation
This Court has held that appellate review regarding an exercise of the Board's discretion requires a determination that the factual findings are supported by the record and that the Board's decision is the product of a logical and orderly deductive process. In re Green, Del.Supr., 464 A.2d 881, 887 (1983). It has been observed that the sine qua non for bar examiners' compliance with the ADA "[is] principally a matter of making reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals to take the examination and to communicate with the licensing board." Fedo & Brown, Accommodating the Disabled Under the ADA: The Issues for Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiner, Aug. 1992, at 6, 6-7. The same authors astutely note that courts are more likely to uphold bar examiners' decisions if they produce an evidentiary record showing that reasonable efforts were made to accommodate a disabled applicant's needs. Id. at 8. Accord Petition of Nenno, Del. Supr., 472 A.2d 815, 818 (1983) (Board's decision must be supported by substantial evidence).
In Rubenstein's case, the record is devoid of any evidentiary basis to support the Board's decision to disregard the recommendation of Rubenstein's expert. In addition, the Board's ultimate decision does not reflect that it was the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. In re Green, 464 A.2d at 887. The Board's decision to afford Rubenstein additional time (one-third) to take the essay section but no additional time to take the MBE section of the Bar Examination, without any explanation, was internally inconsistent. The Board's action was also inconsistent with the MBE guidelines established by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.

Multistate Bar Examination Task Force on Disabled Applicants
The MBE portion of the Delaware Bar Examination is "administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners." B.R. 52.4(b). In October 1990, the Board of Managers of the National Conference adopted the following revision to Standard 22 of the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners:
Without impairing the integrity of the examination process, the bar examining authority should adopt and publish procedures allowing applicants with documented disabilities to have assistance, equipment or additional time as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to assure their fair and equal opportunity to perform on the examination.
Smith, NCBE Guidelines For Testing Disabled Applicants, The Bar Examiner, Feb. 1991, at 28, 28. The revision to Standard 22 was proposed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners Task Force on Disabled Applicants. Id. That Task Force also developed "guidelines for jurisdictions reviewing requests for special accommodations for disabled applicants," i.e. Considerations in Testing Applicants with Disabilities. Id.
The work of the Task Force was reported upon by Jane Peterson Smith, the Director of Testing of the National Conference of Bar Examiners. Id. According to Smith:

*1139 The most difficult issue the task force considered was the amount of extra time to allow for disabled applicants, particularly for those with learning disabilities. The task force concluded that time and one-half was an appropriate accommodation for most disabled applicants because there is evidence that the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) is not a "speeded" examination.
The Task Force on Disabled Applicants also designed a standardized application form for bar examiners to use for those persons requesting testing accommodations. Id. at 30-31 (Appendix I and II). That form is particularly instructive in Rubenstein's case. The choices in Section V, "Accommodations granted for the Multistate Bar Examination," regarding "[e]xtra testing time" are: time and one-half; double time; more than double time; and other. (Appendix II). The form also includes a separate Section VI, which relates to "[a]ccommodations granted for the rest of the bar examination," e.g., the essays. Id.

Board's Decision Manifestly Unfair
The regulations implementing the ADA recognize additional time for taking the examination as one of the specific accommodations which should be made for bar applicants with a learning disability. After careful consideration, the Task Force on Disabled Applicants of the National Conference of Bar Examiners concluded that time and one-half to take the MBE was an appropriate accommodation for most applicants with learning disabilities. The Board's decision to deny Rubenstein additional time to take the MBE in 1993 is inconsistent with the recommendations of Rubenstein's expert, the ADA regulations, and the conclusions of the National Conference of Bar Examiners' Task Force on Disabled Applicants.
The fact that Rubenstein passed the MBE in 1992 without additional time, notwithstanding her then undiagnosed learning disability, did not constitute a rational basis for denying her additional time to take the MBE in 1993, after her learning disability became known. Although this Court recognizes the exemplary and professional manner in which the Board generally discharges its important responsibilities, the Board's decision to deny Rubenstein any additional time to take the MBE portion of the 1993 Bar Examination was not supported by the record. That decision was not the product of a logical deductive reasoning process and was manifestly unfair to Rubenstein.

Equitable Remedy Rubenstein's Petition Granted
Having determined that the Board's decision to deny Rubenstein any additional time to take the MBE portion of the 1993 Bar Examination was manifestly unfair, this Court must consider an appropriate and equitable remedy. Since Rubenstein passed the essay portion of the Bar Examination in 1993, when her learning disability was properly accommodated with additional time to take that test, it would be inequitable to require her to take that section of Bar Examination again. If Rubenstein was permitted to retake only the MBE portion of the Bar Examination, with additional time, this Court would have to direct a waiver of the requirement that the essay and MBE sections both be passed in one sitting. B.R. 52.4(c). In re Hudson, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 369, 371 (1979). The record reflects, however, that Rubenstein has already demonstrated her ability to pass the MBE section of the Bar Examination in a separate sitting, notwithstanding her disability, in 1992.
The Bar Examination tests for minimal competence to practice law. In re Reardon, Del.Supr., 378 A.2d 614, 617 (1977). Rubenstein has demonstrated her competence to practice law by passing both the essay section and the MBE section of the Bar Examination, albeit on separate occasions. See B.R. 52.4(c). Rubenstein's competence to practice law has also been attested to by the members of the Delaware Judiciary she practiced before pursuant to Rule 55, the Attorney General, and other members of the Delaware Bar who are familiar with her legal abilities. Accord Petition of Golby, Del. Supr., 375 A.2d 1049, 1050 (1977).
*1140 The relief requested in Rubenstein's petition implicates Board Rule 52.4(c), which implements "one aspect of this Court's exclusive right to govern the practice of law  the admission of persons to the Bar." Petition of Nenno, Del.Supr., 472 A.2d 815, 819 (1983). This Court alone is responsible for such matters. Id. We have concluded that, under the unique and limited circumstances here, Rubenstein's petition properly invokes this Court's inherent authority to suspend the requirement of Board Rule 52.4(c) that both sections of the Bar Examination be passed during one sitting.[7] Such action does not compromise either the integrity of the administration or the high standards of the Delaware Bar Examination. Compare In re Hudson, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 369, 371 (1979); In re Fischer, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 601, 602 (1980). Nor do we intend any criticism of the Board, which attempted in good faith to comply with the evolving standards of the ADA. Our ruling simply represents the correction of manifest unfairness under unusual circumstances involving an applicant who has exhausted every remedy available to her.

Conclusion
Under the facts and circumstances of Rubenstein's case, equitable principles of justice require that the manifest unfairness to Rubenstein be remedied by granting her application for relief from the Board's actions. Therefore, under this Court's exclusive authority with respect to applications for admission to the Delaware Bar, the simultaneous passage requirements of Board Rule 52.4(c) are waived. The Board is directed to deliver to Rubenstein the certificate required by Supreme Court Rule 52(e). The mandate shall issue forthwith.

*1141 APPENDIX I

*1142
NOTES
[1]  The record reflects that the sole reason for the termination of Rubenstein's employment was her failure to pass the Bar Examination.
[2]  The Board's decision to permit Rubenstein's application to take the Bar Examination for a fourth time was conditioned upon her acceptance of its decision to grant her additional time only with respect to the essay section. The record reflects that under the circumstances, Rubenstein had no alternative. Rubenstein had requested additional time to take the entire Bar Examination. When confronted with a Hobson's choice by the Board, Rubenstein's acquiescence cannot be fairly construed as a waiver of the right to contend that she should have been given additional time for the MBE.
[3]  The Board does not dispute that Rubenstein is "a person of good moral character and reputation," Supr.Ct.R. 52(a), or that she is qualified for admission to the Delaware Bar in every respect with the exception of her failure to pass both portions of the Bar Examination in one administration. B.R. 52.4(c).
[4]  The Justice Department's analysis also states:

Section 309 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12189] is intended to fill the gap that is created when licensing, certification, and other testing authorities are not covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act [29 U.S.C.A. § 794] (West Supp.1993) or title II of the ADA. Any such authority that is covered by section 504, because of the receipt of Federal money, or by title II, because it is a function of State or local government, must make all of its programs accessible to persons with disabilities, which includes physical access as well as modifications in the way the test is administered, e.g., extended time....
Id. (emphasis added).
[5]  In D'Amico, the court pointed out that the ADA defines the term "person" as used in the examination and courses provision of Title III as having the same meaning given the term in Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7)). In the Civil Rights Act, "person" is defined as including governments and governmental agencies. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)).
[6]  The position of the United States Department of Justice, stated in the ADA Handbook, is that the standards of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 will apply unless the ADA or its regulations explicitly adopts a different standard. ADA Handbook, II-11, III-12, Oct. 1991. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.103(a), 36.103(a) (1991). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1220(a) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
[7]  Nothing in this opinion should be construed as a repudiation of the reasonableness of the general requirement that both the essay and MBE portions of the examination should be passed at the same administration, particularly in order to prevent sequential concentration on one portion of the examination by "locking away" one portion of the examination in one year and concentration on the other portion in a following year. In re Hudson, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 369, 371 (1979).


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Q:

Mongo DB Glassfish Server Error Class not found

I am getting an error while executing a glassfish server with use of MongoDB:

java.lang.NoClassDefFoundError: com/mongodb/client/MongoCollection

I have the following dependencies :
<dependencies>
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.glassfish.jersey.containers/jersey-container-servlet -->
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.glassfish.jersey.containers</groupId>
    <artifactId>jersey-container-servlet</artifactId>
    <version>2.26</version>
</dependency>

<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.glassfish.jersey.media/jersey-media-json-jackson -->
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.glassfish.jersey.media</groupId>
    <artifactId>jersey-media-json-jackson</artifactId>
    <version>2.26</version>
</dependency>

    <!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/com.sun.jersey/jersey-client -->
    <dependency>
        <groupId>com.sun.jersey</groupId>
        <artifactId>jersey-client</artifactId>
        <version>1.19.4</version>
    </dependency>
    <dependency>
        <groupId>junit</groupId>
        <artifactId>junit</artifactId>
        <version>RELEASE</version>
    </dependency>

    <!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.mongodb/mongodb-driver -->
    <dependency>
        <groupId>org.mongodb</groupId>
        <artifactId>mongodb-driver</artifactId>
        <version>3.6.1</version>
    </dependency>

</dependencies>

The specific jars are definitly imported, and while compilation there is also occurring no error. I have looked up for solutions here already but none of them helped me. So if anyone might see the error, pleaser tell me. Thanks in advance.

A:

It looks like you should use this dependency:
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.mongodb/mongo-java-driver -->
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.mongodb</groupId>
    <artifactId>mongo-java-driver</artifactId>
    <version>3.6.1</version>
</dependency>

If this doesn't work alternatively you can put the mongodb-driver JAR into /glassfish/glassfish4/lib/.


package com.porterhead.sample;

import com.porterhead.resource.BaseResource;
import com.porterhead.user.User;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;

import javax.annotation.security.RolesAllowed;
import javax.ws.rs.Consumes;
import javax.ws.rs.GET;
import javax.ws.rs.Path;
import javax.ws.rs.Produces;
import javax.ws.rs.core.Context;
import javax.ws.rs.core.MediaType;
import javax.ws.rs.core.Response;
import javax.ws.rs.core.SecurityContext;

/**
 * Created by iainporter on 13/10/2014.
 */
@Path("/v1.0/samples")
@Component
@Produces({MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON})
@Consumes({MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON})
public class SampleResource extends BaseResource {

    @RolesAllowed({"ROLE_GUEST"})
    @GET
    public Response getSample(@Context SecurityContext sc) {
        User user = loadUserFromSecurityContext(sc);
        return Response.ok().entity("{\"message\":\"" + user.getEmailAddress() + " is authorized to access\"}").build();
    }
}


// Badges
.badge {
  box-shadow: $z-depth-1;
  border-radius: $border-radius-base;
  color: $white !important;
}
.badge-pill {
  border-radius: $badge-pill-border-radius;
  padding-right: $badge-pill-padding-x;
  padding-left: $badge-pill-padding-x;
}
@each $name, $color in $basic-mdb-colors {
  @include make-badge($name, $color);
}


Q:

String ou dados binários seriam truncados

Ocorre esse erro quando tento executar minha procedure, não sei o porque acontece isso.
meu codigo:
    Dim con As SqlConnection = New SqlConnection()
        Dim cmd As SqlCommand = New SqlCommand()
        Try
            con.ConnectionString = "Server = 10.230.11.43;Database=GFT_CAD;User Id=sa;Password = qweasd;"

            con.Open()
            cmd.Connection = con
            cmd = New SqlCommand("prdInserirDocDB", con)
            cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure

 cmd.Parameters.Add(New SqlParameter("@SITUACAO_CACS", SqlDbType.VarChar)).Value = SITUACAO_CACS
            cmd.Parameters.Add(New SqlParameter("@CGC_CPF_PORTADOR", SqlDbType.VarChar)).Value = CGC_CPF_PORTADOR
            cmd.Parameters.Add(New SqlParameter("@FONE_CEL_PORT", SqlDbType.VarChar)).Value = FONE_CEL_PORT

            cmd.ExecuteNonQuery()
            MsgBox("inserido com sucesso")
        Catch ex As Exception
            MsgBox("erro em: " & ex.Message)

Minha prodecure:
@VR_ULT_PAGTO  DECIMAL(09,2) ,
@VR_PRINCIPAL  DECIMAL(09,2) ,
@SITUACAO_CACS  VARCHAR(03) ,
@CGC_CPF_PORTADOR VARCHAR(15),
@FONE_CEL_PORT VARCHAR(17)

as
Begin

insert into tCImp_Doc(
SDO_ATUAL,
SDO_PARC_PEND,
SDO_LEGADO,
DT_ULT_PAGTO,
VR_ULT_PAGTO,
SITUACAO_CACS,
CGC_CPF_PORTADOR,
FONE_CEL_PORT
 )
 values(
@SDO_PARC_PEND,
@SDO_LEGADO,
@DT_ULT_PAGTO,
@VR_ULT_PAGTO,
@SITUACAO_CACS,
@CGC_CPF_PORTADOR,
@FONE_CEL_PORT

 )
 end

Ignorem os campos errados meu código tem muitos campos não quis colocar todos.

A:

Esse erro ocorre quando você tentar inserir em um campo um valor maior do que foi definido a ele no momento de sua criação.
Por exemplo:
CREATE TABLE TESTE (
   id int,
   descr varchar(5))

Se eu tentar inserir 6 caracteres ou mais em um campo definido para aceitar apenas 5.
INSERT INTO TESTE( 1, '123456' )

Eu recebo esse erro:

Aqui usei um campo varchar, mas o mesmo vale para qualquer tipo de campo. Por isso que  a mensagem é genérica e fala em String or Binary data.


205 Va. 942 (1965)
H. DINWIDDIE MARTIN AND MARIAM W. MARTIN
v.
NORFOLK REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL.
Record No. 5861.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
March 8, 1965.
Howard I. Legum (Fine, Fine, Legum, Schwan & Fine,    on brief), for the appellants.
Francis N. Crenshaw (Baird, Crenshaw & Ware,    on brief), for appellee, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority.
Present, Eggleston, C.J., and Spratley, Buchanan, Snead, I'Anson and
1.  In 1922 Joel Martin conveyed certain land in Norfolk to the city, which covenanted to acquire adjacent lands, to open a certain street, and to make the area into a public park and to use the property only for such purpose.  The Martin deed provided that unless the city complied with its covenants within twenty-eight months it should become void.  Within this stated time the city acquired the other lands and opened Taylor Park, which it maintained until 1960, when in the course of a redevelopment project the property was sold to Housing Authority, which in 1963 began the present proceeding to acquire any interest of the public arising from the provision of the Martin deed that the property be used only as a park.  The Martins, heirs of Joel Martin, asserted they held a reversionary interest for which they were entitled to be compensated and challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that only a court of equity could determine this question.  This contention was held to have no merit.
2.  The Martins' further contention that the court erred in deciding the issue of their reversionary interest before the commissioners appointed to ascertain just compensation for any outstanding interest had reported their award was likewise without merit.  The decision whether there was any interest to condemn quite properly preceded any decision as to what value it would have if it existed.
3.  The Martins held no reversionary interest by virtue of the city's ceasing to use the property for a public park.  The deed provided it should become void if the city failed to perform those covenants which could be performed within the period of twenty-eight months specified; when they were performed the city held a title free of any condition.
4.  The stated time, in the nature of the case, could not have been intended to apply to the covenant to continue indefinitely to use the land as a park, nor was it a condition subsequent but a mere agreement for use.  Absent clear language in the deed, the principle applied that conditions subsequent are not favored in the law.
5.  Under the proven facts, including the establishment by the city of a nearby park larger than the former Taylor Park, there was nothing to indicate that the commissioners erred in deciding that the public had suffered no substantial damages through the taking of the old park property.
Appeal from orders of the Corporation Court of the city of Norfolk.  Hon. H. Lawrence Bullock, judge presiding. The opinion states the case.
(   S. W. McGann, Jr., Assistant City Attorney,    on brief), for City of Norfolk.
BUCHANAN
BUCHANAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal question in this case is whether the appellants, H. Dinwiddie Martin and Mariam W. Martin, have a reversionary interest in a tract of land formerly known as Taylor Park, in the city of Norfolk.
The appellants are the heirs of Joel W. Martin and others, grantors in a deed dated April 15, 1922, which conveyed to the city of Norfolk all the right, title and interest of the grantors by reason of their ownership of No. 314 York street, in Norfolk, in the land lying between a line parallel with and two hundred feet north of York street on the south and Smith Creek on the north, and between Yarmouth street on the east and Dunmore street on the west.
As consideration for this deed, in addition to five dollars in cash, the city agreed and covenanted (1) to open a street extending from Yarmouth street on the east to Dunmore street on the west; (2) to *944 obtain, simultaneously with the Martin deed, similar conveyances from the owners of all the other properties fronting on the north side of York street, between Yarmouth and Dunmore streets, for their interests in the same parcel of land; and (3) that it would bulkhead and fill in the land so acquired and construct a park or playground thereon for the benefit of the citizens of Norfolk; "and the City of Norfolk hereby agrees that the said land shall not be used for any other purpose, and that no buildings shall be erected thereon, except such as are necessary and incidental to the use of the park, or play-ground."
The concluding paragraph of the Martin deed stated that it was mutually understood between the parties "that unless the city of Norfolk complies with its said covenant and conditions, as above set forth, within twenty-eight months from the date hereof, then this deed shall become null and void."
It is not questioned, but is conceded by the appellants, that the city obtained deeds for the interests in said parcel of land from all the other described owners on York Street, all dated April 15, 1922, and containing the same provisions as the Martin deed; and that the city opened the street and constructed the park (naming it Taylor Park), all as covenanted in the deed and within the twenty-eight months therein specified.
Appellants say in their brief that the "City of Norfolk complied with he conditions set forth in the deed until September 19, 1960."
The park was constructed and maintained by the city until a redevelopment project, as defined in | 36-49 of the Code, was undertaken, with the approval of the city, which involved the abandonment of Taylor Park and the building and operating of another park in the same area in its place.
Pursuant to that plan the city, by deed dated September 19, 1960, conveyed said Taylor Park property to Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, one of appellees, hereinafter referred to as the Authority, a corporation and political subdivision of the Commonwealth, created by and operating under the Housing Authorities Law, Title 36 of the Code, as amended.
In October, 1963, the Authority instituted this proceeding by a petition to condemn and acquire the interest of the public, if any, in said property by reason of the provision in the above-mentioned deeds to the city from Joel W. Martin and others, which contained the provision quoted above, that the land conveyed thereby "shall not be used for any other purpose" than a park or playground, under *945 which provision the appellants, as heirs of the grantors in the Martin deed, claim a reversionary interest.
The Authority made defendants to its petition the city of Norfolk "as Trustee for any of its citizens having an interest in the aforementioned property"; the heirs, devisees and assigns of the grantors in the Martin deed, and others similarly interested whose names and addresses were unknown.  Process was issued and served, and other of publication was executed and the appellants filed their answer alleging that they were the heirs of the grantors in the Martin deed and stating that "they do not know at this time whether they do or do not have any interest in the real estate, which is being condemned," but that if they do then they ask the court to award them reasonable compensation for their interests.
The city answered and denied that it held as trustee for the benefit of any of its citizens any interest in said property, or that any interest had reverted to any other person.
By order entered December 4, 1963, commissioners were appointed and directed to ascertain what would be just compensation for any outstanding interest in said land and to award damages, if any, resulting to the defendants or other persons, and December 10, 1963, was designated as the time for the commissioners to meet.  On that day appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, in which they alleged that only a court of equity had jurisdiction to determine whether they had a reversionary interest.
On December 10, 1963, the appellants made a motion for the court to refrain from hearing the question of reversionary interests until the commissioners returned their award, whereupon the court heard evidence offered by the parties and then entered its decree overruling appellants' plea and motion and adjudicating that no reversionary interest existed in any of the defendants by virtue of the city's abandonment of the property for park and playground purposes, and that the fee simple title to said property was vested in the petitioner under the city's deed to it, "subject only to any interest which the City of Norfolk may have therein as trustees for the benefit of any of its citizens by virtue of its covenants to use the same as a park or playground."
Thereafter the commissioners reported that no compensation was required for the land described in the petition, and that the damages to the adjacent or other property of the owners, or of any other person or persons, beyond the peculiar benefits that would accrue *946 to them from the construction and operation of the project of the Authority was one dollar.
Appellants filed exceptions to the report which were overruled by decree entered December 24, 1963, and the report of the commissioners was thereby confirmed and the fee simple title to the property was adjudicated to be in the Authority.
The record shows that the court, counsel and commissioners viewed the land in controversy, the surrounding neighborhood and the site of the new park; that the evidence was that the redevelopment plan required that the city provide a new public park in the vicinity of the land involved in this proceeding, which will be open to the public and larger than the Taylor Park which was closed, and that no person appeared to assert any damage by virtue of this condemnation.
The errors assigned by the appellants to the decrees of December 4 and December 24, 1963, are in substance that the court erred (1) in overruling their plea to the jurisdiction; (2) in deciding the question of reversionary interests before the commissioners made their award; and (3) in holding that the appellants had no reversionary interest in the property.
  The first two require little discussion.  The Authority has the power of eminent domain, Code | 36-27 (1964 Cum. Supp.).  The Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk has jurisdiction to condemn property, Code | 25-46.4; and any interest in or claim to land is property, Code | 25-46.3.  No reason is perceived why a judge sitting in an eminent domain proceeding cannot construe a deed as readily as a judge sitting in a court of equity.  Appellants' contention to the contrary is without merit.
  It was entirely logical and proper for the court to determine whether any reversionary interest existed in the property before sending the commissioners out to ascertain what would be a just compensation for such interest.  The petitioner sought to condemn the interest of the defendants in the property involved, if any in fact existed by reason of the abandonment of the property as a park which the city had promised in its deeds to construct and had constructed.  If defendants had no interest in the property then there was no interest to condemn and it would have been mere exercise in futility to direct the commissioners to ascertain a just compensation for an interest that did not exist.  The statutes referred to by the appellants, || 25-46.17, 25-46.18 and 25-46.25, do not require that the decision of the issue in this case,    i.e.,    whether there was any *947 interest to condemn, should await the report of the commissioners as to what would be the value of such interest if it existed.
  We hold also that the court correctly decided that "there does not exist in any of the defendants to this proceeding any reversionary interest by virtue of the City of Norfolk's abandonment of the property for park and playground purposes."
As pointed out above, the active covenants of the city contained in all the deeds were to open the street, obtain the companion deeds, and fill in the land and construct a park or playground thereon.  It is clear that these were the convenants to which the time limit of twenty-eight months in the last paragraph of the deeds applied.  That limit could not in the nature of things apply to the agreement of the city that the land should not be used for any other purpose than a park or playground.  Upon the fulfillment of these active covenants within the twenty-eight months, about which there is no question, that limitation of time had no further application, and the fee simple title to the property vested in the city without condition.
  The agreement of the city with respect to the land after the park was constructed was an agreement for use and nothing more.  It clearly was not a condition subsequent, the breach of which would destroy the city's title and transfer ownership of the land back to the grantors in the deeds or their successors.  There is no provision or suggestion in the deeds that such was to be the penalty of abandoning the use of the park after it had been provided within the required time.  The deeds made no reference to reverter or re-entry in the event of abandonment of the park.
It is well settled in this State, and generally, that conditions subsequent are not favored in the law because they tend to destroy estates, and when relied on to work a forfeiture they must be created by express terms or clear implication.
King     Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,    99 Va. 625, 39 S.E. 701, was an action of ejectment to recover property for breach of conditions in deeds to the effect that the grantee would have no power to sell or convey the property to any other person, or use it for any purpose not strictly connected with the business of the grantees, or (in one of the deeds) erect any buildings thereon. It was held that these provisions amounted to covenants rather than conditions and did not diminish the fee simple estate created by the deeds.  In the opinion it was said:
"Conditions subsequent are not favored in law because they tend to destroy estates.  When relied upon to work a forfeiture they must *948 be created by express terms or clear implication, and are strictly construed.  If it be doubtful whether a clause in a deed be a covenant or a condition, the courts will incline against the latter and adopt the more benignant construction upholding the instrument and leaving the parties to pursue their appropriate remedies for the breach of covenant.  4 Kent's Com., pp. 129-30."
In    Lowman     Crawford,    99 Va. 688, 40 S.E. 17, this principle was stated again in practically the same words.
In Minor on Real Property, 2d ed., | 515, page 676, it is said:
"For the same reason that the law favors a covenant rather than a condition subsequent -- its dislike of forfeitures -- it prefers to construe words qualifying the ownership of lands as trusts rather than conditions.  * * *"
"So strongly does the law favor a trust or covenant rather than a condition that even the technical words of condition may be denied their ordinary meaning; and, if such appears to be the intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, construed as trusts or covenants."
See also    Miller     Brookville,    152 Ohio St. 217, 89 N.E.2d 85, 15 A.L.R.2d 967 and Annotation at 975.
  Finally, the appellants assert that there was no evidence to justify a nominal award of one dollar.  On the other hand, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that this amount was not sufficient.  The commissioners viewed Taylor Park and the larger tract nearby which was to become a park.  It is to be presumed that the commissioners saw no disadvantage or source of damage to the citizens of the city in the abandonment of Taylor Park and providing a new park to take its place.  The record discloses no protest on the part of the people to be served.  Appellees describe in their brief physical improvements accomplished by the change which the commissioners would see.  There is no indication that more than nominal damages was required.
The orders appealed from correctly decided the issues presented and are therefore
Affirmed.


Q:

Is there any way to change "DELETE" button from UITableViewCell?

I want to change DELETE button in UITableViewCell.
Actually, I need to :

Change position of button
font
text color of that button.

Here I can only change button text in following delegate method :
- (NSArray<UITableViewRowAction *> *)tableView:(UITableView *)tableView editActionsForRowAtIndexPath:(NSIndexPath *)indexPath
{
    UITableViewRowAction *viewAction = [UITableViewRowAction rowActionWithStyle:UITableViewRowActionStyleDefault title:@"Follow" handler:^(UITableViewRowAction *action, NSIndexPath *indexPath) {

        NSLog(@"View Action fired");
    }];
    viewAction.backgroundColor = [UIColor clearColor];

    return @[callAction];
}

But how to change other attributes of button. If anyone knows, please let me know.
Thanks.

A:

To get this working, implement the following two methods on your UITableView's delegate to get the desired effect
- (BOOL)tableView:(UITableView *)tableView canEditRowAtIndexPath:(NSIndexPath *)indexPath
{
    return YES;
}

 - (void)tableView:(UITableView *)tableView commitEditingStyle:(UITableViewCellEditingStyle)editingStyle forRowAtIndexPath:(NSIndexPath *)indexPath {
// you need to implement this method too esle nothing will work:

}

check your method you created the name of UITableViewRowAction *viewAction but you returned teh value of callAction modify once and try
- (NSArray<UITableViewRowAction *> *)tableView:(UITableView *)tableView editActionsForRowAtIndexPath:(NSIndexPath *)indexPath
{
    UITableViewRowAction *callAction = [UITableViewRowAction rowActionWithStyle:UITableViewRowActionStyleDefault title:@"Follow" handler:^(UITableViewRowAction *action, NSIndexPath *indexPath) {

        NSLog(@"View Action fired");
    }];
    callAction.backgroundColor = [UIColor clearColor];

    return @[callAction];
}

In Standard UITableViewRowAction we can't change , we can change only
style
title
backgroundColor
backgroundEffect
for more information see the Apple Documents