PROCEDURE

The case of Klass and others was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter called “the Commission“). The case originated in an application against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Commission on 11 June 1971 under Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter called “the Convention“) by five German citizens, namely Gerhard Klass, Peter Lubberger, Jürgen Nussbruch, Hans-Jürgen Pohl and Dieter Selb.

The Commission’s request, which referred to Articles 44 and 48, paragraph (a) (art. 44, art. 48-a), and to which was attached the report provided for in Article 31 (art. 31), was lodged with the registry of the Court on 15 July 1977, within the period of three months laid down in Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47). The purpose of the request is to obtain a decision from the Court as to whether or not the facts of the case disclose a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 6 para. 1, 8 and 13 (art. 6-1, art. 8, art. 13) of the Convention.

On 28 July, the President of the Court drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of five of the seven judges called upon to sit as members of the Chamber; Mr. H. Mosler, the elected judge of German nationality, and Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri, the President of the Court, were ex officio members under Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 3 (b) of the Rules of Court respectively. The five judges thus designated were Mr. J. Cremona, Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch, Mr. D. Evrigenis, Mr. G. Lagergren and Mr. F. Gölcüklü (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4 of the Rules of Court) (art. 43) . Mr. Balladore Pallieri assumed the office of president of the Chamber in accordance with Rule 21 para. 5.

The President of the Chamber ascertained, through the Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. By an Order of 12 August, the President decided that the Government should file a memorial within a time-limit expiring on 28 November and that the Delegates of the Commission should be entitled to file a memorial in reply within two months of receipt of the Government’s memorial.

At a meeting held in private on 18 November in Strasbourg, the Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court, on the ground “that the case raise(d) serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention“.

The Government filed their memorial on 28 November. On 27 January 1978, a memorial by the Principal Delegate of the Commission was received at the registry; at the same time, the Secretary to the Commission advised the Registrar that the Delegates would reply to the Government’s memorial during the oral hearings.

After consulting, through the Registrar, the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission, the President directed by an Order of 24 February 1978 that the oral hearings should open on 10 March.

The Court held a preparatory meeting on 10 March, immediately before the opening of the hearings. At that meeting the Court, granting a request presented by the Government, decided that their Agent and counsel would be authorised to address the Court in German at the hearings, the Government undertaking, inter alia, responsibility for the interpretation into French or English of their oral arguments or statements (Rule 27 para. 2). In addition, the Court took note of the intention of the Commission’s Delegates to be assisted during the oral proceedings by one of the applicants, namely Mr. Pohl; the Court also authorised Mr. Pohl to speak in German (Rules 29 para. 1 in fine and 27 para. 3).

The oral hearings took place in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 March. There appeared before the Court:

for the Government: Mrs. I. MAIER, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of Justice, Agent, Mr. H. G. MERK, Ministerialrat at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Mr. H. STÖCKER, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry of Justice, Mrs. H. SEIBERT, Regierungsdirektorin at the Federal Ministry of Justice, Advisers;

for the Commission: Mr. G. SPERDUTI, Principal Delegate, Mr. C. A. NØRGAARD, Delegate, Mr. H.-J. POHL, Applicant, assisting the Delegates under Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence. The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government and by Mr. Sperduti, Mr. Nørgaard and Mr. Pohl for the Commission, as well as their replies to questions put by several members of the Court.

AS TO THE FACTS

The applicants, who are German nationals, are Gerhard Klass, an Oberstaatsanwalt, Peter Lubberger, a lawyer, Jürgen Nussbruch, a judge, Hans-Jürgen Pohl and Dieter Selb, lawyers. Mr. Nussbruch lives in Heidelberg, the others in Mannheim. All five applicants claim that Article 10 para. 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and a statute enacted in pursuance of that provision, namely the Act of 13 August 1968 on Restrictions on the Secrecy of the Mail, Post and Telecommunications (Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- under Fernmeldegeheimnisses, hereinafter referred to as “the G 10“), are contrary to the Convention. They do not dispute that the State has the right to have recourse to the surveillance measures contemplated by the legislation; they challenge this legislation in that it permits those measures without obliging the authorities in every case to notify the persons concerned after the event, and in that it excludes any remedy before the courts against the ordering and execution of such measures. Their application is directed against the legislation as modified and interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).

Before lodging their application with the Commission, the applicants had in fact appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court. By judgment of 15 December 1970, that Court held that Article 1 para. 5, sub-paragraph 5 of the G 10 was void, being incompatible with the second sentence of Article 10 para. 2 of the Basic Law, in so far as it excluded notification of the person concerned about the measures of surveillance even when such notification could be given without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction. The Constitutional Court dismissed the remaining claims (Collected Decisions of the Constitutional Court, Vol. 30, pp. 1 et seq.). Since the operative provisions of the aforementioned judgment have the force of law, the competent authorities are bound to apply the G 10 in the form and subject to the interpretation decided by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany were prompted by this judgment to propose amendments to the G 10, but the parliamentary proceedings have not yet been completed.

As regards the applicants’ right to apply to the Constitutional Court, that Court held, inter alia: “In order to be able to enter a constitutional application against an Act, the applicant must claim that the Act itself, and not merely an implementary measure, constitutes a direct and immediate violation of one of his fundamental rights ... These conditions are not fulfilled since, according to the applicants’ own submissions, it is only by an act on the part of the executive that their fundamental rights would be violated. However, because they are not apprised of the interference with their rights, the persons concerned cannot challenge any implementary measure. In such cases, they must be entitled to make a constitutional application against the Act itself, as in cases where a constitutional application against an implementary measure is impossible for other reasons ...“ (ibid, pp. 16-17).

Although, as a precautionary measure, the applicants claimed before both the Constitutional Court and the Commission that they were being subjected to surveillance measures, they did not know whether the G 10 had actually been applied to them. On this point, the Agent of the Government made the following declaration before the Court: “To remove all uncertainty as to the facts of the case and to give the Court a clear basis for its decision, the Federal Minister of the Interior, who has competence in the matter, has, with the G 10 Commission’s approval, authorised me to make the following statement: At no time have surveillance measures provided for by the Act enacted in pursuance of Article 10 of the Basic Law been ordered or implemented against the applicants. Neither as persons suspected of one or more of the offences specified in the Act nor as third parties within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 2, of the G 10 have the applicants been subjected to such measures. There is also no question of the applicants’ having been indirectly involved in a surveillance measure directed against another person - at least, not in any fashion which would have permitted their identification. Finally, there is no question of the applicants’ having been subjected to surveillance by mistake - for example through confusion over a telephone number -, since in such cases the person concerned is notified of the surveillance measure.“ The contested legislation

After the end of the Second World War, the surveillance of mail, post and telecommunications in Germany was dealt with by the occupying powers. As regards the Federal Republic, neither the entry into force on 24 May 1949 of the Basic Law nor the foundation of the State of the Federal Republic on 20 September 1949 altered this situation which continued even after the termination of the occupation régime in 1955. Article 5 para. 2 of the Convention of 26 May 1952 on Relations between the Three Powers (France, the United States and the United Kingdom) and the Federal Republic - as amended by the Paris Protocol of 23 October 1954 - specified in fact that the Three Powers temporarily retained “the rights ... heretofore held or exercised by them, which relate to the protection of the security of armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic“. Under the same provision, these rights were to lapse “when the appropriate German authorities (had) obtained similar powers under German legislation enabling them to take effective action to protect the security of those forces, including the ability to deal with a serious disturbance of public security and order“.

The Government wished to substitute the domestic law for the rights exercised by the Three Powers and to place under legal control interferences with the right, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Basic Law, to respect for correspondence. Furthermore, the restrictions to which this right could be subject appeared to the Government to be inadequate for the effective protection of the constitutional order of the State. Thus, on 13 June 1967, the Government introduced two Bills as part of the Emergency Legislation. The first sought primarily to amend Article 10 para. 2 of the Basic Law; the second - based on Article 10 para. 2 so amended - was designed to limit the right to secrecy of the mail, post and telecommunications. The two Acts, having been adopted by the federal legislative assemblies, were enacted on 24 June and 13 August 1968 respectively. The Three Powers had come to the view on 27 May that these two texts met the requirements of Article 5 para. 2 of the above-mentioned Convention. Their statements declared: “The rights of the Three Powers heretofore held or exercised by them which relate to the protection of the security of armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic and which are temporarily retained pursuant to that provision will accordingly lapse as each of the above-mentioned texts, as laws, becomes effective.“

In its initial version, Article 10 of the Basic Law guaranteed the secrecy of mail, post and telecommunications with a proviso that restrictions could be ordered only pursuant to a statute. As amended by the Act of 24 June 1968, it now provides: “(1) Secrecy of the mail, post and telecommunications shall be inviolable. (2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a statute. Where such restrictions are intended to protect the free democratic constitutional order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the statute may provide that the person concerned shall not be notified of the restriction and that legal remedy through the courts shall be replaced by a system of scrutiny by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the people’s elected representatives.“

The G 10, adopting the solution contemplated by the second sentence of paragraph 2 of the above-quoted Article 10, specifies (in Article 1 para. 1) the cases in which the competent authorities may impose the restrictions provided for in that paragraph, that is to say, may open and inspect mail and post, read telegraphic messages, listen to and record telephone conversations. Thus, Article 1 para. 1 empowers those authorities so to act in order to protect against “imminent dangers“ threatening the “free democratic constitutional order“, “the existence or the security of the Federation or of a Land“, “the security of the (allied) armed forces“ stationed on the territory of the Republic and the security of “the troops of one of the Three Powers stationed in the Land of Berlin“. According to Article 1 para. 2, these measures may be taken only where there are factual indications (tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte) for suspecting a person of planning, committing or having committed certain criminal acts punishable under the Criminal Code, such as offences against the peace or security of the State (sub-paragraph 1, no. 1), the democratic order (sub-paragraph 1, no. 2), external security (sub-paragraph 1, no. 3) and the security of the allied armed forces (sub-paragraph 1, no. 5). Paragraph 2 of Article 1 further states that the surveillance provided for in paragraph 1 is permissible only if the establishment of the facts by another method is without prospects of success or considerably more difficult (aussichtslos oder wesentlich erschwert). The surveillance may cover only “the suspect or such other persons who are, on the basis of clear facts (bestimmter Tatsachen), to be presumed to receive or forward communications intended for the suspect or emanating from him or whose telephone the suspect is to be presumed to use“ (sub-paragraph 2).

Article 1 para. 4 of the Act provides that an application for surveillance measures may be made only by the head, or his substitute, of one of the following services: the Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federation and the Länder (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz; Verfassungsschutzbehörden der Länder), the Army Security Office (Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr) and the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). The measures are ordered, on written application giving reasons, either by the supreme Land authority in cases falling within its jurisdiction or by a Federal Minister empowered for the purpose by the Chancellor. The Chancellor has entrusted these functions to the Ministers of the Interior and of Defence each of whom, in the sphere falling within his competence, must personally take the decision as to the application of the measures (Article 1 para. 5, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2). Measures ordered must be immediately discontinued once the required conditions have ceased to exist or the measures themselves are no longer necessary (Article 1 para. 7, sub-paragraph 2). The measures remain in force for a maximum of three months and may be renewed only on fresh application (Article 1 para. 5, sub-paragraph 3).

Under the terms of Article 1 para. 5, sub-paragraph 5, the person concerned is not to be notified of the restrictions affecting him. However, since the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 15 December 1970 (see paragraph 11 above), the competent authority has to inform the person concerned as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction. To this end, the Minister concerned considers ex officio, immediately the measures have been discontinued or, if need be, at regular intervals thereafter, whether the person concerned should be notified. The Minister submits his decision for approval to the Commission set up under the G 10 for the purpose of supervising its application (hereinafter called “the G 10 Commission“). The G 10 Commission may direct the Minister to inform the person concerned that he has been subjected to surveillance measures.

Implementation of the measures ordered is supervised by an official qualified for judicial office (Article 1 para. 7, sub-paragraph 1). This official examines the information obtained in order to decide whether its use would be compatible with the Act and whether it is relevant to the purpose of the measure. He transmits to the competent authorities only information satisfying these conditions and destroys any other intelligence that may have been gathered. The information and documents so obtained may not be used for other ends and documents must be destroyed as soon as they are no longer needed to achieve the required purpose (Article 1 para. 7 sub-paragraphs 3 and 4).

The competent Minister must, at least once every six months, report to a Board consisting of five Members of Parliament on the application of the G 10; the Members of Parliament are appointed by the Bundestag in proportion to the parliamentary groupings, the opposition being represented on the Board (Article 1 para. 9, sub-paragraph 1, of the G 10 and Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag). In addition, the Minister is bound every month to provide the G 10 Commission with an account of the measures he has ordered (Article 1 para. 9). In practice and except in urgent cases, the Minister seeks the prior consent of this Commission. The Government, moreover, intend proposing to Parliament to amend the G 10 so as to make such prior consent obligatory. The G 10 Commission decides, ex officio or on application by a person believing himself to be under surveillance, on both the legality of and the necessity for the measures; if it declares any measures to be illegal or unnecessary, the Minister must terminate them immediately (Article 1 para. 9, sub-paragraph 2). Although not required by the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 15 December 1970, the Commission has, since that judgment, also been called upon when decisions are taken on whether the person concerned should be notified of the measures affecting him (see paragraph 19 above). The G 10 Commission consists of three members, namely, a Chairman, who must be qualified to hold judicial office, and two assessors. The Commission members are appointed for the current term of the Bundestag by the above-mentioned Board of five Members of Parliament after consultation with the Government; they are completely independent in the exercise of their functions and cannot be subject to instructions. The G 10 Commission draws up its own rules of procedure which must be approved by the Board; before taking this decision, the Board consults the Government. For the Länder, their legislatures lay down the parliamentary supervision to which the supreme authorities are subject in the matter. In fact, the Länder Parliaments have set up supervisory bodies which correspond to the federal bodies from the point of view of organisation and operation.

According to Article 1 para. 9, sub-paragraph 5, of the G 10: “... there shall be no legal remedy before the courts in respect of the ordering and implementation of restrictive measures.“ The official statement of reasons accompanying the Bill contains the following passage in this connection: “The surveillance of the post and telecommunications of a certain person can serve a useful purpose only if the person concerned does not become aware of it. For this reason, notification to this person is out of the question. For the same reason, it must be avoided that a person who intends to commit, or who has committed, the offences enumerated in the Act can, by using a legal remedy, inform himself whether he is under surveillance. Consequently, a legal remedy to impugn the ordering of restrictive measures had to be denied ... The Bill presented during the 4th legislative session ... provided for the ordering (of such measures) by an independent judge. The Federal Government abandoned this solution in the Bill amending Article 10 of the Basic Law, introduced as part of the Emergency Legislation, mainly because the Executive, which is responsible before the Bundestag, should retain the responsibility for such decisions in order to observe a clear separation of powers. The present Bill therefore grants the power of decision to a Federal Minister or the supreme authority of the Land. For the (above-)mentioned reasons ..., the person concerned is deprived of the opportunity of having the restrictive measures ordered examined by a court; on the other hand, the constitutional principle of government under the rule of law demands an independent control of interference by the Executive with the rights of citizens. Thus, the Bill, in pursuance of the Bill amending Article 10 of the Basic Law ..., prescribes the regular reporting to a Parliamentary Board and the supervision of the ordering of the restrictive measures by a Control Commission appointed by the Board ...“ (Bundestag document V/1880 of 13 June 1967, p. 8).

Although access to the courts to challenge the ordering and implementation of surveillance measures is excluded in this way, it is still open to a person believing himself to be under surveillance pursuant to the G 10 to seek a constitutional remedy: according to the information supplied by the Government, a person who has applied to the G 10 Commission without success retains the right to apply to the Constitutional Court. The latter may reject the application on the ground that the applicant is unable to adduce proof to substantiate a complaint, but it may also request the Government concerned to supply it with information or to produce documents to enable it to verify for itself the individual’s allegations. The authorities are bound to reply to such a request even if the information asked for is secret. It is then for the Constitutional Court to decide whether the information and documents so obtained can be used; it may decide by a two-thirds majority that their use is incompatible with State security and dismiss the application on that ground (Article 26 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court Act). The Agent of the Government admitted that this remedy might be employed only on rare occasions.

If the person concerned is notified, after the measures have been discontinued, that he has been subject to surveillance, several legal remedies against the interference with his rights become available to him. According to the information supplied by the Government, the individual may: in an action for a declaration, have reviewed by an administrative court declaration, the legality of the application to him of the G 10 and the conformity with the law of the surveillance measures ordered; bring an action for damages in a civil court if he has been prejudiced; bring an action for the destruction or, if appropriate, restitution of documents; finally, if none of these remedies is successful, apply to the Federal Constitutional Court for a ruling as to whether there has been a breach of the Basic Law.

Article 2 of the G 10 has also amended the Code of Criminal Procedure by inserting therein two Articles which authorise measures of surveillance of telephone and telegraphic communications. Under Article 100 (a), these measures may be taken under certain conditions, in particular, when there are clear facts on which to suspect someone of having committed or attempted to commit certain serious offences listed in that Article. Under Article 100 (b), such measures may be ordered only by a court and for a maximum of three months; they may be renewed. In urgent cases, the decision may be taken by the public prosecutor’s department but to remain in effect it must be confirmed by a court within three days. The persons concerned are informed of the measures taken in their respect as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the investigation (Article 101 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). These provisions are not, however, in issue in the present case. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In their application lodged with the Commission on 11 June 1971, the applicants alleged that Article 10 para. 2 of the Basic Law and the G 10 - to the extent that these provisions, firstly, empower the authorities to monitor their correspondence and telephone communications without obliging the authorities to inform them subsequently of the measures taken against them and, secondly, exclude the possibility of challenging such measures before the ordinary courts - violate Articles 6, 8 and 13 (art. 6, art. 8, art. 13) of the Convention. On 18 December 1974, the Commission declared the application admissible. It found, as regards Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention: “... only the victim of an alleged violation may bring an application. The applicants, however, state that they may be or may have been subject to secret surveillance, for example, in course of legal representation of clients who were themselves subject to surveillance, and that persons having been the subject of secret surveillance are not always subsequently informed of the measures taken against them. In view of this particularity of the case the applicants have to be considered as victims for the purpose of Article 25 (art. 25).“

Having been invited by the Government to consider the application inadmissible under Article 29 in conjunction with Articles 25 and 27 para. 2 (art. 29+25, art. 29+27-2) of the Convention, the Commission declared in its report of 9 March 1977 that it saw no reason to accede to this request. In this connection, the report stated: “The Commission is ... still of the opinion ... that the applicants must be considered as if they were victims. Some of the applicants are barristers and it is theoretically excluded that they are in fact subject to secret surveillance in consequence of contacts they may have with clients who are suspected of anti-constitutional activities. As it is the particularity of this case that persons subject to secret supervision by the authorities are not always subsequently informed of such measures taken against them, it is impossible for the applicants to show that any of their rights have been interfered with. In these circumstances the applicants must be considered to be entitled to lodge an application even if they cannot show that they are victims.“ The Commission then expressed the opinion:

by eleven votes to one with two abstentions, that the present case did not disclose any breach of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention insofar as the applicants relied on the notion “civil rights“;

unanimously, that the present case did not disclose any breach of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) in so far as the applicants relied on the notion “criminal charge“;

by twelve votes in favour with one abstention, that the present case did not disclose any breach of Article 8 (art. 8) or of Article 13 (art. 13). The report contains various separate opinions.

In her memorial of 28 November 1977, the Agent of the Government submitted in conclusion: “I ... invite the Court to find that the application was inadmissible; in the alternative, to find that the Federal Republic of Germany has not violated the Convention.“ She repeated these concluding submissions at the hearing on 10 March 1978.

For their part, the Delegates of the Commission made the following concluding submissions to the Court: “May it please the Court to say and judge

Whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the applicants could claim to be ‘victims’ of a violation of their rights guaranteed by the Convention by reason of the system of surveillance established by the so-called G 10 Act;

And, if so, whether the applicants are actually victims of a violation of their rights set forth in the Convention by the very existence of that Act, considering that it gives no guarantee to persons whose communications have been subjected to secret surveillance that they will be notified subsequently of the measures taken concerning them.“
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e1
001-57510_a11_em1
PERSON
DIRECT
Klass
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em2
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic of Germany
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e3
001-57510_a11_em3
DATETIME
QUASI
11 June 1971
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em4
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e1
001-57510_a11_em5
PERSON
DIRECT
001-57510_a11_em1
Gerhard Klass
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e5
001-57510_a11_em6
PERSON
QUASI
Peter Lubberger
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e6
001-57510_a11_em7
PERSON
QUASI
Jürgen Nussbruch
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e7
001-57510_a11_em8
PERSON
QUASI
Hans-Jürgen Pohl
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e8
001-57510_a11_em9
PERSON
QUASI
Dieter Selb
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e9
001-57510_a11_em10
DATETIME
QUASI
15 July 1977
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e10
001-57510_a11_em11
DATETIME
NO_MASK
three months
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e11
001-57510_a11_em12
DATETIME
NO_MASK
28 July
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001-57510_a11_e12
001-57510_a11_em13
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. H. Mosler
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em14
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e13
001-57510_a11_em15
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e14
001-57510_a11_em16
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. J. Cremona
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e15
001-57510_a11_em17
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch
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001-57510_a11_e16
001-57510_a11_em18
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. D. Evrigenis
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e17
001-57510_a11_em19
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. G. Lagergren
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001-57510_a11_e18
001-57510_a11_em20
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. F. Gölcüklü
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e13
001-57510_a11_em21
PERSON
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em15
Mr. Balladore Pallieri
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e19
001-57510_a11_em22
DATETIME
NO_MASK
12 August
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e20
001-57510_a11_em23
DATETIME
NO_MASK
28 November
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001-57510_a11_e21
001-57510_a11_em24
DATETIME
NO_MASK
two months
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001-57510_a11_e22
001-57510_a11_em25
DATETIME
NO_MASK
18 November
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001-57510_a11_e23
001-57510_a11_em26
LOC
QUASI
Strasbourg
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e20
001-57510_a11_em27
DATETIME
NO_MASK
28 November
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e24
001-57510_a11_em28
DATETIME
QUASI
27 January 1978
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001-57510_a11_e25
001-57510_a11_em29
DATETIME
QUASI
24 February 1978
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e26
001-57510_a11_em30
DATETIME
NO_MASK
10 March
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e26
001-57510_a11_em31
DATETIME
NO_MASK
10 March
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001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em32
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e27
001-57510_a11_em33
DEM
NO_MASK
French
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001-57510_a11_e28
001-57510_a11_em34
DEM
NO_MASK
English
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e7
001-57510_a11_em35
PERSON
QUASI
001-57510_a11_em8
Mr. Pohl
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001-57510_a11_e7
001-57510_a11_em36
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. Pohl
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001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em37
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e29
001-57510_a11_em38
LOC
NO_MASK
Human Rights Building, Strasbourg
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e26
001-57510_a11_em39
DATETIME
NO_MASK
10 March
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e30
001-57510_a11_em40
PERSON
QUASI
Mrs. I. MAIER
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e31
001-57510_a11_em41
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Ministry of Justice
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001-57510_a11_e32
001-57510_a11_em42
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. H. G. MERK
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e33
001-57510_a11_em43
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Ministry of the Interior
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e34
001-57510_a11_em44
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. H. STÖCKER
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
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001-57510_a11_e31
001-57510_a11_em45
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Ministry of Justice
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001-57510_a11_e35
001-57510_a11_em46
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mrs. H. SEIBERT
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check
001-57510_a11_e31
001-57510_a11_em47
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Ministry of Justice
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e36
001-57510_a11_em48
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. G. SPERDUTI
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e37
001-57510_a11_em49
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. C. A. NØRGAARD
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e38
001-57510_a11_em50
PERSON
NO_MASK
Mr. H.-J. POHL
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e30
001-57510_a11_em51
PERSON
QUASI
001-57510_a11_em40
Mrs. Maier
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e36
001-57510_a11_em52
PERSON
QUASI
001-57510_a11_em48
Mr. Sperduti
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e37
001-57510_a11_em53
PERSON
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em49
Mr. Nørgaard
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e7
001-57510_a11_em54
PERSON
QUASI
Mr. Pohl
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em55
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e1
001-57510_a11_em56
PERSON
DIRECT
Gerhard Klass
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e39
001-57510_a11_em57
DEM
QUASI
Oberstaatsanwalt
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e5
001-57510_a11_em58
PERSON
QUASI
Peter Lubberger
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e6
001-57510_a11_em59
PERSON
QUASI
Jürgen Nussbruch
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e7
001-57510_a11_em60
PERSON
QUASI
Hans-Jürgen Pohl
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e8
001-57510_a11_em61
PERSON
QUASI
Dieter Selb
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e6
001-57510_a11_em62
PERSON
QUASI
001-57510_a11_em59 001-57510_a11_em7
Mr. Nussbruch
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e40
001-57510_a11_em63
LOC
QUASI
Heidelberg
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e41
001-57510_a11_em64
LOC
QUASI
Mannheim
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e42
001-57510_a11_em65
DATETIME
QUASI
13 August 1968
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e43
001-57510_a11_em66
MISC
QUASI
Restrictions on the Secrecy of the Mail, Post and Telecommunications
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e44
001-57510_a11_em67
MISC
QUASI
Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- under Fernmeldegeheimnisses
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em68
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e46
001-57510_a11_em69
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em70
Federal Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e46
001-57510_a11_em70
ORG
NO_MASK
Bundesverfassungsgericht
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e46
001-57510_a11_em71
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e47
001-57510_a11_em72
DATETIME
QUASI
15 December 1970
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em73
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em74
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em75
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em76
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em77
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em78
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic of Germany
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em79
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em80
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em81
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em82
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em83
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em84
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e49
001-57510_a11_em85
MISC
NO_MASK
Second World War
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e50
001-57510_a11_em86
LOC
NO_MASK
Germany
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em87
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em2
Federal Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e51
001-57510_a11_em88
DATETIME
QUASI
24 May 1949
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e52
001-57510_a11_em89
MISC
NO_MASK
State of the Federal Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e53
001-57510_a11_em90
DATETIME
QUASI
20 September 1949
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e54
001-57510_a11_em91
DATETIME
NO_MASK
1955
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e55
001-57510_a11_em92
DATETIME
QUASI
26 May 1952
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e56
001-57510_a11_em93
ORG
NO_MASK
France
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e57
001-57510_a11_em94
ORG
NO_MASK
United States
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e58
001-57510_a11_em95
ORG
NO_MASK
United Kingdom
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em96
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e59
001-57510_a11_em97
DATETIME
QUASI
23 October 1954
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em98
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em99
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e4
001-57510_a11_em100
DEM
NO_MASK
German
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e60
001-57510_a11_em101
ORG
NO_MASK
Three Powers
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e61
001-57510_a11_em102
DATETIME
QUASI
13 June 1967
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e62
001-57510_a11_em103
DATETIME
NO_MASK
24 June
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e42
001-57510_a11_em104
DATETIME
QUASI
13 August 1968
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e63
001-57510_a11_em105
DATETIME
NO_MASK
27 May
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em106
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em107
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em2
Federation
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em108
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em109
ORG
NO_MASK
Federation
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em110
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em109
Republic
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e60
001-57510_a11_em111
ORG
NO_MASK
Three Powers
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e64
001-57510_a11_em112
ORG
NO_MASK
allied armed forces
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e65
001-57510_a11_em113
ORG
NO_MASK
Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federation and the Länder
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e65
001-57510_a11_em114
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em113
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e66
001-57510_a11_em115
ORG
NO_MASK
Verfassungsschutzbehörden der Länder
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e67
001-57510_a11_em116
ORG
NO_MASK
Army Security Office
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e67
001-57510_a11_em117
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em116
Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e68
001-57510_a11_em118
ORG
QUASI
Federal Intelligence Service
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e68
001-57510_a11_em119
ORG
QUASI
001-57510_a11_em118
Bundesnachrichtendienst
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e69
001-57510_a11_em120
ORG
NO_MASK
supreme Land authority
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e70
001-57510_a11_em121
ORG
NO_MASK
Ministers of the Interior
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e10
001-57510_a11_em122
DATETIME
NO_MASK
three months
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e46
001-57510_a11_em123
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e47
001-57510_a11_em124
DATETIME
QUASI
15 December 1970
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em125
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em126
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em127
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e71
001-57510_a11_em128
DATETIME
NO_MASK
every six months
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em129
ORG
NO_MASK
Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e73
001-57510_a11_em130
ORG
NO_MASK
Parliament
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em131
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e73
001-57510_a11_em132
ORG
NO_MASK
Parliament
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
correct
001-57510_a11_e74
001-57510_a11_em133
ORG
NO_MASK
Bundestag
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em134
ORG
NO_MASK
Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em135
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e75
001-57510_a11_em136
DATETIME
NO_MASK
every month
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em137
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e73
001-57510_a11_em138
ORG
NO_MASK
Parliament
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em139
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em140
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em141
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e47
001-57510_a11_em142
DATETIME
QUASI
15 December 1970
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em143
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e74
001-57510_a11_em144
ORG
NO_MASK
Bundestag
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e76
001-57510_a11_em145
ORG
NO_MASK
Board of five Members
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e73
001-57510_a11_em146
ORG
NO_MASK
Parliament
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em147
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em148
ORG
NO_MASK
Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em149
ORG
NO_MASK
Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e77
001-57510_a11_em150
ORG
NO_MASK
Länder
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e77
001-57510_a11_em151
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em150
Länder Parliaments
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em152
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e78
001-57510_a11_em153
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Government
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e74
001-57510_a11_em154
ORG
NO_MASK
Bundestag
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em155
ORG
NO_MASK
Parliamentary Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e79
001-57510_a11_em156
ORG
NO_MASK
Control Commission
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
insert
001-57510_a11_e72
001-57510_a11_em157
ORG
NO_MASK
001-57510_a11_em155
Board
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e74
001-57510_a11_em158
ORG
NO_MASK
Bundestag
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em159
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em160
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em161
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em162
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e48
001-57510_a11_em163
ORG
NO_MASK
Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em164
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e46
001-57510_a11_em165
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Constitutional Court
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em166
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e10
001-57510_a11_em167
DATETIME
NO_MASK
three months
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e80
001-57510_a11_em168
DATETIME
NO_MASK
three days
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e3
001-57510_a11_em169
DATETIME
QUASI
11 June 1971
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em170
MISC
QUASI
G 10
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e81
001-57510_a11_em171
DATETIME
QUASI
18 December 1974
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e82
001-57510_a11_em172
DATETIME
QUASI
9 March 1977
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e83
001-57510_a11_em173
DATETIME
QUASI
28 November 1977
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e2
001-57510_a11_em174
ORG
NO_MASK
Federal Republic of Germany
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e84
001-57510_a11_em175
DATETIME
QUASI
10 March 1978
NOT_CONFIDENTIAL
check
001-57510_a11_e45
001-57510_a11_em176
MISC
QUASI
G 10
Gerhard Klass
DEU
CHAMBER
Task: Annotate the document to anonymise the following person: Gerhard Klass