PROCEDURE

The case originated in an application (no. 44652/98) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a United Kingdom national, Mr Keith Anderson Beckles (“the applicant”), on 4 November 1998.

The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented before the Court by Hickman and Rose, Solicitors, London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The applicant, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing since the judge at his trial misdirected the jury on the issue of the exercise by him of his right to silence during police interview.

The application was originally allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court), which declared it admissible on 28 August 2001.

On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court. Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 2 in fine).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

On 3 January 1997 the applicant and a co-defendant, M., were convicted of the robbery, false imprisonment and attempted murder of Mr Mohamed Mohamoud. The applicant was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. A third co-defendant, W., was convicted of robbery and false imprisonment.

According to the prosecution’s case, on 3 January 1996 Mr Mohamoud, who had spent some of the day selling Khat (a stimulant leaf), picked up W., a prostitute, and arranged to go to her home for sex. W. lived in a fourth-floor council flat which was also occupied by M. When they arrived there were three men, a woman and two teenagers in the flat. Mr Mohamoud was held by the applicant and searched at knife-point by M. who took thirty to forty pounds in cash from him and then left to buy drugs. M. later returned with a quantity of crack cocaine which the occupants of the flat, but not Mr Mohamoud, smoked.

Mr Mohamoud was then searched a second time by the applicant and W. and a further sum of money was taken from him. He was prevented all this time from leaving the flat by the applicant.

At some stage M.’s mood changed under the effects of the drugs and he became angry. M., together with the applicant and an unidentified woman, lifted Mr Mohamoud up and threw him out of the window. He fell four floors. He survived, although he was left paralysed from the waist down. The occupants of the flat made no attempt to call an ambulance. He managed to attract attention by throwing stones at the window of a ground-floor flat. An ambulance eventually arrived to take him to hospital.

M. was arrested on 13 January 1996, the applicant on 24 January and W. on 26 January.

The applicant was cautioned by the police in the following terms: “You do not have to say anything but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you say may be given in evidence.”

The applicant then told the police: “I’m relieved. I’ve expected this every time I’ve been to the shops.”

When being taken to the police station he further stated: “He wasn’t pushed. He jumped. How is he?” and “I can tell you everything, he jumped.”

The applicant was advised to wait until he was interviewed at the police station.

At the start of the interview on 24 January 1996 the applicant’s solicitor informed the police that he had had a lengthy private conversation with his client and had advised him not to reply to any questions at the present time. His reasons were based on what he had been told about the allegations and his view that it would not be reasonable for the applicant to answer questions at that stage. He informed the police that the applicant would be willing to take part in an identification procedure.

The applicant was reminded by the police that he was under caution and he confirmed that he understood the implications of the caution. Thereafter, the applicant answered “no comment” to each question and in particular did so when asked whether he was present at the flat at the time of the offences, whether he knew Mr Mohamoud, whether the latter was thrown out of the window and whether he would like to offer any account of the events in question. The applicant points out that the police never put to him his remark “He wasn’t pushed-he jumped” (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant submits that this statement was at the core of his defence and should have been referred to during interview.

At the end of the interview the applicant was reminded of the terms of the caution.

On 31 May 1996 Mr Mohamoud identified the applicant and the other co-accused in a videotape identification procedure conducted at the hospital where he was being treated.

On 17 September 1996 the applicant was again interviewed by the police in the presence of his solicitor and under caution. On that occasion he admitted being in the occasional presence of Mr Mohamoud at the flat and being in the flat on the night of 3-4 January 1996. The applicant denied being in the room when Mr Mohamoud fell from the window and repeated that Mr Mohamoud had not been pushed out. He stated that Mr Mohamoud had not been threatened and that “he was sitting there quite happy”. The applicant declared that he had been told by W. that Mr Mohamoud had “gone out the window”. He had not believed this and looked out to check. He saw Mr Mohamoud lying on the ground below. He did not go to help him because he was “scared” and thought he was dead. The applicant admitted that on the day(s) in question he was the only person in the flat who fitted the very distinctive features in the description given by Mr Mohamoud of his attackers.

At his trial the applicant testified that he had seen Mr Mohamoud drinking beer in the flat and spoke to him briefly on one occasion. He learnt of the incident from W. who informed him that “he’s gone out of the window”. The applicant thought she was joking. He went into the living room, looked out of the window and saw Mr Mohamoud lying on the ground below. W. then told him that Mr Mohamoud had jumped out of the window. He watched the police and ambulance arrive from a neighbouring flat.

When asked during his evidence why he had not answered some or all of the questions put to him during the police interview the applicant replied that he had done so on the advice of his solicitor.

During the course of the applicant’s evidence, and without seeking the views of the applicant’s counsel in the absence of the jury, the trial judge asked the applicant if he was prepared to testify as to what he had told his solicitor prior to the first interview during the lengthy consultation. His counsel stated that since the question had been asked in the presence of the jury he would not object to the question being put to the applicant. The applicant then stated that he too had no objection to answering the question. The matter was not thereafter pursued by the prosecution or the trial judge.

In his summing up to the jury the trial judge, with reference to section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, directed the jury in the following terms: “... you may draw such inferences as seem to you to be fair and proper from that failure of [his] to mention [the points identified in his interview relating to his presence in the flat on that evening]. You could, for instance, infer that the [applicant and W.] have fabricated their evidence, made it up, after those first interviews. You could infer that they were indeed biding their time and seeing whether or not they would be identified. That failure to mention the sort of things or give answers to the sort of questions that I have listed, as [the applicant] failed, cannot of itself prove guilt. So, of course, if you were not sure of [Mr Mohamoud’s] identifications of any of these defendants, that would be the end of the case even if you thought they were behaving in the way I have just described over their first interviews. But although they cannot of themselves, those failures, prove guilt, you may hold that failure against them in deciding whether he is guilty. You don’t have to. It is for you to decide. [The applicant] told you that his reason for not answering some of the questions was that he had received advice from his solicitor that he should make no comment ... Of course, we have – you have – no independent evidence of what was said by the solicitor, but if simply saying ‘Oh my solicitor advised me not to answer questions’ was by itself a good and final answer, any competent solicitor and a defendant would have the power to strangle at birth any interview and that would make, you may think, a mockery of the Act of Parliament which allows a jury, if they think it is right and proper, to make an adverse inference and that could not have been Parliament’s intention. The fact is that it is [the applicant’s] choice ... whether or not to accept [his] solicitor’s advice or not, and any solicitor worthy of his or her name should have included in the advice the various pros and cons of saying no comment and in particular should have included the possibility, even the probability, that his or her defence could be harmed if they failed to mention facts that they could so easily do and that if they did not mention them, why then an adverse inference could be drawn. But as I say, you have no independent evidence as to what the solicitor said or did not say. But whether or not the solicitors said that, the officers certainly did. They [administered the caution] more than once ... . So it is for each defendant ... to decide whether to answer or not. You decide what you make of the reasons given for not answering. If you thought that the reason given was a good one, then of course you could not hold it against them. If you thought that they were failing to answer certain awkward questions because, for example, they were keeping their powder dry, as it were, hoping against hope they would not be identified and the other reasons I mentioned a moment ago, or because they had not yet worked out what their defence was going to be, you could draw the inference that I have mentioned and, if you did, that might point towards guilt, but it is you who decide whether it is fair and proper to draw those adverse inferences.”

At the request of the applicant’s counsel the trial judge gave the following further direction to the jury: “When dealing with the [applicant’s] first [interview] when [he] failed to answer questions. I did not specifically remind you, though you have heard it any number of times, that the defendants were cautioned that they do not have to say anything. That is of course the position, they do not have to say anything, but the inferences I suggested that you can draw nevertheless remain if you think they have not mentioned things that they could reasonably have been expected to mention and if you think it is fair to take the inferences of the sort I have mentioned, but there is that right to silence.”

On 23 May 1997 the applicant was convicted of robbery, false imprisonment and attempted murder and sentenced to a total of fifteen years’ imprisonment.

The applicant and his co-accused appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal. The applicant relied, inter alia, on the ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the proper inferences to be drawn under section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 from the exercise of his right of silence at the police interview.

On 7 May 1998 the Court of Appeal in a reserved judgment and following a hearing dismissed the appeal. Lord Justice Henry stated in his judgment, with reference to section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, that it could not have been the intention of Parliament to provide that the only adverse inference that could be drawn from failure to disclose facts was recent fabrication. He quoted with approval the judgment of Lord Justice Rose in the case of R. v Roble (judgment of 21 January 1997, unreported). “The purpose of the statutory provisions is to permit adverse inferences to be drawn where there has been late fabrication, to this extent, to encourage speedy disclosure of a genuine defence. If a defendant disclosed to his solicitor, prior to a police interview, charging or trial, information capable of giving rise to a defence, it will always be open to the defence to lead evidence of this to rebut any inference of subsequent fabrication. But if such evidence was not disclosed or was not disclosed at a late stage in the sequence of interview, charge and trial, adverse inferences can be drawn by the jury.”

Lord Justice Henry added: “Thus the statutory objective designed to discourage surprise and “trial by ambush” is achieved. If the applicant was right in submitting that the only adverse inference that could be drawn was subsequent fabrication, the only purpose of the legislation (to encourage speedy disclosure of genuine defences) would be easily defeated. But in our judgment that is not the case... The complaint made ... is that under the Act a ‘proper inference’ is one relevant to ‘in determining whether the accused is guilty’, and not simply adverse to a Defendant. We agree with the first proposition contained in that sentence, but not with the second. As section 34(2)(d) [of the 1994 Act] makes clear, the jury may make such inferences as they think proper in their task of considering their verdict. Clearly such inferences must be properly drawn, that is to say drawn from facts relevant to the verdict. The inferences that are complained of are not simply ‘adverse’... When it is proper to take them into account the Judge rightly reminded the jury that they could draw the adverse inference that [the applicant] was biding his time and seeing whether or not he would be identified, and it was for the jury to decide whether or not ‘to hold that failure against [him] in deciding whether [he was] guilty’.”

With respect to the applicant’s argument that the trial judge should not have intervened to request the applicant whether he wished to relate what he had said to his solicitor before the first police interview, Lord Justice Henry considered that this intervention was improper and an invitation to the applicant to waive legal professional privilege. However he concluded that, in the circumstances, the applicant had not been prejudiced as a result of the intervention.

On 2 June 1998 the Court of Appeal refused to certify that that the case raised a point of public importance and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
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44652/98
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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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United Kingdom
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Mr Keith Anderson Beckles
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4 November 1998
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Hickman and Rose
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London
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United Kingdom Government
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Mr C. Whomersley
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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28 August 2001
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3 January 1997
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M.
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Mr Mohamed Mohamoud
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fifteen years
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W.
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3 January 1996
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Mr Mohamoud
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Khat
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W.
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W.
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M.
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Mr Mohamoud
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M.
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thirty to forty pounds
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M.
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Mr Mohamoud
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Mr Mohamoud
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W.
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M.
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M.
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Mr Mohamoud
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M.
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13 January 1996
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24 January
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W.
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26 January
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24 January 1996
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Mr Mohamoud
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31 May 1996
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Mr Mohamoud
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17 September 1996
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Mr Mohamoud
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3-4 January 1996
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Mr Mohamoud
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Mr Mohamoud
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Mr Mohamoud
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W.
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Mr Mohamoud
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Mr Mohamoud
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Mr Mohamoud
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W.
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Mr Mohamoud
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W.
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Mr Mohamoud
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23 May 1997
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fifteen years
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Lord Justice Henry
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Lord Justice Rose
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R. v Roble
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21 January 1997
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Lord Justice Henry
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Lord Justice Henry
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2 June 1998
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House of Lords
Keith Anderson Beckles
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Task: Annotate the document to anonymise the following person: Keith Anderson Beckles