23 December 2002
Defense Department Briefing Transcript
(Iraq/U.N. Declaration; Post-Iraq/Hussein; Iraq/U.N. Compliance; U.S.
Force Buildup/Region; Predator/Iraq; North Korea/Nuclear Reactor;
Drone/Shootdown; Train and Equip/Iraqi Opposition Forces; Base
Closure/Overseas; Afghanistan/Reconstruction; Kurds/Training) (7420)
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted a Pentagon news briefing
Following is the transcript of the briefing:
United States Department of Defense
Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Monday, Dec. 23, 2002 -- 11:01 a.m. EST
DoD News Briefing -- Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers
(Also participating was Gen. Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Rumsfeld: First, I want to express my personal sympathies to the
family of Army Sergeant Steven Checo, who was killed last Friday when
his unit came under attack from hostile forces in Afghanistan. We
deeply appreciate his courageous service while defending the country
Journalism too can be a difficult and dangerous assignment. We also
want to express appreciation -- correction -- sympathies to the family
of Patrick Bourrat, the French journalist who died Saturday in the
On Thursday of last week the administration set forth the inadequacies
of the Iraqi declaration, which is described as "failing to meet the
U.N. resolution's requirements," unquote. The U.S. is continuing to
discuss with members of the Security Council how to gain Iraq's
compliance with its international obligations. Thanks to President
Bush's leaderships, the U.N. passed a unanimous resolution giving Iraq
an opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, and
inspectors are back in the country for the first time in many years.
We've arrived at this point because of the growing international
diplomatic and military pressure.
The moment Saddam and his ruling clique seem to feel that they're out
of danger, they will undoubtedly see no incentive to comply with their
international obligations. That is why, after the passage of
Resolution 1441, the U.S. and coalition countries are continuing to
take steps to keep pressure on the regime. Among other things, we've
continued patrolling the skies over the north and south no-fly zones.
We've continued developing a humanitarian relief and reconstruction
plan for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. We've continued working with the
Iraqi opposition. We've taken steps to prepare for a post-Saddam
transition. And we're continuing to work with friends and allies to
keep the military pressure on Iraq. For example, the recent Internal
Look exercise in Qatar tested the new Central Command's deployable
headquarters. I was there week before last. General Myers was there
last week. And it should indicate to Iraq that the U.S. and its
coalition partners are prepared to act if necessary.
Similarly, we're taking prudent and deliberate steps with respect to
alerts and mobilizations and deployment of U.S. forces -- active,
Guard and Reserve. These include alerting Reserve combat, combat
support and combat service support forces, deployment of combat and
combat support forces needed to pave the way for future deployments in
the event that that becomes necessary, activating mobilization bases
for processing of Reserve components. I expect that we and others
could continue to make prudent force-flow decisions in the weeks and
months ahead, depending on the degree of Iraqi cooperation.
None of these steps reflect a decision by the president or the United
Nations or anyone else, to my knowledge, to use force. The president
has not made such a decision. Rather, they are intended to support the
diplomatic efforts that are under way, to enhance force protection in
the region and elsewhere in the world, including the United States,
and to make clear to the Iraqi regime that there need -- that they
need to comply with their U.N. obligations.
In the period ahead, we'll continue to work with the United Nations
member states to encourage Iraqi compliance. As the president said,
the use of force is the last choice. The goal is for Iraq to comply
with U.N. resolutions.
This is our last scheduled briefing this year. It's been an eventful
one for military and media alike. Reporting can indeed be difficult
and dangerous, as we saw last week. I salute you and your colleagues
for your professionalism, and I wish you and your families a safe and
Last, I want the men and women in uniform to know how much we
appreciate the sacrifice, especially those who are serving far from
home and loved ones during this special time of year. All Americans
know that our country can celebrate this season of peace only because
the armed forces of the United States voluntarily stand ready to
defend freedom and defeat terror. And we are grateful to each one of
Myers: Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Secretary. I just got back
this morning from a troop visit to Qatar, Afghanistan and Kuwait, and
I can tell you that our young men and women on the front lines of this
global war on terrorism are doing a superb job. They are highly
motivated, despite being away from families during this holiday
season. And they're ready to take on any mission that our nation may
ask of them.
On one sad note, the secretary mentioned the death of Sergeant Steven
Checo. I was in Bagram just six hours after his death. As you know, he
died because of a firefight near Shkin. His unit is based at Kandahar,
and we went there later in the day. And as you can imagine, the troops
there were clearly saddened by the loss of one of their own. So I
would like to add my condolences to those of the secretary for
Sergeant Checo's family.
As the secretary said, we are continuing our deliberate and steady
force build-up in the region. It's important to posture or forces
appropriately to complement our diplomatic efforts. We want to ensure
we can act quickly should it be necessary.
With me on the trip was comedian Drew Carey and baseball great Roger
Clemens. They were a great morale boost to the troops for our folks
serving in those tough, frontline positions, and I want to publicly
thank both of them for taking time out of their busy schedules to meet
and entertain our troops. They were absolutely tireless in their
efforts. And I also want to thank the USO and the Armed Forces
Entertainment Office for sponsoring them.
This morning, at 7:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a U.S.-manned
Predator reconnaissance vehicle was reported missing in Southern Iraq
after being fired upon by Iraqi military aircraft. The Predator is
And with that, I think we'll end there and take your questions.
Q: Charlie's spot.
Rumsfeld: You're Charlie's spot?
Q: Yeah, I'm Charlie's spot. (Laughter.)
On North Korea, the North Koreans announced steps to unfreeze a
reactor that's been idle since 1994 in the non-proliferation pact with
the United States. Some experts think the North has been emboldened by
current U.S. preoccupation with Iraq. Do you share that analysis? And
is the United States any less likely to resort to the use of force in
North Korea because of the focus on Iraq and the war on terror?
Rumsfeld: I have no reason to believe that you're correct that North
Korea feels emboldened because of the world's interest in Iraq. If
they do, it would be a mistake.
Q: But the United States is no longer postured to fight two major
regional wars at a time since the QDR. Are you saying that in fact the
United States is entirely capable of pursuing the war against terror,
Iraq and North Korea at the same time?
Rumsfeld: The answer to the last question is yes, we are perfectly
capable of doing that which is necessary.
And second, I would correct your first portion of your question, in
this way: You said, I believe, that we're no longer capable of
fighting two major regional conflicts since the Quadrennial Defense
Review. That's false. We were -- we had limitations and shortcomings
prior to the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Quadrennial Defense
Review was a reflection of reality.
Second, we are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts, as
the national strategy and the force-sizing construct clearly
indicates. We're capable of winning decisively in one and swiftly
defeating in the case of the other. And let there be no doubt about
Myers: Can I make a comment on the North Korean reactor? I heard on
the radio this morning that North Korea is claiming that they're
restarting it to add electricity to their country. And the fact is, as
I'm told, is that that reactor adds negligible electricity to the
power grid in North Korea, and most of the electricity it produces is
consumed by the reactor itself to run things. So.
Q: But the big question is, what happens if they move to reprocess the
plutonium from the spent fuel rods that are currently under seal at
Yongbyon? The Clinton administration had drawn a kind of red line,
saying that it was ready to use force if the North Koreans moved to
use that plutonium. Would that -- is that also the policy of the Bush
Rumsfeld: The situation today is somewhat different from then. And it
is, as you know, a subject that has been under intensive discussion by
the president of the United States with the People's Republic of
China, with Russia with Japan and with South Korea. And those
discussions are ongoing.
Q: General Myers, do you see today's action by an Iraqi aircraft to
shoot down this drone, penetrating the southern no-fly zone, as an
escalation of things we've been seeing in the no-fly zone with the
Myers: Brett, I don't. They have -- I think we've lost two other
Predators, I believe, to hostile fire in southern Iraq. They've been
attempting -- they attempt to shoot down all our aircraft that fly
over southern and northern Iraq in support of the U.N. Security
Council resolutions. And they got a lucky shot today and they brought
down the Predator. But I don't see -- I do not see it as an
escalation. It's been something they've been doing for literally the
last couple of years.
Q: And to follow, Mr. Secretary, your thoughts --
Rumsfeld: I think that's an assumption on our part.
Rumsfeld: It is not a fact. We do not know for sure that it was shot
Myers: We're still looking at the --
Rumsfeld: We know we've lost communications with it, but --
Q: Your thoughts on the fact that there have been these increased
firings and this firing today, as the Iraqis are saying that they are
completely complying on all fronts with the U.N. resolution?
Rumsfeld: Well, they obviously aren't. And they've been making a
strenuous, energetic effort to shoot down U.S. aircraft for many,
many, many months now -- manned and unmanned.
Q: Mr. Secretary, both you and General Myers mentioned it vaguely, but
I wondered if you could elaborate a little bit on the deployment, the
massive buildup of air, land and sea forces in the next month, and
what sort of message --
Rumsfeld: I don't know that we've said anything about massive buildups
of air, land and sea forces in the next month. I don't think you did
or I did.
Myers: Sir, I didn't --
Q: Are you going to do that?
Rumsfeld: First of all, we don't announce alerts or activations or
deployments. Never have. I doubt if we ever will, unless it's for some
domestic emergency of some type, like a forest fire.
We -- what I did do was to specify that no decision has been made with
respect to the use of force. It is the president's last choice, not
the first choice.
However, there wouldn't be inspectors back in Iraq had there not been
and were there not now the possibility of the use of force. And as a
result, the United States and, I presume, some other countries will,
from time to time, be making decisions with respect to how to manage
that capability on our part in a way that is consistent with the
diplomacy and with our -- the world's desire to have Iraq comply with
the U.N. resolutions.
If you think about it, a decision was made a number of years ago for
the United States military to put in the Reserves and the Guard, as
opposed to the active forces, a whole set of capabilities that are
necessary if you are going to in fact be engaged in the use of force.
That means that you cannot do the things you normally would do with
active forces -- to prepare ports and prepare airfields and to train
people and to begin that process of being able to respond -- in the
event the president makes such a decision, without activating Reserve
and Guard. So we're doing that. It's a shame that we're organized that
way, and we intend to see that we're no longer organized that way in
the future. But at present, we are organized that way.
Second, there are, in the case of Guard and Reserve, some instances
where they need 30, 60, 90 days notice. They have to get their teeth
fixed. They have to fill out papers. They have to get trained. They
have to get (a whole series of ?) equipment up to speed. And as a
result, unless you want to wait 30, 60, 90 days, if and when the
president were to make such a decision, you have to take steps now.
And as a result, what we're doing is, in some instances, we're not
even alerting. What we're doing is, we're saying, "Here's an alert
order, not that we intend to activate you or mobilize you or deploy
you, but we intend to give you an alert so that you can get all that
stuff done, get your paperwork through, get your teeth fixed, do the
-- get your medical exams, do the kinds of things that need to be done
so that it won't take 30, 60, 90 days in the event we need your
So that is the process that's taking place, and it is in a very
orderly and deliberate and prudent way. Dick Myers and I have spent
many, many hours with the individuals who manage this. At the present
time, the Department of Defense is mal-organized to deal with
something like this. We tend to be organized to either be -- do
everything or do nothing. And what we're trying to do is to -- here
we've got the control over the activation of Guard and Reserve in the
services, the three services, the four services. We have -- the Joint
Forces Command has a voice in all of this. And in some cases, there
are capabilities in the combatant commanders' hands. So you've got all
of these six or eight or different places where you may want to bring
forces to a different state of readiness. So we're working with all of
them and trying to get those threads up through the needlehead so that
the -- it remains clear to the Iraqis that it's in their best
interests to disarm. And in the even that the president does make such
a decision, he has the ability to do it in some reasonable period of
time. It is not a simple thing to do. But we're working very hard
trying to do it in a way that doesn't unduly inconvenience a group of
people by activating them before they're needed. So it's a process
that's going to be going forward as we move ahead.
Q: General Myers, would you also say it might put a little -- this
might also put a little bit of pressure on Saddam Hussein and ratchet
Myers: Well, I think we've also said that this is going to complement
the other diplomacy that's going on. Certainly he has to know that the
world is serious about the UNSCR 1441. And after all, it becomes his
decision then how he wants to respond.
Rumsfeld: There wouldn't be any inspectors in there now if he weren't
concerned about that, that's for sure.
Q: Well, why do we continue to think that Iraq is a bigger threat than
North Korea, especially given this weekend's development?
Rumsfeld: We've been over this a number of times. The three --
Q: But this is the first time since -- I mean, this is a much more --
Rumsfeld: That's true.
Q: -- severe development.
Rumsfeld: That's true. But, I mean, the three countries in the axis of
evil are each different. Each represents a danger to the world. And
they're quite different in their circumstance.
We have a very -- they went through a long period of years with
respect to Iraq with respect to diplomacy, and it fell flat on its
face. The diplomacy didn't do any good. The inspectors have been out
for years. The Iraqi regime has thumbed their noses at the United
Nations annually for a good period of time.
Now, at some point, if the United Nations is going to be relevant, it
has to decide how comfortable is it allowing its resolutions to be
totally ignored. The situation in North Korea is a fairly recent one.
The diplomacy that's under way there is in its early stages for the
United States and the interested neighboring countries. It seems to me
a perfectly rational way to be proceeding.
Q: Over the weekend there were some statements from Saddam's regime
inviting U.S. government personnel or the CIA along on the inspection.
Do you have any response to that? Do you think it's a good idea?
Rumsfeld: I have no idea what the decision will be with respect to
that. I read the same statements. I have no -- I'm not sure if they
are accurate or if they were actually given by responsible people
there. And I don't know quite what the United States might consider
doing. I suppose the -- they invited intelligence people in, as I
recall, and I suppose the intel community is thinking about that at
the present time.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I have a question to you and one to General Myers.
To you, sir: Do you think it's theoretically possible that the
inspectors would stay for a long time in Iraq and prevent any
development of weapons of mass destruction by their very presence and
the alert they might get from satellites from the U.S?
Rumsfeld: I don't know. The -- as we've said, the purpose of
inspectors, U.N. inspectors, is not to go into a discovery process,
and it's not a deterrent or a preventative technique historically, as
your question suggests it conceivably could be. In fact, what it's
been is only
-- it has only worked in situations where the country has decided to
cooperate and the country says, "I want to prove to the world that we
do not have these things, and if we do have them, we'll destroy them."
And they invite the inspectors in so that the international community
can say, "Aha! You're right. They're cooperating. They're doing
exactly what we wanted them to do, and isn't that a good thing?"
Inspectors have never been successful in terms of a discovery process.
It's an enormous country. You know, it's bigger than Texas, or as big,
I guess. I haven't looked lately, but it is a very big place. And
they've got enormous -- miles and miles and miles of underground
tunneling. I mean, I don't know how inspectors on the surface of the
Earth can know -- even know what's going on in the underground
facilities that the Iraqis have. So I just don't know the answer to
Q: General Myers, do you have any -- can you shed light on the
circumstances of the death of Patrick Bourrat? There are different
versions on how he died and where, whether it was, you know -- (off
mike) -- or on the spot.
Rumsfeld: Well, there were a lot of press people standing right there,
Myers: I can give you -- I was in Kuwait right after that -- matter of
fact -- and there was an exercise, a field exercise, that reporters
were asked -- were permitted to observe. And there was an observation
place for the press corps a safe distance away for -- tanks and, I
think, armored personnel carriers were moving by. And my understanding
is that the reporter --
Rumsfeld: Was he a reporter or a photographer?
Q: A reporter.
Myers: -- reporter --
Rumsfeld: Is he?
Myers: -- left the observation area and went very close to where these
vehicles were moving down this path, trying to get a picture, I'm
told, and was hit by one of the tanks -- and of course they're 60 tons
and -- or more -- and, my understanding is, was hit in the chest and
passed away in the hospital, actually.
Rumsfeld: But the report we received is that he departed from the
controlled area, where there was engineering tape. And the report I
received also was that he was taking a photograph. I don't know if
that's true, but that's what I --
Myers: The tank driver, when he -- as soon as he caught the vision of
this person, brought the 60 tons to a halt as fast as he could. But
the individual was already hit, and that's obviously a --
Q: Yeah. Well, the cameraman has a slightly different version, saying
that he -- he actually tried to warn a photographer and was hit, and
Rumsfeld: You mean there was a different photographer out there?
Q: Yeah. Well, I don't really know myself, but I mean --
Rumsfeld: (Laughs.) It's amazing to me that --
Q: -- (inaudible) -- the family and the Pentagon have provided a
different version. And also
Rumsfeld: We -- I don't have a version.
Q: No? Okay.
Rumsfeld: There must have been a lot of press people there. And it's
hard for me to believe that with all those press people standing
there, that they can't find a reasonably agreed-upon conclusion as to
what actually took place. So I would think -- and clearly the Pentagon
does not have a version. We were not there. There were a lot of press
people there, and there were people from Central Command in Kuwait who
were physically there.
Myers: And were on-scene --
Rumsfeld: And they've spoken.
Myers: -- within minute. I know that. And that's the ones I've talked
to. And that's they --
Rumsfeld: And it's a terrible shame.
Myers: It is.
Rumsfeld: It's just a shame.
Q: General Myers, can I ask you to go back over one thing you said.
You said that the United States is continuing its deliberate and
steady build-up, and that you want to ensure you can act quickly if
necessary. Do you have some indication or any reason or do you have
any concerns at the moment that Saddam Hussein could suddenly make
some aggressive move in this period of time? Are you now posturing to
deal with any aggressive move that he might make?
And my other questions is, given all of that, is the United States,
has the Bush administration made the commitment to let the inspectors
get out of Iraq before any hypothetical military action would take
Myers: On the first part, and I think the secretary covered it in his
statement, and I covered it in mine, I believe, that I think we remain
postured. You know, one of the reasons we conduct Operation Northern
Watch and Southern Watch under the previous United Nations Security
Council resolutions is to ensure that the Iraqi regime can't attack
the Kurdish population, as it has done in the past, to make sure they
can't attack the Shi'ia population, as it has done in the past. That's
part of what we're doing over there.
So we are -- yes, we're ready and postured and have been for some time
to know when that might be happening, and then take appropriate
action. And I don't think we're worried, particularly worried one way
or the other. This has been -- this has been a potential from -- for
the last 10 years anyway. I might remind you that he also -- in the
north, also used chemical weapons on the Kurdish population. And so
that's part of the reason we're over there.
This build-up --
Rumsfeld: It's one of the reasons for the Northern and Southern No-fly
Q: Well, I guess my confusion -- and I do want to also ask about the
question of inspectors
-- is --
Rumsfeld: Well, wait a second. Let's -- you were --
Myers: I think I'm done with that part of it.
I was just going to say that, as we said in our opening statements, of
course, now we're under a new U.N. Security Council resolution, 1441.
We think by posturing our forces over there, as the secretary said, we
probably wouldn't have a 1441, and we wouldn't have the compliance, as
poor as it's been up to this date, by the Iraqis if it hadn't been for
the fact that we have forces postured in the region to be ready to
take whatever action is necessary. So we'll continue that deliberate
force flow that we've been conducting now for several months.
Rumsfeld: And then you asked a second question before you started with
the third, was about inspectors getting out?
Q: (Off mike) -- commitment to let the inspectors get out before any
hypothetical military action would begin.
Rumsfeld: We're in close touch with the inspectors on deconfliction on
all kinds of things. When they go south of the 36 -- 33, and they go
north of 36, we know it, and we work with them.
Q: But do you have a commitment to let them get out?
Rumsfeld: We don't have commitments to do anything. I said we are in
very close coordination with the inspectors and we deconflict. And
obviously, that is something that we do just in the normal course of
things. It doesn't have anything to do with commitments or lack of
commitments; it has to do with just orderly good business.
Q: Could you, General Myers, give us maybe narratives of both the fire
fight in Afghanistan and what happened with the Predator? On the
Predator, was a U.S. aircraft able to give chase? Did they see it on
radar? Was the Predator armed? And in Afghanistan, was it an ambush?
And what was the outcome of the fire fight?
Rumsfeld: On the Predator, I can't. That was our first report this
morning. And we'll -- Central Command will be looking into it and
we'll get more information later on that situation, what they know.
On the first, since I got to Bagram shortly after that happened, I was
briefed on it to some extent. It was our forces that saw a group of
individuals, that they approached them, mounted and then dismounted.
And these individuals started to flee, but firing back as they were
fleeing. And one of the shots, obviously, unfortunately, hit Sergeant
Checo. And that was the situation.
Q: And did they get away?
Rumsfeld: There were -- not to go into too much detail, but we think
-- we know one of them, one of the aggressors was killed, and we think
a couple more have been picked up, traced back -- with some help from
a coalition partner and traced back to a hospital and picked up,
Q: Mr. Secretary, some Iraqi opposition members have been vocal,
saying that should President Bush order some military action in Iraq,
asking that the Iraqi army soldiers be spared from an initial attack
because if it happened, they believe large numbers of them would turn
on Saddam immediately. Is that something that you believe would happen
should an attack come to fruition?
Rumsfeld: I guess I don't really get into the "believes," "might,"
"should," hypotheticals. The fact of the matter is, in Gulf War,
70,(000), 80,000 of the Iraqi Army surrendered almost instantaneously,
in a matter of hours and days. I would -- I think it's not
unreasonable to suspect that the same might occur in even larger
numbers in this instance, but it's not knowable.
So, one, the combatant commander, needless to say, has to be prepared
for both contingencies. He has to be prepared to cope with a situation
where they do not surrender, and by the same token, he has to be
prepared -- from a humanitarian standpoint, to be prepared for a
situation where they might very well, in which case you have to
suddenly switch what it is your task is. And I can assure you that
General Franks has thought these things through very carefully, and
there's a good deal of evidence that suggests that not everyone is
terribly enthusiastic about Saddam Hussein and his regime.
Q: Is there a military option on the table for preventing North Korea
from manufacturing nuclear weapons?
Rumsfeld: For preventing them from manufacturing their weapons --
Q: Nuclear weapons.
Rumsfeld: Nuclear weapons. Well, let me just put it this way: that the
task of the department, one of the assignments of the department, is
to prepare for a whole host of contingencies. We tend not to get into
details as to what those contingencies might be.
Q: What is the status of the effort to train and equip Iraqi
opposition? I think the president freed up some money for that, but
have you signed an order yet for that to go forward?
Myers: We have allocated, the secretary has approved -- I think it was
about -- just a little bit over $9 million to do some of the
preparation of training facility. We're still in the process of
vetting the individuals that might be trained, and we look to start
training them, potentially, right after the 1st of the year -- some
time after the 1st of the year.
Q: And this would be in Hungary?
Myers: I think we have had other countries --
Q: They announced -- Hungary has announced their readiness to do it,
but I didn't --
Rumsfeld: Well, I wouldn't -- if I said yes, that would then suggest
that that might be the only place where it might be done, which would
not be accurate -- necessarily accurate. It would -- might also not be
inaccurate, but I'm -- (soft laughter) --
Q: The only thing we we know --
Rumsfeld: I know. I'm disinclined to mislead anyone. So I'll --
Q: How many folks are you going to train?
Rumsfeld: It's a number that's low at the present time and growing.
Q: What kind of vetting process are these individuals going through?
Rumsfeld: Very carefully.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned diplomacy on North Korea, but probably
the most important country that we're not talking to is North Korea.
And some of our allies seem to think that there's --
Rumsfeld: We're not talking to them? Assistant Secretary Kelly was
over there. That's when they took the occasion to announce that they
were trashing every one of their international agreements. How can you
say we're not talking to them?
Q: But are we talking to them now? We'll be talking to them about this
Rumsfeld: This is State Department stuff, and I thought I indicated
earlier that, yes, we are engaged in a process of discussions, the
United States, President Bush, Secretary Powell, with the People's
Republic of China, with the Russian Federation, with Japan and the
Republic of Korea. And that process is ongoing. There are a variety of
interactions taking place.
Q: Is our rhetoric in any way responsible for pushing them to the
point where they feel like they have -- the only option that they have
is to pull these restrictions off and start going down a road again of
building nuclear weapons?
Rumsfeld: That's an interesting question. One of those, like, "Stop me
before I kill again"? (Laughter.) That type of thing? I mean, really,
their actions are result of decisions by the leadership of the
country. The leadership of the country is currently repressing its
people, starving its people, has large numbers of its people in
concentration camps, driving people to try to leave the country
through China and other methods, starving these people. Their economy
is in the tank. People at all levels are unhappy with that leadership.
It is a government that has made a whole host of decisions that have
nothing to do with us. I don't know why they decided they wanted to
have those concentration camps. I have no idea why they decided that
they wanted to end up, after a relatively few years, with an economy
that's 1/36th the size of South Korea's. Think of that. Here, the same
people on different sides of a line, and the GDP in South Korea is 36
times, or something like that -- it's close enough for government work
-- that of North Korea. Why would they do anything they do? Do you
think -- the idea that it's the rhetoric from the United States that's
causing them to starve their people or to do these idiotic things, or
to try to build a nuclear power plant. They don't need a nuclear power
plant. Their power grid couldn't even absorb that. If you look at a
picture from the sky of the Korean Peninsula at night, South Korea is
filled with lights and energy and vitality and a booming economy;
North Korea is dark. It is a tragedy what's being done in that
country. And the suggestion that it is a result of rhetoric from
outside I think is -- misses the point. We have a very strange
situation in that country.
I've got to remember that I'm speaking about diplomacy here and be
Myers: I might just add that it was -- (laughs) -- that it was in
1994, I think, is when they, you know, when all this came up, and that
was -- they made a fundamental decision there to continue this uranium
enrichment business at the same time they were allowing the IAEA to
put seals on the fuel rods. And so, I mean, this has been a
long-standing, obviously, policy of the North Korean regime.
Q: But, sir, are you saying -
Rumsfeld: One of the comments by one of the people to -- I'm told --
to Assistant Secretary Kelly was something like what you just said.
"Oh, it was your rhetoric that made us do it." And it turns out they
had started doing all this well before President Bush came into
office; well before the "Axis of Evil" speech. It's utter nonsense.
Q: Could I just follow up on that?
Rumsfeld: Why not?
Q: Were you suggesting that the uranium enrichment activity that we
confronted them with a few months ago, Kelly, that that had been going
on since 1994?
Myers: I think that's -- I think they admitted that they had been
pursuing that all along, right?
Rumsfeld: I did not know that.
Myers: I -- well, then I -- if you don't know it, then maybe I don't
know it. (Laughter.) Well, given that we read a lot of the same --
Rumsfeld: We do know it started well before --
Q: Yeah, most of the -- during most of the framework agreement time,
Myers: Yeah, I think I'd stick with the fact the decision was made a
long, long time ago that they were going to continue on that program
at the same time that they agreed to have the fuel rods under the
monitor of IAEA.
Q: Mr. Secretary, one point of (interest ?).
Q: As you work your way through the base-closure process next year,
will any of the bases under consideration be overseas? And if so, can
you shed a little more light on that?
Rumsfeld: Yes to both questions. There will be bases overseas that
will be addressed energetically and thoughtfully. And we need to do
exactly the same thing with respect to the rest of the world and our
basing structure as we do in the United States of America. And it
would be a mistake not to. And we fully intend to do it, and we're
engaged in that process already.
Throw light on it? I'm not sure how much light I can throw on it,
except to say that the same set of problems exists -- roughly the same
set of issues exist overseas as exist here. We have a base structure
that does not really fit the 21st century. It does not really fit the
circumstances of our country and our friends and allies around the
world. And we do intend to be working with our NATO friends and allies
and our friends in Northeast Asia and elsewhere to see that we adjust
our footprint and manage our basing structure in a way that makes
sense for the future.
Q: For General Myers. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit.
Other than the unfortunate death of the soldier, how did you find the
rebuilding and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan?
Myers: Well, I did talk to Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, who is the
commander of the task force over there that's responsible for our
department's activities in Afghanistan. And I think he would tell you,
and I believe and I think the secretary believes that the situation in
Afghanistan has improved over time. And we've stood up here and talked
about the facts that back that up; and the fact that 2.3 million
refugees and internally displaced people have moved back in; that
there are a large number of nongovernmental organizations and private
organizations that are back in their schools and so forth.
And that I think the operations in about three-quarters of that
country will probably shift in the future -- near future to what we
call stability operations, where the reconstruction that's so
important for long-term stability and prosperity of the Afghan people
will take place and will enable other nongovernmental organizations
and so forth to come in. So -- there is still that piece of
Afghanistan that is to the east, near the Pakistani border, that has
about three groups in there that are anti -- not only anti-coalition
and anti- the new transitional administration -- that being the al
Qaeda and the Taliban and the -- Hekmatyar's group as well. So that
will be problematic for some time to come.
But generally, the trend is positive. The international community has
put a lot of dollars behind this. We need more, but they've put a lot
of dollars toward it. And generally a positive situation.
Q: On a point of clarification --
Rumsfeld: We have a meeting in the White House, so we're going to have
to cut this -- we're already 10 minutes over. We'll take two --
Q: Just one point of clarification.
Rumsfeld: -- questions, yours and Pam's.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you just said that the North Koreans don't need a
nuclear power plant, their power grid can't even handle it. Yet it's
U.S. policy -- it has been since '94 -- to supply two light- water
nuclear reactors. Are you suggesting that that is wrong-headed?
Rumsfeld: No. I wasn't there. I didn't walk in their shoes. And
there's no question but that North Korea wanted exactly what they got
in the agreed framework. They happen not to want it badly enough to
continue with the agreed framework, because they trashed it. But I
wasn't there. I don't know what the -- I don't know what was on the
table. My personal view is that they would have been fine with fossil
fuel electric power. They certainly need electric power, there's no
question about that.
Q: Are you suggesting that you would oppose --
Rumsfeld: But I don't walk around in the Christmas season talking
about wrong-headedness or things like that. I'm much too sensitive and
-- (laughter) -- into the season.
Q: But notwithstanding your sensitivity, just on the matter of public
policy, would you oppose going back to plans to supply --
Rumsfeld: It's not -- it's not for me. That's -- the State Department
does those things, and I defer to them.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I have another --
Rumsfeld: Pam was the second -- the last question for the day and, the
good Lord willing, for the year.
Q: Well, it's for each of you and jumping ahead. The training for the
Kurds -- what will it entail? Is it lethal training? What kind of
equipment are they getting? And who's conducting it? And how are --
what are you vetting to keep out? What are the types of characters you
And Mr. Secretary, last time you were here, you got rather exercised
about keeping a management reserve fund in large acquisition accounts.
Could you talk a little bit about that? Are we going to see that in
this budget? Which kind of acquisition programs will get it? And how
will Congress maintain its oversight if there are surplus funds? I
mean, there's a potential slush fund. That's why -- they used to do
this, and they stopped doing it.
Rumsfeld: People who are against them call them "slush funds."
Q: People who are for them call them "management reserves."
Rumsfeld: Exactly. Yeah, I think she's got it. (Soft laughter.)
Rumsfeld: I think she's got it.
Q: I don't think she needs your Christmas present. I think she's got
everything she needs now. (Laughs.)
The forces are being trained for a variety of things. Some might be as
interpreters. Some might be as management of forces that have decided
not to continue the battle. Others might be assisting in humanitarian
activities. Others --
Q: (Off mike) -- training?
Q: And who's conducting it?
Q: This was Kurdish?
Rumsfeld: The --
Myers: (Off mike.)
Q: Are these Special Forces, or is it other coalition partners doing
Rumsfeld: "It" suggests that it's a single thing.
Q: Okay. Not if they don't --
Rumsfeld: I suspect that what will be taking place is that people that
are appropriate for each of those disciplines will be doing it.
Q: Americans or coalition?
Rumsfeld: Certainly Americans. How many coalition? I don't know. (To
General Myers.) Do you know that?
Myers: I don't know.
Q: And the vetting process -- who is it meant to keep out?
Rumsfeld: Bad guys. (Laughter.)
Q: Is it "bad" like KDP?
Myers: Well, you can imagine that folks are going to infiltrate a
group like this and know what's going on --
Myers: -- so just try to determine the true intentions of those that
Q: And you did --
Rumsfeld: Furthermore, the United States has a set of principles with
respect to Iraq that
-- we would like an Iraq that's disarmed of weapons of mass
destruction, an Iraq that is not a threat to its neighbors, an Iraq
that is a single country, an Iraq that doesn't engage in ethnic
cleansing inside of its country, an Iraq that in some form or another
will end up providing representation for the various elements in the
country, and that they'd have a voice in what happens in that country.
And therefore, when you vet, to the extent you find people who don't
subscribe to those basic principles, one would add those people to the
list of spies who you would just as soon not train.
Have a nice holiday. (Laughter.) And unless something untoward
happens, we won't see you till the first of the year.
Myers: Happy holidays.
Rumsfeld: Have a good holiday.
Q: One more.
Q: (Inaudible) -- please?
Q: Last question.
Q: My question is are Iraq opposition outside the country?
Q: She said Kurds.
Q: Iraq opposition or Kurds. I asked about the Kurds, the Kurdish
training. Do you have a statement on that?
Rumsfeld: (Maybe both ?)
Q: With both?
Q: You wouldn't just be training Kurds. You'd be training --
Rumsfeld: Certainly --
Q: Iraqi --
Rumsfeld: You certainly would be sending people outside of the
country, yes. That's correct. Someone said that. They said Hungary's
already announced that they're -- that they're offering.
Myers: Right. I'm right. (Laughter.)
Q: General, did you (take a stick in the leg?) when you were over
Q: You did?
Myers: Yes, about 50 percent of the time.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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