Was it a gradual thing, or all at once?

>>14921660 (OP)

When American intelligence agencies turned against them after they manipulated the ANC into abandoning communism and adopting Western democratic values.

They probably began to feel the heat as the Soviet Union declined because the "we need them to counterbalance Soviet influence" argument became irrelevant as the Soviets ceased being a threat.

mid 1980s

thats when PW Botha was already secretly negotiating with ANC.

by 1989, it was all over. Communism falls and South Africa is no longer "useful"

whites were hoping they could get some kind 50/50 of joint power sharing agreement with the blacks, but after Nelson Mandela was freed, that didn't matter anymore.

There are a few candidates for this:



1984, when the NP started secret negotiations with the ANC

1989, when the NP won that year's general election and saw off the KP challenge, giving it a mandate to continue reform policies that included repealing more and more apartheid legislation

1992, when the Yes campaign won a referendum asking the electorate whether or not they supported the negotiated establishment of a new constitution

1994, when the ANC won that year's general election

>>14921660 (OP)



They never lost. They cucked and defeated themselves.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_South_African_apartheid_referendum

>They cucked and defeated themselves.

That's a loss anon.

>>14921660 (OP)

Suez crisis

>>14921660 (OP)

When Rhodesia folded... they sacrificed the Rhodies to buy more time for themselves, but the writing was on the wall by then. 1980.

>they sacrificed the Rhodies to buy more time for themselves

How?

https://businesstimes.co.zw/rhodesia-was-successful-because-essentially-it-was-a-province-of-sa/



>In his 1997 memoir, “The Great Betrayal”, Smith tells how South Africa under Johannes Voster betrayed Rhodesia in 1976 by forcing him (Smith) to accept Henry Kissinger’s proposals for black majority rule in Rhodesia.



>Smith and a few of his cabinet colleagues were invited to Cape Town to meet Kissinger and Vorster to discuss the American proposals. Smith reports in Great Betrayal: “We talked over lunch, and the consensus was that the offer [Kissinger’s proposals] seemed to be the least of the various evils facing us. Kissinger was right: The free world was weak and decadent, and on the retreat. We could get along without the rest, but without South Africa’s assistance, there would be serious problems, and it had been made clear that there were a number of areas in which South Africa could turn the screws on us…”



>Smith goes on: “After a while, Vorster asked us Rhodesians to join him and Hilgard Muller in one of the side rooms. Vorster said that it was necessary to inform us that his government had come to the conclusion that they were no longer able to go on supporting us financially and militarily. Vorster went on to say that he felt strongly the need for urgency and therefore we should make our decision, which would enable me to make public my acceptance that night.



>On Tuesday 21 September, Ian Smith met his cabinet back home in Salisbury for a whole morning and afternoon session, and later they went to Parliament to announce the cabinet decision. “Finally,” he reports in his book, “with one exception, the caucus agreed with me and the cabinet decision. They accepted that we were confronted by the one country in the world [South Africa] which controlled our lifeline, and which had now issued an ultimatum leaving us no alternative.

>When American intelligence agencies turned against them after they manipulated the ANC into abandoning communism and adopting Western democratic values.

The CIA turned against Apartheid South Africa back in 1955 and helped to draw up the ANC's Freedom Charter?
