The NSA's backdoor into OpenBSD's Compiler and Kernel

The backdoor was initially introduced using compiler backdooring, which involves modifying the code of a compiler itself to introduce a backdoor into the output executable. In this case, the backdoor was added into the clang compiler, which is used to compile C and C++ code on OpenBSD.

To introduce the backdoor, the NSA used TCP 0day exploits to gain access to the OpenBSD network and modify the binary of the clang compiler on an OpenBSD development server to cause the backdoor to spread into any compiled programs which on execution would infect the system's clang with the same backdoor, as well as adding a new function that could be used to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. They also added a trigger condition to the code that would activate the backdoor only when certain conditions were met, such as upon recieving a specific network packet.

Once the backdoor was added to the compiler code, it was compiled and included in the OpenBSD kernel and other parts of the operating system. This made it incredibly difficult to detect, as the backdoor code was hidden among legitimate code.

The NSA went even further and managed to replicate the backdoor in the BIOS firmware of affected systems. This was accomplished by distributing several BIOS 0day exploits using the original backdoor onto the systems, installing the same backdoor payload as the compiler and kernel onto the system's BIOS image.

The BIOS payload was designed to execute the backdoor code during the system boot process, before the operating system had loaded. This allowed the backdoor to remain fully persistent, even if the hard drive was wiped and the operating system was reinstalled.

The firmware payload was added to a specific area of the BIOS that is not typically overwritten during a standard BIOS update or reflash.

It's also worth noting that this exploit is not limited to OpenBSD or even the x86 architecture, and could potentially be present on many more platforms than we currently know of

Overall, the NSA's backdoor in the OpenBSD clang compiler and kernel, and its replication in the BIOS firmware, represents a serious threat to privacy and security. The techniques used to introduce and replicate the backdoor are incredibly advanced and difficult to detect, and nearly impossible to remove without the replacement of hardware.

sauce now

i made it up

sauce. i mean we know linux and bsd's are comped but still

i just said, i literally made it up

the funny thing is that most of this is probably true since lunix and *BSD are full of proprietary blobs and dont give a flying fuck about freedom or security

https://www.theregister.com/2022/02/23/chinese_nsa_linux/

https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/a-brief-history-of-the-nsa-attempting-to-insert-backdoors-into-encrypted-data

https://www.infoq.com/news/2013/10/Linux-Backdoor/

https://yro.slashdot.org/story/13/07/02/1241246/nsa-backdoors-in-open-source-and-open-standards-what-are-the-odds



And on and on... the list is endless

>>93144044 (OP)

rent-free

Holy based

this did actually happen though, just not the nsa and not openbsd

>>93144044 (OP)

I dev for openbsd 

this is nice story, you should do a fandom but this is false unfortunatly

install openbsd now or gay

this is real tho

https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&amp;m=143355112811564

openBSD is proprietary malware

uuuu spooky

hardware need firmware uuuuuu spooky dooky

OpenBSD has been obsolete for decades anyway. It's only usecase was for building a routerfirewall/dmz. 

It died the year Linux got iptables.

>>93144044 (OP)

Can openbsd be compiled with tcc? That's small enough to be audited by a single non-retard cs grad
