Input:
ΕΚΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΌΣ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΌΣ (ΕΕ) αριθ. 166/2012 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΉΣ
της 24ης Φεβρουαρίου 2012
για καθορισμό των κατ’ αποκοπή τιμών εισαγωγής για τον προσδιορισμό της τιμής εισόδου ορισμένων οπωροκηπευτικών
Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ,
Έχοντας υπόψη τη Συνθήκη για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης,
Έχοντας υπόψη τον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1234/2007 του Συμβουλίου, της 22ας Οκτωβρίου 2007, για τη θέσπιση κοινής οργάνωσης των γεωργικών αγορών και ειδικών διατάξεων για ορισμένα γεωργικά προϊόντα (ενιαίος κανονισμός ΚΟΑ) (1),
Έχοντας υπόψη τον εκτελεστικό κανονισμό (ΕΕ) αριθ. 543/2011 της Επιτροπής, της 7ης Ιουνίου 2011, για τη θέσπιση λεπτομερών κανόνων εφαρμογής του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1234/2007 του Συμβουλίου όσον αφορά τους τομείς των οπωροκηπευτικών και των μεταποιημένων οπωροκηπευτικών (2), και ιδίως το άρθρο 136 παράγραφος 1,
Εκτιμώντας τα ακόλουθα:
(1)
Ο εκτελεστικός κανονισμός (ΕΕ) αριθ. 543/2011 προβλέπει, κατ’ εφαρμογή των αποτελεσμάτων των πολυμερών εμπορικών διαπραγματεύσεων του Γύρου της Ουρουγουάης, τα κριτήρια για τον καθορισμό από την Επιτροπή των κατ’ αποκοπή τιμών εισαγωγής από τρίτες χώρες, για τα προϊόντα και τις περιόδους που ορίζονται στο παράρτημα XVI μέρος A του εν λόγω κανονισμού.
(2)
Η κατ’ αποκοπή τιμή εισαγωγής υπολογίζεται κάθε εργάσιμη ημέρα, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 136 παράγραφος 1 του εκτελεστικού κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 543/2011, λαμβανομένων υπόψη των ημερήσιων μεταβλητών στοιχείων. Συνεπώς, ο παρών κανονισμός θα πρέπει να αρχίσει να ισχύει την ημέρα της δημοσίευσής του στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης,
ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ:
Άρθρο 1
Οι κατ’ αποκοπή τιμές εισαγωγής που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 136 του εκτελεστικού κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 543/2011 καθορίζονται στο παράρτημα του παρόντος κανονισμού.
Άρθρο 2
Ο παρών κανονισμός αρχίζει να ισχύει την ημέρα της δημοσίευσής του στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης,
Ο παρών κανονισμός είναι δεσμευτικός ως προς όλα τα μέρη του και ισχύει άμεσα σε κάθε κράτος μέλος.
Βρυξέλλες, 24 Φεβρουαρίου 2012.


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REGULAMENTO DE EXECUÇÃO (UE) N.o 163/2012 DA COMISSÃO
de 23 de fevereiro de 2012
que altera o Regulamento (CE) n.o 1484/95 no que respeita aos preços representativos nos setores da carne de aves de capoeira e dos ovos, bem como para a ovalbumina
A COMISSÃO EUROPEIA,
Tendo em conta o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia,
Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CE) n.o 1234/2007 do Conselho, de 22 de outubro de 2007, que estabelece uma organização comum dos mercados agrícolas e disposições específicas para certos produtos agrícolas (Regulamento «OCM única») (1), nomeadamente o artigo 143.o, em conjugação com o artigo 4.o,
Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CE) n.o 614/2009 do Conselho, de 7 de julho de 2009, relativo ao regime comum de trocas comerciais para a ovalbumina e para a lactalbumina (2), nomeadamente o artigo 3.o, n.o 4,
Considerando o seguinte:
(1)
O Regulamento (CE) n.o 1484/95 da Comissão (3) estabelece as normas de execução do regime relativo à aplicação dos direitos adicionais de importação e fixa os preços representativos nos setores da carne de aves de capoeira e dos ovos, bem como para a ovalbumina.
(2)
O controlo regular dos dados nos quais se baseia a determinação dos preços representativos para os produtos dos setores da carne de aves de capoeira e dos ovos, bem como para a ovalbumina, revela que é necessário alterar os preços representativos para as importações de certos produtos, atendendo às variações dos preços consoante a origem.
(3)
O Regulamento (CE) n.o 1484/95 deve ser alterado em conformidade.
(4)
A fim de garantir que esta medida seja aplicada o mais rapidamente possível após a disponibilização dos dados atualizados, o presente regulamento deve entrar em vigor no dia da sua publicação.
(5)
As medidas previstas no presente regulamento estão em conformidade com o parecer do Comité de Gestão para a Organização Comum dos Mercados Agrícolas,
ADOTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO:
Artigo 1.o
O anexo I do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1484/95 é substituído pelo texto que figura no anexo do presente regulamento.
Artigo 2.o
O presente regulamento entra em vigor no dia da sua publicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.
O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e diretamente aplicável em todos os Estados-Membros.
Feito em Bruxelas, em 23 de fevereiro de 2012.


Input:
REGOLAMENTO DI ESECUZIONE (UE) N. 160/2012 DELLA COMMISSIONE
del 23 febbraio 2012
recante fissazione anticipata dell'importo dell'aiuto all'ammasso privato di burro per il 2012
LA COMMISSIONE EUROPEA,
visto il trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea,
visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio, del 22 ottobre 2007, recante organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli e disposizioni specifiche per taluni prodotti agricoli (regolamento unico OCM) (1), in particolare l'articolo 43, lettere a) e d), in combinato disposto con l'articolo 4,
considerando quanto segue:
(1)
A norma dell'articolo 28 del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007, sono concessi aiuti per l'ammasso privato di burro.
(2)
L'andamento dei prezzi e delle scorte di burro denota uno squilibrio del mercato che può essere eliminato o attenuato mediante un ammasso stagionale. In considerazione dell'attuale situazione del mercato, è opportuno concedere un aiuto per l'ammasso privato di burro a decorrere dal 1o marzo 2012.
(3)
Il regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008 della Commissione, del 20 agosto 2008, recante norme comuni per la concessione di aiuti all'ammasso privato per taluni prodotti agricoli (2) ha stabilito norme comuni per l'applicazione del regime di aiuto all'ammasso privato.
(4)
A norma dell'articolo 6 del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008, gli aiuti fissati anticipatamente devono essere concessi secondo le modalità e le condizioni stabilite al capo III dello stesso regolamento.
(5)
A norma dell'articolo 29 del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007, l'importo dell'aiuto deve essere fissato in base alle spese di ammasso e all'andamento prevedibile dei prezzi del burro fresco e del burro immagazzinato.
(6)
È opportuno fissare l'importo dell'aiuto in funzione delle spese di entrata e uscita dei prodotti in questione e delle spese giornaliere di deposito in magazzino frigorifero e di finanziamento.
(7)
Per agevolare l'applicazione del presente provvedimento tenendo conto della prassi invalsa negli Stati membri, è opportuno limitare l'aiuto unicamente ai prodotti che sono stati interamente conferiti all'ammasso. Di conseguenza, è necessario prevedere una deroga all'articolo 7, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
(8)
A fini di semplificazione e di efficienza amministrativa, se la domanda di aiuto contiene già le informazioni richieste sul luogo di ammasso, è opportuno dispensare il richiedente dall'obbligo di comunicare le stesse informazioni dopo la stipula del contratto, come prescritto dall'articolo 20, primo comma, lettera a), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
(9)
A fini di semplificazione e di efficienza logistica, è opportuno autorizzare gli Stati membri a dispensare il contraente dall'obbligo di indicare il numero di contratto su ciascuna unità immagazzinata purché il numero di contratto sia riportato nel registro di magazzino.
(10)
A fini di semplificazione e di efficienza amministrativa, alla luce della particolare situazione dell'ammasso del burro, i controlli di cui all'articolo 36, paragrafo 6, del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008 devono interessare almeno la metà dei contratti. Occorre pertanto introdurre una deroga all'articolo citato.
(11)
Il regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009 della Commissione, del 31 agosto 2009, che stabilisce le modalità con le quali gli Stati membri notificano alla Commissione le informazioni e i documenti necessari nell'ambito dell'attuazione dell'organizzazione comune dei mercati, del regime dei pagamenti diretti, della promozione dei prodotti agricoli e dei regimi applicabili alle regioni ultraperiferiche e alle isole minori del Mar Egeo (3) fissa norme comuni per la comunicazione alla Commissione di informazioni e documenti da parte delle autorità competenti degli Stati membri. Tali norme contemplano in particolare l'obbligo per gli Stati membri di utilizzare i sistemi di informazione messi a loro disposizione dalla Commissione e la convalida dei diritti di accesso delle autorità e delle persone abilitate a effettuare comunicazioni. Il suddetto regolamento stabilisce inoltre principi comuni che si applicano ai sistemi di informazione affinché questi garantiscano l'autenticità, l'integrità e la leggibilità nel tempo dei documenti. Esso disciplina altresì la protezione dei dati personali.
(12)
In base al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009, l'obbligo di utilizzare i sistemi di informazione previsti dal medesimo regolamento deve essere stabilito dai regolamenti che impongono un obbligo di notifica specifico.
(13)
Nell'ambito delle sue procedure interne di lavoro e delle sue relazioni con le autorità che operano nel settore della politica agricola comune, la Commissione ha elaborato un sistema di informazione che consente la gestione elettronica di documenti e procedure.
(14)
Si ritiene che gli obblighi di notifica relativi all'ammasso privato di burro possano essere adempiuti tramite tale sistema in conformità al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009, in particolare gli obblighi imposti dall'articolo 35 del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
(15)
Per motivi di chiarezza, è opportuno che il presente regolamento si applichi fino al termine del periodo di ammasso contrattuale.
(16)
Il comitato di gestione per l'organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli non si è pronunciato entro il termine stabilito dal suo presidente,
HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO:
Articolo 1
1. Il presente regolamento istituisce un aiuto all'ammasso privato per il burro salato e non salato di cui all'articolo 28, lettera a), del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007, per i contratti stipulati a decorrere dal 1o marzo 2012.
2. Salvo disposizione contraria del presente regolamento, si applica il regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
Articolo 2
L'unità di misura di cui all'articolo 16, paragrafo 2, lettera c), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008 è il «lotto all'ammasso», definito come il quantitativo del prodotto di cui al presente regolamento, del peso minimo di una tonnellata, di composizione e qualità omogenee, prodotto nello stesso stabilimento ed entrato all'ammasso lo stesso giorno nello stesso magazzino.
Articolo 3
1. In deroga all'articolo 7, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008, le domande riguardano unicamente prodotti che sono stati interamente conferiti all'ammasso.
2. Non si applica l'articolo 20, primo comma, lettera a), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
3. Gli Stati membri possono derogare all'obbligo, imposto all'articolo 22, paragrafo 1, lettera e), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008, di indicare il numero di contratto, purché il responsabile del magazzino si impegni ad annotare il numero di contratto nel registro di cui all'allegato I, punto III, dello stesso regolamento.
4. In deroga all'articolo 36, paragrafo 6, del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008, alla fine del periodo di ammasso contrattuale l'autorità preposta al controllo verifica a campione, per la metà almeno del numero di contratti, peso e identificazione del burro all'ammasso durante l'intero periodo di svincolo dall'ammasso che va dall'agosto 2012 al febbraio 2013.
Articolo 4
1. L'aiuto per i prodotti di cui all'articolo 1 ammonta a:
-
14,88 EUR per tonnellata immagazzinata per le spese fisse di magazzinaggio,
-
0,26 EUR per tonnellata per ciascun giorno di ammasso contrattuale.
2. L'entrata all'ammasso contrattuale ha luogo tra il 1o marzo e il 15 agosto 2012. Lo svincolo dall'ammasso non può avere luogo prima del 16 agosto 2012. L'ammasso contrattuale termina il giorno che precede lo svincolo dall'ammasso o al più tardi l'ultimo giorno del mese di febbraio successivo all'anno di entrata in magazzino.
3. L'aiuto può essere concesso solo se il periodo di ammasso contrattuale è compreso tra 90 e 210 giorni.
Articolo 5
1. Gli Stati membri comunicano alla Commissione:
a)
entro ogni martedì per la settimana precedente, i quantitativi per i quali sono stati stipulati contratti e i quantitativi per i quali sono state presentate domande di stipula di contratti, a norma dell'articolo 35, paragrafo 1, lettera a), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008;
b)
entro la fine di ogni mese per il mese precedente, le informazioni relative alle scorte richieste a norma dell'articolo 35, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento (CE) n. 826/2008.
2. Le comunicazioni di cui al paragrafo 1 sono effettuate a norma del regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009.
Articolo 6
Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il terzo giorno successivo alla pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea.
Esso scade il 28 febbraio 2013.
Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri.
Fatto a Bruxelles, il 23 febbraio 2012


Input:
VERORDNUNG (EU) Nr. 161/2012 DER KOMMISSION
vom 23. Februar 2012
über Sofortmaßnahmen zum Schutz der Schellfischbestände in den Gewässern westlich Schottlands
DIE EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION -
gestützt auf den Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union,
gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2371/2002 des Rates vom 20. Dezember 2002 über die Erhaltung und nachhaltige Nutzung der Fischereiressourcen im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (1), insbesondere auf Artikel 7,
in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
(1)
Nach der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2371/2002 gewährleistet die Gemeinsame Fischereipolitik die Annahme abgestimmter Maßnahmen zur Erhaltung, Bewirtschaftung und Nutzung der lebenden aquatischen Ressourcen, einschließlich spezifischer Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung der Auswirkungen der Fischerei auf die marinen Ökosysteme und auf Nichtzielarten.
(2)
Zum Schutz von Kabeljau, Schellfisch und Wittling wurde gemäß Anhang III Nummer 6.1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 43/2009 des Rates (2), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1288/2009 (3) und die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 579/2011 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates (4), in der ICES-Division VI a ein Gebiet eingerichtet, in dem jeglicher Fischfang verboten ist (nachstehend „Gewässer westlich Schottlands“).
(3)
Abweichend von diesem Verbot darf gemäß Anhang III Nummern 6.5. und 6.6. der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 43/2009 unter bestimmten Bedingungen Kaisergranat gefangen und Fischfang mit Schleppnetzen, Grundschleppnetzen oder ähnlichen Fanggeräten betrieben werden, wobei insbesondere vorgegeben ist, dass nur ein festgelegter Höchstsatz des an Bord behaltenen Fangs aus einer Mischung von Kabeljau, Schellfisch und/oder Wittling bestehen darf.
(4)
Sinn dieser Vorschrift war es, durch Verhinderung einer gezielten Befischung die fischereiliche Sterblichkeit für die drei Bestände in ihrem Verbreitungsgebiet zu senken.
(5)
Der Kommission liegen Hinweise und Gutachten des Internationalen Rates für Meeresforschung (ICES) und des Wissenschafts-, Technik- und Wirtschaftsausschusses für die Fischerei (STECF) vor, dass es als Folge dieser Vorschrift über die Fangzusammensetzung in der ICES-Division VI a zu Rückwürfen kommt.
(6)
Nach Einschätzung des ICES befindet sich der Schellfischbestand in der ICES-Division VI a außerhalb sicherer biologischer Grenzen, aber überdurchschnittlich starke Nachwuchsjahrgänge werden zu einer Erhöhung der Biomasse des Laicherbestands führen.
(7)
Diese Nachwuchsjahrgänge haben jetzt die Größe erreicht, dass sie in die Fischerei eintreten werden. Aufgrund der geltenden Vorschriften über die Fangzusammensetzung ist damit zu rechnen, dass noch mehr Fische zurückgeworfen werden, um den Anlandevorschriften zu genügen, bevor diese Fische zum Nachwachsen des Bestands beitragen konnten. Die Vernichtung von Laicherbiomasse eines Bestands, der sich außerhalb sicherer biologischer Grenzen befindet, ist eine ernste Gefahr für dessen Wiederauffüllung und dessen Fortbestand. Zur Feststellung, ob die Vorschriften über die Fangzusammensetzung eingehalten werden, werden die Anlandungen und nicht die Fänge kontrolliert. Unabhängig von etwaigen Quotenänderungen wird die derzeitige Zunahme des Schellfischbestands zu verstärkten vorschriftsbedingten Rückwürfen führen.
(8)
Der Anstieg der Fangmöglichkeiten für Schellfisch in ICES-Division VI a ab Februar 2012 wird auch den fischereilichen Druck ansteigen lassen. Die Nutzung der Fangmöglichkeiten 2012 wird unweigerlich die Sterblichkeit bei anderen, zusammen mit Schellfisch gefangenen Arten erhöhen, insbesondere bei Wittling und Kabeljau.
(9)
Da Schellfisch hauptsächlich ab Februar gefangen wird, sind umgehend Änderungen erforderlich, um übermäßige Rückwürfe zu verhindern.
(10)
Anhaltende und noch zunehmende Rückwürfe aus dem Schellfischbestand werden sich negativ auf dessen Wiederauffüllung und künftige Produktion auswirken. Die größtmögliche Nutzung der Fangmöglichkeiten gefährdet die Erhaltung anderer Bestände. Aufgrund hoher fischereilicher Sterblichkeit drohen weitere Zusammenbrüche dieser Bestände.
(11)
Die Diskrepanz zwischen Anlandevorschriften und unvermeidlichen Schellfischfängen wird 2012 deutlich zunehmen. Die Vorschriften über die Fangzusammensetzung müssen deshalb für Schellfisch umgehend ausgesetzt werden, um eine ernsthafte Gefährdung dieser Art in den Gewässern westlich Schottlands ebenso wie zusätzlichen fischereilichen Druck auf andere Bestände zu verhindern und gleichzeitig die rationelle Nutzung der Fangmöglichkeiten 2012 zu ermöglichen -
HAT FOLGENDE VERORDNUNG ERLASSEN:
Artikel 1
Die Prozentsätze, die in Anhang III Teil A Nummer 6.5 Ziffer iii und Nummer 6.6 Ziffer ii der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 43/2009 für die Fangzusammensetzung genannt sind, gelten für die Geltungsdauer der vorliegenden Verordnung nicht für Schellfisch.
Artikel 2
Diese Verordnung tritt am Tag nach ihrer Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union in Kraft.
Sie gilt bis 25. August 2012.
Diese Verordnung ist in allen ihren Teilen verbindlich und gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat.
Brüssel, den 23. Februar 2012


Input:
KOMMISSIONENS GENOMFÖRANDEFÖRORDNING (EU) nr 162/2012
av den 23 februari 2012
om fastställande av schablonimportvärden för bestämning av ingångspriset för vissa frukter och grönsaker
EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING
med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,
med beaktande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1234/2007 av den 22 oktober 2007 om upprättande av en gemensam organisation av jordbruksmarknaderna och om särskilda bestämmelser för vissa jordbruksprodukter (”förordningen om en samlad marknadsordning”) (1),
med beaktande av kommissionens genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 543/2011 av den 7 juni 2011 om tillämpningsföreskrifter för rådets förordning (EG) nr 1234/2007 vad gäller sektorn för frukt och grönsaker och sektorn för bearbetad frukt och bearbetade grönsaker (2), särskilt artikel 136.1, och
av följande skäl:
(1)
I genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 543/2011 fastställs, i enlighet med resultatet av de multilaterala handelsförhandlingarna i Uruguayrundan, kriterierna för kommissionens fastställande av schablonvärden vid import från tredjeländer, för de produkter och de perioder som anges i del A i bilaga XVI till den förordningen.
(2)
Varje arbetsdag fastställs ett schablonimportvärde i enlighet med artikel 136.1 i genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 543/2011 med hänsyn till varierande dagliga uppgifter. Denna förordning bör därför träda i kraft samma dag som den offentliggörs i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
Artikel 1
De schablonimportvärden som avses i artikel 136 i genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 543/2011 fastställs i bilagan till denna förordning.
Artikel 2
Denna förordning träder i kraft samma dag som den offentliggörs i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.
Utfärdad i Bryssel den 23 februari 2012.


Input:
COMMISSION DECISION
of 22 February 2012
on the State aid SA.26534 (C 27/10 ex NN 6/09) implemented by Greece in favour of United Textiles S.A.
(notified under document C(2011) 9385)
(Only the Greek text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2012/541/EU)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2) thereof,
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to Article 108, paragraph 2, first quotation of the Treaty (1), and having regard to these comments,
Whereas:
I. PROCEDURE
(1)
Following information that Greece planned to grant a State guarantee for new loans of EUR 35 million to finance United Textiles, the Commission asked the Greek authorities to comment on the specific measure by letters dated 11 September, 14 October, 20 October, 18 November and 4 December 2008. The Greek authorities provided incomplete answers by letters of 15 October and 10 November 2008.
(2)
For that reason, on 3 March 2009 the Commission issued an information injunction under Article 10(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 (2) of the EC Treaty (3), requesting Greece to submit all information necessary to assess whether United Textiles had received State aid and to assess if that aid would be compatible with the internal market. Greece submitted the requested information by letter of 11 March 2009.
(3)
The Commission requested further information, regarding the State measure mentioned in recital 1 and also several additional ones, in favour of United Textiles and its lending banks, by letters of 20 March 2009 and 8 February, 17 March, 19 July and 23 August 2010. The Greek authorities answered by letters of 7 April 2009 and 25 February, 26 March, 13 August and 30 August 2010.
(4)
At the request of the Greek authorities, a meeting was held on 7 July 2010. At that occasion, a draft new restructuring concept of United Textiles was submitted. The company acknowledged that the latter was not linked with previous restructuring actions taken in 2007, which had failed.
(5)
By letter dated 27 October 2010 the Commission informed Greece that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) in respect of the following measures:
(a)
state guarantee of May 2007;
(b)
rescheduling of debts of 2009 for social insurance contributions;
(c)
state guarantee of June 2010.
(6)
Greece submitted its comments to the Commission’s opening decision on 31 December 2010.
(7)
The Commission decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (4). The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the measures.
(8)
The Commission received comments from United Textiles on 7 and 9 February 2011. The comments were transmitted to Greece which was given the opportunity to comment on them. Its comments were received on 4 May 2011.
(9)
The Commission requested additional information from the Greek authorities on 28 July 2011, to which Greece replied by letter of 30 August 2011.
(10)
At the request of the Greek authorities, a meeting was held on 4 April 2011. In that meeting, the Greek authorities presented arguments as regards the alleged aid measures.
II. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGED AID
II(a) The potential beneficiaries
(11)
United Textiles is a large Greek textile company listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. It realised 45 % of its 2008 sales in Greece (38 % in 2007), 54 % in other EU countries (60 % in 2007) and 1 % to non-EU countries (2 % in 2007).
(12)
In 2009 it had total assets of EUR 201,7 million and a turnover of EUR 4,5 million (limited sales of stock). Previous years’ sales were EUR 30,6 million in 2008 and EUR 74,7 million in 2007. At the end of 2009 it had 839 employees. The company has four subsidiaries in three countries: Albania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its main shareholder is an off-shore company named European Textiles Investments Ltd (Mauritius).
(13)
United Textiles’ business is production of clothing, fibre and fabric. Its sales are realised in both wholesale and retail markets. It has 12 plants in several districts of Greece. The plants in question, as well as those of the subsidiaries mentioned in recital 12, have not been operating since 2008, because of lack of working capital.
(14)
The company’s situation has constantly deteriorated at least since 2004, with gradually decreasing sales, negative Earnings Before Taxes and negative own equity since 2008. Because of the latter, the company could be dissolved, according to Greek Legislation (5).
(15)
According to the company’s annual report’s, since 2001 lending banks’ support to the company has been limited, with reduced credit lines and loans. Since June 2008, a large part of its operations has been stopped. Since March 2009, production has almost completely stopped. In July 2008, the company’s main shareholder decided not to participate in a scheduled capital increase. Since 2008, almost all its bank loans have been overdue. Since February 2010, trading of its shares in the Athens Stock Exchange has been suspended. According to the company’s announcements, as published in its webpage (6) as well the webpage of the Athens Stock Exchange (7), its financial statements for 2010 were not published because of a work retention which was ongoing until 29 August 2011 (the last available announcement).
(16)
The lending Greek banks of United Textiles, which are involved in the State aid measures under scrutiny, are the National Bank of Greece, Emporiki Bank, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and Eurobank. They are all commercial banks, active in providing a full range of financial products and services. They all have presence, through subsidiaries, in other EU countries, in particular Bulgaria, Germany, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom (8).
II(b) The measures under examination
(17)
In the period 2007-10, three State measures were taken in favour of the company United Textiles that could involve State aid elements, as follows in recitals 18 to 23.
Measure 1: The State guarantee of May 2007
(18)
On 30 May 2007, the National Bank of Greece, lending bank of United Textiles, was granted a State guarantee for a new loan to include: (a) a rescheduling of an existing loan of EUR 7,5 million; and (b) a new loan of EUR 12,5 million. The State guarantee covered 80 % the loan. This new loan had an interest rate of six-month EURIBOR, plus spread of 1,85 % (9), equal to a total interest rate of 6,10 % on 30 May 2007. There was no premium for the State guarantee. According to the submitted rescheduling contract, the original existing loan was covered with a mortgage on a fixed asset. Also, according to the annual reports of United Textiles for 2007, 2008 and 2009, the above new loan was covered with the guarantee of the main shareholder and also envisaged to be covered with pledges on assets, however there is no reference to any realisation of the latter pledge.
(19)
The guarantee was based on a Ministerial decision of 26 January 2007 (Decision 2/75172/0025/26.01.2007). The decision foresaw that State guarantees could be issued to existing loans of industrial, mining, livestock farming and hotel companies, located in the district of Imathia, Northern Greece (where part of United Textiles’ operations is located). The scheme did not exclude firms in difficulty and did not foresee a premium for the State guarantee. The scheme did not foresee any kind of objective criteria for the selection of beneficiary companies. The Commission notes that the scheme has not been notified, in line with Article 108 TFEU, therefore the Commission reserves the right to investigate other State measures possibly granted on the basis of the scheme.
(20)
On the basis of the guarantee, the loan agreements were signed on 11 October 2007.
Measure 2: Rescheduling of social insurance debts
(21)
On 25 May 2009 the Greek authorities rescheduled the company’s overdue social insurance debts of the period 2004-09, amounting to EUR 14,57 million, to 96 monthly payments of EUR 0,19 million each. The rescheduling took place in the context of Law No 3762/2009 (10). The rescheduled amount partly included debts already arranged in previous reschedulings, which had not been respected. In addition, on the basis of the information submitted, it does not seem that United Textiles has paid any contributions so far.
Measure 3: The State guarantee of October 2009 and June 2010
(22)
On 30 June 2010, with ministerial decision 2/35129/0025, the Greek State granted a guarantee to the lending banks of United Textiles. Those banks are the National Bank of Greece, Emporiki Bank, Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and Eurobank. The guarantee covered a new planned syndicated loan of EUR 63,6 million, separated in three sub-amounts for the purpose of the following:
(a)
EUR 36,6 million to reschedule loans granted to the company by its lending banks in the period August 2008-September 2009. According to the information available, the loans in question had interest rates between three-months and six-months EURIBOR, plus 1,25 % to 3 %. Also according to the information available, those loans were initially not covered by a State guarantee.
(b)
EUR 15 million to finance the payment of overdue debts of the company to the State, to suppliers and to its employees.
(c)
EUR 12 million to finance investments and operating expenses.
(23)
The underlying planned syndicated loan had duration of nine years. The ministerial decision 2/35129/0025 granting the guarantee did not specify any interest rate for the loans to be covered. It merely specified that the loans have to be at ‘market’ rate. The State guarantee covers 80 % of the loan. A yearly premium of 2 % on the loan’s yearly average outstanding amount is foreseen for the State. Lending banks receive, in addition to the State guarantee, securities for the new loan in the form of pledged shares of the company for at least 25,9 % of its total shareholding and first rank mortgages on real estate assets of the company. The State does not receive any security for its guarantee; however, in case the guarantee is called, the securities will be transferred to the State.
(24)
The guarantee granted in June 2010 under ministerial decision 2/35129/0025 replaced (by revoking it) a previously granted one of 2 October 2009 (ministerial decision 2/71055/0025). The latter was granted for a new loan of EUR 40 million, also aiming at financing the rescheduling of the loans granted to the company in the period August 2008-February 2009 (see recital 22(a)). The loan of EUR 40 million, however, was never issued and therefore the October 2009 guarantee was not activated. Instead, the latter was replaced with the new guarantee of June 2010, which covered the syndicated loan of EUR 63,6 million. According to the Greek authorities, the reason for that replacement was that the extent of the loan of EUR 40 million was not sufficient anymore to cover the company’s liquidity needs.
(25)
Despite the guarantee, the underlying loan has never been granted. In view of the company’s acute difficulties, the banks refrained from signing the loan agreement and never paid out the loan.
III. GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
(26)
In the opening decision of 27 October 2010, the Commission questioned whether the terms of the State guarantees of 2007 (Measure 1) and 2010 (Measure 3) were market conform and in line with the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (11) (‘the Guarantee Notice’).
(27)
As regards the measure of the rescheduling of overdue social insurance obligations (Measure 2), in the opening decision of 27 October 2010, the Commission questioned whether a private creditor in the given circumstances would have accepted any type of rescheduling of debts. Indeed, the possibility of obtaining a late repayment of the debt appeared restricted, since United Textiles was already in serious financial difficulties and had stopped most of its production.
(28)
The Commission thus questioned whether the measures under investigation constituted illegal State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and whether the measures were compatible with the TFEU.
IV. COMMENTS FROM GREECE AND THE BENEFICIARY
(29)
The information submitted by the Greek authorities and United Textiles (the beneficiary) on the measures in question can be summarised as follows:
IV(a) Measure 1: The State guarantee of May 2007
(30)
With regard to Measure 1, the comments of Greece and the beneficiary overlap to a large extent, therefore the Commission will expose them together, as follows:
(31)
Greece and the beneficiary acknowledge that at the time of the 2007 guarantee the company was in difficulty, allegedly due to international competition of lower cost countries. Greece also acknowledges having granted the above guarantees.
(32)
Greece and the beneficiary also support that the 2007 guarantee does not constitute aid, as it was not selective to United Textiles: it was granted on the basis of a ministerial decision not only for United Textiles but also for other companies.
(33)
Apart from the above, Greece and the beneficiary argue that the 2007 guarantee was granted pursuant to Greek Law No 2322/1995, which allowed the Minister of Finance to grant State guarantees to banking institutions for loans that reschedule debts or grant new working capital.
(34)
Furthermore, Greece and the beneficiary claim that before having been granted the guarantee, the company had submitted to the Greek authorities a restructuring plan with financing from banks and without any State guarantee. Such a restructuring plan was never formally submitted to the Commission.
(35)
Greece also argues that the 2007 guarantee was granted in line with the State aid rules in force in the EU. According to Greece’s allegations, the guarantee had a maximum coverage of 80 % and was granted for loans with market interest rates. Also, Greece supports that the loan was properly securitised with pledged commodities and personal guarantees of shareholders and that it was granted for a specific transaction and duration.
(36)
Moreover, Greece and the beneficiary support that the latter is one of the most significant textile companies in Greece, employing a significant number of staff and operating mainly in regions close to the border.
(37)
Greece and the beneficiary also claim that the National Bank of Greece (the lending bank) has accepted to decline the State guarantee and in its place to inscribe a mortgage on real estate assets of United Textiles, which will inactivate the guarantee.
(38)
Finally, Greece and the beneficiary argue that the guarantee was incorporated in the guarantee of 2010, therefore there is a continuum in the settlement of the company’s lending.
IV(b) Measure 2: Rescheduling of overdue public insurance debts
(39)
Greece and the beneficiary argue that the measure is based on Law No 3762/2009, which is a general law, applicable to all companies with overdue or unpaid public insurance obligations, therefore the measure in question is not selective.
IV(c) Measure 3: The State guarantee of June 2010
(40)
Greece acknowledges having granted the 2010 guarantee and argues that the latter was granted because the extent of the previous guarantee of 2009 (which has never been implemented) was not sufficient anymore to cover the company’s liquidity needs, therefore the 2009 guarantee was incorporated into the 2010 guarantee.
(41)
Greece argues that the 2010 guarantee is in line with the communication from the Commission - community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (12) (‘Rescue and restructuring guidelines’) and that it does not confer an advantage to United Textiles. Moreover, it claims that there is no infringement of the ‘one time last time’ principle as enshrined in the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, since the 2010 guarantee replaces the 2009 guarantee and changes several provisions of the 2007 guarantee (see Measure 1 in recital 18). Therefore, the 2010 guarantee embodies the totality of the clauses of the company’s loans in a single text with unified provisions. Greece also states that the guarantee is not valid yet, because the Ministry’s competent service has not approved it yet.
(42)
Finally, Greece informed the Commission that the 2010 guarantee has not yet been activated, as the company has not signed any loan contract with any bank and no loan payment has taken place. Also, the Greek authorities have drawn the Commission’s attention to the fact that the granting ministerial decision 2/35129/0025/28.06.2010 foresees that the loan’s first two sub-loans (EUR 36,6 million + EUR 15 million) had to be paid until 28 July 2010 and this date has expired, therefore the guarantee actually cannot be activated.
(43)
United Textiles argues that the underlying loan contract has not been signed yet, therefore there is no interest rate defined yet. When this is done, the interest rate will be market conform.
(44)
Regarding the restructuring plan of 2010 (see recital 4), United Textiles supports that it foresees a drastic reduction of production, therefore the forecasted return to viability does not distort competition.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID
(45)
On the basis of the above facts and also of the arguments of Greece and United Textiles, the Commission will assess the measures in question in this section. First, the Commission will assess the status of United Textiles at the time of the measures under scrutiny, in order to conclude if the company was in difficulty or not (Section V(a)). Secondly, the Commission will assess the presence of aid in the measures under scrutiny, in order to conclude if there is aid or not (Section V(b)). Thirdly, where a measure indeed involves aid, the Commission will assess its compatibility with the internal market (Section V(c)).
V(a) Status of the company
(46)
As shown in recitals 14 and 15 and set out in more detail in Table 1 below, the company’s operating and financial performance deteriorated significantly in the period 2004-09.
Table 1
United Textiles’ key financial data (million EUR)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Turnover
154,3
97,5
64,6
74,7 (13)
30,6
4,5
EBT
-89,6
-61,3
-49,3
-38,5
-62,4
-60,6
Accumulated losses
264,1
316
378,3
418,7
481
520,3 (14)
Registered capital
276,3
283,3
280,8
288,9
290,4
290,4 (14)
Own equity
95,2
35,7
32,9
4,6
-49,1
- 111,5
Debt/equity
281 %
692 %
829 %
6 243 %
- 561 %
- 280 %
Data from 2004-09 financial statements.
(47)
On the basis of these financial figures, the Commission concludes that the company has been in difficulty in the meaning of point 10 of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines at the time of the granting of the measures under scrutiny (the period 2007-10). The Commission equally considers that the company is in difficulties at present.
(48)
More specifically, with regard to point 10(a) of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, the company’s registered capital, as appearing in its financial statements of years 2004-09, was not lost but increased in the period 2004-09. However, the Commission notices that in the same period the company’s own equity was reduced to minimal (2007) or negative level (2008 and 2009). At the same time, the company did not adopt appropriate measures in order to tackle the decrease of its own equity, as foreseen by Greek legislation (15). If adopted, those measures would be either the increase of capital or the capitalisation of losses, which would wipe out the registered capital. It appears that only the latter case would be feasible for United Textiles, due to its critical financial situation (see Table 1) and its difficult access to finance (see recital 15). On the basis of the above, the Commission considers that the company lost more than half of its registered capital.
(49)
Furthermore, concerning point 10(c) of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, since 2008 the company fulfilled the criteria under Greek law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings (16).
(50)
Finally, as regards point 11 of the of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover and mounting debt, have been present since at least 2004.
V(b) Presence of aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU
(51)
Article 107(1) TFEU states that ‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’.
(52)
The Commission will assess whether the measures under scrutiny in favour of United Textiles constitute State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V(b)(1) Measure 1: State guarantee of May 2007
(a) State resources
(53)
The Commission notes that the State guarantee in question indeed involves State resources, as it has been granted directly by the State. The decision has been made by the responsible minister; therefore, the measure is also imputable to the State. Thus, the criterion of State resources is fulfilled.
(b) Advantage
(54)
Greece and the beneficiary claim that the National Bank of Greece (the lending bank) has accepted to decline the State guarantee and in its place to inscribe a mortgage on real estate assets of United Textiles, which will deactivate the guarantee. To demonstrate their claim, Greece and the beneficiary submit a letter of the National Bank of Greece, dated 24 December 2010 (replying to a letter of United Textiles dated 23 December 2010).
(55)
The Commission cannot accept the above. Indeed, in the submitted letter of the National Bank of Greece, it is only stated that the bank would be willing to examine the proposed exchange of securities, mainly under the conditions that the bank would choose the assets to be pledged and that the exchange would be accepted by all concerned parties. Thus, the Commission considers that the National Bank of Greece has not actually accepted the proposed exchange of securities.
(56)
Greece also argues that the 2007 guarantee was granted in line with the State aid rules that are in force in the EU. According to Greece’s allegations, the guarantee had a maximum coverage of 80 % and that it was granted for loans with market interest rates.
(57)
The Commission cannot accept the above argumentation and considers that the 2007 guarantee has indeed procured an undue advantage to United Textiles. According to the Guarantee Notice, points 2.2 and 3.2, when the borrower does not pay a market-oriented price for the guarantee, it obtains an advantage. In some cases, the borrower, as a firm in financial difficulty, would not find a financial institution prepared to lend on any terms, without a State guarantee.
(58)
In the case at hand, the 2007 guarantee was granted for loans of a firm in difficulty and did not foresee a premium for the guarantor (State). In the light of points 3.2 and 4.2 of the Guarantee notice, the Commission notes the significant deterioration of the company’s financial situation in the period 2004-07, the overdue situation of its loans and the fact that already since 2001 its lending banks’ support had been limited, with reduced credit lines and loans. The Commission considers that, since at the time that the measure was taken United Textiles was in serious difficulty, it must be classified in the credit category ‘bad’.
(59)
In addition to the above, the Commission notes that, according to the company’s annual reports of 2007, 2008 and 2009, the guaranteed loan was still envisaged to be securitised with assets of the company, therefore that securitisation was apparently not realised yet (see recital 18). In addition, the Commission notes that the National Bank of Greece (the lending bank) was proposed in December 2010 to decline the State guarantee and in its place to inscribe a mortgage on real estate assets of United Textiles (see recital 37). The Commission considers this proposal to be a clear indication that indeed the securitisation in question was not realised. On this issue, the Greek authorities submit that the 2007 guarantee was securitised with commodities of the company and personal guarantees of its shareholders (see recital 35), however the facts of the case only verify the shareholders’ personal guarantees. Thus, the Commission considers that the underlying loan was not securitised.
(60)
On the basis of the above, the Commission doubts that any private guarantor would have offered such a guarantee and that any private bank would have accepted to finance the company without a State guarantee at all, as in a similar situation it would appear extremely difficult for such company to be able to repay the loan and for the guarantor to avoid to honour the guarantee. Thus, the Commission considers that the aid amount stemming from the 2007 guarantee amounts up to the whole amount of the guaranteed loan, i.e. EUR 16 million (80 % of EUR 20 million).
(c) Selectivity
(61)
Greece and the beneficiary also support that the 2007 guarantee does not constitute aid, as it was not selective to United Textiles: it was granted on the basis of ministerial decision 2/75172/0025/26.01.2007 which concerned not only United Textiles but also other companies.
(62)
The Commission notes that the ministerial decision on which the guarantee was based targeted certain sectors of a specific geographical area, i.e. the Imathia district. In addition, in the case at hand, the Greek authorities had a wide range of manoeuvre in granting a guarantee in favour of United Textiles, as there were no objective criteria set for deciding whether to grant the guarantee or not. In the absence of such objective criteria, the measure was indeed selective, because the authorities applied it individually on a discretionary basis (17). According to established case-law (18), where the public body granting financial assistance enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to choose the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided, that assistance cannot be considered to be general in nature. Thus, the criterion of selectivity is indeed fulfilled.
(d) Distortion of competition and affectation of trade between Member States
(63)
United Textiles is active in a sector whose products are widely traded among Member States and who is subject to intense competition. At the time of the granting of the aid measures, United Textiles was an undertaking which realised most of its sales to other Member States (see recital 11). Also, the aid measure in question granted United Textiles an advantage over its competitors (see recitals 45, 46 and 47). According to established case-law (19), when State aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in trade between Member States, those other undertakings must be regarded as affected by that aid. Thus, the criterion of distortion of competition and affectation of trade between Member States is indeed fulfilled.
(64)
Regarding the bank lending the underlying loan of the 2007 guarantee (the National Bank of Greece), the investigation has shown that it did not benefit from the guarantee in question. Indeed, the guarantee was granted in the context of a new loan contract, with a new duration of 10 years. According to point 2.3.1 of the Guarantee Notice, if a State guarantee is given ex post in respect of a loan, without the terms of this loan being adjusted, then there may also be aid to the lender; in the case at hand, however, the terms of the existing loan were changed, through the change of the loan’s duration. Therefore the Commission considers that the 2007 guarantee did not constitute aid to the lender.
(65)
At the same time, the 2007 guarantee merely resulted in the bank not seeking immediately to collect its loan. However, the bank would be able to recover the existing loan through liquidation procedures. In this regard, the Commission notes that the 2007 loan was already covered with a mortgage on a fixed asset (20).
(66)
On the basis of the above, it is concluded that the State guarantee of May 2007 (Measure 1) constitutes unlawful State aid in favour of United Textiles in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
(67)
The Commission considers that the State guarantee of May 2007 did not constitute State aid in favour of the lending bank the National Bank of Greece in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V(b)(2) Measure 2: Rescheduling of overdue social insurance obligations
(a) State resources
(68)
The Commission notes that the aim of social insurance contributions is to finance the budget of Social Security Organisations, which constitute public legal entities under the State’s supervision. Therefore the non-collection of such contributions deprives the State of resources. Thus, this criterion is fulfilled.
(b) Advantage
(69)
The Commission notes that United Textiles was effectively granted a delay of eight years to the payment of a financial obligation, at the time of severe financial difficulty and high probability of default. According to well-established case-law (21), in order to establish whether a selective advantage is conferred by non-enforcement of debts and whether the advantage could be classified as State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, it must still be established that United Textiles could not have obtained such an advantage under normal market conditions. In this regard the essential question to be asked is whether the behaviour of the State as creditor in the given circumstances could be compared to the behaviour of a diligent private creditor.
(70)
According to the Greek authorities, previous rescheduling agreements had not been respected by United Textiles. At the same time, the company was effectively granted an extension of eight years for the payment of a financial obligation of EUR 14,57 million (see recital 16), at the time of severe financial difficulty and high probability of default. Such an extension would not have been granted by a market economy creditor, especially since previous reschedulings had already failed.
(71)
For the above-stated reasons, the Commission considers that the behaviour of the Greek authorities could not be compared to that of a diligent private creditor, since the rescheduling of 2009 was applied in spite of previous failed rescheduling agreements and the company was already in serious financial difficulties and had stopped most of its production, thus the perspective of obtaining a repayment of the debt appeared unlikely.
(72)
Thus, the Commission considers that the 2009 rescheduling of the company’s public insurance debts has conferred an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU on the company.
(c) Selectivity
(73)
The Greek authorities and the beneficiary claim that the rescheduling was based on a general national law (22), applicable to all companies in Greece, therefore the measure was not selective.
(74)
The Commission cannot accept the above argument. Indeed, in the case at hand, the Greek authorities had a wide range of manoeuvre in the treatment of United Textiles’ social insurance debts, as there were no objective criteria set for deciding whether to grant the rescheduling or not. In the absence of such objective criteria, the measure was indeed selective, because the authorities applied it individually on a discretionary basis (23). Also, according to established case-law, where the public body granting financial assistance enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to choose the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided, that assistance cannot be considered to be general in nature (24). Thus, the criterion of selectivity is indeed fulfilled.
(d) Distortion of competition and affectation of trade between Member States
(75)
Finally, the criterion of distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States is fulfilled in the same way as in recital 63.
(e) Conclusion on the existence of aid in Measure 2
(76)
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that the 2009 rescheduling of overdue social insurance obligations constitutes State aid in favour of United Textiles in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
(77)
The amount of aid equals to EUR 14,57 million, granted to the company at the moment of the overdue debts’ rescheduling on 25 May 2009, as the total amount of the rescheduled debts.
V(b)(3) Measure 3: State guarantee of June 2010
(78)
The Commission notes that the company stopped operations already in 2009 and did not even publish financial statements since then (see recital 15). The guarantee was not sufficient to obtain any fresh funding and the undertaking did not resume its activities while it was valid. Under these circumstances, the Commission considers that the guarantee did not distort or threaten to distort competition. Therefore, it does not constitute State aid.
V(c) Compatibility of the aid measures with the Internal Market
V(c)(1) General
(79)
Inasmuch as Measures 1 and 2 constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, their compatibility must be assessed in the light of the exceptions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article.
V(c)(2) Company in difficulty
(80)
As shown in recitals 46 to 50, the company’s operating and financial performance deteriorated significantly in the period 2004-09. On this basis, the Commission concludes that the company has been in difficulty in the meaning of points 10 and 11 of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines at the time of the granting of the measures under scrutiny (the period 2007-10), as also acknowledged by Greece and the beneficiary. The Commission equally considers that the company is in difficulties at present because the situation has not improved since.
V(c)(3) Exemptions under Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU
(81)
The derogations laid down in Article 107(2) and Article 107(3), points (d) and (e), are clearly not applicable and have not been invoked by the Greek authorities.
(82)
Article 107(3)(a) states that ‘aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment’ may be declared compatible with the internal market. United Textiles is located in an assisted area under Article 107(3)(a), therefore it could potentially be eligible for regional aid.
(83)
The Guidelines on regional aid 2007-2013 (25) (‘Regional aid guidelines’), which were applicable at the time of application of the 2007 guarantee and the 2009 debt rescheduling (Measures 1 and 2), set out the conditions for the approval of regional investment aid.
(84)
The Regional aid guidelines clearly exclude firms in difficulty from their scope. United Textiles was already in difficulty at the time when Measures 1 and 2 were granted, therefore it was not eligible for regional aid. On this basis, the Commission concludes that the aid cannot be declared compatible on the basis of the Regional aid guidelines.
(85)
The Commission will also assess the compatibility of the measures in question under the Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) (26). The Commission notes that aid to firms in difficulty is excluded from the scope of the general block exemption Regulation. United Textiles was already in difficulty at the time when Measures 1 and 2 were granted, therefore the aid granted to United Textiles is not compatible under the general block exemption Regulation.
(86)
The Commission has also to assess whether any of the measures concerned could be compatible under the crisis rules enshrined in the Communication from the Commission - Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (27) (hereinafter ‘Temporary Framework’). However, the Commission notes that United Textiles was clearly a company in difficulties before 1 July 2008 and therefore not eligible for aid under the Temporary Framework.
(87)
Since United Textiles was a firm in difficulty at the time of the granting of the measures, the compatibility of the aid measures can only be assessed in the light of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, i.e. under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.
(88)
First, the Commission considers that the measures in question cannot be found compatible as rescue aid. Indeed, the guarantee does not have a limited duration of six months, as foreseen in point 25(c) of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines, and the debt rescheduling, which could be comparable to a loan, also goes beyond a six-month period admissible as rescue aid. Also, the measures are not restricted to the minimum necessary amount, as foreseen in point 25(d) of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines and stemming from the formula set out in the Annex to those guidelines.
(89)
Second, none of the measures could be found compatible as restructuring aid either. Greece and the beneficiary claim that before having been granted the 2007 guarantee, the company had submitted to the Greek authorities a restructuring plan with financing from banks and without any State guarantee. However, such a restructuring plan was never officially submitted to the Commission, therefore, the grant of these measures was made in the absence of a restructuring plan; however, such a restructuring plan is the condition for ensuring the restoration of a firm’s long-term viability. In fact, based on the evidence of the investigation, no such plan existed, and all restructuring efforts in this period have failed, to the point that the company practically ceased to operate and was taken off the stock exchange. Despite this failure to restructure, the State continued to provide working capital to United Textiles, through the 2007 State guarantee. Thus, the Commission considers that Measures 1 and 2 constituted mere operating aid without any underlying credible restructuring.
(90)
Finally, no compensatory measures in the sense of points 38 to 42 of the Rescue and restructuring guidelines have been officially submitted.
(91)
As regards United Textiles’ eligibility to receive restructuring aid, the Commission notes that the company has been granted operating aid since at least 2007, at a time when it was already in difficulty. The Commission considers that the above fact is an infringement of the ‘one time last time’ principle, as it demonstrates that the company’s difficulties are of a recurrent nature and that the aid measures in the company’s favour have distorted competition contrary to the common interest. In addition, the beneficiary argues that the 2007 guarantee was incorporated in the guarantee of 2010, therefore there is a continuum in the settlement of the company’s lending. However, the Commission considers that there are no elements suggesting that the restructuring should be considered to form a continuum, as the aid measures of 2007, 2009 and 2010 were granted over several years and were not granted on the basis of a single restructuring project or concept capable of restoring the company’s viability.
(92)
On the basis of the above, the Commission considers that the ‘one time last time’ principle is not respected.
(93)
Finally, as United Textiles was in difficulty at the time of the granting of the measures, the Commission cannot conceive of another set of State aid rules that could make the alleged aid measures compatible with TFEU.
V(c)(4) Conclusion on compatibility
(94)
In the view of the above, the Commission concludes that Measures 1 and 2 are incompatible with TFEU.
VI. RECOVERY
(95)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the 2007 State guarantee and the 2009 rescheduling of overdue social insurance obligations constitute State aid which is incompatible with the internal market. The Commission has also come to the conclusion that the 2010 State guarantee does not constitute State aid.
(96)
Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 lays down that ‘where negative decisions are taken in respect of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary’.
(97)
Thus, given that the measures at hand are to be considered as unlawful and incompatible aid, the amount of aid must be recovered in order to re-establish the situation that existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid. Recovery shall be hence affected from the time when the advantage occurred to the beneficiary, i.e. when the aid was put at the disposal of the beneficiary and shall bear recovery interest until effective recovery.
(98)
The incompatible aid element of the 2007 State guarantee (Measure 1) is calculated as amounting up to the total of the guaranteed loan. The Commission estimates that the aid thus granted to United Textiles amounts up to EUR 16 million.
(99)
The incompatible aid element of Measure 2 is calculated as the total amount of the rescheduled debts, thus the amount of aid granted to United Textiles is EUR 14,57 million. Payments made other than the amounts paid under the agreement may be deducted from the sum to be recovered as unlawful and incompatible aid.
(100)
The exact recovery amount and the recovery interest to be applied on these amounts have to be calculated by Greece,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
1. The State aid granted by Greece in breach of Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in favour of United Textiles S.A., in the form of a 2007 State guarantee and a rescheduling of overdue social insurance obligations in 2009, is incompatible with the internal market.
2. The 2010 State guarantee does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Article 2
1. Greece shall recover the aid stipulated in Article 1, paragraph 1, from the beneficiary.
2. The sums to be recovered shall bear interest generated from the date on which they were put at the disposal of the beneficiary until their actual recovery.
3. The interest shall be calculated on a compound basis in accordance with Chapter V of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 (28).
4. Greece shall cancel all outstanding payments under the aid stipulated in Article 1, paragraph 1, with effect from the date of notification of this decision.
Article 3
1. Recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be immediate and effective.
2. Greece shall ensure that this decision is implemented within four months following the date of notification of this Decision.
Article 4
1. Within two months following notification of this Decision, Greece shall submit the following information to the Commission:
(a)
the total amount (principal and recovery interests) to be recovered from the beneficiary;
(b)
a detailed description of the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision;
(c)
documents demonstrating that the beneficiary has been ordered to repay the aid.
2. Greece shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this Decision until recovery of the aid stipulated in Article 1, paragraph 1, has been completed. It shall immediately submit, on simple request by the Commission, information on the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision. It shall also provide detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and recovery interest already recovered from the beneficiary
Article 5
This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.
Done at Brussels, 22 February 2012.


Input:
ΕΚΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΉ ΑΠΌΦΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΉΣ
της 22ας Φεβρουαρίου 2012
με την οποία επιτρέπεται προσωρινά η εμπορία ορισμένων σπόρων του είδους Triticum durum Desf. που ανήκουν στην ποικιλία Marialva και δεν πληρούν τις απαιτήσεις της οδηγίας 66/402/ΕΟΚ του Συμβουλίου όσον αφορά τη μέγιστη περιεκτικότητα των σπόρων σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum aestivum L.)
[κοινοποιηθείσα υπό τον αριθμό Ε(2012) 1114]
(2012/116/ΕΕ)
Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ,
Έχοντας υπόψη τη Συνθήκη για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης,
Έχοντας υπόψη την οδηγία 66/402/ΕΟΚ του Συμβουλίου, της 14ης Ιουνίου 1966, περί εμπορίας σπόρων δημητριακών προς σπορά (1), και συγκεκριμένα το άρθρο 17 παράγραφος 1,
Εκτιμώντας τα ακόλουθα:
(1)
Στην Πορτογαλία η ποσότητα των διαθέσιμων σπόρων σκληρών σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum durum Desf.) της κατηγορίας «πιστοποιημένος σπόρος προς σπορά», δεύτερης γενιάς, της ποικιλίας Marialva, που είναι κατάλληλη για τις εθνικές περιβαλλοντικές συνθήκες και πληροί τις απαιτήσεις της οδηγίας 66/402/ΕΟΚ σχετικά με τη μέγιστη περιεκτικότητα σπόρων σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum aestivum L.) είναι ανεπαρκής και, επομένως, ακατάλληλη για να ανταποκριθεί στις ανάγκες του εν λόγω κράτους μέλους.
(2)
Η ζήτηση για τον εν λόγω σπόρο προς σπορά δεν δύναται να ικανοποιηθεί με σπόρο από άλλα κράτη μέλη ή από τρίτες χώρες που να πληροί όλες τις απαιτήσεις που προβλέπονται στην οδηγία 66/402/ΕΟΚ.
(3)
Κατά συνέπεια, θα πρέπει να επιτραπεί στην Πορτογαλία να χορηγεί άδεια εμπορίας σπόρων προς σπορά της ίδιας ποικιλίας που υπάγονται σε λιγότερο αυστηρές απαιτήσεις από εκείνες που εφαρμόζονται στον πιστοποιημένο σπόρο προς σπορά, δεύτερης γενιάς, για περίοδο που λήγει στις 29 Φεβρουαρίου 2012 και για μέγιστη ποσότητα μέχρι 130 τόνους.
(4)
Επιπροσθέτως, πρέπει να δοθεί άδεια σε άλλα κράτη μέλη, που είναι σε θέση να προμηθεύσουν την Πορτογαλία με σπόρους προς σπορά της εν λόγω ποικιλίας, είτε αυτοί συγκομίστηκαν σε κράτος μέλος είτε σε τρίτη χώρα, να επιτρέψουν την εμπορία τέτοιων σπόρων προς σπορά.
(5)
Είναι σκόπιμο η Πορτογαλία να ενεργήσει ως συντονιστής ώστε να εξασφαλιστεί ότι η συνολική ποσότητα των σπόρων προς σπορά για την οποία χορηγείται άδεια σύμφωνα με την παρούσα απόφαση δεν υπερβαίνει την ανώτατη ποσότητα που προβλέπεται από την παρούσα απόφαση.
(6)
Τα μέτρα που προβλέπονται στην παρούσα απόφαση είναι σύμφωνα με τη γνώμη της μόνιμης επιτροπής σπόρων προς σπορά και γεωργικών, δενδροκηπευτικών και δασικών φυτών προς φύτευση,
ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ:
Άρθρο 1
1. Επιτρέπεται η εμπορία στην Ένωση σπόρων σκληρών σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum durum Desf.) της κατηγορίας «πιστοποιημένος σπόρος προς σπορά», δεύτερης γενιάς, της ποικιλίας Marialva, η οποία δεν πληροί τις απαιτήσεις που ορίζονται στο σημείο 2A του παραρτήματος II της οδηγίας 66/402/ΕΟΚ όσον αφορά τη μέγιστη περιεκτικότητα των σπόρων σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum aestivum L.).
Ωστόσο, η μέγιστη περιεκτικότητα των σπόρων σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum aestivum L.) που επιτρέπεται στους σπόρους σκληρών σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum durum Desf.) και προσδιορίζονται στο πρώτο εδάφιο είναι 45 σπόροι προς σπορά σ’ ένα δείγμα βάρους προβλεπόμενο στο παράρτημα III στήλη 4 της οδηγίας 66/402/ΕΟΚ.
Η εν λόγω άδεια χορηγείται για συνολική ποσότητα μέχρι 130 τόνους και για περίοδο που λήγει στις 29 Φεβρουαρίου 2012.
2. Επιπλέον της τήρησης των απαιτήσεων επισήμανσης της οδηγίας 66/402/ΕΟΚ, η επίσημη ετικέτα αναφέρει ότι ο σπόρος προς σπορά δεν πληροί τις απαιτήσεις του σημείου 2Α του παραρτήματος II της εν λόγω οδηγίας όσον αφορά τη μέγιστη περιεκτικότητα των σπόρων σιτηρών προς σπορά (Triticum aestivum L.).
Άρθρο 2
1. Κάθε προμηθευτής σπόρων προς σπορά που επιθυμεί να διαθέσει στην αγορά τους σπόρους που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 1 υποβάλλει αίτηση για χορήγηση άδειας στο κράτος μέλος στο οποίο εδρεύει ή στο οποίο πραγματοποιεί εισαγωγές. Στην αίτηση προσδιορίζεται η ποσότητα των σπόρων που ο προμηθευτής επιθυμεί να διαθέσει στην αγορά.
2. Το οικείο κράτος μέλος χορηγεί στον προμηθευτή την άδεια να διαθέσει τους σπόρους, όπως αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 1, στην αγορά, εκτός εάν:
α)
υπάρχουν επαρκείς αποδείξεις με βάση τις οποίες αμφισβητείται η ικανότητα του προμηθευτή να διαθέσει στην αγορά την ποσότητα των σπόρων προς σπορά για την οποία υπέβαλε αίτηση χορήγησης άδειας·
β)
λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις πληροφορίες που παρέχονται από το κράτος μέλος- συντονιστή σύμφωνα με τα όσα αναφέρονται στο τρίτο εδάφιο του άρθρου 3, η χορήγηση της άδειας θα είχε ως αποτέλεσμα την υπέρβαση της μέγιστης συνολικής ποσότητας σπόρων που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 1.
Όσον αφορά το στοιχείο β), σε περίπτωση που η μέγιστη συνολική ποσότητα επιτρέπει τη χορήγηση άδειας για μέρος μόνο της ποσότητας που προσδιορίζεται στην αίτηση, το οικείο κράτος μέλος μπορεί να χορηγήσει άδεια στον προμηθευτή για τη διάθεση μικρότερης ποσότητας στην αγορά.
Άρθρο 3
Τα κράτη μέλη συνεργάζονται σε διοικητικό επίπεδο για την εφαρμογή της παρούσας απόφασης.
Η Πορτογαλία ενεργεί ως κράτος μέλος-συντονιστής, προκειμένου να διασφαλιστεί ότι η ποσότητα των σπόρων προς σπορά που θα εγκρίνεται για διάθεση στην αγορά της Ένωσης από τα κράτη μέλη, σύμφωνα με την παρούσα απόφαση, δεν θα υπερβεί τη μέγιστη συνολική ποσότητα σπόρων που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 1.
Κάθε κράτος μέλος που λαμβάνει αίτηση σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 2 κοινοποιεί αμέσως στο κράτος μέλος-συντονιστή την ποσότητα που καλύπτεται από την αίτηση. Το κράτος μέλος-συντονιστής ενημερώνει αμέσως το κράτος μέλος από το οποίο έλαβε την κοινοποίηση σχετικά με το εάν η χορήγηση άδειας θα έχει ως αποτέλεσμα την υπέρβαση της μέγιστης ποσότητας.
Άρθρο 4
Τα κράτη μέλη κοινοποιούν αμέσως στην Επιτροπή και στα άλλα κράτη μέλη τις ποσότητες για τις οποίες χορήγησαν άδεια εμπορίας σύμφωνα με την παρούσα απόφαση.
Άρθρο 5
Η παρούσα απόφαση απευθύνεται στα κράτη μέλη.
Βρυξέλλες, 22 Φεβρουαρίου 2012.


Input:
KOMISJONI RAKENDUSMÄÄRUS (EL) nr 159/2012,
22. veebruar 2012,
millega muudetakse teatavate suhkrusektori toodete suhtes turustusaastaks 2011/2012 rakendusmäärusega (EL) nr 971/2011 kehtestatud tüüpilisi hindu ja täiendavaid impordimakse
EUROOPA KOMISJON,
võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingut,
võttes arvesse nõukogu 22. oktoobri 2007. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 1234/2007, millega kehtestatakse põllumajandusturgude ühine korraldus ning mis käsitleb teatavate põllumajandustoodete erisätteid (ühise turukorralduse ühtne määrus) (1),
võttes arvesse komisjoni 30. juuni 2006. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 951/2006, millega kehtestati nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 318/2006 üksikasjalikud rakenduseeskirjad kolmandate riikidega kauplemise suhtes suhkrusektoris, (2) eriti selle artikli 36 lõike 2 teise lõigu teist lauset,
ning arvestades järgmist:
(1)
Valge suhkru, toorsuhkru ja teatavate siirupite tüüpilised hinnad ja täiendavad impordimaksud turustusaastaks 2011/2012 on kehtestatud komisjoni rakendusmäärusega (EL) nr 971/2011 (3). Kõnealuseid hindu ja makse on viimati muudetud komisjoni rakendusmäärusega (EL) nr 142/2012 (4).
(2)
Praegu komisjoni käsutuses olevast teabest lähtuvalt tuleks eespool osutatud hindu ja tollimakse muuta määruse (EÜ) nr 951/2006 artikli 36 kohaselt.
(3)
Vajadusest tagada, et kõnealust meedet hakataks kohaldama võimalikult kiiresti pärast ajakohastatud andmete kättesaadavaks tegemist, peaks käesolev määrus jõustuma avaldamise päeval,
ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA MÄÄRUSE:
Artikkel 1
Määruse (EÜ) nr 951/2006 artiklis 36 osutatud toodetele rakendusmäärusega (EL) nr 971/2011 kehtestatud tüüpilisi hindu ja täiendavaid impordimakse turustusaastaks 2011/2012 muudetakse käesoleva määruse lisa kohaselt.
Artikkel 2
Käesolev määrus jõustub Euroopa Liidu Teatajas avaldamise päeval.
Käesolev määrus on tervikuna siduv ja vahetult kohaldatav kõikides liikmesriikides.
Brüssel, 22. veebruar 2012


Input:
VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE KOMISIE (EÚ) č. 158/2012
z 22. februára 2012,
ktorým sa ustanovujú paušálne dovozné hodnoty na určovanie vstupných cien niektorých druhov ovocia a zeleniny
EURÓPSKA KOMISIA,
so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
so zreteľom na nariadenie Rady (ES) č. 1234/2007 z 22. októbra 2007 o vytvorení spoločnej organizácie poľnohospodárskych trhov a o osobitných ustanoveniach pre určité poľnohospodárske výrobky (nariadenie o jednotnej spoločnej organizácii trhov) (1),
so zreteľom na vykonávacie nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 543/2011 zo 7. júna 2011, ktorým sa ustanovujú podrobné pravidlá uplatňovania nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1234/2007, pokiaľ ide o sektory ovocia a zeleniny a spracovaného ovocia a zeleniny (2), a najmä na jeho článok 136 ods. 1,
keďže:
(1)
Vykonávacím nariadením (EÚ) č. 543/2011 sa v súlade s výsledkami Uruguajského kola mnohostranných obchodných rokovaní ustanovujú kritériá, na základe ktorých Komisia stanovuje paušálne hodnoty na dovoz z tretích krajín, pokiaľ ide o výrobky a obdobia uvedené v časti A prílohy XVI k uvedenému nariadeniu.
(2)
Paušálne dovozné hodnoty sa vypočítajú každý pracovný deň v súlade s článkom 136 ods. 1 vykonávacieho nariadenia (EÚ) č. 543/2011, pričom sa zohľadnia premenlivé každodenné údaje. Toto nariadenie by preto malo nadobudnúť účinnosť dňom jeho uverejnenia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie,
PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
Článok 1
Paušálne dovozné hodnoty uvedené v článku 136 vykonávacieho nariadenia (EÚ) č. 543/2011 sú stanovené v prílohe k tomuto nariadeniu.
Článok 2
Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dňom jeho uverejnenia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
V Bruseli 22. februára 2012