article: On July 1, 2013, a lawful permanent resident held in immigration detention in Massachusetts for eight months filed a federal habeas petition under 18 U.S.C. § 2241, and a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, contending that the prolonged detention of himself and others similarly situated without an individualized bond hearing violated the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause. The plaintiff was represented by Yale's Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, the ACLU, and private attorneys. The defendants included several Massachusetts sheriffs, the Franklin County Jail, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor was assigned to the case. While living in the U.S., the plaintiff had been convicted of a number of crimes, including selling an illegal drug, third degree burglary, and failure to appear. As a result of those convictions, he was sentenced in Connecticut state court to twelve years in prison, to be suspended after five. After serving two years, he was paroled on November 13, 2012. On that same day, ICE took the plaintiff into custody and immediately took action to deport him to Jamaica. In removal proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief against deportation under the Convention Against Torture, and on the ground that his removal would be disproportionate to any underlying misconduct. The Immigration Judge denied relief, and after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded, the Immigration Judge denied relief a second time. On December 29, 2014, the BIA found error and remanded the case once more. On January 9, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiff's habeas petition and ordered ICE to provide the plaintiff with a bond hearing. The Court determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the statute governing the detention of noncitizens who have committed certain crimes and are in removal proceedings, imposed a "reasonableness limit on the length of time an individual can be detained in immigration custody without an individual bond hearing." 991 F.Supp.2d 275. The Court held that detention beyond six months, absent an individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness, was presumptively unreasonable. In the alternative, the Court found that the individualized circumstances of the plaintiff's case rendered his continued detention unreasonable. The plaintiff also argued in District Court that he had been needlessly shackled in Hartford Immigration Court. On March 6, 2014, the District Court held that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. However, the Judge found that the claim of Mr. Reid himself was moot because he had been released on bond as a result of his successful habeas petition. Finally, because ICE had repeatedly and unlawfully held detainees like the plaintiff for months or years without a bond hearing, the plaintiff had moved to represent a class of similarly situated detainees in Massachusetts (where ICE confines most Connecticut residents). The District Court granted the motion for class certification, defining the class as: all individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond hearing. On May 27, 2014, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class and ordered class-wide relief. The Court held that the defendants must: (1) cease and desist subjecting all current and future class members to mandatory detention; (2) immediately determine the custody of every current class member under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and timely provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19; (3) determine the custody of every future class member under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 & 1236.1(d); (4) provide class counsel with a list of identified class members, including their names and alien numbers, and the facility in which they are detained; and (5) submit to the Court a report detailing custody determinations, bond hearing information, etc. The defendants appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 13, 2016, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members, and remanded the class action for reconsideration of the class certification. The Court disagreed with the District Court's adoption of the six-month bright line rule regarding detention under § 1226(c), preferring instead an individualized approach. And while it agreed that in the plaintiff's particular case his prolonged detention had become unreasonable, it determined that the adoption of the six-month rule was "an essential predicate to class certification" in the case, and by removing that predicate the class's legitimacy was called into question. 819 F.3d 486. On February 10, 2017, the defendants moved to decertify the class. The District Court denied the request on March 23. On January 2, 2018, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but on April 16, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. On May 11, 2018, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Jennings v. Rodriguez</i> (<a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12492">summarized here</a>), where the Court reversed the six-month detention rule that had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit withdrew its 2016 opinion and vacated the judgment. The District Court’s judgment as to the plaintiff was again affirmed but vacated as to the class members. The class action was remanded for reconsideration of the certification order. On May 30, 2018, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Patti B. Saris. On June 26, 2018, the defendants again moved to decertify the class. On October 23, 2018, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class, and certified the following class: All individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or the State of New Hampshire pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond or reasonableness hearing. On October 24, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, including new class representatives and expanding the class to include detainees at an additional county jail in New Hampshire. On January 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the individual habeas claims of the newly added named plaintiffs. However, this motion was denied as moot in February as those plaintiffs were no longer in detention. On April 15, 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion for summary judgment, this time renewing their constitutional claims, which the District Court had not reached in its prior decision. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same day. On July 9, 2019, Judge Saris granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions. 390 F.Supp.3d 201. First, the court agreed that mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates due process when circumstances render the detention unreasonably prolonged in relation to its purpose (ensuring removal of criminal noncitizens). Second, it held that the determination of whether mandatory detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonably prolonged is a fact-specific analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' request for a bright-line six-month rule. Third, it found that when such detention lasts for more than one year (excluding any delay attributable to the noncitizen), the delay is likely to be unreasonable. Fourth, it held that noncitizens subject to such detention without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) must bring a habeas petition in federal court to challenge the detention as unreasonably prolonged (if the court agrees, they are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge where the government carries the burden of proving dangerousness or risk of flight). And fifth, it declared that in making release determinations, immigration courts may not impose excessive bail, must evaluate the individual's ability to pay bond, and must consider alternative conditions of release (e.g., GPS monitoring). The court issued a permanent injunction to enforce its holdings related to the burden at bond hearings and bail setting by immigration courts. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the First Circuit. The defendants filed a cross-appeal on September 6. The case is ongoing.
summary: In ruling on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a lawful permanent resident and veteran held in immigration detention in Massachusetts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violates immigration statutes and the Constitution and that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, and ordered relief for all ICE detainees in Massachusetts. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members. After the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the First Circuit withdrew its opinion and vacated the judgment (still affirming the judgment as to the original plaintiff), remanding for reconsideration of the class certification. The class was upheld and the District Court ruled on the plaintiffs' constitutional claims in July 2019, granting a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, but rejecting the request for a bright-line six-month rule for when prolonged detention becomes unconstitutional. Both parties appealed to the First Circuit. The case is ongoing.