article: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States has been a leader in seeking to contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials. (2) With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially to countries in unstable regions, is now the leading military threat to the national security of the United States and its allies. (3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 31, 1992, that ``proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security'' and committed to taking appropriate action to prevent proliferation from occurring. The establishment of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was an important precedent to that end. (4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon states, a number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. (5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons. (6) The break-up of the Soviet Union has increased the threat of nuclear proliferation. (7) In May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the protocols to START I and committed to acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states ``in the shortest possible time''. (8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear weapons program which went undetected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection process and was greatly assisted by dual-use exports from western countries, including the United States. (9) North Korea's statement of intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its refusal to allow IAEA inspections of all of its known and suspected nuclear facilities, are unprecedented actions which could greatly undermine efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. (10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial programs to build nuclear weapons and South Africa has admitted developing and building 6 nuclear weapons, but in response to reduced regional tensions and other factors, all 3 countries have renounced nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safeguards for all of their nuclear facilities, and South Africa has acceded to the Non- Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. (11) United States security interests and current policy and practices are consistent with the terms of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which, like nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East that the United States supports, can contribute to efforts to avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races. (12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter proliferation, but the effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear materials may be adversely affected by institutional and financial constraints. (13) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which codifies world consensus against further nuclear proliferation and is scheduled for review and extension in 1995, should be expanded in membership and extended indefinitely, and additional steps should be taken to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. (14) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 declared that the United States is committed to continued strong support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened and more effective IAEA, and established that it is United States policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology. (15) The goal of the United States is to end the further spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. To that end the United States should adopt a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation policy. SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives: (1) Encourage Ukraine to join Kazakhstan and Belarus in ratifying the START I treaty and encourage Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join Belarus in voting to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest possible time. (2) Encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept IAEA safeguards over all of their nuclear facilities, and implement effective controls on nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. (3) Reach an agreement with the Russian Federation-- (A) to deactivate and retire from field deployment on an accelerated schedule all weapons to be withdrawn under the START I treaty and the START II treaty; (B) on data exchanges and inspection arrangements to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons scheduled to be withdrawn under the START I treaty and the START II treaty; and (C) to place all fissile material from such weapons under bilateral or international controls, or both. (4) Prepare for the ratification of the START II treaty by seeking the exchange of information between the United States and the Russian Federation on nuclear weapons stockpiles and fissile material facilities and inventories as required by the United States Senate as a condition to its approval of the START I Treaty. (5) Conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by early 1995, before the conference to renew and extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is held. (6) Ratify the START II treaty in the United States and encourage ratification of that treaty by the Russian Federation, and reach agreement with the Russian Federation to end the production of new types of nuclear warheads. (7) Conclude a multilateral agreement to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation to within a range of 1,000 to 2,000 each, with lower levels for the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China. (8) Conclude additional multilateral agreements to significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear arsenals of all countries through a stage-by-stage process. (9) Reach immediate agreement with the Russian Federation to halt permanently the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and achieve worldwide agreements to-- (A) end by 1995 the production of fissile material for any purpose; (B) place existing stockpiles of such materials under bilateral or international controls; and (C) require all countries to place all of their nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards. (10) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, and financial support necessary to implement the necessary safeguard reforms. (11) Strengthen nuclear export controls in the United States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions on individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States. (12) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation agreements. (13) Support the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials. (14) Adopt a United States policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons, reach agreement with the other nuclear weapon states to adopt such a policy and to assist immediately any country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should the use of nuclear weapons be initiated against such country. (15) Conclude a verifiable bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapon states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons. (16) Sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. SEC. 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY. (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than February 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on-- (1) the actions the United States has taken and the actions the United States plans to take during the succeeding 12-month period to implement each of the policy objectives set forth in this Act; (2) actions which have been taken by the Russian Federation, by the other former Soviet republics, and by other countries and institutions to achieve those policy objectives; and (3) obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to implement those policy objectives. Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary. (b) Report on Nuclear Stockpile Information.--The President shall submit a report to the Congress on the specific actions that have been taken and those that are planned to comply with Condition 8 concerning the ``Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement'' of the Senate resolution of ratification of the START I treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20 and 102-32). SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act-- (1) the term ``fissile materials'' means highly enriched uranium and plutonium; (2) the term ``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235; (3) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy Agency; (4) the term ``IAEA safeguards'' means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; (5) a policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons; (6) the term ``non-nuclear weapon state'' means any country that is not a nuclear weapon state; (7) the term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; (8) the term ``nuclear weapon state'' means any country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; (9) the term ``START I treaty'' means the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 31, 1991; and (10) the term ``START II treaty'' means the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 1993.
summary: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993 - Declares that, in order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be U.S. policy to pursue the following objectives: (1) encourage the Ukraine to ratify the START I treaty and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to vote to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states; (2) encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards over nuclear facilities, and implement effective controls on nuclear exports; (3) reach an agreement with the Russian Federation to deactivate weapons to be withdrawn under START I and II, place all fissile material from weapons under bilateral or international controls, and arrange for inspections and data exchanges; (4) prepare for the ratification of START II by seeking the exchange of information; (5) conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by early 1995; (6) ratify START II in the United States and encourage the Russian Federation to do the same; (7) conclude multilateral agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals; (8) reach agreement with the Russian Federation to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other worldwide agreements respecting such materials and the placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; (9) strengthen IAEA safeguards and nuclear export controls; (10) reduce incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions; (11) support the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference; (12) adopt a U.S. policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, reach agreement with other nuclear weapon states to adopt such a policy, and assist any country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should weapons be initiated against such country; (13) conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation to dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons; and (14) sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.