article: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002''. SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION. (a) Statement of Policy.-- (1) It is the policy of the United States to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and materials relating thereto, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as the scientific and technical expertise necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction. (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction, there should be three primary objectives, as stated in the President's review of 30 different United States-Russia cooperative programs, as follows: (A) To ensure that existing United States cooperative non-proliferation programs with the Russian Federation are focused on priority threat reduction and non-proliferation goals, and are conducted as efficiently and effectively as possible. (B) To examine what new initiatives might be undertaken to further United States threat reduction and non-proliferation goals. (C) To consider organizational and procedural changes designed to ensure a consistent and coordinated United States Government approach to cooperative programs with the Russian Federation on the reduction of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of their proliferation. (3) The goal of United States programs to assist the Russian Federation should be to have them work well, be focused on priority tasks, and be well managed. (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the following key programs should be expanded: (A) The Department of Energy Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to assist the Russian Federation secure and consolidate weapons-grade nuclear material. (B) The Department of Energy Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program. (C) The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program. (E) The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable its earliest completion at no increased expense. (5) Other programs should be adjusted, refocused, or reexamined, including-- (A) approaches to the current plutonium disposition program in the Russian Federation, in order to make the program less costly and more effective; (B) the project to end production by the Russian Federation of weapons-grade plutonium, in order to transfer the project from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy; (C) consolidation of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), with a focus on projects to assist the Russian Federation in reduction of its nuclear warheads complex; and (D) acceleration of the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense program to assist the Russian Federation install nuclear detection equipment at border posts. (b) Increased Funding of Certain Key Programs.--In order to guarantee that the United States-Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction efforts operate as efficiently as possible, certain key programs should receive additional funding above current levels, including-- (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement; (2) the Second Line of Defense program; (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention; (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program; (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program; (6) the Department of Energy Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program; (7) the International Science and Technology Center; and (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program. (c) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of United States- Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, which shall include-- (1) recommendations on how to improve and streamline the contracting and procurement practices of those programs; and (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and effective implementation of those programs. SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of weapons-grade material and warheads should be tracked in order, among other things-- (1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can fully account for its entire inventory of weapons-grade material and assembled weapons; and (2) to make it more likely that the sources of any material or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or terrorist organization can be identified. (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of Russian and United States weapons-grade material and assembled warheads, with particular attention to tactical, or ``nonstrategic'' warheads, one of the most likely weapons a terrorist organization or terrorist state would attempt to acquire, and with particular attention focused on weapons that have been removed from deployment. (c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States Government shall work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium programs and assembled warheads, with special attention to be focused on tactical warheads and warheads that have been removed from deployment. (d) Data Exchanges.--As part of this process, to the maximum extent practicable, without jeopardizing United States national security interests, the United States is authorized to enter into ongoing data exchanges with the Russian Federation on categories of material and weapons described in subsection (c). (e) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until a comprehensive inventory is created and the information collected from the inventory exchanged between the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both an unclassified and classified form as necessary, describing the progress that has been made toward that objective. SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY (MAS). (a) Statement of Policy.--With the end of the Cold War more than a decade ago, with the United States and the Russian Federation fighting together against global terrorism, and with the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation agreeing to establish ``a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the world community'', the United States and the Russian Federation should increase significantly their efforts to put dangerous and unnecessary elements of the Cold War to rest. (b) Establishment.--In order to assist with the policy expressed in subsection (a), the President is authorized to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a Joint United States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Security (MAS) (in this section referred to as the ``Commission''). (c) Composition.--The United States delegation of the Commission shall consist of 13 members appointed by the President, as follows: (1) Three members, after consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (2) Three members, after consultation with the Majority Leader of the Senate. (3) Two members, after consultation with the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. (4) Two members, after consultation with the Minority Leader of the Senate. (5) Two members as the President may determine. (d) Qualifications.--The United States members of the Commission shall be appointed from among private United States citizens with knowledge and expertise in United States-Russia strategic stability issues. (e) Chair.--The chair of the Commission should be chosen by consensus from among the members of the Commission. (f) Russian Commission.--The President should make every effort to encourage the Government of the Russian Federation to appoint a Russian Federation delegation of the Commission that would jointly meet and discuss the issues described in subsection (g). (g) Duties of the Commission.--The duties of the Commission should include consideration of how-- (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons announced by the United States and the Russian Federation in November 2001 take effect in a rapid, safe, verifiable and irreversible manner; (2) to preserve and enhance START I monitoring and verification mechanisms; (3) to develop additional monitoring and verification mechanisms; (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified START II agreement, especially those measures that affect strategic stability; (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed from deployment; (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads in excess of the ceiling established by the President Bush at the November 2001 United States-Russia summit; (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss United States and Russian Federation proposals for a global and theater level missile defense systems; (8) to extend presidential decision-making time as it relates to nuclear weapons operations; (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative efforts to enhance strategic early warning, including but not limited to the Joint Data Exchange Center and the Russian-American Observation Satellite; and (10) to increase cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation on the programs and activities described in sections 2 and 3. (e) Cooperation.--In carrying out its duties, the Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation of United States Government officials, including providing the Commission with analyses, briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. (f) Report.--The Commission shall, not later than six months after the date of its first meeting, submit to Congress an interim report on its findings and, not later than six months after submission of the interim report, submit to Congress a final report containing its conclusions.
summary: Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002 - States the policy of the United States to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as scientific and technical expertise necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.Requires the U.S. Government to work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade material and warheads.Authorizes the President to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a joint United States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Security.