article: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act''. SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. (a) First Principal Finding.--Ending the war in Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for United States national security, the safety of members of the United States Armed Forces currently serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and the Middle East. (b) Second Principal Finding.-- (1) Open-ended commitment is unsustainable.--An open-ended United States involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of United States national security, and United States military forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely over- strained. (2) Supporting facts.-- (A) Currently, 40 percent of all United States Army equipment is in Iraq. (B) There is no Army unit currently in the United States in a state of readiness that would permit the unit to deploy anywhere another contingency might occur in the world. (c) Third Principal Finding.-- (1) Lengthy redeployment process.--Redeployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process. (2) Supporting facts.-- (A) Redeploying approximately 160,000 troops and 50,000 civilian contractors from Iraq and closing bases are logistically challenging, especially during conflict. (B) The critical consideration is the closure or turnover of the sixty-five Forward Operating Bases held by the United States Armed Forces in Iraq. (C) It takes on average 100 days to close just one Forward Operating Base, and any decision regarding the number of Forward Operating Bases to close at one time depends on surrounding strife and the fact that receiving facilities in Kuwait to prepare military vehicles for shipment to the United States or elsewhere can handle only 2 to 2\1/2\ brigade combat teams at a time and there are currently 40 brigade combat teams or their equivalent in Iraq. (D) Redeployment is the most vulnerable of military operations, particularly in this case because redeployment will rely on a single road, leading from Iraq to Kuwait. (E) For comparison purposes, the removal of 6,300 members of the Armed Forces from Somalia in 1993 took six months and actually required the deployment of another 19,000 troops to protect their withdrawal. (F) In view of the logistical challenges, it will take at least a year, more likely 15 to 20 months to complete redeployment of United States forces from Iraq. SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY. (a) First Declaration of Policy.-- (1) Need for comprehensive regional security plan.-- Congress declares that it is critical that a comprehensive security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a deliberate redeployment of United States forces from Iraq. (2) Supporting details.-- (A) A comprehensive security plan is necessary for both the safety of United States forces in Iraq and the overall national security of the United States. (B) Redeployment would allow large numbers of members of the United States Armed Forces to return to the United States, while some forces could be deployed to areas, such as Afghanistan, where terrorists pose a threat to the national security of the United States or could remain at existing bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar and on aircraft carrier and amphibious groups, to protect United States interests in the region. (b) Second Declaration of Policy.-- (1) Iraqi assumption of responsibility.--Congress declares that a planned end to United States involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for the security and governance of their country while providing Iran and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by the redeployment of United States forces. (2) Supporting details.-- (A) The United States intelligence community has found that Iran and Syria, currently involved destructively in the fighting in Iraq want stability in Iraq following redeployment, and can play a constructive role in improving security and stability in Iraq. (B) Because the redeployment of United States may take up to 20 months, there is an opportunity for a strategic approach to work diplomatically for political accommodation in Iraq with Iran and Syria (as well as Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region) during that timeframe. (c) Third Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that while a ``date certain'' deadline for the redeployment of United States forces could force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility and provide Iran and Syria the incentive to prevent violence that could result from the redeployment, a ``goal'' for the redeployment's end instead of a ``date certain'' is a necessary compromise in order to ensure a strategic approach for United States security and create a greater level of Iraqi stability in the aftermath of the redeployment. SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS. (a) Redeployment Required.-- (1) Requirement.--Redeployment of United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall begin within three months after the date of the enactment of this Act. Within six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre- surge level of 130,000 troops. (2) Goal.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not later than twenty months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the goal is that all United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall be deployed outside of Iraq, to locations within the Middle East or Southwest Asia regions or to other regions or nations, or returned to the United States. (3) Purpose and pace of redeployment.--The redeployment required by this subsection shall be carried out for the purposes of both enhancing global security interests of the United States and improving the military readiness of the United States. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the redeployment is carried out at a deliberate, orderly pace that allows for the full security of members of the Armed Services. (b) Exceptions to Redeployment Requirement.--The redeployment required by subsection (a) shall not apply to the following: (1) Special operations forces and counter-terrorism operations.--Special operations forces assigned outside of Iraq that conduct either targeted counter-terrorism operations or periodic support operations of the Iraqi security forces in Iraq. (2) Military liaison teams.--Military or civilian personnel on military liaison teams involved in military-to-military contacts and comparable activities between the United States and Iraq, as authorized under section 168 of title 10, United States Code. (3) Air support.--Members of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assigned to locations outside Iraq for purposes of conducting air operations in Iraq (including air operations in support of combat operations) to support the Iraqi security forces. (4) Security for united states diplomatic missions in iraq.--Members of the Armed Forces providing security for the United States Embassy and other United States diplomatic missions in Iraq. (5) Defense attache.--Personnel conducting routine functions of the Office of Defense Attache. SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS. Effective six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense under any provision of law for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 members of the United States Armed Forces within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for troops in Iraq within twenty months after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 6. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES. (a) United States Leadership.--The United States should take a leadership role in diplomatic efforts and negotiations necessary for countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to ensure the long-term stability of Iraq, which is in the best interests of such countries and the United States. (b) International Conference.--The United States should convene an international conference to bring together countries throughout the world to provide economic aid for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq and other reconstruction efforts in Iraq that are essential to ensure the long-term stability of Iraq and America's national security.
summary: Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act - Sets forth the following findings: (1) ending the war in Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for U.S. national security, the safety U.S. Armed Forces members serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and the Middle East; (2) an open-ended U.S. involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of U.S. national security and U.S. military forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely overstrained; and (3) redeployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process. Declares that: (1) it is critical that a comprehensive security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a deliberate U.S. redeployment of forces from Iraq; (2) a planned end to U.S. involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for security and governance while providing Iran and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by the U.S. redeployment; and (3) a "goal" for the redeployment's end rather than a "date certain" end is a necessary compromise to ensure a strategic approach for U.S. security and to create to a greater level of post-redeployment Iraqi stability. States that: (1) with specified exceptions, redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall begin within three months, and that within six months troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre-surge level of 130,000 troops; and (2) the goal is that all U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall be deployed outside of Iraq within 20 months. States that funds for the Department of Defense (DOD) for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 U.S. Armed Forces members within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for troops in Iraq within 20 months. States that the United States should take a leadership role in diplomatic efforts necessary for countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to ensure Iraq's long-term stability of Iraq.