article: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion Act of 2000''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is still at its Cold War size. Little information about this complex is shared, and 10 of its most sensitive cities remain closed. These cities house 750,000 people and employ approximately 150,000 people in nuclear military facilities. Although the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced the need to significantly downsize its workforce, perhaps by as much as 50 percent, it has been very slow in accomplishing this goal. Information on the extent of any progress is very closely held. The major impediments to downsizing have been economic and social conditions in Russia. (2) The United States, on the other hand, has significantly downsized its nuclear weapons complex in an open and transparent manner. As a result, an enormous asymmetry now exists between the United States and Russia in nuclear weapon production capacities and in transparency of such capacities. It is in the national security interest of the United States to assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing significant reductions in its nuclear military complex and in helping it to protect its nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear secrets during such reductions. Such assistance will accomplish critical nonproliferation objectives and provide essential support towards future arms reduction agreements. Without a significant, transparent reduction in nuclear weapons production capacity, the Russian Federation's ability to quickly reconstitute its arsenal remains inconsistent with current and contemplated arms control agreements. (3) Several current programs address portions of the downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The Nuclear Cities Initiative was established to assist Russia in creating job opportunities for employees who are not required to support realistic Russian nuclear security requirements. Its focus has been on creating commercial ventures that can provide self- sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The current scope and funding of the program are not commensurate with the scale of the threats to the United States sought to be addressed by the program. (4) To effectively address threats to United States national security interests, progress with respect to the nuclear cities must be expanded and accelerated. The Nuclear Cities Initiative has laid the groundwork for an immediate increase in investment and potential for immediate risk reduction in the cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which house four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable progress with the limited funding available. However, to gain sufficient advocacy for additional support, the program must demonstrate-- (A) rapid progress in conversion and restructuring; and (B) an ability for the United States to track progress against verifiable milestones that support a Russian nuclear complex consistent with their future national security requirements. (5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade material stocks in the United States and Russia enhance prospects for future arms control agreements and reduce concerns that these materials could lead to proliferation risks. Confidence in both nations will be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each nation's stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The United States already makes this information public. (6) Many current programs contribute to the goals stated herein. However, the lack of programmatic coordination within and among United States Government agencies impedes the capability of the United States to make rapid progress. A formal single point of coordination is essential to ensure that all United States programs directed at cooperative threat reduction, nuclear materials reduction and protection, and the downsizing, transparency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in the Russian Federation's military complex. (7) Specialists in the United States and the former Soviet Union trained in nonproliferation studies can significantly assist in the downsizing process while minimizing the threat presented by potential proliferation of weapons materials or expertise. SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Energy shall, in accordance with the provisions of this section, take appropriate actions to expand and enhance the activities under the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order to-- (1) assist the Russian Federation in the downsizing of the Russian Nuclear Complex; and (2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian Nuclear Complex under the Initiative with other United States nonproliferation programs. (b) Enhanced Use of MINATOM Technology and Research and Development Services.--In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary shall facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the research and development services, of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) by-- (1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful, non- threatening advanced technologies of the Ministry through the development of projects to commercialize research and development services for industry and industrial entities; and (2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and encouraging other departments and agencies of the United States Government, to utilize such research and development services for activities appropriate to the mission of the Department, and such departments and agencies, including activities relating to-- (A) remediation of the environmental consequences of United States nuclear weapons activities and Russian nuclear weapons activities; (B) nonproliferation (including the detection and identification of weapons of mass destruction and verification of treaty compliance); (C) global energy and environmental matters; and (D) basic scientific research. (c) Acceleration of Nuclear Cities Initiative.--(1) In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear Cities Initiative by implementing, as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities referred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant portions of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities from military activities to civilian activities. (2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph are the following: (A) Zarechnyy (Penza-19). (B) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard). (C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). (D) Seversk (Tomsk-7). (3) Before implementing a program under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable milestones for the first year of the program. (d) Plan for Restructuring the Russian Nuclear Complex.--(1) The President, acting through the Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter into negotiations with the Russian Federation for purposes of the development by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure the Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes in the national security requirements of Russia by 2010. (2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the following: (A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons production capacity in Russia that is consistent with the obligations of Russia under current and future arms control agreements. (B) Mechanisms to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons production processes and nuclear materials inventories in Russia to the levels of transparency for such matters in the United States, including the participation of Department of Energy officials with expertise in transparency of such matters. (C) Measurable milestones that will permit the United States and the Russian Federation to monitor progress under the plan. (e) Encouragement of Careers in Nonproliferation.--(1) In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary shall carry out a program to encourage students in the United States and in the Russian Federation to pursue a career in an area relating to nonproliferation. (2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f), $2,000,000 shall be available for purposes of the program required under paragraph (1). (f) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2001, $50,000,000 for purposes of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including activities under this section. (g) Sense of Congress Regarding Funding for Fiscal Years After Fiscal Year 2001.--It is the sense of Congress that the availability of funds for the Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal year 2001 should be contingent upon-- (1) demonstrable progress in the programs carried out under subsection (c), as determined utilizing the milestones required under paragraph (3) of that subsection; and (2) the development and implementation of the plan required by subsection (d). SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) there should be a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate-- (A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative; (B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program; (C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs; (D) the materials protection, control, and accounting programs; and (E) the International Science and Technology Center; and (2) the position of National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regarding nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by designation of the President under section 1441(a) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)). SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Nuclear city.--The term ``nuclear city'' means any of the closed nuclear cities within the complex of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) as follows: (A) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard). (B) Zarechnyy (Penza-19). (C) Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44). (D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45). (E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65). (F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). (G) Trechgornyy (Zlatoust-36). (H) Seversk (Tomsk-7). (I) Zhelenznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). (I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45). (2) Russian nuclear complex.--The term ``Russian Nuclear Complex'' refers to all of the nuclear cities.
summary: Urges the President to enter into negotiations with the Russian Federation for the Federation's development of a plan to restructure its nuclear complex in order to meet changes in Russian nuclear security requirements by 2010. Directs the Secretary to carry out a program to encourage students in the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue careers in nonproliferation. Authorizes appropriations. Expresses the sense of Congress that availability of Initiative funds after FY 2001 should be contingent upon: (1) demonstrable progress in enhancing and accelerating Initiative activities; and (2) the development and implementation of Russia's nuclear restructuring plan. Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) there should be a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate various Federal nonproliferation programs, including the Initiative; and (2) such Coordinator position should be similar to the Coordinator position filled by the President under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.