{"push_id":3176578659,"size":7,"distinct_size":7,"ref":"refs/heads/9.0","head":"d01c5e442062d3951be33b7b15e092c969a40a70","before":"b739cae61830428c92924bd2b5a687476284e3d7","commits":[{"sha":"b89f828854c5499a2395039347ba84e9f3498516","author":{"name":"Johannes Berg","email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com"},"message":"ipv4: add option to drop unicast encapsulated in L2 multicast\n\nIn order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,\nadd an option (sysctl) called \"drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast\" which, if\nenabled, causes the stack to drop IPv4 unicast packets encapsulated in\nlink-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)\nbe created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted\nas valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames\nis shared between all stations.\n\nAdditionally, enabling this option provides compliance with a SHOULD\nclause of RFC 1122.\n\nChange-Id: I8de9fa5bdbea0556802f2ee553d0e73c1349213e\nReviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/b89f828854c5499a2395039347ba84e9f3498516"},{"sha":"bc3f75dfb00471431498f3b99bbec67415cef1b2","author":{"name":"Johannes Berg","email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com"},"message":"ipv6: add option to drop unicast encapsulated in L2 multicast\n\nIn order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,\nadd an option (sysctl) called \"drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast\" which, if\nenabled, causes the stack to drop IPv6 unicast packets encapsulated in\nlink-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)\nbe created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted\nas valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames\nis shared between all stations.\n\nReviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n(cherry picked from commit dede82143bf1bbf92ea73a519bb0298b19c56cb9)\n\nChange-Id: I76c8f84b53e95c40ad3c2b5adac0ec4964cc920c\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/bc3f75dfb00471431498f3b99bbec67415cef1b2"},{"sha":"53d99f70e4a9b45766351c769cfa5029a0b616ca","author":{"name":"Johannes Berg","email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com"},"message":"ipv6: add option to drop unsolicited neighbor advertisements\n\nIn certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be NA proxies\nthat use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.\nTo prevent unsolicitd advertisements on the shared medium from\nbeing a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.\n\nEnable this by providing an option called \"drop_unsolicited_na\".\n\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n(cherry picked from commit aec215e7aa380fe5f85eb6948766b58bf78cb6c3)\n\nChange-Id: Iad429a767a786087b0985632be44932b2e3fd1a8\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/53d99f70e4a9b45766351c769cfa5029a0b616ca"},{"sha":"bdc4e2c91324378904e85dcc5735f40b34426968","author":{"name":"Johannes Berg","email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com"},"message":"ipv4: add option to drop gratuitous ARP packets\n\nIn certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be ARP proxies\nthat use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.\nTo prevent gratuitous ARP frames on the shared medium from being\na problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.\n\nEnable this by providing an option called \"drop_gratuitous_arp\".\n\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n(cherry picked from commit 4078228159c9f54cca7347a8bdace29f2abdef65)\n\nChange-Id: I8772dbd7471085878f8b4161eb2a056d79b8b232\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/bdc4e2c91324378904e85dcc5735f40b34426968"},{"sha":"f420356dc439e88b788cd0cd2ac644356ac63143","author":{"name":"Martijn Coenen","email":"e2bfaa8b522ad2b3c4a1c86442cc7f7aa55b5234@android.com"},"message":"FROMLIST: ANDROID: binder: Add BINDER_GET_NODE_INFO_FOR_REF ioctl.\n\nThis allows the context manager to retrieve information about nodes\nthat it holds a reference to, such as the current number of\nreferences to those nodes.\n\nSuch information can for example be used to determine whether the\nservicemanager is the only process holding a reference to a node.\nThis information can then be passed on to the process holding the\nnode, which can in turn decide whether it wants to shut down to\nreduce resource usage.\n\nSigned-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/f420356dc439e88b788cd0cd2ac644356ac63143"},{"sha":"f903bf503d591a6dca0d272ca3b370257420cc68","author":{"name":"Todd Kjos","email":"8be399b0cc2f31b2ed16702a88343f61fd6797ee@android.com"},"message":"UPSTREAM: binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer\n\ncommit 7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c upstream\n\nMalicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER\nioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer\nwhile in use by the kernel, however there was a window where\nBC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that\nwas not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free\ndetected by KASAN with a malicious test program.\n\nThis window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute\nto 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed\nit instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that\nwhen the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set\nto 1 allowing a free to go through.\n\nBug: 116855682\nChange-Id: I0b38089f6fdb1adbf7e1102747e4119c9a05b191\nSigned-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>\nAcked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>\nCc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14\nSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>\nSigned-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/f903bf503d591a6dca0d272ca3b370257420cc68"},{"sha":"d01c5e442062d3951be33b7b15e092c969a40a70","author":{"name":"davidliu","email":"23db3845af156717ac27444a7081401a14e3a9b0@oneplus.com"},"message":"Optimized sRGB display mode\n\nrepair that the sRGB is not effect after screen on\n\nChange-Id: I568fad38bdaf1129e13e6741664a50986d0d6cd9","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/whoknowswhoiam/weebmsm8998-pie/commits/d01c5e442062d3951be33b7b15e092c969a40a70"}]}
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