{"push_id":1257833330,"size":4,"distinct_size":4,"ref":"refs/heads/cm-13.0-ak","head":"f9274e40d58b3bd1f0667bb428beb87e5c4e0ac8","before":"a760382dc2417a5253caa0c9ddd02cb5c8d8cac6","commits":[{"sha":"d50c839ef90e02f7c9b2cba8aae4bcda87389f01","author":{"name":"Eric Dumazet","email":"b3d77ad2db30f558882cc0c038be5a3cf96611f9@google.com"},"message":"tcp: make challenge acks less predictable\n\n(cherry picked from commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758)\n\nYue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS\n(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker\nto hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic\npaper.\n\nThis patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds\nsome randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack\nsessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.\n\nBased on initial analysis and patch from Linus.\n\nNote that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting\nto remove the host limit in the future.\n\nv2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.\n\nFixes: 282f23c6ee34 (\"tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2\")\nReported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>\nSigned-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>\nSuggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\nCc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>\nCc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>\nAcked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>\nAcked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\nChange-Id: Ib46ba66f5e4a5a7c81bfccd7b0aa83c3d9e1b3bb\nBug: 30809774","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/anarkia1976/AK-Crackling/commits/d50c839ef90e02f7c9b2cba8aae4bcda87389f01"},{"sha":"378106d83fe899cb92f8a00b125f713194bdd405","author":{"name":"Jaganath Kanakkassery","email":"b1803504bdc91c6b87292801bbc34df5d0b85920@samsung.com"},"message":"Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback\n\n(cherry picked from 951b6a0717db97ce420547222647bcc40bf1eacd)\n\naddr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.\n\nSigned-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>\nSigned-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>\nChange-Id: I18bda54bb1427d9443a39a04a5c551720118dc26\nBug: 30149612","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/anarkia1976/AK-Crackling/commits/378106d83fe899cb92f8a00b125f713194bdd405"},{"sha":"24101a08723d89e2cdf1572a6d75af26a52f4dbb","author":{"name":"Anson Jacob","email":"9e88ac225abe7919fcbe04d242309642644216d3@gmail.com"},"message":"usb: gadget: f_audio_source: Fixed USB Audio Class Interface Descriptor\n\nFixed Android Issue #56549.\n\nWhen both Vendor Class and Audio Class are activated for AOA 2.0,\nthe baInterfaceNr of the AudioControl Interface Descriptor points\nto wrong interface numbers. They should be pointing to\nAudio Control Device and Audio Streaming interfaces.\n\nReplaced baInterfaceNr with the correct value.\n\nChange-Id: Iaa083f3d97c1f0fc9481bf87852b2b51278a6351\nSigned-off-by: Anson Jacob <ansonkuzhumbil@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/anarkia1976/AK-Crackling/commits/24101a08723d89e2cdf1572a6d75af26a52f4dbb"},{"sha":"f9274e40d58b3bd1f0667bb428beb87e5c4e0ac8","author":{"name":"Anson Jacob","email":"9e88ac225abe7919fcbe04d242309642644216d3@gmail.com"},"message":"usb: gadget: f_accessory: Enabled Zero Length Packet (ZLP) for acc_write\n\nAccessory connected to Android Device requires\nZero Length Packet (ZLP) to be written when data\ntransferred out from the Android device are multiples\nof wMaxPacketSize (64bytes (Full-Speed) / 512bytes (High-Speed))\nto end the transfer.\n\nChange-Id: Ib2c2c0ab98ef9afa10e74a720142deca5c0ed476\nSigned-off-by: Anson Jacob <ansonkuzhumbil@gmail.com>","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/anarkia1976/AK-Crackling/commits/f9274e40d58b3bd1f0667bb428beb87e5c4e0ac8"}]}
{"actor":{"display_login":"anarkia1976"}}