{"action":"created","issue":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70","repository_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go","labels_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70/labels{/name}","comments_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70/comments","events_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70/events","html_url":"https://github.com/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70","id":171087894,"number":70,"title":"Key lookup & Consistency check","user":{"login":"c633","id":5112602,"avatar_url":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/5112602?v=3","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633","html_url":"https://github.com/c633","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"labels":[{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/labels/question","name":"question","color":"cc317c"},{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/labels/server","name":"server","color":"1d76db"}],"state":"open","locked":false,"assignee":null,"assignees":[],"milestone":null,"comments":17,"created_at":"2016-08-14T23:46:51Z","updated_at":"2016-08-27T16:22:46Z","closed_at":null,"body":"Continue the discussion at https://github.com/coniks-sys/coniks-go/pull/64#discussion_r74705314"},"comment":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/comments/242926464","html_url":"https://github.com/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70#issuecomment-242926464","issue_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/coniks-sys/coniks-go/issues/70","id":242926464,"user":{"login":"c633","id":5112602,"avatar_url":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/5112602?v=3","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633","html_url":"https://github.com/c633","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/c633/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"created_at":"2016-08-27T16:22:46Z","updated_at":"2016-08-27T16:22:46Z","body":"> The point I'm trying to make is that the server could be presenting Alice a malicious STR for t=2, which other auditors also see (if she happens to query the right auditors).\r\n\r\nI think if the auditors also see a malicious STR for `t=2` as Alice, then the hash chain has been equivocated since (at least) epoch `t=2` or before. Then this problem is actually auditing for non-equivocation operation, not just specified for `KeyLookupInEpoch`, I think. \r\n\r\n>> She also compares these STRs with auditor's, and instead of storing all the STRs herself, she trusts the auditors to store these STRs for her.\r\n> I see two issues with this approach. The auditors aren't really trusted entities in the system, and by design Alice shouldn't always query the same auditors, so having Alice rely on some auditors to store the STRs leaves her open for being equivocated later by the server.\r\n \r\nUsing \"trust\" here is probably wrong. \"Trust\" here meant Alice could believe in the auditors that they would store the STR at each epoch. What I meant here is all the auditors would store the STR, and Alice queries the auditors at random. I'm still using assumptions per paper.\r\n\r\n> I do think that this additional check is necessary (especially if this auditor is different than the ones Alice queried when monitoring her own key) since it can help increase her confidence that her and the auditor see the same history, and she doesn't have to check the entire hash chain on her end again.\r\n\r\nYes, you're right. This check is necessary if all the auditors Alice queried see the same invalid history. \r\n\r\n> I'm not sure I understand, at this point, what we would achieve by avoiding some of the checks that seem necessary to prove non-equivocation.\r\n\r\nI'm trying to simplify the `KeyLookupInEpoch`'s response. If my thought was right, the response would need to include the STR at querying epoch, and the latest STR, not a range of the hash chain."}}
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