{"push_id":1081230303,"size":114,"distinct_size":0,"ref":"refs/heads/caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-security-3.18","head":"7af984f3fa9c9c0dcc10cde15efd4520c9dc5afc","before":"c28868aceea8210b9012f8625ce294983e50e20d","commits":[{"sha":"e8b50d68ad6d1c07f35896b83e4ab0a2c10eb2f3","author":{"email":"e180a809e49f87ec262dcf2e1499b58e80ddd4fa@chromium.org","name":"Paul Taysom"},"message":"CHROMIUM: lib: zlib_inflage: fixed potential buffer overflow\n\nsmatch error from arm build:\narch/arm/boot/compressed/../../../../lib/zlib_inflate/inftrees.c:240 zlib_inflate_table() error: buffer overflow 'count' 16 <= 16\n\nBecause min is later assigned to len in zlib_inflate_table, by switching the tests\naround, min always stays in bounds.\n\nBUG=chromium:237705\nTEST=FEATURES=test emerge-$B chromeos-kernel-next\n\nChange-Id: Ic3fbbec8beda1cbe48378a7001b2a2c7ac1b8f4e\nSigned-off-by: Paul Taysom <taysom@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/59426\nReviewed-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/e8b50d68ad6d1c07f35896b83e4ab0a2c10eb2f3"},{"sha":"beacdd57883146e9cafdc8f09f69e0a3a1b54651","author":{"email":"3404ec003679ada95ae8a765c5826e8ab65be72c@chromium.org","name":"Toshi Kikuchi"},"message":"FROMLIST: lib/genalloc.c: fix the end addr check in addr_in_gen_pool()\n\nSince chunk->end_addr is (chunk->start_addr + size - 1),\nthe end address to compare should be (start + size - 1).\n\nBUG=chrome-os-partner:33870\nTEST=boot storm image with 3 peregrine cards\n\nChange-Id: I0c9865160cf17cfd06c9d45ba14a4441e703e46b\nSigned-off-by: Toshi Kikuchi <toshik@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/236764\nReviewed-by: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/beacdd57883146e9cafdc8f09f69e0a3a1b54651"},{"sha":"d6638f3a27d7e6f0b635a06022b247c11f42c4f3","author":{"email":"72416dde44ea762d19e3a7a555e3b59ce98f8eea@chromium.org","name":"Will Drewry"},"message":"CHROMIUM: mmap, sysctl: add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint\n\nThis patch proposes a sysctl knob that allows a privileged user to\ndisable ~VM_MAYEXEC tainting when mapping in a vma from a MNT_NOEXEC\nmountpoint.  It does not alter the normal behavior resulting from\nattempting to directly mmap(PROT_EXEC) a vma (-EPERM) nor the behavior\nof any other subsystems checking MNT_NOEXEC.\n\nIt is motivated by a common /dev/shm, /tmp usecase. There are few\nfacilities for creating a shared memory segment that can be remapped in\nthe same process address space with different permissions.  Often, a\nfile in /tmp provides this functionality.  However, on distributions\nthat are more restrictive/paranoid, world-writeable directories are\noften mounted \"noexec\".  The only workaround to support software that\nneeds this behavior is to either not use that software or remount /tmp\nexec.  (E.g., https://bugs.gentoo.org/350336?id=350336)  Given that\nthe only recourse is using SysV IPC, the application programmer loses\nmany of the useful ABI features that they get using a mmap'd file.\n\nWith this patch, it would be possible to change the sysctl variable\nsuch that mprotect(PROT_EXEC) would succeed.  In cases like the example\nabove, an additional userspace mmap-wrapper would be needed, but in\nother cases, like how code.google.com/p/nativeclient mmap()s then\nmprotect()s, the behavior would be unaffected.\n\nThe tradeoff is a loss of defense in depth, but it seems reasonable when\nthe alternative is frequently to disable the defense entirely.\n\n(There are many other ways to approach this problem, but this seemed to\n be the most practical and feel the least like a hack or a major change.)\n\nSigned-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>\n\nBUG=chromium-os:19221,native-client:1883\nTEST=built x86, booted,\n     ran sysctl -w vm.mmap_noexec_taint=0\n     run mmap_tester.c from issue such that it uses mprotect.\n\nChange-Id: I1e13adc0d9e8fdb1a0027a2e715557f4aff1b283\nReviewed-on: http://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/6007\nReviewed-by: <krasin@google.com>\nReviewed-by: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>\nTested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>\n\n[benzh: 3.14 rebase. Resolved trivial conflicts]\nSigned-off-by: Ben Zhang <benzh@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/d6638f3a27d7e6f0b635a06022b247c11f42c4f3"},{"sha":"583531a5d8b0845bfe8a234dda4aef6afae71b34","author":{"email":"1693f95ea06ee6d7b2276cb599c3f4f33a951d9c@chromium.org","name":"Elly Fong-Jones"},"message":"CHROMIUM: add DEVTMPFS_SAFE support\n\nIf DEVTMPFS_SAFE==y, automount devtmpfs with nosuid and noexec.\n\nBUG=chromium-os:32629\nTEST=adhoc\nmount | grep devtmpfs\n\nChange-Id: I7a330fb7bd1e0da7e42fe2194a958c6878c0ce68\nSigned-off-by: Elizabeth Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/38061\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/583531a5d8b0845bfe8a234dda4aef6afae71b34"},{"sha":"e8356ca710557e5e3b87ef781f7b767435a62e35","author":{"email":"895da5e8ef0fc46877c90966f17b25ed610e8335@chromium.org","name":"Stephan Uphoff"},"message":"CHROMIUM: kernel: Initial chromiumos security module.\n\nInitially the chromiumos security module only prevents symlinks\nin mount paths. Future versions will be more restrictive and\nwill be configurable using a driver interface.\n\nBUG=chromium-os:21954\nTEST=Use a mount path with a symlink and observe mount failure.\n\nChange-Id: I47ade3b7be684ab9e0533ce5ffd1e81009eaebfe\nSigned-off-by: Stephan Uphoff <ups@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/10581\nReviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>\n\n[3.4 kernel: added include linux/sched.h --grundler]\n[sonnyrao: 3.8: fix signature of chromiumos_security_sb_mount()]\n\nConflicts:\n\tsecurity/Makefile\n[filbranden: 3.18 rebase. Solved trivial conflicts.]\nSigned-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/e8356ca710557e5e3b87ef781f7b767435a62e35"},{"sha":"c794d911b2a0e6f85525972485e7e9044ea37b70","author":{"email":"d867fc987a366be56684d1145622524a3ba1efbf@chromium.org","name":"Sonny Rao"},"message":"CHROMIUM: security: enable VFS link restrictions by default\n\nThis enables the protected symlink and hardlink sysctls by default.\n\nChange-Id: I7725cb4e4342022e469b22a7156ba6754b571a96\nSigned-off-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/c794d911b2a0e6f85525972485e7e9044ea37b70"},{"sha":"5a1cc4c29e88de9fd0b671cfb13d14dd7da3408e","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: add module loading restrictions\n\nOnly allow modules to be loaded from the same initial file system.\n\nAt run-time, if root device is writable (dm-verity disabled), the restriction\ncan be disabled via the sysctl \"/proc/sys/kernel/chromiumos/module_locking\".\n\nBUG=chromium-os:34134\nTEST=parrot build & boot, manual testing\n\nChange-Id: I2ee7b15fb70b342ba8ffbdb74a0377215187924a\n[sonnyrao: 3.8: squashed with LSM: allow old style loads when locking diabled]\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/34306\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>\n\n[bleung : 3.10 rebase. removed use of f_vfsmnt for f_path.mnt]\nSigned-off-by: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/5a1cc4c29e88de9fd0b671cfb13d14dd7da3408e"},{"sha":"092fb3a33c1fa7db27bd6049f8d25ba7b4e2c328","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: spinlock the root directory lock\n\nSince module loading routines can be called simultaneously, initialization\nof the LSM's root directory lock must be mutexed.\n\nBUG=chrome-os-partner:17321\nTEST=link build, manual testing\n\nChange-Id: I8a6e317ea887d535770f5c8617406bf83c06c2e2\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/41687\nReviewed-by: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/092fb3a33c1fa7db27bd6049f8d25ba7b4e2c328"},{"sha":"988eff027294f766d5a1626f56b221c53e7a7047","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: fix sysfs parameter exposure\n\nThe kernel commandline used to change LSM parameters is exposed to\nsysfs, which does not enforce defined DAC permissions. As a result,\nit was possible to disable module locking after boot:\n\n    # cd /sys/module/lsm/parameters\n    # ls -l module_locking\n    -r-------- 1 root root 4096 Dec 10 14:31\n    # echo 0 > module_locking\n    -bash: module_locking: Permission denied\n    # chmod u+w module_locking\n    # echo 0 > module_locking\n    # insmod /tmp/evil.ko\n    # echo $?\n    0\n\nBUG=chromium:440990\nTEST=test image (with rootfs verification) now ignores sysfs fiddling\n\nChange-Id: Ibdda085960f7bb6bbd1e20c7cbe6678f1d0286cf\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/234550\nReviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/988eff027294f766d5a1626f56b221c53e7a7047"},{"sha":"49d4d5cde6088642dd7efeaefa637d57568a6cb7","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: switch to stacked Chromium OS LSM\n\nIn the effort to allow a \"full\" LSM (like SELinux) to build with a\nChrome OS kernel, switch the Chromium OS LSM into a hard-stacked LSM,\nin the same way as done for Yama.\n\nBUG=chromium:458652\nTEST=rambi build/boot, security_ModuleLocking passes\n\nChange-Id: I9746366adfd6fbddf4ffca79b1f60488cf96bfa4\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/249673\nReviewed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/49d4d5cde6088642dd7efeaefa637d57568a6cb7"},{"sha":"ed513dd0403a0bf397ba6c25def53470d7632cf7","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: handle pinned filesystem umount\n\nWhen the filesystem that was selected for module loading gets umounted,\nwe must release our reservation, otherwise we can Oops during umount.\n\nBUG=chromium:221461\nTEST=rambi build/boot\n\nChange-Id: Id9631bebd2b26ab1ed26f4c707d8c6fef6527398\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/249940\nReviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/ed513dd0403a0bf397ba6c25def53470d7632cf7"},{"sha":"290c6ccdca12d525e1bc26914e572db9f473d4e5","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: enable firmware pinning\n\nEnable firmware pinning, as done for module pinning.\n\nBUG=chromium:214576\nTEST=rambi build/boot\n\nChange-Id: Ifc20c7206206acd0a07d3fd6cc0e88c819a23c8c\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/249972\nReviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>\n\nConflicts:\n\tsecurity/security.c\n[filbranden: 3.18 rebase. Reolved conflict in security_kernel_fw_from_file.]\n[TODO(filbranden): Ask keescook@ to review this patch.]\nSigned-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/290c6ccdca12d525e1bc26914e572db9f473d4e5"},{"sha":"0bd6bd191770eec9869a03b2de741842a98cb1d4","author":{"email":"8c1011c9d06fc72acd93645d683782ab9543044d@google.com","name":"Michael Halcrow"},"message":"UPSTREAM: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine\n\ncommit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.\n\nDmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the\nend of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This\nfix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when\nthe current bit offset is 2.\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>\nReported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>\nSuggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nSigned-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>\nSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>\n(cherry picked from v3.14.y commit a306ae6aaca17d46f63143c0c8a5f1c9cfe75b4b)\n\nTEST=cbuildbot + manual boot\nBUG=chromium:459332\n\nChange-Id: If66c5e63d18be6e52bacfe2f6152ad89f5c755f4\nSigned-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/251001\nReviewed-by: Andrew Bresticker <abrestic@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/0bd6bd191770eec9869a03b2de741842a98cb1d4"},{"sha":"df3260c10740680d190667f7e64292a7a900d652","author":{"email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com","name":"Johannes Berg"},"message":"BACKPORT: device coredump: add new device coredump class\n\n(upstream commits 833c95456a70826d1384883b73fd23aff24d366f,\n9c6026994c2a18473c9ef9ed77e8cf8e344f4357 and\ncd3d9ea142c9fd47351e79fe30c7ae2c86302cda to get the same\nKconfig logic; all modified to compile on this tree)\n\nMany devices run firmware and/or complex hardware, and most of that\ncan have bugs. When it misbehaves, however, it is often much harder\nto debug than software running on the host.\n\nIntroduce a \"device coredump\" mechanism to allow dumping internal\ndevice/firmware state through a generalized mechanism. As devices\nare different and information needed can vary accordingly, this\ndoesn't prescribe a file format - it just provides mechanism to\nget data to be able to capture it in a generalized way (e.g. in\ndistributions.)\n\nThe dumped data will be readable in sysfs in the virtual device's\ndata file under /sys/class/devcoredump/devcd*/. Writing to it will\nfree the data and remove the device, as does a 5-minute timeout.\n\nNote that generalized capturing of such data may result in privacy\nissues, so users generally need to be involved. In order to allow\ncertain users/system integrators/... to disable the feature at all,\nintroduce a Kconfig option to override the drivers that would like\nto have the feature.\n\nFor now, this provides two ways of dumping data:\n 1) with a vmalloc'ed area, that is then given to the subsystem\n    and freed after retrieval or timeout\n 2) with a generalized reader/free function method\n\nWe could/should add more options, e.g. a list of pages, since the\nvmalloc area is very limited on some architectures.\n\nChange-Id: I8b84d6880c8f0430d4f0454dea323cc8603efa07\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/226530\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/df3260c10740680d190667f7e64292a7a900d652"},{"sha":"710f63c6db63ec2b56ff5420fcba0f8c6227776f","author":{"email":"bff32994ff0f8d048f262a8388145a71b6071bfe@intel.com","name":"Johannes Berg"},"message":"FROMLIST: devcoredump: provide a one-way disable function\n\n(From http://mid.gmane.org/1415913389-17734-1-git-send-email-johannes@sipsolutions.net)\n\nSince device/firmware coredumps can contain private data, it can\nbe desirable to turn them off unconditionally to be certain that\nno such data will be collected by the system.\n\nTo achieve this, provide a \"disabled\" sysfs class attribute that\ncan only be changed from 0 to 1 and not back. Upon disabling,\ndiscard existing coredumps and stop storing new ones.\n\nChange-Id: I9e1c9a7f375f3636ad7c9486eb1b4619b3ffc8c8\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/229780\nReviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/710f63c6db63ec2b56ff5420fcba0f8c6227776f"},{"sha":"1ae2641fefbbf9ed066049f7a8c9dd8384109f77","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: x86: implement thread_info-based syscall table\n\nThis moves the x86 syscall table into thread_info to allow for\nper-thread syscall tables. Native 32-bit, 64-bit, and 32-bit emulation\nare handled. The feature is enabled with CONFIG_ALT_SYSCALL.\n\nBased on proof-of-concept from Will Drewry.\n\nBUG=brillo:384\nTEST=gizmo build & boot, manual testing\n\nSuggested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nChange-Id: I2adb4742e284e8555621ccd78e487d8e4be73f6c\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/253230\nReviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>\n[bfreed: resolved conflicts for the 3.18 rebase]\nSigned-off-by: Bryan Freed <bfreed@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/1ae2641fefbbf9ed066049f7a8c9dd8384109f77"},{"sha":"2a6954f486ff8b4c06a99659176325080163817f","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: x86: create alt-syscall infrastructure\n\nCreate infrastructure for changing syscall tables. This adds a new\nPR_BRILLO prctl, along with the PR_BRILLO_SET_SYSCALL_TABLE command.\n\nBUG=brillo:384\nTEST=gizmo build & boot, manual testing\n\nChange-Id: I548a36092812af48dfd251e8f616d2092ffcf71b\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/253231\nReviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/2a6954f486ff8b4c06a99659176325080163817f"},{"sha":"1820f8ec3303ce05c854979ec71200567ca4b51d","author":{"email":"50cb10d2be062154b17ab4d66a4eab34f1cf1c84@chromium.org","name":"Kees Cook"},"message":"CHROMIUM: LSM: check vfsmount to avoid disengagement\n\nInstead of locking the dentry associated with the internal mount\nstructure, use the vfsmount structure. This means we don't have to\ncheck mount counts (in the face of bind mounts).\n\nAdditionally add checking of the actual backing device being pinned\ninstead of going arbitrarily after the rootdev, which may not be the\npinning origin (in the case of recovery kernels, etc).\n\nBUG=b:21762937\nTEST=gizmo build, umount a bind mount doesn't disable module pinning\n\nChange-Id: I6c4e4e985996698b24abf0edc0c2873e327258d1\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/277331\nReviewed-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/1820f8ec3303ce05c854979ec71200567ca4b51d"},{"sha":"d61f40f155ef2ea10e2e7ea167dd2fc8ec27be23","author":{"email":"d6e1285e1c84d3d5885c2124fdacc780e9fc0a94@tycho.nsa.gov","name":"Stephen Smalley"},"message":"UPSTREAM: selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.\n\nAdd support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that\nwe can distinguish them in policy.  This is particularly\nimportant in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable\nby apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and\nsearched by all.\n\nSince debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is\nimmutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can\nsimply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from\npolicy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.\nGeneralize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it\nfor debugfs too.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>\n(cherry picked from commit 134509d54e4e98888be2697a92cb4b48957b792b)\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>\n\nBUG=none\nTEST=kernel compiles and boots\n\nChange-Id: Ib605028e3f43be25724a3e8ec60d40f54e52e7ac\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/281743\nReviewed-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org>\nTested-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>\nCommit-Queue: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/d61f40f155ef2ea10e2e7ea167dd2fc8ec27be23"},{"sha":"6e056824cec34271a2dee0e45328b716e036307f","author":{"email":"d6e1285e1c84d3d5885c2124fdacc780e9fc0a94@tycho.nsa.gov","name":"Stephen Smalley"},"message":"UPSTREAM: selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files\n\nSupport per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on\ngenfscon policy entries.  This is safe because the sysfs\nand pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace,\nexcept to unlink pstore entries.\nThis provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling\nto sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from\nuserspace on each boot.  The advantages of this approach are that\nthe labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated\nand userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and\nset the labels on each boot.  The limitations of this approach are\nthat the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching.\nYou can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change\nthem at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy.\n\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>\nSuggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>\nAcked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>\nSigned-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>\n(cherry picked from commit 8e01472078763ebc1eaea089a1adab75dd982ccd)\nSigned-off-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>\n\nBUG=none\nTEST=kernel compiles and boots\n\nChange-Id: If8913209ef7f7d8edaafc14e693275b97119fffb\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/281745\nReviewed-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org>\nTested-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>\nCommit-Queue: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>","distinct":false,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/Jackeagle/kernel_msm-3.10/commits/6e056824cec34271a2dee0e45328b716e036307f"}]}