{"push_id":1390147588,"size":8,"distinct_size":8,"ref":"refs/heads/style_n_nit's","head":"76facbe4e94dbc70d2717aeee8460ca4279e33c7","before":"d2485eb01d02e7b94bd63665a177185428d34d50","commits":[{"sha":"608a026494c1e7a14f6d6cfcc5e4994fe2728836","author":{"name":"David Benjamin","email":"732e9177229740f757cac883f1aea417a06f67bd@google.com"},"message":"Implement RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified.\n\nRFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode\nthe DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key\noperation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal.\n\nOpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding\nround-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient\nlaxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in\nhttps://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html\n\nAlthough there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme,\nthis change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This\navoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy\necosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations\nwhich enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature\nproducer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and\naccidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a\nresponsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical.\n\nIn some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and\nsecurity risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not\nhere. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed\nRSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so\nthis change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL\nreleases.\n\nSee also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00\n\nAs a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this\nversion is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces\ndigest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath\nwasn't quite doing this right.\n\nReviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>\nReviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>\n\nGH: #1474","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/608a026494c1e7a14f6d6cfcc5e4994fe2728836"},{"sha":"aa90ca11c930114d5c0d68a2c1f446bf97853287","author":{"name":"David Benjamin","email":"732e9177229740f757cac883f1aea417a06f67bd@google.com"},"message":"Make RSA_sign.pod less confusing.\n\nPKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm\nRSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as \"PKCS #1 v1.5\" after an earlier\ndocument which specified it. This gets further confusing because the\ndocument PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms,\nRSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.\n\nRefer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find\nanyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name.\n\nReviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>\nReviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>\n\nGH: #1474","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/aa90ca11c930114d5c0d68a2c1f446bf97853287"},{"sha":"f320555735af7aa52172a2b8c56181445e8490dd","author":{"name":"David Benjamin","email":"732e9177229740f757cac883f1aea417a06f67bd@google.com"},"message":"Improve RSA test coverage.\n\nMD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo\nwrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length\nmismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It\nappears 5824cc298174d462c827cd090675e30fc03f0caf added support for\nVerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data.\n\nReviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>\nReviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>\n\nGH: #1474","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/f320555735af7aa52172a2b8c56181445e8490dd"},{"sha":"27ed73a98f88c98be996a6ffe7bda1b84bfc8be7","author":{"name":"Andrea Grandi","email":"6c0f903cd3548774c3c36c357a4ffee6a408c1c4@intel.com"},"message":"Improve PRF documentation\n\nReviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>\nReviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>\n\nGH: #1834","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/27ed73a98f88c98be996a6ffe7bda1b84bfc8be7"},{"sha":"7cb1ecec59d7c8d6628fb9bfd435306f7e06fd33","author":{"name":"FdaSilvaYY","email":"2f8912adbfeec453f1a4d1e06d0dab23c13e5e86@gmail.com"},"message":"Allow null in  X509_CRL_METHOD_free\n\nand fix documentation.\n\nReviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>\nReviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>\n(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1634)","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/7cb1ecec59d7c8d6628fb9bfd435306f7e06fd33"},{"sha":"30d7797305c62a9dd2b90ede0d5c8bae638c19fa","author":{"name":"FdaSilvaYY","email":"2f8912adbfeec453f1a4d1e06d0dab23c13e5e86@gmail.com"},"message":"Fix some extra or missing whitespaces...","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/30d7797305c62a9dd2b90ede0d5c8bae638c19fa"},{"sha":"8b6e55f0304fd66a141db34f9ff6f18023db0077","author":{"name":"FdaSilvaYY","email":"2f8912adbfeec453f1a4d1e06d0dab23c13e5e86@gmail.com"},"message":"Few nit's","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/8b6e55f0304fd66a141db34f9ff6f18023db0077"},{"sha":"76facbe4e94dbc70d2717aeee8460ca4279e33c7","author":{"name":"FdaSilvaYY","email":"2f8912adbfeec453f1a4d1e06d0dab23c13e5e86@gmail.com"},"message":"Fix some style and indent issue\nsimplify some code.","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/commits/76facbe4e94dbc70d2717aeee8460ca4279e33c7"}]}
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