{"action":"opened","issue":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/193","repository_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/800-63-3","labels_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/193/labels{/name}","comments_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/193/comments","events_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/193/events","html_url":"https://github.com/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/193","id":168440079,"number":193,"title":"To Avoid the False Sense of Security","user":{"login":"hitoshikokumai","id":20733106,"avatar_url":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/20733106?v=3","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai","html_url":"https://github.com/hitoshikokumai","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/hitoshikokumai/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"labels":[],"state":"open","locked":false,"assignee":null,"assignees":[],"milestone":null,"comments":0,"created_at":"2016-07-30T01:00:38Z","updated_at":"2016-07-30T01:00:38Z","closed_at":null,"body":"**Organization**:3\r\n \r\n**Type**:  Security design\r\n \r\n**Document (63-3, 63A, 63B, or 63C)**:63B\r\n\r\n**Reference (Include section and paragraph number)**:5.2.3\r\n \r\n**Comment (Include rationale for comment)**: It reads \"(The biometric system SHALL allow no more than 10 consecutive failed authentication attempts.) Once that limit has been reached, the claimant SHALL be required to use a different authenticator or to activate their authenticator with a different factor such as a memorized secret.\"\r\n\r\nThis implies that the second authenticator(factor) and the biometrics are used by OR/Disjunction, which necessarily makes the security lower than that of the second factor alone.  In other words, the security is better when the second factor alone is used.\r\n\r\nThere is a 2-minute video outlining the rationale.\r\n- Biometrics in Cyber Space - \"below-one\" factor authentication\r\nhttps://youtu.be/wuhB5vxKYlg  \r\n\r\nThis article may also help. \r\n- Misuse of Biometrics Technology\r\nhttp://www.paymentsjournal.com/Content/Blogs/Industry_Blog/30986/\r\n\r\n* Biometrics authentications are good for physical security but ruin the security of password protection and generate a false sense of security in cyber space. Deployed with a fallback password against false rejection, they provide the level of security that is even poorer than a password-only authentication.\r\n\r\n**Suggested Change**:  It is desirable to see the above sentence in 5.2.3 followed by such a footnote as \"It should be noted that the security in such cases is necessarily lower than when the second authenticator alone is used\".\r\n \r\n---\r\n \r\nOrganization: 1 = Federal, 2 = Industry, 3 = Other \r\n\r\n"}}
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