{"action":"created","issue":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773","repository_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing","labels_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773/labels{/name}","comments_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773/comments","events_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773/events","html_url":"https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773","id":132805615,"number":2773,"title":"Provide secure hashes in sha256sum.txt.asc","user":{"login":"generalmanager","id":6797943,"avatar_url":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6797943?v=3","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager","html_url":"https://github.com/generalmanager","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/generalmanager/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"labels":[],"state":"closed","locked":false,"assignee":null,"milestone":null,"comments":1,"created_at":"2016-02-10T20:15:07Z","updated_at":"2016-02-11T09:55:36Z","closed_at":"2016-02-11T09:55:35Z","body":"Is there a good reason why we are still using SHA1 hashes for release signing? Even the sha256sum.txt.asc contains only SHA1 hashes, which many users probably won't notice.\r\n\r\nIf they've heard about SHA1 beeing insecure/not recommended and SHA256 beeing secure, they'll likely assume that the sha256sum.txt.asc file actually contains SHA256 sums. SHA512 would be even better of course, but I don't want to appear greedy ;)"},"comment":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/comments/182787053","html_url":"https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773#issuecomment-182787053","issue_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/syncthing/syncthing/issues/2773","id":182787053,"user":{"login":"calmh","id":125426,"avatar_url":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/125426?v=3","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh","html_url":"https://github.com/calmh","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/calmh/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"created_at":"2016-02-11T09:55:35Z","updated_at":"2016-02-11T09:55:35Z","body":"So, there's a few different points and some confusion here. I'll try to address and clear up.\r\n\r\n- The sha256sum and sha1sum files are for humans only. The auto upgrade process never looks at these files. The auto upgrade process uses a 521 bit EC signature of the binary located inside the release package.\r\n- The sha256sum file indeed does contain sha256 sums. It says \"Hash: SHA1\" at the top, but that refers to what GPG is using when it signs the text file. That's apparently the default; I hadn't noticed or cared. I don't think it's a big deal.\r\n\r\nI think both sha1 and sha256 are plenty secure for the purpose; even if we are approaching some sort of point where there might theoretically be collisions against sha1 with 2^88 attempts or whatever, creating such a collision that is still a valid release package and contains a presumably malicious but otherwise working syncthing release doesn't seem feasible."}}