iowa state university to destroy the iowa anthrax archive and the archive was destroyed on october 10 and 11, 2001. the fbi and cdc investigation was hampered by the destruction of a large collection of anthrax spores collected over more than seven decades and kept in more than 100 vials at iowa state university, ames, iowa. many scientists claim that the quick destruction of the anthrax spores collection in iowa eliminated crucial evidence useful for the investigation. a precise match between the strain of anthrax used in the attacks and a strain in the collection would have offered hints as to when bacteria had been isolated and, perhaps, as to how widely it had been distributed to researchers. such genetic clues could have given investigators the evidence necessary to identify the perpetrators. al-qaeda and iraq blamed for attacks immediately after the anthrax attacks, white house officials pressured fbi director robert mueller to publicly blame them on al-qaeda following the september 11 attacks. during the president's morning intelligence briefings, mueller was "beaten up" for not producing proof that the killer spores were the handiwork of osama bin laden, according to a former aide. "they really wanted to blame somebody in the middle east," the retired senior fbi official stated. the fbi knew early on that the anthrax used was of a consistency requiring sophisticated equipment and was unlikely to have been produced in "some cave". at the same time, president bush and vice president cheney in public statements speculated about the possibility of a link between the anthrax attacks and al qaeda. the guardian reported in early october that american scientists had implicated iraq as the source of the anthrax, and the next day the wall street journal editorialized that al qaeda perpetrated the mailings, with iraq the source of the anthrax. a few days later, john mccain suggested on the late show with david letterman that the anthrax may have come from iraq, and the next week abc news did a series of reports stating that three or four (depending on the report) sources had identified bentonite as an ingredient in the anthrax preparations, implicating iraq. statements by the white house and public officials quickly proved that there was no bentonite in the attack anthrax. "no tests ever found or even suggested the presence of bentonite. the claim was just concocted from the start. it just never happened." nonetheless, a few conservative journalists repeated abc's bentonite report for several years, even after the invasion of iraq proved there was no involvement. "person of interest" barbara hatch rosenberg, a molecular biologist at the state university of new york at purchase and chairwoman of a biological weapons panel at the federation of american scientists, and others began claiming that the attack might be the work of a "rogue cia agent" in october 2001, as soon as it became known that the ames strain of anthrax had been used in the attacks, and she told the fbi the name of the "most likely" person. on november 21, 2001, she made similar statements to the biological and toxic weapons convention in geneva. in december 2001, she published "a compilation of evidence and comments on the source of the mailed anthrax" via the web site of the federation of american scientists (fas) claiming that the attacks were "perpetrated with the unwitting assistance of a sophisticated government program". she discussed the case with reporters from the new york times. on january 4, 2002, nicholas kristof of the new york times published a column titled "profile of a killer" stating "i think i know who sent out the anthrax last fall." for months, rosenberg gave speeches and stated her beliefs to many reporters from around the world. she posted "analysis of the anthrax attacks" to the fas web site on january 17, 2002. on february 5, 2002, she published "is the fbi dragging its feet?" in response, the fbi stated, "there is no prime suspect in this case at this time". the washington post reported, "fbi officials over the last week have flatly discounted dr. rosenberg's claims". on june 13, 2002, rosenberg posted "the anthrax case: what the fbi knows" to the fas site. on june 18, 2002, she presented her theories to senate staffers working for senators daschle and leahy. on june 25, the fbi publicly searched steven hatfill's apartment, and he became a household name. "the fbi also pointed out that hatfill had agreed to the search and is not considered a suspect." american prospect and salon.com reported, "hatfill is not a suspect in the anthrax case, the fbi says." on august 3, 2002, rosenberg told the media that the fbi asked her if "a team of government scientists could be trying to frame steven j. hatfill". in august 2002, attorney general john ashcroft labeled hatfill a "person of interest" in a press conference, though no charges were brought against him. hatfill is a virologist, and he vehemently denied that he had anything to do with the anthrax mailings and sued the fbi, the justice department, ashcroft, alberto gonzales, and others for violating his constitutional rights and for violating the privacy act. on june 27, 2008, the department of justice announced that it would settle hatfill's case for $5.8 million. hatfill also sued the new york times and its columnist nicholas d. kristof, as well as donald foster, vanity fair, reader's digest, and vassar college for defamation. the case against the new york times was initially dismissed, but it was reinstated on appeal. the dismissal was upheld by the appeals court on july 14, 2008, on the basis that hatfill was a public figure and malice had not been proven. the supreme court rejected an appeal on december 15, 2008. hatfill's lawsuits against vanity fair and reader's digest were settled out of court in february 2007, but no details were made public. the statement released by hatfill's lawyers said, "dr. hatfill's lawsuit has now been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all the parties". bruce edwards ivins bruce edwards ivins in 2003. bruce e. ivins had worked for 18 years at the government's bio defense labs at fort detrick and was a top biodefense researcher. the associated press reported on august 1, 2008, that he had apparently committed suicide at the age of 62. it was widely reported that the fbi was about to press charges against him, but the evidence was largely circumstantial and the grand jury in washington reported that it was not ready to issue an indictment. rush d. holt jr. represented the district where the anthrax letters were mailed, and he said that circumstantial evidence was not enough and asked fbi director robert s. mueller to appear before congress to provide an account of the investigation. ivins' death left two unanswered questions. scientists familiar with germ warfare said that there was no evidence that he had the skills to turn anthrax into an inhalable powder. alan zelicoff aided the fbi investigation, and he stated: "i don't think a vaccine specialist could do it…. this is aerosol physics, not biology". w. russell byrne worked in the bacteriology division of the fort detrick research facility. he said that ivins was "hounded" by fbi agents who raided his home twice, and he was hospitalized for depression during that time. according to byrne and local police, ivins was removed from his workplace out of fears that he might harm himself or others. "i think he was just psychologically exhausted by the whole process," byrne said. "there are people who you just know are ticking bombs. he was not one of them." on august 6, 2008, federal prosecutors declared ivins the sole perpetrator of the crime when us attorney jeffrey a. taylor laid out the case to the public. "the genetically unique parent material of the anthrax spores... was created and solely maintained by dr. ivins." but other experts disagreed, including biological warfare and anthrax expert meryl nass, who stated: "let me reiterate: no matter how good the microbial forensics may be, they can only, at best, link the anthrax to a particular strain and lab. they cannot link it to any individual." at least 10 scientists had regular access to the laboratory and its anthrax stock, and possibly quite a few more, counting visitors from other institutions and workers at laboratories in ohio and new mexico that had received anthrax samples from the flask. the fbi later claimed to have identified 419 people at fort detrick and other locations who had access to the lab where flask rmr-1029 was stored, or who had received samples from flask rmr-1029. mental health issues ivins told a mental health counselor more than a year before the anthrax attacks that he was interested in a young woman who lived out of town and that he had "mixed poison" which he took with him when he went to watch her play in a soccer match. "if she lost, he was going to poison her," said the counselor, who treated ivins at a frederick clinic four or five times in mid-2000. she said that ivins emphasized that he was a skillful scientist who "knew how to do things without people finding out". the counselor was so alarmed by his emotionless description of a specific, homicidal plan that she immediately alerted the head of her clinic and a psychiatrist who had treated ivins, as well as the frederick police department. she said that the police told her that nothing could be done because she did not have the woman's address or last name. in 2008, ivins told a different therapist that he planned to kill his co-workers and "go out in a blaze of glory". that therapist stated in an application for a restraining order that ivins had a "history dating to his graduate days of homicidal threats, actions, plans, threats and actions towards therapists". dr. david irwin, his psychiatrist, called him "homicidal, sociopathic with clear intentions." evidence of consciousness of guilt according to the report on the amerithrax investigation published by the department of justice, ivins engaged in actions and made statements that indicated a consciousness of guilt. he took environmental samples in his laboratory without authorization and decontaminated areas in which he had worked without reporting his activities. he also threw away a book about secret codes, which described methods similar to those used in the anthrax letters. ivins threatened other scientists, made equivocal statements about his possible involvement in a conversation with an acquaintance, and put together outlandish theories in an effort to shift the blame for the anthrax mailings to people close to him.: 9 the fbi said that ivins' justifications for his actions after the environmental sampling, as well as his explanations for a subsequent sampling, contradicted his explanation for the motives for the sampling. according to the department of justice, flask rmr-1029, which was created and controlled by ivins, was used to create "the murder weapon". in 2002, researchers did not believe it was possible to distinguish between anthrax variants. in january 2002, ivins suggested that dna sequencing should show differences in the genetics of anthrax mutations which would allow the source to be identified. despite researchers advising the fbi that this may not have been possible, ivins tutored agents on how to recognize them. considered cutting edge at the time, this technique is now commonplace. in february 2002, ivins volunteered to provide samples from several variants of the ames strain in order to compare their morphs. he submitted two test tube "slants" each from four samples of the ames strain in his collection. two of the slants were from flask rmr-1029. although the slants from flask rmr-1029 were later reported to be a positive match, all eight slants were reportedly in the wrong type of test tube and would therefore not be usable as evidence in court. on march 29, 2002, ivins' boss instructed ivins and others in suites b3 and b4 on how to properly prepare slants for the fbi repository. the subpoena also included instructions on the proper way to prepare slants. when ivins was told that his february samples did not meet fbir requirements, he prepared eight new slants. the two new slants prepared from flask rmr-1029 submitted in april by ivins did not contain the mutations that were later