as well as monthly income from the government if he or she is diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease. singapore use of all types of asbestos has been banned in singapore since 1989. currently, only removal of asbestos-containing materials is allowed in singapore and the ministry of manpower must be notified before work commences. turkey a complete ban on asbestos in turkey went into effect in 2011. finland the manufacture and import of asbestos containing building materials was banned from 1993 onwards, while the selling and use of such materials was banned from 1994. delayed recognition soviet made asbestos, after 1983. no ehs information. in a 1998 paper, medical historian peter bartrip examines why awareness and legislation appear to have lagged unduly, compared to evidence of the risks of asbestos. the paper concludes by agreeing with a previous paper ('asbestos: a chronology of its origins and health effects', british journal of independent medicine, 1990) and the 1930 report of edward mereweather (a factory medical inspector involved in the legislative investigations of the time), that despite theories suggesting a coverup and historical evidence that could be cobbled together after the fact, it is more likely that the issue was one of hindsight. according to bartrip, mereweather's 1930 report identified six relevant issues:: p.422 significant commercial exploitation of asbestos was still relatively new. the industry was small and employed comparatively few workers, particularly in dusty processes. the disease developed slowly and unobtrusively. the disease was easily confused with tuberculosis. affected workers left the industry and therefore fell out of sight of factory inspectors. (gee, below, states that studies "focused on factories, rather than users") medical research had concentrated on dusts containing free silica. there had been earlier discussion, notably a few brief comments by factory inspectors adelaide anderson and edgar collis during 1898–1911, described by bartrip as minor reports of no great substance in otherwise very large reports about factory workers.: p.423–424 as a result, he concludes that between 1898 and the late 1920s, all that can be said is that, "the dangers of the material were slowly beginning to be appreciated".: p.423–424 as of 1927, the senior medical inspector had reported that the effect of asbestos dust inhalation "was as yet imperfectly understood".: p.422–423 a second paper, by gee & greenberg, noted additional factors: the discovery of carcinogenicity of smoking at approximately the same time as the 1950s asbestos studies, had made it far harder to prove a proposed causative link for asbestos. anecdotal evidence and hearsay noted by local doctors and inspectors, was not pursued or taken seriously. "negative" cancer studies were used, which are poor at detecting statistically significant pathology rates unless they include follow-up for around 30 years. a "latency lacuna" exists and contributes to complacency (also reported by knox 1965) – as the consequences of exposure take decades to arise, by the time they occur it is possible to argue convincingly that "standards have improved" and that therefore the risk is eliminated; however this in turn is not confirmed for another 30 years by which time the same argument can be raised again. compared to short-term needs, a "speculative" risk not yet confirmed may carry less weight, until long after the time when action could be taken. long term surveys and sanction regimes failed to match short term pressures within politics, nor those within industry; in the case of asbestos they were inadequate. fallacious arguments were used, such as the observation that many asbestos workers remained healthy into old age as evidence of lack of risk or lack of harm. as even the most harmful occupation can have numerous apparent healthy survivors this is an example of "absence of evidence" being interpreted as "evidence of absence". as late as 1967, even the lancet was capable of writing that "it would be ludicrous to outlaw this valuable and often irreplaceable material in all circumstances (as) asbestos can save more lives than it can possibly endanger". litigation litigation related to asbestos is regarded as one of the largest litigation cases in legal history in terms of duration, claim size, and scope. factors responsible for this include: asbestos use was extremely widespread: it was used across many sectors, countries, industries and uses. it was also widespread in society itself, being used not in limited "niche" areas but within many everyday products, in housing, fire protection, and even decorative material such as artex, as well as numerous other ways. over 50% of homes in some countries contained asbestos even after its ban there. so it was somewhat ubiquitous; knowledge or suspicion of health issues existed for a long time: the health issues related to asbestos were known, suspected, or reported, for decades, with modern medical coverage dating back to the 19th century. impact was severe, and included factors that tend to lead to high claims: serious and fatal disease; also apart from death the costs include long-term care and disability, care costs, lifetime loss of income, and other high value compensations. relatively easy to be at risk: asbestos-related diseases are caused by inhaling tiny airborne fibers, therefore any activity related to asbestos that led to loose dust or fibers could potentially cause disease (secondary asbestosis). as a result, illness occurred not only in the widespread primary industries using asbestos, such as the asbestos mining and processing businesses, but also across industries that might handle their products (construction and demolition, repairs, fire safety), persons who disturbed asbestos products in their homes or workplaces, and even those who laundered clothing used by asbestos workers. illnesses arise long after exposure: asbestos related diseases can arise decades after actual exposure. asbestos industry alleged misconduct: alleged concealing, distorting, and suppressing of risk related information, by asbestos related businesses. as of 1999, trends indicate that the worldwide rate at which people are diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases will likely increase through the next decade. analysts have estimated that the total cost of asbestos litigation in the usa alone is over $250 billion. in the united kingdom, more people died in 2011 from asbestos-related causes (4721) than in all types of traffic and transport accidents combined, and new reported cases were estimated at 2126. in the united states, asbestos litigation is the longest, most expensive mass tort in u.s. history, involving more than 8,400 defendants and 730,000 claimants as of 2002 according to the rand corporation, and at least one defendant reported claim counts in excess of $800,000 in 2006. the federal legal system in the united states has dealt with numerous counts of asbestos-related suits, which often included multiple plaintiffs with similar symptoms. in 1999 there were 200,000 related cases pending in the federal court system of the united states. further, it is estimated that within the next 40 years, the number of cases may increase to 700,000. these numbers help explain how there are thousands of current pending cases. litigation of asbestos materials has been slow. companies sometimes counter saying that health issues do not currently appear in their worker or workers, or sometimes are settled out of court. the volume of the asbestos liability has concerned manufacturers and insurers and reinsurers. the amounts and method of allocating compensation have been the source of many court cases, and government attempts at resolution of existing and future cases. in 1999 the united states considered but did not enact the fairness in asbestos compensation act. between 1981 and the present, many asbestos companies have filed for bankruptcy. while companies filed for bankruptcy, this limited payouts to those who were actually affected by the material. christopher edley, jr. commented what the 1999 act ultimately would have done if passed would be to "limit punitive damages that seek retribution for the decisions of long-dead executives for conduct that took place decades ago." litigation exists outside the united states in england, scotland, ireland, the netherlands, france, italy, and japan among other nations (though the amounts awarded in these countries are not as large as in the us). see the companion article for further information. in australia a significant and controversial case was brought against the industrial building materials company james hardie, which had mined and sold asbestos related products for many years. criticisms of asbestos regulation criticisms of regulation include the discredited suggestion by dixy lee ray that the space shuttle challenger disintegrated because the maker of o-ring putty was pressured by the epa into ceasing production of asbestos-laden putty. however, the putty used in challenger's final flight contained asbestos, and failures in the putty were not responsible for the failure of the o-ring that led to loss of the shuttle. asbestos was also used in the first forty floors of the world trade center north tower causing an airborne contamination among lower manhattan after the towers collapsed in the september 11 attacks. after the attack, another discredited suggestion came from steven milloy of the libertarian cato institute that the world trade center towers could still be standing or at least would have stood longer had a 1971 ban not stopped the completion of the asbestos coating above the 64th floor. this was not considered in the national institute of standards and technology's report on the towers' collapse, on the basis that all fireproofing materials, regardless of their construction, are required to obtain a fire-resistance rating prior to installation, and all fiber-based lightweight commercial spray fireproofing materials are vulnerable to the dispersive effects of high speed/high energy impacts, as these are outside the fire testing upon which all ratings are based. therefore, asbestos would have made little or no difference in preventing the towers' collapse, if used as fireproofing, and upon collapse any asbestos, however used, would still have been largely dispersed into the air within the massive dust cloud.