and consultant and an expert on risk utility and scientific research, wrote in the libertarian cato institute's magazine regulation that "...of the 75 published studies of ets and lung cancer, some 70% did not report statistically significant differences of risk and are moot. roughly 17% claim an increased risk and 13% imply a reduction of risk." milloy steven milloy, the "junk science" commentator for fox news and a former philip morris consultant, claimed that "of the 19 studies" on passive smoking "only 8— slightly more than 42%— reported statistically significant increases in heart disease incidence." another component of criticism cited by milloy focused on relative risk and epidemiological practices in studies of passive smoking. milloy, who has a master's degree from the johns hopkins school of hygiene and public health, argued that studies yielding relative risks of less than 2 were meaningless junk science. this approach to epidemiological analysis was criticized in the american journal of public health: a major component of the industry attack was the mounting of a campaign to establish a "bar" for "sound science" that could not be fully met by most individual investigations, leaving studies that did not meet the criteria to be dismissed as "junk science." the tobacco industry and affiliated scientists also put forward a set of "good epidemiology practices" which would have the practical effect of obscuring the link between secondhand smoke and lung cancer; the privately stated goal of these standards was to "impede adverse legislation". however, this effort was largely abandoned when it became clear that no independent epidemiological organization would agree to the standards proposed by philip morris et al. levois and layard in 1995, levois and layard, both tobacco industry consultants, published two analyses in the journal regulatory toxicology and pharmacology regarding the association between spousal exposure to secondhand smoke and heart disease. both of these papers reported no association between secondhand smoke and heart disease. these analyses have been criticized for failing to distinguish between current and former smokers, despite the fact that former smokers, unlike current ones, are not at a significantly increased risk of heart disease. world health organization controversy a 1998 study by the international agency for research on cancer (iarc) on environmental tobacco smoke (ets) found "weak evidence of a dose–response relationship between risk of lung cancer and exposure to spousal and workplace ets." in march 1998, before the study was published, reports appeared in the media alleging that the iarc and the world health organization (who) were suppressing information. the reports, appearing in the british sunday telegraph and the economist, among other sources, alleged that the who withheld from publication of its own report that supposedly failed to prove an association between passive smoking and a number of other diseases (lung cancer in particular). in response, the who issued a press release stating that the results of the study had been "completely misrepresented" in the popular press and were in fact very much in line with similar studies demonstrating the harms of passive smoking. the study was published in the journal of the national cancer institute in october of the same year, and concluded the authors found "no association between childhood exposure to ets and lung cancer risk" but "did find weak evidence of a dose–response relationship between risk of lung cancer and exposure to spousal and workplace ets." an accompanying editorial summarized: when all the evidence, including the important new data reported in this issue of the journal, is assessed, the inescapable scientific conclusion is that ets is a low-level lung carcinogen. with the release of formerly classified tobacco industry documents through the tobacco master settlement agreement, it was found (by elisa ong and stanton glantz) that the controversy over the who's alleged suppression of data had been engineered by philip morris, british american tobacco, and other tobacco companies in an effort to discredit scientific findings which would harm their business interests. a who inquiry, conducted after the release of the tobacco-industry documents, found that this controversy was generated by the tobacco industry as part of its larger campaign to cut the who's budget, distort the results of scientific studies on passive smoking, and discredit the who as an institution. this campaign was carried out using a network of ostensibly independent front organizations and international and scientific experts with hidden financial ties to the industry. epa lawsuit in 1993, the united states environmental protection agency (epa) issued a report estimating that 3,000 lung cancer related deaths in the united states were caused by passive smoking annually. philip morris, r.j. reynolds tobacco company, and groups representing growers, distributors and marketers of tobacco took legal action, claiming that the epa had manipulated this study and ignored accepted scientific and statistical practices. the united states district court for the middle district of north carolina ruled in favor of the tobacco industry in 1998, finding that the epa had failed to follow proper scientific and epidemiologic practices and had "cherry picked" evidence to support conclusions which they had committed to in advance. the court stated in part, "epa publicly committed to a conclusion before research had begun…adjusted established procedure and scientific norms to validate the agency's public conclusion... in conducting the ets risk assessment, disregarded information and made findings on selective information; did not disseminate significant epidemiologic information; deviated from its risk assessment guidelines; failed to disclose important findings and reasoning…" in 2002, the epa successfully appealed this decision to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit. the epa's appeal was upheld on the preliminary grounds that their report had no regulatory weight, and the earlier finding was vacated. in 1998, the u.s. department of health and human services, through the publication by its national toxicology program of the 9th report on carcinogens, listed environmental tobacco smoke among the known carcinogens, observing of the epa assessment that "the individual studies were carefully summarized and evaluated." tobacco-industry funding of research the tobacco industry's role in funding scientific research on secondhand smoke has been controversial. a review of published studies found that tobacco-industry affiliation was strongly correlated with findings exonerating secondhand smoke; researchers affiliated with the tobacco industry were 88 times more likely than independent researchers to conclude that secondhand smoke was not harmful. in a specific example which came to light with the release of tobacco-industry documents, philip morris executives successfully encouraged an author to revise his industry-funded review article to downplay the role of secondhand smoke in sudden infant death syndrome. the 2006 u.s. surgeon general's report criticized the tobacco industry's role in the scientific debate: the industry has funded or carried out research that has been judged to be biased, supported scientists to generate letters to editors that criticized research publications, attempted to undermine the findings of key studies, assisted in establishing a scientific society with a journal, and attempted to sustain controversy even as the scientific community reached consensus. this strategy was outlined at an international meeting of tobacco companies in 1988, at which philip morris proposed to set up a team of scientists, organized by company lawyers, to "carry out work on ets to keep the controversy alive." all scientific research was subject to oversight and "filtering" by tobacco-industry lawyers: philip morris then expect the group of scientists to operate within the confines of decisions taken by pm scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be 'filtered' by lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity. philip morris reported that it was putting "...vast amounts of funding into these projects... in attempting to coordinate and pay so many scientists on an international basis to keep the ets controversy alive." tobacco industry response measures to tackle secondhand smoke pose a serious economic threat to the tobacco industry, having broadened the definition of smoking beyond a personal habit to something with a social impact. in a confidential 1978 report, the tobacco industry described increasing public concerns about secondhand smoke as "the most dangerous development to the viability of the tobacco industry that has yet occurred." in united states of america v. philip morris et al., the district court for the district of columbia found that the tobacco industry "... recognized from the mid-1970s forward that the health effects of passive smoking posed a profound threat to industry viability and cigarette profits," and that the industry responded with "efforts to undermine and discredit the scientific consensus that ets causes disease." accordingly, the tobacco industry have developed several strategies to minimise the impact on their business: the industry has sought to position the secondhand smoke debate as essentially concerned with civil liberties and smokers' rights rather than with health, by funding groups such as forest. funding bias in research; in all reviews of the effects of secondhand smoke on health published between 1980 and 1995, the only factor associated with concluding that secondhand smoke is not harmful was whether an author was affiliated with the tobacco industry. however, not all studies that failed to find evidence of harm were by industry-affiliated authors. delaying and discrediting legitimate research (see for an example of how the industry attempted to discredit takeshi hirayama's landmark study, and for an example of how it attempted to delay and discredit a major australian report on passive smoking) promoting "good epidemiology" and attacking so-called junk science (a term popularised by industry lobbyist steven milloy): attacking the methodology behind research showing health risks as flawed and attempting to promote sound science. ong & glantz (2001) cite an internal phillip morris memo giving evidence of this as company policy. creation of outlets for favourable research. in 1989, the tobacco industry established the international society of the built environment, which published the peer-reviewed journal indoor and built environment. this journal did not require conflict-of-interest disclosures from its authors. with documents made available through the master settlement, it was found that the executive board of the society and the editorial board of the journal were dominated by paid tobacco-industry consultants. the journal published a large amount of material on passive smoking, much of which was "industry-positive". citing the tobacco industry's production of biased research and efforts to undermine scientific findings, the 2006 u.s. surgeon general's report concluded that the industry had "attempted to sustain controversy even as the scientific community reached consensus... industry documents indicate that the tobacco industry has engaged in widespread activities... that have gone beyond the bounds of accepted scientific practice." the u.s. district court, in u.s.a. v. philip morris et al., found that "...despite their internal acknowledgment of the hazards of secondhand smoke, defendants have fraudulently denied that ets causes disease." position of major tobacco companies the positions of major tobacco companies on the issue of secondhand smoke is somewhat varied. in general, tobacco companies have continued to focus on questioning the methodology of studies showing that secondhand smoke is harmful. some (such as british american tobacco and philip morris) acknowledge the medical consensus that secondhand smoke carries health risks, while others continue to assert that the evidence is inconclusive. several tobacco companies advocate the creation of smoke-free areas within public buildings as an alternative to comprehensive smoke-free laws. us racketeering lawsuit against tobacco companies on september 22, 1999, the u.s. department of justice filed a racketeering lawsuit against philip morris and other major cigarette manufacturers. almost 7 years later, on august 17, 2006, u.s. district court judge gladys kessler found that the government had proven its case and that the tobacco company defendants had violated the racketeer influenced corrupt organizations act (rico). in particular, judge kessler found that pm and other tobacco companies had: conspired to minimize, distort and confuse the public about the health hazards of smoking; publicly denied, while internally acknowledging, that secondhand tobacco smoke is harmful to nonsmokers, and destroyed documents relevant to litigation. the ruling found that tobacco companies undertook joint efforts to undermine and discredit the scientific consensus that secondhand smoke causes disease, notably by controlling research findings via paid consultants. the ruling also concluded that tobacco companies were fraudulently continuing to deny the health effects of ets exposure. on may 22, 2009, a three-judge panel of the u.s. court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit unanimously upheld the lower court's 2006 ruling. smoke-free laws