male preference is based on the economic benefits of having a son and the costs of having a daughter. in india, there is a very limited social security system so parents look to their sons to ensure their futures and care for them in old age. daughters are liabilities because they have to leave to another family once they are married and cannot take care of their parents. additionally, they do not contribute economically to the family wealth and are costly because of the dowry system. people in india usually see men's work as "productive" and contributing the family, while the social perception of female labor does not have that connotation. this also ties to the fact that it is easier for men in india to get high paying jobs and provide financially for their families. women need increased access to education and economic resources in order to reach that level of gainful employment and change people's perceptions of daughters being financial liabilities. with this cost and benefit analysis, many families come to the conclusion that they must prioritize male children's lives over female lives in order to ensure their financial future. the traditional social security system in india is family centered, with the joint family of three generations living together and taking care of each other. consequences of a declining sex ratio in indian states 2011 census sex ratio map for the states and union territories of india, boys per 100 girls in 0 to 1 age group. this table gives information on the child sex ratio in major states in india throughout the years 1981, 1991, and 2001 the following table presents the child sex ratio data for india's states and union territories, according to 2011 census of india for population count in the 0-1 age group. the data suggests 18 states/ut had birth sex ratio higher than 107 implying excess males at birth and/or excess female mortalities after birth but before she reaches the age of 1, 13 states/ut had normal child sex ratios in the 0-1 age group, and 4 states/ut had birth sex ratio less than 103 implying excess females at birth and/or excess male mortalities after birth but before he reaches the age of 1. state / utboys (0-1 age)2011 censusgirls (0-1 age)2011 censussex ratio(boys per100 girls) india10,633,2989,677,936109.9 jammu and kashmir154,761120,551128.4 haryana254,326212,408119.7 punjab226,929193,021117.6 uttarakhand92,11780,649114.2 delhi135,801118,896114.2 maharashtra946,095829,465114.1 lakashadweep593522114.0 rajasthan722,108635,198113.7 gujarat510,124450,743113.2 uttar pradesh1,844,9471,655,612111.4 chandigarh8,2837,449111.2 daman and diu1,6751,508111.1 bihar1,057,050957,907110.3 himchal pradesh53,26148,574109.6 madhya pradesh733,148677,139108.3 goa9,8689,171107.6 jharkhand323,923301,266107.5 manipur22,85221,326107.2 andhra pradesh626,538588,309106.5 tamil nadu518,251486,720106.5 odisha345,960324,949106.5 dadra and nagar haveli3,1813,013105.6 karnataka478,346455,299105.1 west bengal658,033624,760105.0 assam280,888267,962104.8 nagaland17,10316,361104.5 sikkim3,9053,744104.3 chhattisgarh253,745244,497103.8 tripura28,65027,625103.7 meghalaya41,35339,940103.5 arunachal pradesh11,79911,430103.2 andaman and nicobar islands2,7272,651102.9 kerala243,852238,489102.2 puducherry9,0898,900102.1 mizoram12,01711,882101.1 marriage market and importation of brides this graph shows the marriage market for women in india and how the lack of females due to female foeticide results in a lower supply of women. the gap is bridged by men kidnapping or importing wives from other regions. classic economic theory views the market for marriage as one in which people bargain for a spouse who maximizes their utility gains from marriage. in india, many of these bargains actually take place within the family and therefore individual utility is replaced by family utility. in this marriage market, men and their families are trying to maximize their utility, which creates a supply and demand for wives. however, female foeticide and a high sex ratio have high implications for this market. dharma kumar, argues that, "sex selection at conception will reduce the supply of women, they will become more valuable, and female children will be better cared for and will live longer". in the graph, this is depicted by the leftward shift of the supply curve and the subsequent decrease in quantity of females from q1 to q2 and increase in their value from p1 to p2. however, this model does not work for the situation in india because it does not account for the common act of males importing brides from other regions. a low supply of women results in men and their families trafficking women from other areas and leads to increased sexual violence and abuse against women and children, increased child marriages, and increased maternal deaths due to forced abortions and early marriages. this ends up devaluing women instead of the presumed effect of increasing their value. in the graph, the supply of brides outside each village, locality, or region is depicted as 'supply foreign'. this foreign supply values the price of getting a wife at much cheaper than the first domestic price p1 and the second domestic price p2. therefore, due to the decrease of women domestically due to sex selection and the low price of foreign women (because they are often bought as slaves or kidnapped), the resulting gap of imported women is from q3 to q4. women act like imports in an international trade market if the import price is lower than the high price of domestic dowries with a low supply of women. the foreign price is lower than the market price and this results in even fewer domestic brides than without importation (q3 instead of q2). in turn, this creates a self-fulfilling cycle of limiting females domestically and continually importing them and there is no end to the cycle of female feticide if these acts can continue and importation is an option. the imported brides are known as "paros" and are treated very badly because they have no cultural, regional, or familial ties to their husbands before being brought into their homes. one of the field studies in haryana revealed that more than 9000 married women are bought from other indian states as imported brides. this act also results in wife sharing and polyandry by family members in some areas of haryana, rajasthan, and punjab, which maintains the gender imbalance if one family can make do with only one female. for example, the polyandrous toda of nilgiri hills in southern india practiced female infanticide in order to maintain a certain demographic imbalance. negative spillovers of pre-natal sex selection and female foeticide when families choose to partake in pre-natal sex selection through illegal ultrasounds or abortions, they impart a negative spillover on society. these include increased gender disparity, a high sex ratio, lives lost, lack of development, and abuse and violence against women and children. families do not often keep this spillover in mind and this results in sex selection and female foeticide, which hurts society as a whole. empirical study on male/female child mortality a study by satish b. agnihotri infers the gender bias in india by studying the relationship between male and female infant and child mortality rates in the face of mortality as a whole looking like it is decreasing. hypothetically, if males and females are identical, then there should be no difference in mortality rates and no gender gap. however, male and female children are perceived as psychologically and socially different so the equation relating mortality looks like this: mrf = a + b*mrm. mrf is female child mortality, a is residual female mortality when male mortality is 0, the slope b shows the rate of decline in female mortality for a decline in male mortality, and mrm is male mortality. in india, the infant mortality equation for 1982-1997 was imrf = 6.5 + 0.93* imrm, which shows that there is a high level of residual female mortality and male mortality declines slightly faster than female mortality. the author then breaks down the information by states and rural or urban population. many states, like haryana, that are known for high levels of female mortality have slopes greater than 1, which seems counterintuitive. however, this actually goes to show that pre-natal selection may reduce the extent of infanticide or poor treatment of girls who are born. it has a substitution effect on the post-natal discrimination and replaces its effects instead of adding to it. additionally, urban households usually have a high constant term and a low slope. this shows that simply reducing mortality may not result in a subsequent reduction of female mortality. this research goes to show the extent of gender discrimination in india and how this affects the high sex ratio. it is important to not only target mortality, but specifically female mortality if there is to be any change in gender disparities. laws and regulations a sign in an indian hospital stating that prenatal sex determination is a crime. india passed its first abortion-related law, the so-called medical termination of pregnancy act of 1971, making abortion legal in most states, but specified legally acceptable reasons for abortion such as medical risk to mother and rape. the law also established physicians who can legally provide the procedure and the facilities where abortions can be performed, but did not anticipate female foeticide based on technology advances. with increasing availability of sex screening technologies in india through the 1980s in urban india, and claims of its misuse, the government of india passed the pre-natal diagnostic techniques act (pndt) in 1994. this law was further amended into the pre-conception and pre-natal diagnostic techniques (regulation and prevention of misuse) (pcpndt) act in 2004 to deter and punish prenatal sex screening and female foeticide. however, there are concerns that pcpndt act has been poorly enforced by authorities. the impact of indian laws on female foeticide and its enforcement is unclear. united nations population fund and india's national human rights commission, in 2009, asked the government of india to assess the impact of the law. the public health foundation of india, an premier research organization in its 2010 report, claimed a lack of awareness about the act in parts of india, inactive role of the appropriate authorities, ambiguity among some clinics that offer prenatal care services, and the role of a few medical practitioners in disregarding the law. the ministry of health and family welfare of india has targeted education and media advertisements to reach clinics and medical professionals to increase awareness. the indian medical association has undertaken efforts to prevent prenatal sex selection by giving its members beti bachao (save the daughter) badges during its meetings and conferences. however, a recent study by nandi and deolalikar (2013) argues that the 1994 pndt act may have had a small impact by preventing 106,000 female foeticides over one decade. according to a 2007 study by macpherson, prenatal diagnostic techniques act (pcpndt act) was highly publicized by ngos and the government. many of the ads used depicted abortion as violent, creating fear of abortion itself within the population. the ads focused on the religious and moral shame associated with abortion. macpherson claims this media campaign was not effective because some perceived this as an attack on their character, leading to many becoming closed off, rather than opening a dialogue about the issue. this emphasis on morality, claims macpherson, increased fear and shame associated with all abortions, leading to an increase in unsafe abortions in india. the government of india, in a 2011 report, has begun better educating all stakeholders about its mtp and pcpndt laws. in its communication campaigns, it is clearing up public misconceptions by emphasizing that sex determination is illegal, but abortion is legal for certain medical conditions in india. the government is also supporting implementation of programs and initiatives that seek to reduce gender discrimination, including media campaign to address the underlying social causes of sex selection. given the dismal child sex ratio in the country, and the supreme court directive of 2003 to state governments to enforce the law banning the use of sex determination technologies, the ministry set up a national inspection and monitoring committee (nimc). dr. rattan chand, director (pndt) was made the convenor of the nimc. the nimc under the guidance of dr. rattan chand conducted raids in some of the districts in maharashtra, punjab, haryana, himachal pradesh, delhi and gujarat. in april, it conducted raids on three clinics in delhi. in its reports sent to the chief secretaries of the respective states, the committee observed that the authorities had failed to monitor or supervise the registered clinics. laws passed in india to alleviate female foeticide other legislation year passed goals dowry prohibition act 1961 prohibits families from taking a dowry, punishable with imprisonment hindu marriage act 1955 rules around marriage and divorce for hindus hindu adoption and maintenance act 1956 deals with the legal