determined to be in flask rmr-1029. it was reported that in april 2004, henry heine found a test tube in the lab containing anthrax and contacted ivins. in an email sent in reply, ivins reportedly told him it was probably rmr-1029 and for heine to forward a sample to the fbi. doubts regarding the reliability of the fbi tests were later raised when the fbi tested heine's sample and a further one from heine's test tube: one tested negative and one positive. a doj summary report of february 19, 2010, said that "the evidence suggested that dr. ivins obstructed the investigation either by providing a submission which was not in compliance with the subpoena, or worse, that he deliberately submitted a false sample.": 79 records released under the freedom of information act in 2011 show that ivins provided four sets of samples from 2002 to 2004, twice the number the fbi reported. three of the four sets tested positive for the morphs. the fbi said that "at a group therapy session on july 9, 2008, dr. ivins was particularly upset. he revealed to the counselor and psychologist leading the group, and other members of the group, that he was a suspect in the anthrax investigation and that he was angry at the investigators, the government, and the system in general. he said he was not going to face the death penalty, but instead had a plan to 'take out' co-workers and other individuals who had wronged him. he noted that it was possible, with a plan, to commit murder and not make a mess. he stated that he had a bullet-proof vest, and a list of co-workers who had wronged him, and said that he was going to obtain a glock firearm from his son within the next day, because federal agents were watching him and he could not obtain a weapon on his own. he added that he was going to 'go out in a blaze of glory.'": 50 while in a mental hospital, ivins allegedly made menacing phone calls to his social worker jean duley on july 11 and 12. alleged hidden texts in the letters sent to the media, the characters 'a' and 't' were sometimes bolded or highlighted by tracing over, according to the fbi suggesting that the letters contained a hidden code.: 58 some believe the letters to the new york post and tom brokaw contained a "hidden message" in such highlighted characters. below is the media text with the highlighted as and ts: 09-11-01 this is next take penacilin now death to america death to israel allah is great according to the fbi, summary report issued on february 19, 2010, following the search of ivins' home, cars, and office on november 1, 2007, investigators began examining his trash.: 64 a week later, just after 1:00 a.m. on the morning of november 8, the fbi stated that ivins was observed throwing away "a copy of a book entitled gödel, escher, bach: an eternal golden braid, published by douglas hofstadter in 1979" and "a 1992 issue of american scientist journal which contained an article entitled 'the linguistics of dna,' and discussed, among other things, codons and hidden messages".: 61 the book gödel, escher, bach contains a lengthy description of the encoding/decoding procedures, including an illustration of hiding a message within a message by bolding certain characters. according to the fbi summary report, "hen they lifted out just the bolded letters, investigators got ttt aat tat – an apparent hidden message". the 3-letter groups are codons, "meaning that each sequence of three nucleic acids will code for a specific amino acid".: 59 ttt = phenylalanine (single-letter designator f) aat = asparagine (single-letter designator n) tat = tyrosine (single-letter designator y) the fbi summary report proceeds to say: "from this analysis, two possible hidden meanings emerged: (1) 'fny' – a verbal assault on new york, and (2) pat – the nickname of former colleague #2." ivins was known to have a dislike for new york city, and four of the media letters had been sent to new york.: 60 the report states that it "was obviously impossible for the task force to determine with certainty that either of these two translations was correct", however, "the key point to the investigative analysis is that there is a hidden message, not so much what that message is".: 60 according to the fbi, ivins showed a fascination with codes and also had an interest in secrets and hidden messages,: 60 ff and was familiar with biochemical codons.: 59 ff ivins' "non-denial" denials experts have suggested that the anthrax mailings included a number of indications that the mailer was trying to avoid harming anyone with his warning letters. examples: none of the intended recipients of the letters were infected. the seams on the backs of the envelopes were taped over as if to make certain the powders could not escape through open seams. the letters were folded with the "pharmaceutical fold", which was used for centuries to safely contain and transport doses of powdered medicines (and currently to safely hold trace evidence). the media letters provided "medical advice": "take penacilin now." the senate letters informed the recipient that the powder was anthrax: "we have this anthrax." at the time of the mailings, it was generally believed that such powders could not escape from a sealed envelope except through the two open corners where a letter opener is inserted, which had been taped shut. in june 2008, ivins was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. the fbi stated that during a june 5 group therapy session there, ivins had a conversation with an unnamed witness, during which he made a series of statements about the anthrax mailings that the fbi said could best be characterized as "non-denial denials".: 70–71 when asked about the anthrax attacks and whether he could have had anything to do with them, the fbi said that ivins admitted he suffered from loss of memory, stating that he would wake up dressed and wonder if he had gone out during the night. some of his responses allegedly included the following selected quotes: "i can tell you i don't have it in my heart to kill anybody." "i do not have any recollection of ever have doing anything like that. as a matter of fact, i don't have no clue how to, how to make a bio-weapon and i don't want to know." "i can tell you, i am not a killer at heart." "if i found out i was involved in some way, and, and ..." "i don't think of myself as a vicious, a, a nasty evil person." "i don't like to hurt people, accidentally, in, in any way. and wouldn't do that. and i, in my right mind wouldn't do it ... but it's still, but i still feel responsibility because wasn't locked up at the time ..." in an interview with a confidential human resource (chr) which took place on january 8, 2008, the fbi said that the chr told fbi agents that since ivins' last interview with the fbi (on november 1, 2007), ivins had "on occasion spontaneously declared at work, 'i could never intentionally kill or hurt someone'". doubts about fbi conclusions after the fbi announced that ivins acted alone, many people with a broad range of political views, some of whom were colleagues of ivins, expressed doubts. reasons cited for these doubts include that ivins was only one of 100 people who could have worked with the vial used in the attacks and that the fbi couldn't place him near the new jersey mailbox from which the anthrax was mailed. the fbi's own genetic consultant, claire fraser-ligget, stated that the failure to find any anthrax spores in ivins' house, vehicle or on any of his belongings seriously undermined the case. noting unanswered questions about the fbi's scientific tests and lack of peer review, jeffrey adamovicz, one of ivins' supervisors in usamriid's bacteriology division, stated, "i'd say the vast majority of people think he had nothing to do with it." more than 200 colleagues attended his memorial service following his death. alternative theories proposed include fbi incompetence, that syria or iraq directed the attacks, or that similar to some 9/11 conspiracy theories the us government knew in advance that the attacks would occur. senator patrick leahy, who had received an anthrax-tainted letter, said the fbi had not produced convincing evidence in the case. the washington post called for an independent investigation in the case saying that reporters and scientists were poking holes in the case. on september 17, 2008, senator patrick leahy told fbi director robert mueller during testimony before the judiciary committee which leahy chairs, that he did not believe army scientist bruce ivins acted alone in the 2001 anthrax attacks, stating: i believe there are others involved, either as accessories before or accessories after the fact. i believe that there are others out there. i believe there are others who could be charged with murder. tom daschle, the other democratic senator targeted, believes ivins was the sole culprit. although the fbi matched the genetic origin of the attack spores to the spores in ivins' flask rmr-1029, the spores within that flask did not have the same silicon chemical "fingerprint" as the spores in the attack letters. the implication is that spores taken out of flask rmr-1029 had been used to grow new spores for the mailings. on april 22, 2010, the u.s. national research council, the operating arm of the national academy of sciences, convened a review committee that heard testimony from henry heine, a microbiologist who was formerly employed at the army's biodefense laboratory in maryland where ivins had worked. heine told the panel that it was impossible that the deadly spores had been produced undetected in ivins' laboratory, as maintained by the fbi. he testified that at least a year of intensive work would have been required using the equipment at the army lab to produce the quantity of spores contained in the letters and that such an intensive effort could not have escaped the attention of colleagues. heine also told the panel that lab technicians who worked closely with ivins have told him they saw no such work. he stated further that biological containment measures where ivins worked were inadequate to prevent anthrax spores from floating out of the laboratory into animal cages and offices. "you'd have had dead animals or dead people," heine said. according to science magazine, "heine caveated his remarks by saying that he himself had no experience making anthrax stocks." science magazine provides additional comments by adam driks of loyola who stated that the amount of anthrax in the letters could be made in "a number of days". emails by ivins state, "we can presently make 1 x 10^12 spores per week." and the new york times reported on may 7, 2002, that the leahy letter contained .871 grams of anthrax powder in a technical article to be published in the journal of bioterrorism & biodefense in 2011, three scientists argued that the preparation of the spores did require a high level of sophistication, contrary to the position taken by federal authorities that the material would have been unsophisticated. the paper is largely based on the high level of tin detected in tests of the mailed anthrax, and the tin may have been used to encapsulate the spores, which required processing not possible in laboratories to which ivins had access. according to the scientific article, this raises the possibility that ivins was not the perpetrator or did not act alone. earlier in the investigation, the fbi had named tin as a substance "of interest" but the final report makes no mention of it and fails to address the high tin content. the chairwoman of the national academy of sciences panel that reviewed the fbi's scientific work and the director of a separate review by the government accountability office said that the issues raised by the paper should be addressed. other scientists, such as johnathan l. kiel, a retired air force scientist who worked on anthrax for many years, did not agree with the authors' assessments — saying that the tin might be a random contaminant rather than a clue to complex processing. kiel said