would put the safety of the people first". qin concluded that the chinese public were told by state-controlled media that the contamination of milk was a well orchestrated process, and they "are very sad, very frightened and very concerned". quest for milk substitutes poorer consumers reliant on local infant formula, which was approximately half the price of imported brands, had been left without alternatives to feed their children. many had lost faith in local brands, with others unsure of which brands were safe. supermarket shelves had been swept bare from product recalls. shops in hong kong reported a rush for imported formula from cross-border shoppers, with some retailers reportedly rationing their stocks. some mainlanders were also reportedly rushing to import infant formula from kinmen. wet nurses enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in major cities. some media reports have documented that chinese sailors and expatriates have been buying local dairy produce in australia to send back to relatives in china. it had been estimated in 2018 that up to 80% to 90% of infant formula purchased in australia was destined for china. following widespread complaints and appeals by exasperated australian parents unable to find formula for their children, coles supermarkets resorted to locking baby formula tins away behind the service counter, like tobacco products, in order to regulate their sale. the two major supermarkets, coles and woolworths, placed a two item limit on baby formula purchases to curb the growing practice of bulk purchasing by predominantly chinese customers known as "daigous", or "personal shoppers". these people would often travel in large, organised groups from supermarket to supermarket, clearing the shelves of baby formula, then make substantial profits by sending the formula to china to be sold at a significant markup. taiwan half a million participated in anti-china demonstrations in taiwan. the melamine food scare became a focal point against the warming relations between taiwan's government and the chinese government, and a major demonstration was held by the opposition democratic progressive party on 25 october 2008 to voice dissatisfaction with taiwan's increasingly closer ties with beijing, notably related to the incident. protesters fearful at reunification blamed the kuomintang for the melamine scare, and criticised it for failing to stand up to china over the contamination. one citizen voiced concern that president ma ying-jeou's promise for closer ties with china would bring in more tainted products to taiwan. the minister of the department of health, lin fang-yue, was heavily criticised for raising the legally acceptable limit of melamine in food products from zero to 2.5 ppm. the public outcry subsequent to the move forced lin to resign. his successor, yeh ching-chuan, announced a return to the original zero-tolerance policy to melamine. top leaders' comments aqsiq announced the revocation of all exemptions from inspection previously granted to dairy producers, who were asked to cease citing the privilege in their advertisements. the state council ordered an overhaul of the dairy industry, and promised to provide free medical care to those affected. formally, the state council released its initial findings, and a top-level official apology of the incident both came on 21 september. wen jiabao apologised while visiting victims in hospitals. this incident made me feel sad, though many chinese have been understanding. it disclosed many problems for government and company supervision of the milk sources, quality and marketing administration ... the government will put more efforts into food security, taking the incident as a warning. what we are trying to do is to ensure no such event happens in future by punishing those leaders as well as enterprises responsible. none of those companies without professional ethics or social morals will be let off.— wen jiabao, china's premier (21 september 2008) on 1 october, cpc general secretary hu jintao noted the importance of food safety to the public, and said that "chinese companies should learn from the lessons of the sanlu tainted milk powder incident." on 6 october 2008, putting the blame on "illegal production and greed", the country's "chaotic dairy production and distribution order", and the "gravely absent supervision" for the crisis, the state council announced new dairy industry regulations. in response to the crisis, the state council of china issued the "regulations on the supervision and administration of dairy product quality and safety" on october 10, 2008 to regulate the production, processing, packaging and sales of dairy products, thereby ensuring content and quality compliance. on november 19, 2008, the state council promulgated the "china dairy industry reorganization and revitalization plan" to rectify the chaos in china's dairy industry. on 9 october 2008, in an attempt to control the damage to chinese dairy exports, officials at a world trade organization meeting insisted that contamination had been "accidental", directly contradicting the who observations. chinese trade representatives criticised countries which have imposed blanket bans on chinese food products. they urged member states to base import restrictions on scientific risk assessments, and to use official wto notification mechanisms. on 11 october, deputy health minister liu qian stated that all the foreign companies' application for compensation for dairy products recall would be dealt with on a commercial basis, although government may use diplomatic channels if necessary, if problems were encountered. stepped-up inspection program according to a senior quality inspectorate official, the government aimed to establish nearly 400 product testing centres within the next two years, and 80 of these would be food testing centres. working groups were established in nearly every single province in order to set up new food testing centres and replace outdated equipment. on 24 september 2008, china's newly appointed aqsiq chief wang yong said that the government would "carry out 'forceful' measures to deal with the chemical contamination", and stated that inspectors had removed 7,000 tonnes of melamine-contaminated dairy products from shops all over china. on 4 october, the ministry of agriculture announced it had drawn up an emergency rescue plan with the ministry of finance to give special subsidies to dairy farmers seriously affected by the lack of demand following the contamination scandal; local governments had already drafted policies to stabilise the dairy industry; 150,000 officials had been sent to overhaul the entire supply chains from cattle feed to milk collection; 18,803 milk-collecting stations had been registered and checked by these officials. the ministry was reported to have investigated 98 dairy producers and farms, banned 151 illegal companies and indicted three manufacturers for feed containing melamine. during an investigation into melamine contamination at yili and mengniu in hohhot, police arrested six more people for allegedly selling and mixing melamine into raw milk. the aqsiq announced on 5 october that all tests showed all milk produced after 14 september were free from contamination. the general administration of quality supervision, inspection and quarantine stated all dairy products made before 14 september will be tested for melamine. they gave notice to all supermarkets, shops, and all city, town and village-level vendors to urgently remove and seal up all powdered milk and liquid milk made before 14 september, pending further testing. five government agencies, including the ministry of health, issued a joint statement on 9 october setting the legally acceptable level of melamine content in infant formula at 1 ppm (1 mg/kg), and at 2.5ppm in other dairy products (including milk) - in line with standards recognised by the world health organization and the un food and agriculture organization. a researcher at the chinese centre for disease control and prevention said that any amount exceeding 1 ppm would give reason to suspect its presence was intentional. public relations on 26 september 2008, in order to quell the disquiet over the speech by zhu yonglan of the cgosfsc regarding leaders' insulation from the food-security issues faced by the general population, xinhua issued a brief statement, in chinese, denying the existence of the centre, the award, or any person named zhu yonglan, saying these were "purely rumours". on 16 september, the aqsiq tests on baby milk powder produced by 109 companies showed 69 batches from 22 companies to be melamine-contaminated; the state council attempted to reassure that formula produced by most companies in china was safe. it said: "the number of companies with melamine-tainted milk accounted for 20.18% of the total of powdered milk companies in china; the number of tainted batches accounted for 14.05% of the total batches tested." on 30 september, the aqsiq said its tests on 265 batches from 154 companies showed that "only 18%" had tested positive for melamine: "of the 290 dairies nationwide 154 dairies, representing 87% market share, 134 of these dairies had tested negative for melamine." on 16 september, the aqsiq published results of tests on 408 liquid milk producers, and found "most dairy products were safe to drink", although the test results showed nearly 10 percent of batches from mengniu, yili and bright were contaminated. the government stressed that no new cases of melamine-related illnesses had been detected since 20 september, and that test results on samples from 31 brands of baby formula, 84 brands powder for adult consumption, and 75 domestic brands of liquid milk produced after 14 september did not contain melamine, the aqsiq said. to demonstrate that its emergency measures had been effective, the ministry of agriculture said the rate of raw milk dumping because of the contamination scandal has decreased from 23.6% on 22 september to 4.6% on 1 october. censorship during the scandal, china's media was ordered to tone down coverage of the unfolding scandal to prevent unrest. news editors were told to adhere to the official copy provided by china's state news agency, xinhua news agency, and to emphasize other news instead. china central television shifted its reporting emphasis to the launch of shenzhou vii, with the announcement of the aqsiq test results relegated to the final item on the cctv evening news. as a result of media suppression, chinese consumers were ill-informed about the extent of global recalls. according to chinese journalists, discussion of the causes of the crisis, government responsibility, questions about government complicity with dairy companies, was forbidden. on 2 january, a website created by individuals protesting against sanlu was also blocked by the authorities. a group of parents whose children were rendered ill by melamine-contaminated milk held a news conference to draw attention to the plight of their sick children; five were allegedly detained by police and taken to a labour camp outside beijing. they were released a day later. in 2012, jiang weisuo, a 44-year-old general manager of a dairy products plant in shanxi province, was rumoured to have been murdered in xi'an city. it was jiang who had first alerted authorities to the scandal. according to the xi'an evening news, jiang died in hospital on 12 november from knife wounds inflicted by his wife, yang ping, but the purported murder by his wife was subsequently reported to be incorrect. pressure on the legal profession a group of 90 lawyers from hebei, henan and shandong—the three worst affected provinces—had made pro bono offers to assist victims, and a list of their names was published. organisers of the group declared that they had come under pressure from officials to not get involved in the issue. the beijing lawyers' association, a part of the communist party apparatus, asked its members "to put faith in the party and government". other members of the group have reportedly received less subtle requests. authorities are said to fear social unrest if lawsuits were unleashed. pro-beijing hong kong journal ta kung pao reported that central authorities, fearful of the effect of mass lawsuits, held a meeting with lawyers' groups on 14 september, asking them to "act together, and help maintain stability". chang boyang, one of the group of volunteer lawyers, said he had filed one suit in guangdong against sanlu on behalf of the parents of one victim, and another suit in henan. according to chang, the justice department of henan ordered 14 henan lawyers to drop their cases and "follow the arrangements set out by the government". he said they were told that if they did not, "the lawyer and the firm will be dealt with." zhang yuanxin, lawyer and officer in the xinjiang lawyers' association said that these government actions have "set back the development of the legal profession," and called this interference in citizen lawsuits "intolerable". an official said that central government had