community ownership and management in rural areas. it also sets out to implement "demand driven approaches". its first phase was supposed to last until 2012, but was extended. the programme "promotes the integration of water supply and sanitation with hygiene education." the wsdp has four components: water resources management; institutional development and capacity building; rural water supply and sanitation - as part of this component comprehensive district water supply and sanitation plans are to be developed; urban water supply and sanitation - which aims at the execution of utility business plans in regional and district capitals, as well as at the implementation of national and small towns water schemes. water and sanitation policies in tanzania are developed in line with development vision 2025 and the national strategy for growth and reduction of poverty, better known under its swahili name mkukuta (mkakati wa kukuza uchumi na kupunguza umasikini tanzania). universal access to safe water is one of the objectives of vision 2025, to be realised "through the involvement of the private sector and the empowerment of local government." the importance of water supply and adequate sanitation is recognised in the second cluster of mkukuta ("improvement of quality of life and social well being"). here, one of the primary goals is to achieve "increased access to clean, affordable and safe water, sanitation, decent shelter, and a safe and sustainable environment." urban areas in dar es salaam and two districts of pwani region the responsibility for water supply and sanitation is split between an asset holding company that is responsible for capital investments (the dar es salaam water and sewerage authority - dawasa - with a staff of about 60) and an operating company that runs the water and sewer system on a daily basis and bills the customers (the dar es salaam water and sewerage corporation - dawasco - with a staff of about 1,500). dawasco operates under a 10-year lease contract with dawasa that is almost identical to the lease contract that dawasa had signed with a foreign private company in 2003 as part of a failed privatization attempt. the institutional separation between asset ownership and operation thus is a legacy of the privatization attempt. in dar es salaam, insufficient piped water supplies, especially in poor squatter settlements and neighborhoods, has forced residents to resort to complementary water systems to meet their daily needs. these include illegal connections, illegal pumping, and purchasing water from pushcart vendors that resale at 15-25 times the official price. it is estimated that 29% of water supplied in the city is from illegal connections and that only 30% of residents have a legal connection to the utility distribution line. in other cities, the operation, maintenance and development of water and sewerage infrastructure is carried out by urban water and sanitation authorities (uwssas). uwssas are autonomous legal entities that are meant to operate on the basis of commercial principles. they have been established in 19 major urban cities in accordance with the waterworks act no. 8 of 1997. the 19 uwssas are divided in three categories from a to c in declining order of cost recovery (see below for more details). as of 2010 they were classified in the following categories: map of tanzania category a (13 utilities): arusha, iringa, shinyanga, songea, mbeya, morogoro, moshi, mwanza, musoma, tabora, tanga, dodoma, and mtwara. category b (4 utilities): bukoba, kigoma, sumbawanga, and singida. category c: babati, and lindi. in districts and small towns there are about one hundred small public service providers, the district urban water supply and sanitation authorities (duwssas). in 2007, mowi initiated a process of clustering them with the aim to increase the quality and efficiency of service. however, as of 2012 clustering had made little process because it runs counter to the ongoing overall decentralization process. donor agencies such as giz have thus stopped their support for clustering. urban and district water utilities are not responsible for on-site sanitation, which remains in the hands of the relevant local council. rural areas overview. in rural areas, water supply and sanitation services are provided by community owned water supply organisations (cowsos). they have been established through the local government framework of village councils following the adoption of the water sector development strategy. out of 10,639 villages, 8,394 had a water committee dealing with issues in the water and sanitation sector as of 2007. the role of cowsos is to operate and maintain the water supply systems on behalf of the community. they are expected to meet all the costs of operating and maintaining their water supply systems through charges levied on water consumers, and to contribute to the capital cost of their systems. however, inadequate technical training of community associations in operations and maintenance has resulted in misuse and disrepair of rural water systems, with 40% of rural water schemes experiencing persistent non-functionality. the main source of capital investment are block grants to local government authorities, disbursed by the regional secretariat. there are two main types of cowsos: water consumer associations (vikundi vya huduma ya maji), who are responsible for drinking water supply, and water user associations (vikundi vya watumiaji maji), who are responsible for water resources and for solving conflicts among water users. as of 2006, 121 water user associations have been established. formally, water user associations require payment of membership fees, participation in meetings, development of constitutions and by-laws, and election processes for leadership positions. however, consistent member participation remains low as villagers opt instead for participation in informal associations that have fewer requirements. example:hai district. in the hai district in the kilimanjaro region 200,000 people in 55 villages are served by gravity systems from sources in the rainforest on the slopes of mount kilimandjaro. until the early 1990s the water systems were in bad shape: local communities did not maintain the infrastructure, water quality was poor and some systems even failed to provide any water. the national water policies of 1991 and 2002, which emphasized local participation and ownership as well as payment for water and metering, turned the situation around. together with investments financed as part of development cooperation with germany the new approach achieved substantial improvements. it benefited from a strong local tradition of self-help. water systems are now operated and maintained by employees of water supply trusts - the local name for a cowso. each trust has ten members, half of which have to by women by law, who are elected by the communities. they set tariffs, manage their own budgets and hire managers for each water system. the managers in turn supervise technicians and accountants employed by the water committee. water is sold at public taps by tap agents or provided to metered house connections. an evaluation in 2002 showed that the incidence of waterborne diseases had declined substantially compared to the early 1990s and that costs were more than fully recovered. as of 2009, water supply remained continuous and water quality good. the water committees remained financially sustainable with more than 90% of the customers paying their water bills. interface between formal and informal institutions. in rural areas that lack formal water systems or water management, traditional forms of water resource management and sanitation practices are passed down generationally as traditional ecological knowledge. here, distrust between the government and indigenous groups stemming from the failed free water policy results in a lack of compliance with formal regulations. for example, water conflicts at the village level are often resolved informally, rather than being brought to primary and district courts that they find time-consuming, expensive, and unjust. instead, informal water management practices are carried out at a grassroots level by traditional village elites, such as the mwanamijie in sonjo villages. rules including when and where water can be collected as well as punishments or fines when these rules are broken are closely connected to local religious beliefs, customs, and cultural values. formal institutions that lack the technical skill and capital to build and maintain water systems in indigenous communities can take advantage of informal systems to lighten their responsibility, but the central government often fails to recognize these systems as legitimate. formal institutions and international aid agencies also place high emphasis on provisioning of potable water, ignoring other water needs faced by rural communities, including water supplies necessary for irrigation, livestock, and washing. when treated water is only made available in sufficient quantities for consumption, residents continue using traditional, contaminated sources for all other activities resulting in persistence of enteric diseases and conflict over water availability. participation of community stakeholders in the process of rural water system development can prevent underemphasis of these needs. civil society civil society actors also participate in the water and sanitation sector. in 2008 they have set up tawasanet, a network that aims at strengthening civil society participation in the water and sanitation and securing that policies are carried out in an equitable way. among the ngos active in the tanzanian water sector (and mentioned in a report by mowi) are: wateraid, the netherlands development organisation (snv);concern worldwide, plan international, wwf, shahidi wa maji, daraja, and msabi. investment planning and decision-making water investment planning for rural areas is done at the district level by the respective water departments. in 2009 the ngo wateraid studied the local government planning process for water investments in four of the country's 99 rural districts, namely in mpwapwa, kongwa, iramba and nzega. planning begins with long wish-lists based on demands from the village level. since real priorities are difficult to identify, one selection criterion used is the balance of money held in the village water fund. this is seen as a sign of community ownership and can be easily explained to councillors and villagers. other purported criteria are health statistics and data collected from a waterpoint mapping exercise, but they are not given high priority in practice. selection is done in such a way that water projects are equally divided between the constituencies of the district's members of parliament. furthermore, councilors steer projects to villages in their wards, with more dynamic councillors exerting greater influence. another de facto criterion is the previous track record in caring for infrastructure: in some areas handpumps have been stolen, making it hard to justify new investments. communities close to town, located on main roads or with existing social services have an advantage in the decision-making process, since officials visit them more often and the cost of providing infrastructure is lower. the wateraid report suggests that if there was better availability of data on rural water supply infrastructure this could help the representatives of underserved communities to lobby on behalf of their constituents. public opinion the afrobarometer survey 2008 collected information about tanzanians' opinions about the water sector. the disparity in access to safe and clean water between rural and urban areas is illustrated by the responses: 51% of urban residents were satisfied with government efforts to deliver water and sanitation services, compared to 39% in rural areas. accordingly, the water sector is considered as a higher priority for government action by rural tanzanians. 44% of respondents in rural areas cited water supply as one of the three most pressing issues that the government should address (for 16% it is the single most important problem). in urban areas water supply came third behind economic and health concerns in 25% of responses. issues of corruption in the water sector were also examined by the survey: 4% of respondents admitted that they had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to get water or sanitation services in the past year. economic efficiency some common indicators of the economic efficiency of water and sewerage utilities are billing efficiency, the level of non-revenue water and labour productivity. on the basis of these indicators the economic efficiency of urban service provision in the water sector in tanzania is low. billing efficiency. government data indicated that urban water utilities have relatively high levels of billing efficiency (never below 70%). however, a public expenditure review in 2009 reported that 15% of the revenues of the 20 largest utilities regulated by ewura is not collected. non-revenue water. the average level of non-revenue water among the 20 regional water utilities was 45% in fiscal year 2006–2007. data reported by the ministry of water and