guidelines did not expect any business closures, although studies had long predicted 80% drops in arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 5% to 10% drops in other economic activity over a year, with more severe drops in peak months. the pandemic preparation studies did not address government action to help business, nor the recovery path. the guidelines anticipated "during a pandemic, infection in a localized area can last about six to eight weeks." the 2017 guidelines listed steps which could take place, up to voluntary home isolation of sick people, and voluntary home quarantine of their contacts for up to three days. there was no discussion or planning for closing businesses or ordering people to stay home, which may explain officials' delays in deciding on stay-at-home orders in the 2020 covid-19 pandemic and lack of preparation to distinguish non-essential from essential workers, and to protect essential workers. in the 1918 flu pandemic many cities closed at least bars, for up to six weeks, and most cities had mandatory isolation and quarantine of sick people and their contacts. cities with the most severe closures had the best economic recovery. the guidelines told businesses to be ready to keep workers 3 feet apart, though the guidelines said coughs and sneezes can send viruses six feet. research says sneezes can send droplets 27 feet, and they can lodge in ventilation systems. the guidelines did not consider distances between customers or between them and workers. since the late cold war, russia has led misinformation campaigns to raise mistrust in public health authorities, and to say that the aids pandemic, the 2009 swine flu pandemic, the ebola outbreaks and covid-19 pandemic were american-created bio-weapons. reorganization and departures in may 2018, national security advisor john bolton reorganized the executive branch's united states national security council (nsc), largely merging the group responsible for global health security and biodefense—established by the obama administration following the 2014 ebola epidemic—into a bigger group responsible for counter-proliferation and biodefense. along with the reorganization, the leader of the global health security and biodefense group, rear admiral timothy ziemer, left to join another federal agency, while tim morrison became the leader of the combined group. critics of this reorganization referred to it as "disbanding" a pandemic preparedness group. after the coronavirus outbreak, reporters repeatedly asked trump about this reorganization, and trump provided conflicting responses. on march 6, 2020, when asked at a press briefing if he would "rethink" the 2018 choice not to have a pandemic preparation office, trump implied the reorganization had been a reasonable choice at the time because "you can never really think is going to happen ... who would have thought we would even be having the subject?" on march 13, when pbs newshour white house correspondent yamiche alcindor asked if the reorganization had hampered the government response to the coronavirus outbreak, trump berated her for asking a "nasty question", and he added: "i didn't do it ... disbanding, no, i don't know anything about it ... it's the administration, perhaps they do that, let people go ... things like that happen." on april 1, fox news journalist john roberts began a question by saying "you got rid of the pandemic office in the national security council," and trump replied, "we didn't do that," describing the allegation four times as "false" but not elaborating further. as of july 2020, the administration planned to create a new pandemic preparedness office within the state department. also in 2018, homeland security advisor tom bossert left the administration, reportedly at bolton's request. bossert had helped to create the trump administration's biodefense plans, and it was his responsibility to coordinate the government's response in the event of a biological crisis. bossert's successor, doug fears, and fears' successor peter j. brown, took over the biodefense responsibilities of the dhs. bloomberg news reported in january 2020 that biodefense was by then a "less prominent" part of the homeland security advisor's responsibilities. in another departure, luciana borio, the national security council director for medical and biodefense preparedness, left her post in march 2019. the washington post reported in march 2020 that the white house would not confirm the identity of borio's replacement. reuters reported in march 2020 that the trump administration had in the years before the coronavirus outbreak drastically reduced the number of staff working in the beijing office of the u.s. cdc from 47 to 14. according to reuters, one of the staff eliminated in july 2019 was training chinese field epidemiologists to respond to disease outbreaks at their hotbeds. trump claimed the report of the trainer's being cut was "100% wrong", but the u.s. cdc acknowledged that the report was true. the trump administration also confirmed that it had closed the beijing offices of the national science foundation (nsf) and the united states agency for international development (usaid); these offices had been each staffed by a single u.s. official. in addition, the trump administration acknowledged it had eliminated one managerial position from the beijing office of the u.s. department of agriculture; reuters reported that the position oversaw an animal disease monitoring program. the trump administration also ended funding for the predict pandemic early-warning program in china, which trained and supported staff in 60 foreign laboratories, with field work ceasing september 2019. the scientists tasked with identifying potential pandemics were already stretched too far and thin. efforts to improve mask and ventilator supply since 2015, the federal government has spent $9.8 million on two projects to prevent a mask shortage but abandoned both projects before completion. a second barda contract was signed with applied research associates of albuquerque, to design an n95-rated mask that could be reused in emergencies without reduced effectiveness. though federal reports had called for such a project since 2006, the ara contract was not signed until 2017, and missed its 15-month completion deadline, resulting in the 2020 pandemic reaching the united states before the design was ready. previous respiratory epidemics and government planning indicated a need for a stockpile of ventilators that were easier for less-trained medical personnel to use. barda project aura issued a request for proposals in 2008, with a goal of fda approval in 2010 or 2011. a contract for the production of up to 40,000 ventilators was awarded to newport medical instruments, a small ventilator manufacturer, with a target price of $3,000, much lower than more complicated machines costing more than $10,000, and it produced prototypes with target fda approval in 2013. covidien purchased nmi and after requesting more money to complete the project (bringing the total cost to around $8 million) asked the government to cancel the contract, saying it was not profitable. the government awarded a new $13.8 million contract to philips, in 2014. the design for the trilogy evo universal gained fda approval in july 2019. the government ordered 10,000 ventilators in september 2019, with a mid-2020 deadline for the first deliveries and a deadline of 2022 to complete all 10,000. despite the start of the epidemic in december, the capacity of the company to have produced enough to fill the full order, and the ability of the government to force faster production, the government did not reach an agreement with philips for accelerated delivery until march 10, 2020. by mid-march, the need for more ventilators had become immediate, and even in the absence of any government contracts, other manufacturers announced plans to make many tens of thousands. in the meantime, philips had been selling a commercial version, the trilogy evo, at much higher prices, leaving only 12,700 in the strategic national stockpile as of march 15. compared to the small amount of money spent on recommended supplies for a pandemic, billions of dollars had been spent by the strategic national stockpile to create and store a vaccine for anthrax, and enough smallpox inoculations for the entire country. potential response strategies in 2016, the nsc laid out pandemic strategies and recommendations including moving swiftly to fully detect potential outbreaks, securing supplemental funding, considering invoking the defense production act, and ensuring sufficient protective equipment available for healthcare workers. the trump administration was briefed on it in 2017, but declined to make it official policy.