national microbiology laboratory national microbiology laboratory the national microbiology laboratory (nml) is part of the public health agency of canada (phac), the agency of the government of canada that is responsible for public health, health emergency preparedness and response, and infectious and chronic disease control and prevention. nml is located in several sites across the country including the canadian science centre for human and animal health (cschah) in winnipeg, manitoba. nml has a second site in winnipeg, the wilt infectious disease research centre on logan avenue which serves as a hub for hiv research and diagnostics in canada. the three other primary sites include locations in guelph, st. hyacinthe and lethbridge. the cschah is a biosafety level 4 infectious disease laboratory facility, the only one of its kind in canada. with maximum containment, scientists are able to work with pathogens including ebola, marburg and lassa fever. the nml's cschah is also home to the canadian food inspection agency's national centre for foreign animal disease, and thus the scientists at the nml share their premises with animal virologists. history the national microbiology laboratory was preceded by the bureau of microbiology which was originally part of the laboratory centre for disease control of health canada in ottawa. in the 1980s, health canada identified both the need to replace existing laboratory space that was reaching the end of its lifespan and the need for containment level 4 space in the country. around the same time, agriculture canada (prior to the canadian food inspection agency being formed) also identified the need for new laboratory space including high-containment. numerous benefits were identified for housing both laboratories in one building and winnipeg was chosen as the site; an announcement to that effect was made in october 1987. after some debate, the spot chosen for the site was a city works yard near to the health sciences centre (a major teaching hospital), the university of manitoba's medical school, and other life science organizations. construction of the facility that came to be named the canadian science centre for human and animal health (often referred to locally as "the virology lab") began with an official ground-breaking in december 1992. the joint venture design team of toronto-based dunlop architects and winnipeg-based smith carter architects and engineers visited 30 laboratories to seek best practices in containment and design. construction was largely complete by the end of 1997 with the first programs beginning in the spring of 1998 and all laboratories coming on line after that. the official opening took place in june 1999. following the sars outbreak in 2003, the public health agency of canada was formed in 2004 to provide a stronger focus on public health and emergency preparedness in the country. it is a member of the federal health portfolio (along with health canada, the canadian institute of health research, and other organizations). by 2018 the nml was beginning to use genomics and advanced computing to study microbes at the genetic level in so-called "dry lab" facilities, as opposed to "wet labs" with petri dishes and cell cultures. the nml (phac) fired chinese nationals xiangguo qiu and her husband keding cheng from their jobs as bsl4 infectious disease researchers in january 2021; previously in july 2019 the pair had been dismissed from their positions as unpaid members of the university of winnipeg for their agency in a mysterious trans-pacific shipment of bsl4-grade virus materials back to their homeland when the rcmp was called in. containment human pathogens are classified into risk groups. the criteria to determine the group includes the level of risk to the health of a person or to public health, as well as the likelihood that the human pathogen will actually cause disease in a human, and whether treatment and preventative measures are available. it can depend on the type of work being done as to which level of containment is needed for pathogens from specific risk groups; as an example, culturing (or growing) a virus or bacterium requires higher containment than some diagnostic tests. nml operates containment level 2, 3 and 4 laboratories. in human health infectious disease laboratories, the design and construction of the facility, the engineering controls, and the training and techniques of staff are all focused on protecting lab workers, containing the pathogens, and preventing contamination of materials to ensure accurate diagnosis and research. all of these factors vary depending on the level of containment. the vast majority (87.7%) of nml's lab space is containment level 2 (cl2). this is the same type of laboratory found in doctors' offices, hospitals and universities. in a level 2 lab, work with infectious materials is done inside a biosafety cabinet (bsc) and appropriate personal protective gear is worn relative to activities (gloves, eye protection, lab coats, gowns, etc.). risk group 2 pathogens worked with in level 2 can cause disease but are not a serious hazard and they are often circulating in the community. environmental contamination must be minimized by the use of hand washing sinks and decontamination facilities such as autoclaves. examples include e-coli; whooping cough; and seasonal influenza. nml also has containment level 3 (cl3) laboratories (8.6% of lab space). risk group 3 pathogens may be transmitted by the airborne route, often need only a low infectious dose to produce effects, and can cause serious or life-threatening disease. cl3 emphasizes additional primary and secondary barriers to minimize the release of infectious organisms into the immediate laboratory and the environment. additional features to prevent transmission of cl3 organisms are appropriate respiratory protection, hepa filtration of exhausted laboratory air, and strictly controlled laboratory access. examples include tuberculosis; west nile virus; and pandemic h1n1 influenza. a small percentage of laboratory space (3.6%) is devoted to containment level 4 (cl4) at nml. these agents have the potential for aerosol transmission, often have a low infectious dose and produce very serious and often fatal disease; there is no licensed treatment or vaccine available. this level of containment represents an isolated unit independent of other areas. cl4 emphasizes maximum containment of the infectious agent by completely sealing the facility perimeter with confirmation by negative pressure testing, isolation of the researcher from the pathogen by an enclosed positive pressure suit, and decontamination of air and all other materials. examples include ebola, nipah, marburg, and 1918 pandemic influenza. structure nml programs are housed in several facilities across the country. two of these facilities are in proximity to each other in winnipeg: the canadian science centre for human and animal health on arlington street and the j.c. wilt infectious diseases research centre on logan avenue. the other facilities are located in guelph, on; st. hyacinthe, qc and lethbridge, ab. nml is divided into five main laboratory divisions which are supported by scientific and administrative services. the primary nml divisions are: bacterial pathogens - focussing on bacterial diseases such as tuberculosis and antibiotic resistant organisms. enteric diseases - focussing on food and water-borne pathogens including e.coli and salmonella. viral diseases - addressing a range of viral diseases, including hepatitis and other blood-borne pathogens, respiratory viruses and viral exanthemata, such as measles. zoonotic diseases and special pathogens - dealing with viral, bacterial and rickettsial zoonoses (diseases transmitted to humans from other species), such as west nile virus and lyme disease, along with risk group 4 agents such as ebola, marburg and lassa fever viruses. hiv and retrovirology - providing laboratory services and scientific expertise relating to hiv and emerging retroviruses. the science technology core and services division works with these divisions to provide technological approaches, including genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics. there is also the public health risk sciences division, which is a specialized resource that provides scientific knowledge and solutions to better assess public health risks and enable decisions, with specific attention to infectious disease threats transmitted from food, the animals, or the physical environment. these science-based divisions are complemented and supported by numerous other units that ensure their ongoing operations such as the office of science planning, program support and services, scientific informatic services, science support and client services, surveillance and