pain in invertebrates pain in invertebrates pain in invertebrates is a contentious issue. although there are numerous definitions of pain, almost all involve two key components. first, nociception is required. this is the ability to detect noxious stimuli which evokes a reflex response that moves the entire animal, or the affected part of its body, away from the source of the stimulus. the concept of nociception does not necessarily imply any adverse, subjective feeling; it is a reflex action. the second component is the experience of "pain" itself, or suffering—i.e., the internal, emotional interpretation of the nociceptive experience. pain is therefore a private, emotional experience. pain cannot be directly measured in other animals, including other humans; responses to putatively painful stimuli can be measured, but not the experience itself. to address this problem when assessing the capacity of other species to experience pain, argument-by-analogy is used. this is based on the principle that if a non-human animal's responses to stimuli are similar to those of humans, it is likely to have had an analogous experience. it has been argued that if a pin is stuck in a chimpanzee's finger and they rapidly withdraw their hand, then argument-by-analogy implies that like humans, they felt pain. it has been questioned why the inference does not then follow that a cockroach experiences pain when it writhes after being stuck with a pin. this argument-by-analogy approach to the concept of pain in invertebrates has been followed by others.