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In this task, you are given a text of many news articles seperated by special token "|||||". Your task is to summarize them.

A Panorama investigation is to reveal key aspects of the secret intelligence used by Downing Street and the White House to justify the invasion of Iraq. 
  
 Peter Taylor reports on how two crucial pieces of intelligence from perhaps the best sources Western intelligence ever had, were used selectively or simply ignored. 
  
 Speaking to the Today programme, he said: "We've conducted a forensic investigation of the intelligence, and we've found that key elements were based on fabrication, wishful thinking and lies. 
  
 "But we've also revealed that there was intelligence that was accurate - that Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction." 
  
 First broadcast on BBC Radio 4's Today programme on Monday 18 March 2013. ||||| MI6 and CIA were told before invasion that Iraq had no active WMD 
  
 Fresh evidence has been revealed about how MI6 and the CIA were told through secret channels by Saddam Hussein's foreign minister and his head of intelligence that Iraq had no active weapons of mass destruction. 
  
 Tony Blair told parliament before the war that intelligence showed Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programme was "active", "growing" and "up and running". 
  
 A special BBC Panorama programme aired on Monday night details how British and US intelligence agencies were informed by top sources months before the invasion that Iraq had no active WMD programme, and that the information was not passed to subsequent inquiries. 
  
 It describes how Naji Sabri, Saddam's foreign minister, told the CIA's station chief in Paris at the time, Bill Murray, through an intermediary that Iraq had "virtually nothing" in terms of WMD. 
  
 Sabri said in a statement that the Panorama story was "totally fabricated". 
  
 However, Panorama confirms that three months before the war an MI6 officer met Iraq's head of intelligence, Tahir Habbush al-Tikriti, who also said that Saddam had no active WMD. The meeting in the Jordanian capital, Amman, took place days before the British government published its now widely discredited Iraqi weapons dossier in September 2002. 
  
 Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary who led an inquiry into the use of intelligence in the runup to the invasion of Iraq, tells the programme that he was not told about Sabri's comments, and that he should have been. 
  
 Butler says of the use of intelligence: "There were ways in which people were misled or misled themselves at all stages." 
  
 When it was suggested to him that the body that probably felt most misled of all was the British public, Butler replied: "Yes, I think they're, they're, they got every reason think that." 
  
 The programme shows how the then chief of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, responded to information from Iraqi sources later acknowledged to be unreliable. 
  
 One unidentified MI6 officer has told the Chilcot inquiry that at one stage information was "being torn off the teleprinter and rushed across to Number 10". 
  
 Another said it was "wishful thinking… [that] promised the crock of gold at the end of the rainbow". 
  
 The programme says that MI6 stood by claims that Iraq was buying uranium from Niger, though these were dismissed by other intelligence agencies, including the French. 
  
 It also shows how claims by Iraqis were treated seriously by elements in MI6 and the CIA even after they were exposed as fabricated including claims, notably about alleged mobile biological warfare containers, made by Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, a German source codenamed Curveball. He admitted to the Guardian in 2011 that all the information he gave to the west was fabricated. 
  
 Panorama says it asked for an interview with Blair but he said he was "too busy". 
  
 • The Spies Who Fooled the World, BBC Panorama Special, BBC1, Monday, 18 March, 10.35pm |||||
Output:
Days before the September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons that Tony Blair used to justify sending British troops to join the US in Iraq, an MI6 officer met with Iraq's head of intelligence and was told that Saddam Hussein had no active weapons of mass destruction, according to an investigative report by the BBC. The CIA had its own secret meeting in the months before the invasion, this one with Hussein's foreign minister, and was also told that Iraq had "virtually nothing" when it came to WMDs, according to the Guardian. But MI6 and the CIA dismissed the intelligence, and the information was not passed along to relevant officials for subsequent inquiries. But, while dismissing information from high-level officials, MI6 stood by information gleaned from unreliable sources (such as the claim that Iraq was buying uranium from Niger) even after other intelligence agencies dismissed them, and MI6 and the CIA continued to take such claims seriously even after the sources were found to be unreliable.