Detailed Instructions: In this task, you are given a text of many news articles seperated by special token "|||||". Your task is to summarize them.
Problem:Accused spy Anna Chapman wasn't the only suspected Russian agent on Facebook. A tipster with access to co-defendant Mikhail Semenko's Facebook photos sent us some of his pictures. Want to see an alleged spy in a Bill Clinton costume? 
  
 Ten people were arrested by the U.S. government on Monday and accused of spying for Russia. One of the indicted, Anna Chapman, had pictures from various social networking sites posted all over the internet today (you can see those photos at the bottom of this post). Unsurprisingly, another one of the ten defendants had a significant social networking presence: Mikhail Semenko, an Arlington, Va. travel agent. 
  
 Semenko, whose LinkedIn profile has already been the subject of media speculation, worked at a travel agency called Travel All Russia, where he had a reputation for being "'clumsy' and 'quirky,' but highly intelligent." Our tipster, who knew him slightly, says he "was pretty much just super socially awkward... He always said weird jokes that no one really got. Probably super smart though." 
  
 So, not exactly James Bond. He and his fellow defendants are facing charges of "conspiracy to act as agents of a foreign government while concealing that from the U.S. government"—not espionage or high treason. In fact, they may not have done much spying at all. To be sure, this wasn't necessarily their M.O.; Russia may have just been hoping for vague and limited access to policymaking circles, with no specific information-gathering objectives. But mostly, Semenko and others seem to have blended in so well as ordinary Americans that, like ordinary Americans, they didn't have a lot of access to state secrets. 
  
 Semenko's Facebook photos don't really contradict that. The Seton Hall graduate looks like most goofy 20-somethings, messing around with friends at parties. How many Russian master spies do you think have been photographed wearing "U.S.S.R." t-shirts or Bill Clinton masks? 
  
 Then again, how many 20-somethings are accused of being spies? 
  
  
  
  
  
 Anna Chapman Photos ||||| Are you one of alleged Russian sleeper spy Anna Chapman's 181 Facebook friends? Do you subscribe to her Twitter feed? She's @nycrentalsnews. What about one of her 150 connections on LinkedIn? Were you one of the five people who recommended her on LinkedIn? 
  
  
  
  
  
 According to documents seized by the FBI , Chapman's key tasking was to "search and develop ties in policy making circles in the U.S." and then send intelligence reports back to Moscow Center. In today's world, connections are made online. 
  
  
  
  
  
 Chapman's Twitter feed offers a glimpse into how her own recruitment might work. As a real estate agent, she could gain intimate knowledge of her clients. She'd know their residences inside and out, and even be in a position to recommend where a technical agent might place a listening device. Her LinkedIn resume suggests she was a prodigious networker, attaching herself to groups like the Online Marketing Association, the eMarketing Association Network and others. 
  
  
  
  
  
 On Facebook, one of Chapman's friends posted a news alert about her arrest and asked, in Russian, whether the Anna Chapman he knew was the same person who was caught in the dragnet. There was no reply. 
  
  
  
  
  
 How many connections away were they from folks like me and you? Were the alleged spies directly connected on Twitter/Facebook/LinkedIn? (Not that I could tell.) 
  
  
  
  
  
 Folks in the intelligence community want to forbid their people from using social media, believing it to be a counterintelligence risk of the first order. There is almost no training in how to use social media to figure out who the bad guys (or gals) might be. 
  
  
  
  
  
 When journalists communicate with tipsters on Twitter, through direct messages, who's watching? This is a digital version of the following question: when an old college friend who now works for a foreign embassy invites you for drinks and gently probes you for information about the mood inside the West Wing, are you complicit? 
  
  
  
  
  
 The technology the alleged spies used to communicate -- steganography, WiFi brush passes, and old, regular, high-frequency Morse code -- is quite antiquated and exploitable, provided the FBI knew where to look. You can find WiFi networks with your own cell phone, and the NSA and CIA have long used devices that can suck up data from both unencrypted and encrypted networks. And they were looking since at least 2005, probably exploiting the spies and (perhaps) passing disinformation back to Moscow through them. 
  
  
  
  
  
 Want to try your own brush pass? Download the " bump " application from iTunes. It's ingeniously easy to figure out ways to wirelessly pass information from one person to another within a range of about 400 feet. Spies these days prefer disk drives whose contents they can delete with a press of a button; they keep the drives on their persons at all times, so that if they're ever taken into custody, they can, with a swipe of their hand, erase much of the evidence against them. 
  
  
  
  
  
 The U.S. is experimenting with Ultra Wide Band (UWB) frequencies for its communications; these frequencies are very hard to exploit because the radio information is distributed across the spectrum. 
  
  
  
  
  
 The fact that the FBI was able to run the spy-hunting operation for seven years suggests that American counterintelligence efforts have improved dramatically since the days of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Harold Nicholson. |||||
Solution:
Mikhail Semenko's co-workers found him clumsy and awkward, but on Facebook he looks like a pretty sociable guy. The accused Russian spy's profile features pics of him mugging with friends in a Bill Clinton mask and a USSR T-shirt, Gawker reports, as well as just chatting at parties with beer in hand. Semenko and fellow 20-something spy Anna Chapman are present on LinkedIn as well, and Chapman also has a Twitter feed. News of the plugged-in spies adds to calls in the intelligence community to ban agents from using social media, Marc Ambinder writes in the Atlantic. Facebook and its ilk are considered a "counterintelligence risk of the first order," Ambinder notes, and operatives receive no training in how to figure out who the bad guys on Facebook might be.