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Report calls Kajaki dam either hubris or commitment 
  
 A Marine patrols near the Kajaki River. (Photo: David Goldman, AP) 
  
 There are few locations more desolate – or with more breathtaking scenery. Nestled high in the mountains, the Kajaki dam spills emerald green waters from a reservoir into the raging Helmand River below. 
  
 Surrounded by steep mountains and barren plains, the dam has also been home to a small combat outpost of Marines and Afghan soldiers over the years. They would be excused for thinking they had been deposited at the end of the earth. 
  
 The United States first began construction on the Kajaki dam in the early 1950s. Construction on the project was halted after the Soviet invasion in 1979. It resumed after the U.S.-led invasion to oust the Taliban and rebuild Afghanistan. 
  
 The original planners had a grand vision for the hydrorelectric dam and power plant. It would turn the Helmand valley green with crops and bring electricity and economic growth to Kandahar. 
  
 But today, Kajaki stands at the center of a debate that goes to the heart of America's role in Afghanistan. The project is seen either as a symbol of American hubris gone awry or America's steadfast commitment to rebuild Afghanistan. 
  
 That debate will likely surface again with the release of a report Tuesday. 
  
 "Unfortunately, after using multiple contractors and sub­contractors, spending tens of millions of dollars, and losing scores of U.S. and coalition lives, the work is still not complete," John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, wrote in a letter accompanying his office's quarterly report . 
  
 "As some wryly note, the ancient Egyptians took less time—about 20–25 years—to complete the Great Pyramid at Giza," Sopko added. 
  
 Now, the U.S. government has decided to turn the last $75 million phase of construction over to the Afghans. The United States has already spent $75 million on the dam since 2004. 
  
 Sopko said his office is concerned about Afghanistan's ability to manage the contract. 
  
 For its part, the U.S. Agency for International Development has said it will have strict financial controls in place and turning the contract over to the Afghans is a natural part of the transition as the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan. 
  
 "USAID conducted a rigorous financial management assessment of the organization and determined that DABS has the ability to effectively manage the Kajaki Dam project," Gordon Weynand, a USAID official, said in a statment. DABS is the Afghan utility company. 
  
 Weynand said energy from the dam project already reaches 185,000 Afghans, a significant increase from 2003 when the work on rehabilitating two turbines began. 
  
 Read or Share this story: http://usat.ly/1e6P4VB ||||| The Kajaki Dam and power station, a project begun by the U.S. in 1953 to bring development to southern Afghanistan. Though it's still not running at capacity, it is considered important to the long-term development of Helmand and Kandahar. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction announced it has launched an initiative to examine how money is spent on installation of the final turbine at the Kajaki Dam project. 
  
 'Growing gap' between policy, reality in Afghanistan, SIGAR reports 
  
 KABUL — Less than 18 months before all foreign combat troops are to leave Afghanistan, there are still billions of U.S. tax dollars at risk of being wasted — or worse, funneled to insurgents and terrorists — if the American government doesn’t do more to ensure reconstruction money is spent properly, according to a quarterly report from the top government watchdog agency in Afghanistan. 
  
 “There appears to be a growing gap between the policy objectives of Washington and the reality of achieving them in Afghanistan, especially when the government must hire and oversee contractors to perform its mission,” said Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John Sopko in a letter introducing the report. 
  
 The report reiterated that some U.S. contract money is going to insurgents and terrorists. 
  
 The inspector general recommended 43 companies and individuals be suspended or blocked from receiving government contracts because of ties to insurgents or terrorists but the Army rejected each suggestion, the report said. 
  
 “I am deeply troubled that the U.S. military can pursue, attack, and even kill terrorists and their supporters, but that some in the U.S. government believe we cannot prevent these same people from receiving a government contract,” Sopko said in his introduction letter. “I feel such a position is not only legally wrong, it is contrary to good public policy and contrary to our national security goals in Afghanistan.” 
  
 Army spokesman Matthew Bourke said, “Quite simply, the Army Procurement Fraud Branch did receive and review the 43 recommendations late last year, but the report did not include enough supporting evidence to initiate suspension and debarment under Federal Acquisition Regulations.” 
  
 In addition, the inspector general’s office announced it has launched an initiative to examine how money is spent on installation of the final turbine at the Kajaki Dam project. The turbine would provide power to perpetually electricity-starved Kandahar, the cradle of the Taliban and a strategic city for Afghanistan. 
  
 The effort to install a third turbine on the key hydroelectricity producer in the volatile province of Helmand has been in the works almost since the outset of the war in 2001 and is still not complete, despite the U.S. spending tens of millions of dollars on the project. It is often pointed to as one of the signature failures of America’s aid program in Afghanistan. 
  
 Earlier this year, the U.S. abruptly dropped plans for the U.S. Agency for International Development to complete the work, deciding instead to give $75 million directly to Afghanistan’s national utility to finish the project. 
  
 “SIGAR’s prior work has raised concerns about the readiness of the Afghan government to handle direct assistance, which is why we remain concerned about the prospects of success at Kajaki,” Sopko said in his letter. 
  
 In a prepared statement, a USAID official said the Afghan national utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), has proved effective in managing its assets, pointing to a 67 percent increase in payment collection from 2010 to 2012. 
  
 “USAID conducted a rigorous financial management assessment of the organization and determined that DABS has the ability to effectively manage the Kajaki Dam project,” Gordon Weynand, acting assistant to the administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, said in an emailed response to Stripes questions. 
  
 Among other findings highlighted in the report: 
  
 -- The Defense Department is moving forward with a $771.8 million purchase of aircraft the Afghan National Army cannot operate or maintain. 
  
 -- USAID’s main stabilization program has suffered from repeated delays and is failing to meet critical contract objectives. 
  
 -- Fuel destined for the U.S. military was illegally held at the border with Uzbekistan because of a dispute with the Afghan Ministry of Finance. 
  
 The inspector general’s office also announced the launch of the “SIGAR High-Risk List,” which “will call attention to programs, projects, and practices in Afghanistan that SIGAR finds especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse.” 
  
 druzin.heath@stripes.com 
  
 Twitter: @Druzin_Stripes |||||

The US started construction on Afghanistan's Kajaki dam in the early 1950s—and it's still not done. "After using multiple contractors and sub­contractors, spending tens of millions of dollars, and losing scores of US and coalition lives, the work is still not complete," writes the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction in a report out today. And here's his best line, per USA Today: "The ancient Egyptians took less time—about 20 to 25 years—to complete the Great Pyramid at Giza." The remote dam in the mountains above the Helmand valley, which holds a small combat outpost where Marines and Afghan soldiers serve, still needs $75 million worth of work (the US has spent that much on it since 2004), and the US is planning to hand it over to the Afghans to finish as part of the withdrawal process. The special inspector general's office isn't sure Afghanistan can manage it—even though, as Stars and Stripes reports, the US is supplying Afghanistan’s national utility with cash for the final phase, which will see a third turbine installed. That turbine installation effort has been ongoing since 2001, and Stars and Stripes notes that "it is often pointed to as one of the signature failures of America's aid program in Afghanistan."