In this task, you will be presented with a context passage, a question about that paragraph, and a possible answer to that question. The task is to check the validity of the answer. Answer with "Yes" or "No".

Example Input: Sam Farragut is a sociopathic business executive in Southern California who forces a team of advertising agency employees to embark on a dangerous dirtbike trip to the Baja California desert in order to compete for his business .  The men are Warren Summerfield , a suicidal middle-aged ad executive who has been fired from the agency ; the straightlaced Paul McIlvain who is inattentive to his wife , and brash art designer Maxon who feels suddenly trapped after his girlfriend announces she is pregnant .  There are numerous long sequences of motorcycle riding on desert backroads .  Summerfield has been having an affair with McIlvian's wife .  He has not told his wife that he was fired and is simply serving out his tenure at the agency while looking for a new position .  His wife is actually aware of the affair .  Farragut convinces the ad men to make the motorcycle journey on the pretext of looking for a location to shoot a commercial .  In reality , Farragut is reckless and looking to involve the men in spontaneous edgy adventure of his own manipulation .  After they leave , McIlvain's wife suspects that Summerfield is planning to kill himself for the insurance money , but she can not convince Summerfield's wife to instigate a search .  The four men travel deeper into Mexico on isolated dirt roads .  At one point Summerfield contemplates plunging off a cliff .  After being humiliated by a young American couple in a Baja bar , Farragut tracks them down on the beach while accompanied by Maxon . <sep>Which business executive in California arranged the jouney on the pretext of looking for a location to shoot his commercial?<sep>The young American couple
Example Output: No

Example Input: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated  Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any  Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring  Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's  Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money. <sep>Why did the OFAC have little information about the financing of al Qaeda?<sep>Al Qaeda was a clandestine worldwide organization
Example Output: Yes

Example Input: In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama  Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting  Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of  Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about  Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on  Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about  Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing  Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of  Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training. <sep>President Clinton often spoke of terrorist camps, but did he refer to  Bin Laden by name and what was the reason for his choice?<sep>He chose not to mention names in order to not give  Bin Laden publicity
Example Output:
Yes

