In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials

A: (C)
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Q: irrelevant, a respondent’s awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material.”). Simply because an attorney’s conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, ¶ 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). ¶ 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case

A: (C)
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Q: of whether evidence of a conviction for a third degree sexual offense is admissible for impeachment under Rule 5-609, the intermediate appellate court opined that the conviction was not relevant to credibility and thus inadmissible for impeachment purposes: As shown by an examination of section 3-307 of the Criminal Law Article, there are numerous ways that the State can convict a person under that section. The offense can be committed by various assaultive acts (see Section 3-307(a)(1)), but the offense can also be committed by nonassaultive means. See § § 3-307(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5). “[A]cts of violence generally have little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity.” Prout, 311 Md. at 364, 535 A.2d 445. See also Fulp [v. State], 130 Md.App. [157] at 167[, 745 A.2d 438 (2000)] (<HOLDING>) Likewise, the non-assaultive ways that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty (B) holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime (C) holding that the crime of assault with intent to murder was neither an infamous crime nor a crime relevant to the witnesss credibility 130 mdapp at 167 745 a2d 438 (D) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (E) holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage

A:
(C)
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