In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: exception, which provides that “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen” if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). After review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part. I Ms. Lian acknowledges that binding circuit precedent prohibits us from reaching her challenge to the BIA’s refusal to reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, Ms. Lian urges us to overrule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte (D) holding that a decision of the bia whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 cfr  10032a is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond the courts review  ie the court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias decision not to reopen (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court’s judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in Bat-son. As for the State’s strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: leaving the corner and walking away from the officers after making eye contact with them. See United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 494 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual’s flight from uniformed law enforcement officer may be a fact used to support reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity is afoot”); Magda, 547 F.2d at 758-59 (defendant’s companion immediately moved away with a “rapid motion” after looking in direction of observing officer); State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983) (flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of an officer may be a factor leading to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 80 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1984). Id., 331 N.C. at 233-34, 415 S.E.2d at 722-23; See also State v. I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 585-86, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Crenshaw, 144 N.C. App. 574, 578-79, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory detention where a juvenile in a high drug area started walking away upon the approach of a law enforcement officer while keeping his head turned away from the officer and while moving his mouth as if he had something in it (B) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (C) holding fact that appellant immediately turned and started walking in opposite direction when confronted by police officer was factor to be considered in determining existence of probable cause to believe he was attempting to flee after committing offense (D) holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot (E) holding that absent warrant or exigent circumstances an officer had no authority to demand that the juvenile keep the door open to his residence or demand entry into it and thus the juvenile could not be convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer for trying to close door even if the officer had probable cause to believe that the juvenile was sheltering a runaway
[EX A]:
(A)

