In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), it qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.1, see USSG § 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony

so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a

electronic receipts, that indicate that both Gillette and Mohamed clicked the ‘Yes, I agree” buttons on the Uber application, as depicted in the pictures above. See Colman Decl. Mohamed at ¶ 13-16; Colman Decl. Gillette at ¶ 12. Moreover, it is undisputed that Uber requires drivers to indicate acceptance of the relevant agreements before a driver can continue to use the Uber application, and it is similarly undisputed that both Gillette and Mohamed did, in fact, drive for Uber. Thus, Uber has submitted sufficiently probative evidence that Gillette and Mohamed took some affirmative step to indicate an assent to be bound (i.e., they clicked ‘Yes, I agree” on two separate application screens). See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 25, 2014) (Koh, J.) (<HOLDING>) (citing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individuals access to a service or website that requires an indication of assent to contractual terms before access to the service or website will be granted was sufficient evidence that the user clicked i accept  (B) holding that user access codes that facilitated access to a law enforcement database were properly redacted under exemption 7e (C) holding that riminis claim that they had permission from their clients to access oracles  website is irrelevant under the state statutes (D) holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective (E) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service

holding that user access codes that facilitated access to a law enforcement database were properly redacted under exemption 7e

