In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
commercial, including ... [any maritime contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 202; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2. A seaman’s contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate generally falls under the convention. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>) (citing Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts (C) holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage (D) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (E) holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same

Ex Output:
holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous


Ex Input:
with the court, that Mr. Peralta has been granted a labor certification pursuant to a subsequent application filed by his employer. He has been awarded all of the relief that he sought, and there is consequently no live controversy concerning the original denial of his application for the same position with the same employer. As to the appellants whose employers have re-filed new certification applications that are currently pending, we do not think their claims are mooted. In contrast to Mr. Peralta, these parties have not yet received the relief originally sought and thus their original claim that the denial of their first certification application was arbitrary remains a live controversy. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Actually, even after a certification is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending (B) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (C) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (D) holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party (E) holding that a previously live case can become moot only if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation

Ex Output:
holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending


Ex Input:
The parole officer testified that his job was to supervise convicted felons and that Mr. Prieto was one of his supervisees. And during her testimony, Ms. Prieto stated twice that her son was a convicted felon. This testimony did not violate Old Chief or Rule 404(b)(1). Old Chief does not preclude reference to the fact that the defendant has a prior felony conviction; instead, it precludes any discussion of the nature and substance of the felony: “In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644; see also United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, there was no Old Chief violation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice the parties should make use of a redacted record stipulation affidavit or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed only of the fact of a prior felony conviction but not the nature or substance of the conviction (D) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (E) holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded

Ex Output:

holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction


