In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
(A)

as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of § 1603(b) which states that “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon’s argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi’s prima 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final
(B)

in part. As the Majority explains, the “implied bias [doctrine] remains available, in appropriate circumstances, to disqualify jurors whose connection with the litigation makes it highly unlikely that they can remain impartial adjudicators.” (Slip Op. at 13 (citing United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991)).) In dicta in Calabrese, we cited with approval Justice O’Connor’s observation in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982), that a “juror [who] is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency” is one example of an “extreme situation^ that would justify a finding of implied bias.” Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 226 (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); accord United States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 861-64 (7th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). It is true, as the Majority says, that Juror 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy (B) holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him (C) holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added (E) holding without citing to justice oconnors concurrence in smith that a juror who was a 15year secretarial employee in the civil division of the prosecuting agency was impliedly biased

(E)

