In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to establish eligibility-triggering factors: Though Ia-beled as "sentencing factors,” those factors are more appropriately considered as elements of a capital offense. This logic applies equally to the establishment of any sentencing factors necessary to expose a defendant to a higher maximum penalty in the noncapital context. As discussed supra, Fields’s Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively. 19 .See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment (B) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (C) holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment (D) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (E) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment
[A]: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment


[Q]: by [the motorist].” Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed that “procedural due process requires that a person have an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action
[A]: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner


[Q]: of constructive notice. Defendant’s second argument requires more discussion. District of Columbia cases show a tendency to merge claims for implied warranty of merchantability with strict liability. That is the second basis for Defendant’s argument to dismiss this count. In Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808 (D.C.1970), the court characterized the doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability in tort as “but two labels for the same right and remedy, as the governing principles are the same.” The reason why implied warranty merges with the strict liability claim is that both are based on the sale of a product alleged to be defective. (M.D. at 13.) Precedent supports the merging of these two claims: Bowler v. Stewart-Wamer Corp., 563 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (<HOLDING>); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F.Supp. 417, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding the learned intermediary doctrine as adopted by georgia courts insulated a defendant from liability for negligence strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims (C) recognizing strict product liability actions (D) holding that a commercial buyer of defective goods cannot maintain a strict liability or negligence suit for economic loss to the product as the remedy is a breach of warranty suit under the ucc (E) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
[A]:
holding the learned intermediary doctrine as adopted by georgia courts insulated a defendant from liability for negligence strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims


