In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
(A)

in their pension payments would only be temporary, rather than receiving any express representations regarding that fact. See Grossman Decl. Ex. D at 141-42 (Avitabile); id. Ex. E at 119 (Keelin). Further, as previously noted, it is undisputed that all five plaintiffs received clear and unambiguous written information that accurately described the Level Income Option and indicated that the reduced payments would continue “until death.” These (and other) accurate written communications rendered any inconsistent oral representations (assuming, arguendo, that there were any) entirely immaterial, because plaintiffs had full notice of their benefit rights and could not reasonably have been misled by anything to the contrary. Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballone, 109 F.3d at 126; Adams, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud a plaintiff must have justifiably relied to his detriment on the defendants material misrepresentations (B) holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage (C) holding that class actions may be reasonably litigated through use of legitimate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at issue (D) holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation (E) holding that plan beneficiaries could not have reasonably relied on any alleged oral misrepresentations in light of a signed severance agreement containing information to the contrary
(E)

a sufficient supporting brief for purposes of the Local Rules. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Whiting’s motion to sever Cable-La’s third-party complaint against Whiting and GAI from the Cable-La-Williams matter. This results in two separate act nge Corp., 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir.1988), continues to govern the distinction between mandatory and permissive forum-selection clauses in this circuit, because the Supreme Court’s subsequent overruling of the case was limited to a holding on an unrelated issue. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989). The language contained in the forum-selection clause in the contract between Cable-La and Williams is unquestionably mandatory under Sterling Forest. 840 F.2d at 251-52 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The court notés that, while the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forumselection clause which stated that any dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent greek courts was permissive rather than mandatory (B) holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory (C) holding clause reading the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall be in california to be mandatory (D) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court (E) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad

(C)

