In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]” We conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant’s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements that the victim “is 80 years of age” and “is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk” and that Defendant “told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]” “grabbed the victim[,]” and “slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch” provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant’s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari (E) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea
[A]: (C)


[Q]: complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort
[A]: (A)


[Q]: (1874), the equitable tolling doctrine provides that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.’ ” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-397 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), quoting from Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. at 348. “This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 396-397, 66 S.Ct. at 585. One court has held that equitable tolling does not apply to § 727(e)(2). See Johnson, 187 B.R. at 986-989 (<HOLDING>). The Court based its holdings on two grounds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (B) holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose (C) holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action (D) holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed (E) holding that  727e is a statute of repose and an essential prerequisite to the proceeding
[A]:
(E)


