In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
[EX A]: holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification

[EX Q]: of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
[EX A]: holding apprendi is not retroactive

[EX Q]: (1982)). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held that, assuming “the absence of express statutory language precluding the formation of a property right,” a cognizable property interest in a government permit or license requires both a “right to transfer” and a “right to exclude.” Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2005). The government argues that, as a matter of law, a medical license does not meet either of these requirements. The Court agrees. First, it is clear that the holder of a medical license cannot sell or transfer his medical license to another individual or entity; a medical license can only be obtained by-meeting the requirements specified in state law for the holders of such licenses. See Webster, 74 Fed.Cl. at 447 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Filler’s arguments to the contrary are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint (B) holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent (C) holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license (D) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (E) holding that because plaintiff does not have the right to sell assign or otherwise transfer her medical license a medical license does not possess the requisite indicia of transferability
[EX A]:
holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint

