In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291
[EX A]: holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable

[EX Q]: of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), it qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.1, see USSG § 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
[EX A]: holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony

[EX Q]: against its probative value.” Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶55, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789. We review the admission of photographs under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pettigrew, 116 N.M. 135, 139, 860 P.2d 777, 781 (Ct.App.1993). In this case, the photographs of Victim after death were used to show the nature of the injury, to explain the basis of the forensic pathologist’s opinion, and to illustrate the forensic pathologist’s testimony. It is well established that photographs may properly be admitted for such purposes, even if they are gruesome. See, e.g., Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶¶ 54-55, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789 (upholding the admission of photos of a child homicide victim on grounds they were illustrative); State v. Perea, 2001-NMCA-002, ¶ 22, 130 N.M. 46, 16 P.3d 1105 (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part and vacated in paH, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime (C) holding that the admission of a photograph of a homicide victim for the purpose of identification was within the discretion of the district court and determining that a family photo excluded by the court as prejudicial that was inadvertently seen by two jurors was harmless error (D) holding that a potentially inflammatory photograph of a victims face was relevant and that its admission was well within the discretion of the district court (E) holding that the exclusion of marginally relevant evidence was within the courts discretion
[EX A]:
holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion

