In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: with intent to murder”; therefore, the two convictions did not violate double jeopardy. Id. In addition to comparing the statutory elements of an offense both in the abstract under Blockburger and as applied to the facts of the particular case under Duchac, courts consider other factors relevant to ascertaining legislative intent. These factors include the following: (1) whether there were multiple victims involved; (2) whether several discrete acts were involved; and (3) whether the evil at which each offense is directed is the same or different. As we noted in Goins, “generally, if a criminal episode involves several victims who have personally been victimized, the evidence could sustain multiple convictions.” Goins, 705 S.W.2d at 651 (citing State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980)(<HOLDING>)). In Goins, however, we held that the multiple 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that killing more than one person in a single automobile accident justified multiple homicide convictions (E) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm
[A]: holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense


[Q]: required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing
[A]: holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation


[Q]: not indispensably necessary for the disposition of the case”). However, because this Court’s resolution of the statute’s constitutionality is indispensably necessary for the disposition of this case, we proceed with our analysis of the LHMA’s constitutionality. Rhode Island’s Equal Protection Clause, article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution, forms the basis of plaintiffs’ primary claim. Like the corresponding federal guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no person shall be “denied equal protection of the laws.” R.I. Const, art. 1, sec. 2; see also Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., 716 A.2d 730, 734 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, this protection “does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state and federal equal protection guarantees provide similar protections (B) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (C) holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection (D) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
[A]:
holding that the state law violated equal protection principles


