In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review

A: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo
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Q: such equitable relief as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). A. Serious Health Condition Wells Fargo first argues that Vincent did not suffer a “serious health condition” as that term is defined by the FMLA. The parties agree that the Court should examine the regulations implementing the FMLA in order to determine whether Vincent suffered from a serious health condition. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the interim regulations or the final regulations, which became effective on April 6, 1995, should be used by the Court in arriving at its determination. The Court finds that the interim regulations which were in effect in January of 1995, the time of Vincent’s termination, govern this action. See Gay v. Gilman Paper Company, 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Having resolved the dispute as to which set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (B) holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue (C) holding that the interim regulations governed a dispute in which the serious health condition and subsequent termination occurred prior to april 6 1995 the effective date of the final regulations (D) holding that iiriras effective date is april 1 1997 (E) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996

A: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it
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Q: 1st DCA 2003). Because Wife has agreed that her living with a cellmate amounts to cohabitation as that term is defined in the settlement agreement, and because driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a voluntary act which is known to possibly result in incarceration, we cannot say that on these facts such an interpretation of the agreement leads to an absurd result. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and direct that a judgment terminating alimony be entered upon remand. FARMER, J., concurs. KLEIN, J., dissents with opinion. KLEIN, J., dissenting. The former wife’s position in the trial court was that, even though the word “cohabitation” is not ambiguous, to apply it here would produce an absurd result. James v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 66 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Other cases applying the absurd result 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the appellate courts will not rely upon the literal meaning of a statute when such a construction would be absurd unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate (B) holding that all portions of a statute are to be read in concert as to harmonize all provisions and that construction of a statute should avoid unreasonable or absurd results (C) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (D) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (E) holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results

A:
recognizing that the appellate courts will not rely upon the literal meaning of a statute when such a construction would be absurd unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate
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