In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
[EX A]: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

[EX Q]: it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was “nonexistent” because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang’s failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he “did not listen clearly” was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so
[EX A]: holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences

[EX Q]: the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”). The Court provided a nonexclusive, illustrative list of such “presumptively lawful” exceptions, including but not limited to “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” id. at 2816-17, but did not explain how lower courts were to identify other such “presumptively lawful” exceptions. More recently, the Court restated its belief in the existence of “presumptively lawful” regulations but again declined to provide any guidance to lower courts in our efforts to identify them. McDonald v. Chicago, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3047, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Post-Heller, and now, post-McDonald, lower 
 Holding statements: (A) holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment (D) holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the second amendment constrains state and local laws through its incorporation under the fourteenth amendment due process clause
[EX A]:
holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment

