In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

court’s conclusion that the Jarvisons had a traditional ceremonial marriage under the Navajo Code. Moreover, because the Jarvi-sons had not completed the procedure under Navajo law to validate a traditional or common law marriage, the government argues that their marriage was invalid. In evaluating the government’s contentions, we observe that the district court could have produced a more robust order detailing its findings of fact and evidentia-ry basis similar to the detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003). Nonetheless, on our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish a valid marriage between the Jarvisons. See United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Esther testified to having 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law (B) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (C) holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely (D) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (E) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact
holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required

§ 42-217. If, based on the proof submitted by the applicant and the field examination, the Department “is satisfied that the law has been fully complied with and that the water is being used at the place claimed and for the purpose for which it was originally intended, the [Department shall issue to such user or users a license confirming such use.” I.C. § 42-219(1). On the other hand, “[i]n the event that the [Department shall find that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of permit, it may issue a license f ls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005) (finding that “a party is not entitled to vested rights in a water right by virtue of filing a permit application”); Hardy v. Higginson, 123 Idaho 485, 491, 849 P.2d 946, 952 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has never considered the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (B) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (C) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (D) holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use (E) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use
holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate

acknowledge that Garcetti addresses mostly free speech claims, as opposed to political affiliation or freedom of association claims: But Garcetti’s concerns about the "delicate balancing" of public-employee rights and government flexibility, as well as its anxiety about “judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations,” are not applicable only in the free speech context. 547 U.S. at 423, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Those concerns, for example, also underlie the so-called policymaker exception: the principle that political affiliation, for certain public employees, is an "appropriate requirement for continued tenure.” O’Connell, 724 F.3d at 126 (quoting Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir, 2003)); see also Maymí v. P.R, Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Speaker Eves cites several other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment (B) recognizing that both an officials political affiliation and her substantive views on agency matters are permissible justifications for firing or demotion when she occupies a policymaking role citing flynn v city of boston 140 f3d 42 47 1st cir 1998 (C) holding that first amendment prohibits government officials from discharging or threatening to discharge lowerlevel public employees based on their political affiliation (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) recognizing a life tenants power to lease not only her present interest in the land she occupies but also a future interest she owns in the same land

holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment

