In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: farmer-brewer, importer or wholesaler. If the legislature intended the obligation to run with the product, it would have said it.” Heublein, 434 Mass. at 698 (approving Commission declaration to this effect) (citations and quotations omitted). It is thus the general rule that “a supplier is not obligated under Section 25E to continue to make sales to those wholesalers with whom an unaffiliated predecessor did business.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 499. This principle has been applied consistently in the few reported decisions by Massachusetts courts, confirming that purchasers of liquor businesses are not ordinarily saddled with the Section 25E restrictions of either their sellers or those through whom their sellers distributed product. See, e.g., Heublein, 434 Mass. at 701-02 (<HOLDING>); Pastene Wine & Spirits, 401 Mass. at 619 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supplier who acquired all assets and operations related to manufacture and sale of prod uct in armslength transaction did not succeed to predecessor suppliers section 25e obligations a former suppliers obligations under section 25e to continue to sell its product to its wholesalers is not imputed to a successor supplier who obtains ownership of the product through an arms length asset acquisition (B) holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (D) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (E) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury
[A]: holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury


[Q]: facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
[A]: holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case


[Q]: not actually moot because the alleged harm was “capable of repetition but evading review,” id. at 800-01, but the general rule of law holds true: where a representative plaintiffs claim has been rendered moot before certification is granted, dismissal of the entire action is warranted unless the claims fall into either of the enunciated exceptions. See also Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1987) (“In a class action, the claim of the named plaintiff, who seeks to represent the class, must be live both at the time he brings suit and when the district court determines whether to certify the putative class. If the claim is not live, the Court lacks a justiciable controversy and must dismiss the claim as moot.”); Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1252 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, no class had been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (B) holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory (C) holding that the dismissal of a class action suit after the representative plaintiffs claims became moot was proper noting that  because the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the district court the decision that the claims of the purported representative were moot dictated the dismissal of the uncertified class action as well quoting bd of school commrs v jacobs 420 us 128 130 95 sct 848 850 43 led2d 74 78 1975 per curiam (D) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (E) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
[A]:
holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed


