In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper
holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law

for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 16 . Plaintiffs’ April 3, 2009 Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs never received a Notice of Deficiency for any of the tax years at issue. Compl. at 2. Plaintiffs, however, attached a copy of a Notice of Deficiency for 1997 and 1998 in their Petition to the Tax Court challenging the deficiency determinations for these years. Gov't Mot. Ex. C. Further, Plaintiffs did not dispute their receipt of a Notice of Deficiency at the November 15, 2002 CDP hearing. Gov’t Mot. Exs. E, G, H. Section 2514 of Title 28 of the United States Code requires forfeiture of a tax claim when a party attempts to establish its claim through fraud. 28 U.S.C. § 2514; see also Standard Oil v. United States, 98 Ct.Cl. 201, 246, 47 F.Supp. 120 (1942) (<HOLDING>); see also Kamen Soap Products v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs claim for refund of corporate income taxes was forfeited when plaintiff presented forged corporate minutes to the irs with the knowledge they were forged (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors (C) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (D) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant
holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors

relevant inquiry is “fact specific,” Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 311 (11th Cir.1994), and the plaintiff must point to a controlling case, decided before the events at issue, that establishes a constitutional violation on “materially similar” facts. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994); see also Cofield v. Randolph County Comm’n, 90 F.3d 468, 470 (11th Cir.1996). As emphasized in Lassiter, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what de fendant is doing violated federal law in the circumstances.” Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)(<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has warned that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (B) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (C) holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity (D) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right (E) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right

holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right

